R.R. “Bob” Greive

An Oral History

Washington State Oral History Program
Office of the Secretary of State

R.R. “Bob” Greive

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Interviewed and Edited by Sharon Boswell

Washington State Oral History Program
Office of the Secretary of State
Sam Reed, Secretary of State

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May the road rise up to meet you.
May the wind be always at your back.
May the sun shine warm upon your face
And the rain fall soft upon you fields.
And until we meet again,
May God hold you in the hollow of His hand.

-- *Senator Greive's favorite Irish blessing*

Dedicated to Barbara and my kids:

Bernadette Lucas
Kathleen Deakins
Mary Long
Raymond Greive
J.J. Greive
Tom Greive

CONTENTS

Forewords
Albert D. Rosellini
Dean Foster
Preface
Acknowledgements
Reflections
Sharon Boswell
Biographical Highlights

Interviews

1. Family Background.....1

2. First Election and "Futile Fifteen".....12

3. Early Legislative Career.....25

4. Anti-Communist Crusades and the Post-war Era.....35

5. Political Allies and the Role of the Press.....50

6. Uncommon Personalities and Issues of Legislative Ethics.....60

7. Senate Leadership and the Greive Fund.....73

8. Redistricting: 1956-1957.....105

9. Redistricting: 1962-1964.....127

10. Redistricting Under Court Order: 1965.....164

11. Redistricting: 1971-1974.....193

12. The End of a Senate Career.....212

13. Metro and the King County Council.....226

14. The West Seattle Bridge and County Council Finances.....239

15. Final Thoughts.....251

CONTENTS

Appendices

A. Redistricting Timeline

B. Drawings by Senator Greive

C. Political Career: Photographs, Articles and Correspondence

Index



FOREWORD

My first recollection of Bob was in 1947 when he came into the Legislature. I was majority leader of the State Senate, and he had just been elected. He got attached to me primarily as a mentor to learn about politics and the makeup of the Senate. It just happened that that year we had a coalition in the Senate—eight Democrats deserted the party and turned over the control to the minority party. That automatically made me the Minority Leader of the Democrats instead of the Majority Leader. I liked Bob and enjoyed working with him. We conjured up all types of things to take over the leadership, and we had the advantage of having the presiding officer, Lieutenant Governor Victor Meyers, on our side. We had lots of fights and disputes with the majority, but from a practical standpoint, we won more battles than we lost. I've always thought—looking back over the eighteen years I was in the Senate—that the 1947 session was possibly the most enjoyable one. Bob and I got to be good friends, and we've been good friends ever since.

During those early years the newspapers dubbed us the Futile Fifteen, not only because there were fifteen of us, but because we were solid. We could always count on each other, and we worked together on all the issues. Bob was the hardest worker of all. He was lively, loud, anxious—full of vim, vigor, and vitality. He had an opinion about everything and always came up with good ideas for the caucus to follow. Bob also became a dedicated student of the rules of the Senate and the rules as dictated by the State Constitution and stood out as an excellent parliamentarian. Although Bob was always anxious to work hard during the day, he also loved to go out and play at night. He and his wife were wonderful dancers, and despite all the work we had lots of fun.

Bob and I had adjoining districts—he was in West Seattle and I was in the 33rd, which took in Beacon Hill, Rainier Valley, Mount Baker, and the Garfield area of Seattle. We'd compare notes and work together. Bob studied campaigning techniques and worked hard at every election. I always thought he was practically impossible to beat. He'd make his own signs and had the capacity to save money by doing that. He left no stone unturned to do everything he could in any election, for himself or whoever he was working for. He got in the habit of devoting himself in elections to helping other candidates for the Senate or around the state. He made friends with them, and they supported him. He also worked awfully hard on redistricting, trying to do a job that would protect the Democrats in the Senate and the House. He showed a lot of leadership in trying to put together a good redistricting package.

Bob was a good, honest public servant all the way through his career. He

devoted himself to his work in the Senate, to the practice of law, and later to his position on the King County Council. As a councilman, he'd work at the county during the day and spend up to midnight working out in West Seattle for his law practice. He was a demon for work. Yet he went to church every morning, regardless of how late he was up the night before. He was a real sincere and good father and husband.

Throughout his years in the Senate, Bob was very determined, hardworking, and smart. He knew the issues. Nobody worked harder than he did for the things he believed in. He was honest and forthright, and he didn't hesitate to speak out on anything. I had a lot of respect for him. I always felt that he was a good senator and a good individual—a good fellow to have in public office.

ALBERT D. ROSELLINI
Former Governor

FOREWORD

I first met Senator Greive in 1959 as a high school student. I had been hired as a bill clerk in the Senate and in those days the bill room was located just off the floor of the Senate. I spent long hours learning about what became a lifelong involvement in the Legislature. I enjoyed it all. Also working in the bill room was Hayes Elder, slightly older than me but as hooked on politics. Hayes was a brilliant student who worked for Senator Greive, the Senate majority leader from the Thirty-fourth District in West Seattle. My friendship with Hayes flourished and when Hayes decided to enroll in law school I was asked to go to work with Senator Greive in the 1963 session of the Legislature.

The Legislature had begun to redistrict after a federal court ruling invalidated the existing legislative districts in the case of *Thigpen v. Meyers* in 1962. I was the principal redistricting staff person hired by the Senate for Senator Greive for the 1963 session and continued in that position through the end of the 1965 completion of the court ordered redistricting. During that time our Legislature not only experienced the "coalition" of 1963, it endured a federal court mandated moratorium on bill passage until redistricting was accomplished in 1965. Tempers were short, partisan war was rampant and the stakes were high. Midnight phone calls to members and staff were common—redistricting was a twenty-four hours a day job. Was he driven by power or concern for his caucus? Each reader will have an opinion. I knew it was all encompassing for Senator Greive and anyone near him. Thus began my relationship with Greive and redistricting.

I never worked harder. I never worked longer hours. I never matched him for time, dedication or intensity. Senator Greive outworked everyone. He was not without controversy, and even after forty years emotions reveal the tensions of the past, but no one doubts his work ethic. Even today people ask what made him tick? He is too complex a person for such a question, but loyalty to his majority in the Senate and a fierce tie to West Seattle were key.

Legends were made from the political shenanigans, the scheming, the accusations, the half-truths and the personal animosity that developed between Senator Greive, the chief Democratic redistricting master, and then Representative Slade Gorton, on the Republican side who later became a United State Senator. My counterpart, the Republican staff member Howard McCurdy and I watched history and myth in the making—an experience never forgotten. I learned great lessons from Senator Greive and from my involvement in the redistricting process: it was the start of my long career of public service, leading to my present position as one of four members of the Redistricting Commission.

FOREWORD

History is a series of stories. This oral history of Senator R.R. "Bob" Greive is an important addition to our collection of historical documents because it tells not only about the rough and tumble of local politics in the years of the "communist" dynamic—the years of fascination and the years of panic—but also about the years when the Washington State Legislature was still assigned the task of redistricting. The story of Bob Greive is an important addition to our understanding of Washington politics in the mid-twentieth century.

DEAN FOSTER

PREFACE

The Washington State Oral History Program was established in 1991 by the Washington State Legislature. It is located in the Office of the Secretary of State and guided by the Oral History Advisory Committee.

The purpose of the program is to document the formation of public policy in Washington State by interviewing persons closely involved with state politics and publishing their edited transcripts. Each oral history is a valuable record of an individual's contributions and convictions, their interpretation of events and their relationships with other participants in the civic life of the state. Read as a series, these oral histories reveal the complex interweaving of the personal and political, and the formal and informal processes that are the makings of public policy.

The Oral History Advisory Committee chooses candidates for oral histories. Extensive research is conducted about the life and activities of the prospective interviewee, using legislative journals, newspaper accounts, personal papers and other sources. Then a series of taped interviews is conducted, focusing on the interviewee's political career and contributions. Political values, ideas about public service, interpretation of events and reflections about relationships and the political process are explored. When the interviews have been completed, a verbatim transcript is prepared. These transcripts are edited by program staff to ensure readability and accuracy and then reviewed by the interviewer and interviewee. Finally, the transcript is published and distributed to libraries, archives and interested individuals. An electronic version of the text is also available on the Secretary of State website (www.secstate.wa.gov).

Oral history recording, while assisted by careful research, is based on individual memory and perspective. Although great effort is expended to insure accuracy, recollection and interpretation of events vary among participants. Oral history documents present uncensored accounts of relationships, actions and events; readers are encouraged to analyze and weigh this primary material as they would other historical evidence. It is the hope of the Oral History Program that this work will help the citizens of Washington better understand their political legacy and the persons who have contributed years of service to the political life of our state.

WASHINGTON STATE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Washington State Oral History Program wishes to thank all of those who contributed to this project.

Senator Greive dedicated himself unstintingly to the task of recollecting almost half a century of public service to the state of Washington. His attention to sorting out the details of the many campaigns and causes on which he spent his prodigious energies in the Senate and King County Council was unsparing and thoughtful. Despite the accidents and illness which seemed to beset him these last few years, he always remained willing to persevere with this project.

Dean Foster helped us understand the intricacies of statewide redistricting and the role played by Senator Greive in that effort. His comments on early versions of the manuscript and his measured interpretation of events helped clarify a difficult subject. We thank him for all his support and encouragement.

Phyllis Manzano, Senator Greive's legal assistant, helped keep the project on track in numerous ways, from scheduling interview appointments to finding background materials. Without her assistance, the completion of this project would have been very difficult. Her constant good humor, enthusiasm and support are greatly appreciated.

The Legislative Advisory Committee guides the work of the Oral History Program. The members include: Senators Sid Snyder, Ken Jacobsen, Harold Hochstadder and Shirley Winsley, Representatives Kathy Lambert, Karen Keiser, Patricia Lantz and Beverly Woods, Secretary of the Senate Tony Cook, the Co-Chief Clerks of the House Tim Martin and Cynthia Zehnder and Secretary of State Sam Reed. Ex officio members of the committee former Senators Robert Bailey, Eugene Prince and Alan Thompson, former Representative Don Brazier, former Chief Clerk Dean Foster, Warren Bishop, and David Nicandri also gave generously of their time and expertise. We thank the members for their support and unfailing interest in the program.

Our oral histories are printed by the State Printer. We thank his able team for their assistance.

Finally, we are also grateful for the assistance and support of the Office of the Secretary of State.

REFLECTIONS

INTERVIEWING BOB GREIVE

When I first began to interview Senator Greive, he was putting the finishing touches on his book about political campaign techniques. From everything I had heard about Bob before our first meeting, I knew him to be a tireless fundraiser and masterful tactician—perhaps best described as a politician's politician. Yet over the years of contact with him as we recorded this series of interviews, I found that his career motivations and goals were much more complex than I had ever imagined. His book represents the accumulated knowledge of a very skilled campaigner, but I have come to think that its introductory quotation ultimately offers the most vivid insights on Bob's views of a life in politics. The passage he chose, which is said to be on a plaque in Senator Ted Kennedy's office, reads:

> Until you've been in politics, you've never really been alive. It's rough and sometimes it's dirty and it's always hard work and tedious detail. But it's the only sport for grown-ups—all other games are for kids.
>
> Heinlein

For Bob Greive, politics was a sport, and he was as serious about preparing for and playing the game as any professional athlete. He was still a kid when he started—he won his first election to the state senate at the age of twenty-seven—but he rapidly became a grown-up competitor. No matter how many hours he worked or how many times he had to build and rebuild his coalitions, he persevered—and, I think, loved every minute of it.

My interviews with Bob spanned nearly six years, certainly the longest on record for the oral history office. Most of the delays rest on my shoulders, but part of the length of the project was due to the care and consideration with which Bob approached the interviews and also his willingness to reflect on all aspects of his more than forty years of experience in the political life of Washington state. Despite a busy law practice, Bob unfailingly made time for me when I asked, and answered all my questions thoughtfully and in detail. If he didn't have strong recollections about a particular issue or event, he would take the time to research and refresh his memory before proceeding with the interview, and I sincerely appreciate the efforts he made. We also had many great discussions on current affairs, as Bob remains just as informed and excited about the political scene today as he obviously was when he served in the legislature. Bob introduced me to Husky ice cream—a West Seattle institution—and I will always fondly remember speculating about the course of national politics as we happily devoured many scoops of that tasty treat.

REFLECTIONS

Throughout those years of interviewing, I also developed a deep admiration for Bob's toughness and resilience in the face of illness and accidents. Bob has confronted the onset of Parkinson's disease with the same perseverance that he showed in politics, never letting it stop him from continuing his daily business. In the course of just a few months last year, Bob was also mugged by an assailant and hit by a car—experiences that most of us, thankfully, have not had to endure. Yet after each incident Bob rebounded with remarkable aplomb. Although the image of a cat with nine lives comes to mind, I think a bulldog's tenacity is a better representation of Bob's spirit and strength. Certainly none of these experiences, no matter how difficult, has altered his deep religious faith, and he has continued to attend church daily, as has been his habit throughout his life. He has also refused to let physical setbacks interfere with his love of drawing, and over the last few years he has turned out a number of new portraits of friends and political acquaintances. We have included some of his self-portraits in this volume, as they are a wonderful record of how he has used this talent in his political career.

Recording interviews over such a long period time had many benefits, I believe, although possibly a few downsides. It has allowed Senator Greive and me to pursue topics in great depth and to develop a level of comfort with each other that has made our sessions proceed more smoothly and with more trust. I was particularly fascinated by his frank discussions of political pragmatism and his reflections on motivation and political power. The particular strengths of the oral history process are in evidence in these interviews. Senator Greive provides many insights on his rationale for various activities that are simply unavailable in any documentary source. He is remarkably candid in his assessments of his own strengths and weaknesses as well as those of some of his colleagues, and yet at the same time very determined not to make comments that would be considered too negative, as he views all of his former colleagues with respect. Oral history is a process that relies on human memory and individual perspective, however, and it is inevitable that over time, the little details become less important than the overall impression or significance of an event in one's life. Although Bob's own point of view may, at times, differ from other published accounts, I believe that how he interprets events or explains his motivations is uniquely important to an understanding of his personality, political philosophy, and leadership style. To Bob, politics was a serious game, and he mastered it well.

Probably one of the best examples of his incredible attention to detail and political maneuvering was in the redistricting battles. Bob has been called "Mr. Redistricting" and we spent countless hours talking about the intricacies of the steps he went through to develop his redistricting plans. For those

who are interested in this political process, his commentary is a very useful complement to the work of Howard McCurdy, a former aide to Slade Gorton, who wrote an account of the redistricting attempts in the mid-1960s. We have interspersed some quotations from McCurdy's work in the text of Bob's interviews to show the interplay of their varying perspectives, and I think that the insights offered are quite unique. Dean Foster, who assisted Bob in some of the later redistricting campaigns, was also of great help in explaining some of the details of this very complicated and politically charged process.

Throughout these interviews, I also had a chance to get to know Senator Greive's legal assistant, Phyllis Manzano, who was unfailingly helpful to Bob and to me in all aspects of this interviewing process. We share a love of major-league sports—although Phyllis is truly the ultimate fan—but I most respect her loyalty and consideration of Bob's needs.

In his own published oral history, Senator Ray Moore commented that Bob Greive had "more moves than Michael Jordan"—a description of himself that Bob seems to relish. Like any talented gamesman, he sincerely appreciates being compared to the best. Bob probably worked harder than anyone else in state government, was tough and determined, and built a highly successful career in the sport he most loved—politics. It has kept him alive and vital and spirited, and it was a true pleasure for me to interview him over the last few years.

SHARON BOSWELL
Interviewer

BIOGRAPHICAL HIGHLIGHTS

Senator R. R. "Bob" Greive was born in 1919 and has lived within a few blocks of his childhood home in West Seattle for most of his life. His mother, an émigré from Canada, and his father, who was originally from Ohio, came to Seattle to work in the shipyards and eventually started a successful salvage business. Raised in a devout Catholic family, Senator Greive and his sister attended Catholic grade schools, and then O'Dea High School.

Senator Greive's talent for graphic design led him to transfer to West Seattle High School in his senior year in order to take advantage of the school's superior art department. Senator Greive also spent a post-graduate year at West Seattle and, during his time there, explored several interests in addition to art. He became the captain of the debate team and was also very active in school politics. He helped several fellow students run their campaigns and began to hone a skill that continued to be important throughout his own career. At home, both of his parents loved to discuss current affairs, but his mother, who was very active in the local Democratic party, particularly encouraged his passion for politics.

After graduating from West Seattle in 1939, Senator Greive began course work for a degree in commercial art from Cornish College of the Arts. However, World War II intervened and Senator Greive joined the Coast Guard. Military officials soon recognized his artistic abilities, and he was assigned to draw cartoons and other illustrations for Coast Guard publications. He was stationed in the Puget Sound area for two and a half years during the war. After his discharge, Senator Greive continued to work for a short time in the field of graphic design, but commercial art had lost its appeal as a career choice. He began to take classes that would help him earn a law degree. He attended several different schools before settling in at the University of Miami Law School in Florida, from which he obtained his degree in 1951.

Senator Greive also continued to pursue his interest in politics, supporting local and national candidates. In 1946, at the tender age of twenty-seven, he ran in his first campaign for public office and won election to the state Senate. He was able to balance his political career with his studies, and for several years attended law school classes when the Legislature was not in session.

Senator Greive set up a law practice in West Seattle and married a few years after he won his first election. He and his wife Barbara had six children together, three girls and three boys. Although West Seattle was the center of their activities, the entire family often accompanied him to

Olympia, where the children enrolled in school during the session.

Senator Greive represented the people of West Seattle, in the Thirty-Fourth District, for twenty-seven years. He was Democratic Senate majority leader for an impressive sixteen of those years. He is, perhaps, best remembered for his Senate work on legislative redistricting and for his tireless efforts to support the campaigns of Senate Democrats. He was a strong backer of the interests of labor and also introduced legislation for environmental protection and cleanup.

After leaving the Senate in 1974, Senator Greive rejoined the political arena in 1976 as a King County Council member, a fitting position for someone who had spent most of his life in the Puget Sound area. On the council he tackled problems such as water pollution and financing for a new West Seattle Bridge among other notable issues. He also played a pivotal role for many years as chairman of the council's Finance Committee. Senator Greive was a strong supporter of Metro during his years in the Senate, and he continued that interest as a gubernatorial appointee to the Metro Council, where he also headed the budget committee.

Bob Greive left public office in 1987 when he lost his council seat to a challenger. After this defeat, he devoted more attention to his busy law practice, which he never abandoned during all his years as an elected official. In addition, he had a doctoral thesis to occupy his time, and in 1991, he earned a Ph.D. in political science from Claremont Graduate University in California. He also began work on a practical guide to campaign strategy, which contains the wisdom of nearly forty years in public office. The book, entitled *The Blood, Sweat and Tears of Political Victory. . .and Defeat*, was published in 1996 and brought full circle a life's work in politics that began in earnest for Senator Greive as a youthful campaigner in West Seattle.

Today Bob Greive continues to reside in West Seattle, where he avidly follows local and national politics, and pursues his love of drawing.

CHAPTER 1

FAMILY BACKGROUND

Ms. Boswell: Let's start with your family. Tell me about how your family got to the Northwest.

Senator Greive: My mother was from Canada. She was English and Irish. My father was from Ohio, and he came to Seattle to work in the shipyards. My mother came here shortly after, and I was born right about that time.

In those days, my father's name was not Greive, but Grieve. He changed the name. My mother always said it was because he said it was hard to pronounce, and that he didn't want to be a German, because it wasn't very popular being a German then. I don't know the real reason, but, anyway, my father came from a German section of Cincinnati where there had always been Germans going back several generations. That area was called Norwood. I was back there last year and I bought a tour. They took me to Norwood because I was interested, and I saw what it looked like. But, apparently, it's Germantown now.

Ms. Boswell: Has it changed quite a bit?

Sen. Greive: Probably it has. My father said that he went to a German Catholic school that was on one corner, and an Irish Catholic school was on the other corner, and they fought all the time in the middle of the street. I don't know if that's literally true or not, but that's what he always said.

He left home when he was about sixteen to seek his fortune, and he did quite well. He was quite successful. He was a carpenter who did a lot of salvage work—clean up and demolition work. He was in junk, mostly—I call it junk—but it was surplus materials and bankruptcy sales and that sort of thing. That was his business. He was a salvage man, that's what he was.

Ms. Boswell: I see. And did he come immediately to the West?

Sen. Greive: No, he went to Canada first. Like he said, by the time he was thirty, he'd been broke five times. When he and my mother got married—they got married late—they must have been around thirty, which in those days was ancient.

Ms. Boswell: Do you know about what year that was?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I was born in 1919, so it was a couple of years earlier than that. Then they came out here.

Ms. Boswell: So he came out during World War I?

Sen. Greive: Right after World War I. Maybe it was during the last half of World War I. I was born about three blocks from here in West Seattle. There was a woman who ran a maternity home, and all the women here on the block had their children there. She was a midwife, but she had doctors come in and deliver the babies. All the neighbor kids and I were delivered there, and I grew up right here in West Seattle.

Ms. Boswell: So, your father met your mom in Canada, then?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes. My mother was an activist. She was interested in politics. She was a Liberal in those days, a supporter of the party in Canada. A particular hero of hers was Sir Wilfrid Laurier. He was a French-Canadian, and was the leader of the Liberal party. She talked about him all the time.

Ms. Boswell: What part of Canada was she from?

Sen. Greive: She was from the prairies, a small town outside of Calgary in the High River area. She was always very interested in politics. She particularly got interested because she was a very strong Catholic and when Al Smith ran for president, she got mixed up in the Al Smith campaign. She was from the conservative or the Al Smith faction of the party. In those days here in West Seattle, the story was—and I'm sure that this isn't literally true—but they used to call the group she was in "the Pope's men." Well, they weren't all Catholics. Political groups used to fight back and forth and call each other names. Her group called the opposition "the communists." So, there was a distinct left and right wing.

As an actual matter, a number of the people who got in trouble with the so-called communist investigations and everything lived in West Seattle, down in Alki. They were people famous to us, but they wouldn't be to you because you didn't know people like them. They were quite strong in the area at that time.

Ms. Boswell: So, there was a whole network of people that she was involved with?

Sen. Greive: She actually was district chairman of the Democratic Party at one time. I think for a short time, she actually did serve as chairman, and she also served as vice chairman several times.

Ms. Boswell: Did your father have the interest in politics, too?

Sen. Greive: He talked a lot, but he didn't do anything about it. He contributed, and he'd go put up signs, but he didn't get deeply involved. My mother was the one that was the politician. He was always interested in politics; they were mutually interested.

I remember my first vote was kind of a kick. My father didn't want to go to war—he was an isolationist from Ohio, so he voted for Wendell Wilkie. I was an isolationist, and my mother voted for Roosevelt. She was a strong Roosevelt supporter, but my first vote was for Norman Thomas. My sister wasn't old enough to vote then, but later she said that when she grew up she wasn't going to be any of those damn things; she was going to be in the GOP (Republican Party). But today she's turned out to be more liberal than I am. She's a retired teacher and her husband's a retired teacher. He was a dean for years at a community college down in San Diego.

Ms. Boswell: So, they're not still in the West Seattle area?

Sen. Greive: Oh, no, but, there were only two of us as we grew up.

I went to the Catholic grade schools. Then I went to O'Dea High School for three years, but I wanted to be a commercial artist, and they had no art department there, so I transferred to West Seattle High School. I graduated and then went an extra year as a postgraduate, and I took art seriously pretty near all day. Then I went to art school at Cornish.

Ms. Boswell: As a student, was art your major interest or did you have others?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I don't know. I'm a dyslexic, so I found reading, writing, and arithmetic very difficult, but I excelled in history and I could do art. I had a tendency to do the things that I

could do easily.

Ms. Boswell: How would you describe yourself as a child?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I don't know. It's hard. It depends on the circumstances. I really can't answer that.

Ms. Boswell: I just was curious whether you were something of an extrovert. Did you have any political dealings in school?

Sen. Greive: I was out delivering pamphlets and things for Al Smith, so I had to be a little interested in politics, and my mother always had me involved. And I was interested in being involved in one way or another in political campaigns, but in a minor way.

Ms. Boswell: Did you discuss politics at home?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. And, I was always very good at discussing politics in grade school and high school. As an actual matter, in the eighth grade, one of the sisters, Sister Laurentia, let me teach the history class part-time. I was very good in history, so she would sit, and she'd let me be the teacher for a lot of the time—about half of the time.

Ms. Boswell: What kind of history in particular?

Sen. Greive: I forget. Whatever we'd be learning. Thinking that far back, I can't remember.

Ms. Boswell: Could you tell me a little about the community of West Seattle at that time when you were growing up?

Sen. Greive: There weren't nearly as many people as there are now. It was part of a legislative district that ran down over toward Beacon Hill and took in Skid Road. It was a very heavily Democratic district—generally speaking, the best way I can describe it is by the following story:

One time Senator Andy Hess, a state senator and the most liberal man—certainly in the Senate, and even in the House, and a very fine guy—came to me one day in the late 1950s or early 1960s, and he said, "Bob, you're an enigma." Well, I didn't know what an enigma was, exactly. At first I didn't know what he was talking about. I said, "What do you mean by enigma?" He said, "You're an enigma, because down in Olympia you always vote liberal, but at home you're always a conservative." I said, "You just discovered my secret." And, he said, "What do you mean?" "Well, that's exactly the way I want it. I never wanted to be a flaming liberal at home. It isn't popular in West Seattle," I said.

That area is made up of upper-type union men and professionals. There aren't any great masses there, except down in Skid Road for two or three precincts. I said, "It just doesn't buy heavy." You see, in those days, it was true that if you got in a place that generally went Republican, virtually all of the Democrats were big liberals. But, if you got in a workingman's area, they weren't that liberal. They were Democrats because of Roosevelt and so forth. I never really fit very well with them, but when it came to voting, invariably I found myself on their side. I never said much, but I always voted for liberal causes.

Ms. Boswell: What were the occupations of the people around West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: In those days we were cut off. There was no high bridge, just some low-level bridges. First, we only had one, and then we had two low-level bridges. The residents, for the most part, all worked down at Boeing. We had a big Boeing contingent. We had a lot of longshoremen, and we had a lot of people who

worked on the waterfront in various capacities—on Harbor Island and areas like that.

Ms. Boswell: How did your parents choose this area?

Sen. Greive: I think because land was cheap. My father came to this area, built a platform, and then he put a tent on it. So, when I was a baby, apparently, we lived in a tent, and then he started to build a house in back of it.

Ms. Boswell: Was he still at the shipyard at that time?

Sen. Greive: No, no. He was an asbestos coverer at that time. Luckily he left that job—he probably would have had silicosis—but see, he was trained as a carpenter, his father was a carpenter, and so he knew something about carpentry.

Ms. Boswell: Did you ever hear anything about his shipyard experiences?

Sen. Greive: No, nothing except that, I know that during the war, he voted for a Socialist, Eugene Debs, so he must have been pretty liberal. But he basically was pretty near always a Democrat. He was an upper-income Democrat. He did fairly well financially. I didn't have a deprived childhood.

Ms. Boswell: So, you were born right down the street from your office here in West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: Just over the hill, three blocks from here.

Ms. Boswell: Did you live in the same place the whole time you were growing up?

Sen. Greive: No. I wasn't born there, but I moved a couple of blocks from there, and then when I was eighteen, I eventually moved up closer to the Holy Rosary church, about three or four blocks from my current office on California Avenue. I was raised in two different houses and that's all.

Ms. Boswell: Was there a strong Catholic community in West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: I don't know that it was very strong, but they did stick together. We had a state representative from this area for years called Jeanette Testu, and before that we had Howard Doherty. And then, of course, we had a bunch of radicals too, on the other side—Senator Paul Thomas, the man I beat, and various other people who took the left. It was a left, right thing.

Ms. Boswell: As you were growing up, did you ever run for office at school?

Sen. Greive: I never was a very good student. I worked hard, but if you're dyslexic, you have a lot of trouble. My standing at school started low, but every year I got better. Nobody knew what a dyslexic was then. I didn't know what a dyslexic was either, all through my career in school.

I found out that dyslexia was inherited when my kids had it. My wife is the one who found out all about it, and then she became quite interested. This guy, for his Ph.D. dissertation, wrote a book and I was in the book. He called me by a pseudonym, Mr. Sorrow. He was talking about various people who had dyslexia, and what they did to overcome it. I found that if I did it my way, I could do fairly well, but I always had to circumvent normal conventions.

Ms. Boswell: What was your way?

Sen. Greive: By not reading—read a summary, read a synopsis. Pick out various things and so forth. I could write, but I couldn't read.

Ms. Boswell: You didn't have problems writing?

Sen. Greive: No, I could write. I could write theses and so forth, but if I did that, then somebody else had to correct the spelling. My mother and my sister used to do it, or else when I got older, I always had a typist who did it. That's one reason I never learned to type. I always figured all my bad spelling would show up.

The one child of my six children who has it the worst, and I mean the worst, has a master's degree in education. I had the determination to do it and she has that as well. She always tells a story, in fact, that when she was a kid, her older sister was a pretty good student, and is now a nurse. And the sister below her graduated *magna cum laude* from college and is the brightest one in the family. And she says that when they had report card day, I'd sit there, and she was afraid to show her card, but she said she could always count on me because I would say, "You're doing better than I did at this age," which was true.

But, anyway, when I got to be in college, I had a 3.58 grade point average out of a 4.0. When I went to law school, I suffered a big setback because I had so much reading to do. But once I knew what my problems were and I knew how to study, I didn't have any trouble. I did real well in college.

Ms. Boswell: Were you close to your sister?

Sen. Greive: No, not particularly. We were a year and a half apart, but she married early, about ten years before I did. She was only nineteen or something like that, and she went to Eastern Washington, and then to southern California. That's where they made their home. She has four children. I talk to her, and she comes up once a year and so forth, and that's about it. I married at about thirty, thirty-one.

Ms. Boswell: Would you say that you were most heavily influenced by your mother, then, as opposed to your dad?

Sen. Greive: I think it would be my mother, yes. She's the one that got me interested in politics, although my dad loved to argue politics all the time. It would seem to me that in those years politics was much more of a subject of discussion than it is now. The social upheaval, social change, the feelings for and against Roosevelt were very strong. It seemed like politics was everywhere. Now, maybe that's just my perception as a child or a young man growing up.

I did do a lot of things in high school. I was on the debate team and all that sort of thing. Matter of fact, I was president of the debate team in West Seattle High School. They've got what we used to refer to as the Rogues Gallery. It's a list of people who they feel have made it, and I'm one. My picture is up there, along with a number of others.

Ms. Boswell: Besides debate, what other things were you involved in—athletics or clubs?

Sen. Greive: Debate only. No, I was never much of an athlete. I was quite a debater, and I was always one of the best in history in the class. I was very interested in that subject.

Ms. Boswell: You were talking about arguing politics at home. What was the attitude at that time toward politicians?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I thought they were pretty good people, myself. I'm sure there were a lot of bad things said, but depending on who you are, it affects you differently. I liked the idea of politics, and I was interested. I knew who was running, and I knew an awful lot about the detail because I was interested.

Ms. Boswell: What about the notion of public

service?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. All of this whipped cream that people talk about all the time; I think they make most of that up as they go along. In other words, when you get older, and you know it isn't quite respectable to say that you want elective office, then it gets to be "public service" and, when you quit, "you're going to spend time with your family." They've got a lot of clichés that they use, and that's just one of the clichés.

Now, I'm not saying that it's impossible for a person to be motivated just by public service, but I don't think that's very often the case. I think a person is motivated more by the love of battle, and the power and importance, and the instant notoriety, and all of the other things that go to make up a human being. Philosophically, well, sometimes you have a strong particular bent for a cause or something like that. This idea that, "I want public service," sounds like the Rockefellers. And I just don't think that that happens. It could happen in his case—Rockefeller had all the money in the world and everything, and then he decided he wanted to give back something. That's another one of the clichés: "I want to give something back to the community."

One of the things you tell people when they get started in politics is that's what they've got to learn. They've got to learn those clichés so that when they make speeches, they have to talk about giving something back to the community. But I don't think that's the only motivation.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think, when you first got started, that there was more of a public sense of the honor of serving?

Sen. Greive: I don't think you can make that judgment. Before I was in politics, how I viewed things, how I viewed things after, and how I view them today are quite different. You'd have to be in that position to make an honest comparison.

Ms. Boswell: So you see a lot more personal motivations, then, in becoming a politician?

Sen. Greive: I spent an awful lot of my years getting people to run. These people just didn't all get in office. A lot of times I never had any success in getting people to run. I had my greatest success with somebody who would file on his own, and then I'd go down and help him and show him how to do it…somebody who had a chance. Usually, they already had the motivation. This idea of going down and talking about public service, your duty, and so forth—that can happen.

The fact is, there's a fellow by the name of Dick Simpson who ran against Dan Rostenkowski a couple of times—a reform candidate. He's written a book on how you organize a campaign called *Winning Elections*. You organize the committee: you make sure you're not on the committee but your supporters are, and you make sure you're chosen, then you go and put it in the press. It's all built up. I think the people who run, including Richard Nixon incidentally, are people who want to run and figure out a way to make it go. And I'm not against Nixon. I don't think he's a bad man. I never voted for him, but that doesn't mean that I thought he was all that bad.

Mostly, when you see that, it's all built up by somebody. It's all part of the promotion. That's like the Municipal League, which gives me a pain in the neck. These people pretend that they've got lofty motives that really don't exist.

Ms. Boswell: What's the motivation for helping others on their campaigns?

Sen. Greive: You're interested. You're part of the deal. You're part of the team. Lots of times,

you've got a cause; maybe it's to stay out of war, for example. I was a very strong anti-war activist, "America First" type of guy when I was a young man because I didn't want to go to war. I didn't believe in it. You get caught up in a cause very often, and it just sort of goes from there.

Ms. Boswell: Was that a fairly popular cause around here, "America First?"

Sen. Greive: I don't know how popular it was, but it was popular with me. I went to the rallies and did some artwork and distributed some brochures. I did various small chores—nothing of great importance—but I was interested in it. I was interested in a lot of different causes.

Or, you've got an organization of people. You get caught up in the organization. I was a school politician, among other things. I remember one woman—I ran her campaign—and in those days they had a rule at the school I went to, Seattle University, that only a man could be president of the student body. It wouldn't fly now, but that seemed to be perfectly acceptable then, and my slogan was, "If only a man can be president, let's have a woman for vice…." That's great college stuff.

Ms. Boswell: Did she win?

Sen. Greive: No, she didn't. She came very close, though.

Ms. Boswell: Was that a first—that a woman ran for vice-president?

Sen. Greive: I don't know; a man beat her. She probably was one of the first. It was an unusual thing.

Ms. Boswell: Was your mother fairly typical or rare in terms of her political activism? Were a lot of women really active?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. You can make all the judgments you want when you're older, and you can see the whole panorama. I don't know that I could see the whole panorama. I knew that any time a woman was running, my mother was for the woman. I was always brought up to be on the women's side, and I usually was.

Ms. Boswell: You said you went to high school at O'Dea for a while, but they didn't have art classes?

Sen. Greive: I attended O'Dea High School for three years. I drew a cartoon every month for the school paper, but it was a classical school aimed at college entry. In those years I was sure I never wanted to go to college. I changed my mind later. Good thing I did, but I was terrible in algebra, and I was terrible in Latin and French and so forth and so on. I always said that I could spell those French words wrong, just like I could spell the English words wrong.

Ms. Boswell: So then you transferred to West Seattle High School?

Sen. Greive: To West Seattle High School, as a senior. And then I went another post-graduate year, and that wasn't too bad because West Seattle was, for most, a two-year high school. Most of its students came from Madison. The Catholics may have gone there four years, a few people did, but generally speaking, they'd all come over from Madison. So, I got two years of school. I did fabulously well there. I was into all kinds of things. I loved it.

Ms. Boswell: Why did you like it better than O'Dea?

Sen. Greive: I suppose because they had girls, for one thing. But quite aside from that, another thing was that it was more of a political atmosphere, it seemed to me. And I was active

in school politics and ran some campaigns, and I was president of the debate organization. I was into a whole lot of different stuff. And I got to draw all day. I didn't have to do any real work in the sense that I took an awful lot of art classes. See, I graduated in 1938 and 1939, so I really graduated twice. I got to be a senior for two years in a row. I sat with the seniors and acted like a senior twice.

I was probably one of the most knowledgeable people on campaigns and politics in my circle of friends and, I presume, in the whole school. I'm not saying most, but I don't think there were very many people who knew more about politics and political affairs than I did.

I read. See, a dyslexic can read, and if it's something you're interested in, it flows pretty easy. But the trouble with a dyslexic is that you've got to read a thing very slowly and sometimes go back two or three times. It hit me the hardest when I went to law school, and the professor gave me two hundred pages a night to read. I tried, but I couldn't read two hundred pages; there was no way I could even approach it. In those days, they didn't know enough to know that you had to learn at a different pace. And also, we learn differently. They say there are no dyslexics in the Orient because they read up and down. It's because we read across. I'm not much of an expert on that, so I don't want to hold forth on something I don't really know much about.

Ms. Boswell: When you were in school, was anybody in your family for Roosevelt?

Sen. Greive: We were all for Roosevelt, one hundred percent. I just think we lived in a different time. At the Holy Rosary School, the woman who had a great impact on my political career was Sister Laurentia. All the nuns in those days came from Ireland. This particular school was a part of the Dominican Order and taught by the Dominicans, and they had all been born in Ireland and came over here. Sister Laurentia was very, very political. She was a very good friend of John L. O'Brien's, too. Later we had her down to the Legislature, and O'Brien and I escorted her down the aisle. She was very political.

As an actual matter, when I got in high school she had me coach the debate team for Holy Rosary. We were very, very successful. That's probably the most success I ever had. Our big opponent was John L. Spellman. My star debater was McLucas, Beverly McLucas. She's now Beverly Smith; she's a widow. She's been vice chairman of the party here, and she represented the nurses as their business representative for many, many years. She's retired now. She was their parliamentarian, and so forth. She won all kinds of things, but we won several debating tournaments. It was the smallest school in the whole thing. We only had one hundred students, so we didn't have many to select from. I was very proud of that. We won it for several years. We were very, very successful.

And the other thing that's kind of significant is, in my class in grade school, half of the women became nuns, and there was one priest. Some of them didn't stay, but I think three of them are still there. There were only about thirty of us, so fifteen would be women, and six or seven of them, I think, became nuns.

Ms. Boswell: What do you think encouraged that situation?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I think we were just a religious bunch. It comes in bunches. You just don't know. Fact is, I go to church most mornings.

Ms. Boswell: Did the economic situation, the Depression, affect the career choices of men and women at that time?

Sen. Greive: I suppose, but what does some

little kid really know about the economic situation? There are people who can go back and remember, and I'm sure that they tell you a lot of things, but do they really know that, or are they just fantasizing and putting two and two together, putting it back together? I'm not knocking that, if they can do it, but I don't know how I felt at the time.

Ms. Boswell: Did the economic situation and the Depression affect your family at all?

Sen. Greive: No. My father did quite well. He was in a second-hand salvage business; a lot of it was scrap metal and that sort of thing. He finally ended up with two other partners, salvaging in Saipan and Tinian. Those were islands out in the South Pacific, the big time. He got the business going and then he sold it out, but he spent two or three years out there, and made quite a little money. So, I always had the best of everything. I didn't know it at the time, but as I look back on it now, I didn't have any real problems.

Ms. Boswell: When you graduated from West Seattle High School, what did you do then?

Sen. Greive: I went to the Cornish School of Fine Arts. I went from there, eventually, to Seattle University, because I had decided that I wanted to be a lawyer. I decided art wasn't my field. It wasn't that I couldn't do some of the technical things that were necessary, and I probably could have gotten by, but I decided there was no future in art.

Ms. Boswell: Did you work in the field for a while before you made that decision?

Sen. Greive: Yes, after I came out of the service. When I went in the service, I was only in a short time, two and a half years, I think. And then when I came out, I was one of the earliest discharges. See, they had put me on limited service, and they got me out early.

Ms. Boswell: Can you tell me about your career in the Coast Guard?

Sen. Greive: Well, there was nothing distinguished about that at all. I just could draw, so that was something that I could do, and that added to my prestige. I could draw cartoons of people and pictures of them, so I'd be sketching all the time.

Ms. Boswell: You said you worked on newsletters and things?

Sen. Greive: Well, I drew a picture of the admiral and sent it to the Coast Guard publication. Suddenly an order came through, and I was just picked off a little old boat that I was on, taken up to headquarters, and put to work with another artist, and so I did artwork. I got to go home every night. It was a glory job.

I was a little ashamed of the fact that I had the uniform on. I wouldn't let it go. I used to pretend like I wasn't from here when I went to the USO. I was always embarrassed that I was still at home.

Ms. Boswell: You were stationed primarily here?

Sen. Greive: I was always in this area. You got moved around, but I always stayed here. I was in the Ballard area at one time around the locks, guarding the locks. I was up in Friday Harbor for a while, and I was over in Neah Bay and the Duwamish area. It was very undistinguished.

Ms. Boswell: Was there a stigma that if you didn't go abroad for service, you didn't really "serve your country?"

Sen. Greive: Well, I didn't try to go abroad,

I'll tell you that, so I don't know. I wasn't anxious to get shot.

Ms. Boswell: You said you didn't want to tell people that you were a local?

Sen. Greive: Yes. The way I used to do it is, I used to tell all the USO girls when I danced with them that I was from Seattle, and then I would say something like, "If you go down there on First Street…," or "If I went to Alkali…." They all thought I was lying because I mispronounced the words and put myself in real places. I called Alki "Alkali" all the time. I knew what I was doing.

Ms. Boswell: And they fell for it?

Sen. Greive: They may have thought I was full of baloney. See, I was a dancer, that's how I would get acquainted. From the day I went to high school—not the day, but I learned in high school—I've always gone to dances. I still go to dances three times a week. It's something I like to do. I did this all the time I was in the Legislature, too.

Nowadays, I go to an Elks or an Eagles Hall. Washington is the biggest fraternal state in the United States. They've got more membership per capita. The Eagles started in Seattle, right down here. It's down in Georgetown, now, Eagle's Aerie Number One. That's the first for the entire United States. I've represented them, incidentally, in various litigations, although I'm not a member there. The West Seattle Lodge is five doors from my office. The largest and best Elks Lodge in the United States is in Tacoma. It's got between 8,000 and 11,000 members.

There's a real good reason for that; it's a political reason. We didn't have liquor by the drink in Washington. There was no liquor by the drink until about the late 1960s. They couldn't get it, and so nobody could sell liquor but the clubs. The Masons and the Knights of Columbus may be rivals otherwise, but they had that one thing in common. All the veterans organizations, nobody wanted us to change that law. So, they never could get it through. But, finally, a fellow by the name of Clark, who owned the Clark restaurants, he organized the effort with the help of Rosellini's cousin and some other restaurateurs. They put it on the ballot and got it through. That's how we got liquor by the drink.

During that period of time, the clubs all had slot machines until the Legislature had to stop them. They had slot machines and they flourished. They got payments made, built up their membership, got the thing all running real well. It's running down now, but they still do a pretty good business.

Ms. Boswell: That's interesting. When did they first start? How long have they been going?

Sen. Greive: It depends. The Eagles started one hundred years ago. Their centennial anniversary was in 1998. The Elks, I think, is about two hundred years old. For a variety of reasons, in those days, you couldn't be an Elk unless you were in various things. For instance, they wouldn't let women be members because they were afraid of prostitutes. They had to be a family organization. They didn't want single women to be able to go in or unattached women. The Eagles take in women, but they can't be full-fledged members. It's a man's organization, but they take them in.

Speaking of dancing, this place is dotted with clubs, and that's where we usually go now. In the old days, of course, they had the Trianon Ballroom and the Spanish Castle, and they had a place called Parker's Pavilion out in the north end, and they had the Palladium, but those have all been converted to something else.

They had dance bands in those days. And we had dances up at Hiawatha Park next to the high school in West Seattle. I went to the PTA dances, and so forth. I don't mean that I'm a

great dancer, but, obviously, since I've danced all my life, I'm a lot better than the average person. I can do most things. I can do the tango, which is unusual, my version of the tango, anyway. I can do almost anything: the rumba, the samba, and various dances.

Ms. Boswell: Is it hard to find partners who are good?

Sen. Greive: Well, no. The same people show up all the time. You get to know them. And then, of course, you have somebody you're taking out regularly, and she's an excellent dancer.

Ms. Boswell: Were the old clubs fairly active at the time you were growing up?

Sen. Greive: I don't remember that, but they were sure active at the time I was elected.

Ms. Boswell: Just to finish your earlier story about your education before you were elected, you went from Cornish to Seattle University, and then you graduated from there?

Sen. Greive: No, I didn't graduate. I went in the service, served two years, and then I went to law school when I came out.

Ms. Boswell: Where did you go to law school?

Sen. Greive: Unhappily, I went to Washington for a couple of years. I didn't do well there because I had helped to pass the law that cut Washington down from a four-year law school to a three-year law school. So, they flunked me out and I had to go somewhere else. I went through various stages. I went to Idaho for a short time, came home and ran for office and got elected, and ended up going to school in Miami. Everything was a big success down there. That was just fine.

Ms. Boswell: In Miami, Florida?

Sen. Greive: Yes, the University of Miami in Florida.

Chapter 2

First Election and the "Futile Fifteen"

Ms. Boswell: What prompted you to run for office? You were in school and you still decided to run?

Senator Greive: I was going to run. It was quite a variety of things. I think, mostly I just plain wanted to run, and I dreamed of it all the time. My parents and I had been active in Howard Doherty's campaign. He had been a state representative and then ran for the state Senate. I think he's still alive. His family still lives in West Seattle, his brothers and sisters. He'd be very elderly now. His sister was a client of mine for years, and I've done things for other members of his family.

Howard Doherty was a Catholic, and he'd been beaten by Paul Thomas four years before. My mother had campaigned for Doherty and, of course, I helped Doherty, too. We didn't like the fellow that he'd run against. Paul Thomas was with the left-wingers. Now, I don't think Paul was ever a communist, but he followed the liberal or the left, they called it—the communist line. I don't know that it was really a communist line, but he followed their line, and he was very, very anti-Catholic. And Howard Doherty and I were both Catholics, so naturally, in the various interparty fights, Paul Thomas was on one side and my mother and Mrs. Jeanette Testu and everybody were on the other. Mrs. Testu later became the national committeewoman for the Democratic Party.

Paul had suffered from infantile paralysis, and he couldn't get around and campaign, which gave me an advantage. I just set out doorbelling and started running. I first ran against him in 1946, and I beat him.

Ms. Boswell: Were your parents behind you on this campaign? Did they think that was a good idea?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. My father furnished most of the money. It was in pieces, but it essentially was his money. It wasn't very much by today's standards. I imagine we spent $1,000 or $1,500. Everything was cheap then. It was a five dollar a day job, so you wouldn't spend too much money on that. But that would probably be like $15,000 now, I suppose, ten times what it was then.

Ms. Boswell: Were there any issues in particular that prompted you to run?

Sen. Greive: It wasn't so much the issues as the right-left argument, in a way. The things that Paul Thomas was for—labor, for example—I ended up outdoing him along the same line. Actually, when I got down there, I decided he was a pretty good state senator. I shouldn't have run against him. But, I didn't know that at the time. The fact is, if I'd have been down there, except for the religious issues, it wouldn't have made a great deal of difference how I voted and how he would have voted.

Ms. Boswell: How did you characterize yourself as a politician?

Sen. Greive: I ran on the vigor and energy of youth.

Ms. Boswell: When you decided to run, did you organize your own campaign?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. As I view it now—I don't know how I viewed it then—I was pretty sophisticated. I think I was quite a little more sophisticated than my opponent. I don't think he recognized it. He'd been elected simply by going to some meetings, showing up, and smiling. He had the support of labor and the support of the left wing, which was quite strong. Partly because he couldn't get around, he hadn't made campaigning a priority. I went and doorbelled. I spent my full time doorbelling. I knew to do that, and I had my father putting signs up everywhere, and I had one thing that Thomas couldn't duplicate—I ran in a sailor suit. I had a head picture of myself, and you could tell I was a sailor. In 1946 that was very popular.

Ms. Boswell: I see. So, in your campaign, did that veteran's status help you? Was that almost a prerequisite to run, then?

Sen. Greive: No, there weren't very many veterans who were elected. The veterans who elected me were mostly of my age. I just happened to hit it right. What I did, I had helped a guy run two years before by the name of Bernie Pierce, and he was quite an activist. He'd run, and I just went and took his platform, lifted it up, and made that my platform over here. It was all a bunch of meaningless pabulum, anyway. It didn't say anything, but it was nice words.

Ms. Boswell: I did see an old newspaper article from that campaign, and one of the things that you said was that you wanted changes in workmen's compensation.

Sen. Greive: Yes, but I probably didn't know anything about it. I probably didn't know what workmen's compensation was, except that I knew labor wanted it, and that's probably why I wanted it. I don't know; it's hard to be perfectly honest about things like that. You can always fantasize if you want to, but I don't remember.

Ms. Boswell: You campaigned on being the young and vigorous one?

Sen. Greive: Mostly you campaigned by working at it. It's one of the things that I had to fight with my candidates for years. Everyone wants to sit in the car and talk, or drive somewhere, or go to a speech, and all that sort of thing. They don't like doorbelling. They are lazier than hell. They will not do that. They don't want that hard work. Well, if you're working twice as hard as they are, you've got a big advantage.

Ms. Boswell: So you see doorbelling as a key to running a good election?

Sen. Greive: I use that as a symbolic word, but it's doorbelling, putting up signs, getting around, and seeing people. You could do it by going to taverns, or wherever. But, doorbelling is good in a city district because you know you've covered the area. If you live in a country district, everybody you see can vote because geographically they live in your district. If you're down in Kelso, Washington, or some small town, you're pretty sure that everybody on that street, if they're registered, could vote for you. But in the city, where you've got a number of multiple districts, they might live in a different district and still work here. So, by doorbelling, you've got everybody in there, and you are sure that you've covered all of them.

Ms. Boswell: Here you were then, only twenty-six years old, and you beat the incumbent.

Sen. Greive: Well, there were a variety of things going for me. That election was somewhat of a reaction. Historically, there were very few Democrats in the state of Washington. From about the Civil War until 1930, it was almost always Republicans. Now, occasionally, a Democrat would get elected as a reform candidate against a machine, or something like that. Occasionally, we had some Democratic governors, but the governors were pretty much always Republican, and the legislatures were pretty much always Republican. However, the Republicans then subdivided into factions. For instance, when Roland Hartley was governor, they would do things like throw inkwells at each other. It was terrible. Their fights were even more vicious than the party fights.

Well, if you were a Democrat in those years, you were an extra vote. The Republicans didn't care that you weren't in their party; you still belonged to their side. The Democrats would get a certain amount of patronage, a certain amount of favorable treatment, simply because they were on a side that divided the Republican factions.

Then, when the Democrats came along and got elected in 1932, and took two elections, they wiped everybody out of the House and everybody out of the Senate to where there were no Republicans. There were one or two, or something like that, who just survived in some of the silk-stocking areas. Then in 1946 was the big resurgence. That was the year that I ran, and I was elected as a Democrat, but the Republicans, generally, ended up controlling the House. Perry Woodall became the leader because he was from Eastern Washington where they had been electing Republicans right along.

The year I was elected, there were only two or three new Democrats, as I recall. The Republicans had surged forward. That was the year they had a Republican sweep. That was the Eightieth Congress. Remember Truman didn't like them? People were fed up; they wanted something new. Truman was fortunate he wasn't up that year; he was up in 1948, two years after that. If he'd been up that year, he'd have been swept out. But I was new. I beat the sweep. So, it was probably the times.

You'd have to look at the statistics, but the Republicans thought they were going to control from then on. I thought so, too. I thought we were coming into a Republican era—for the next twenty years it was going to be all Republican. They had won this huge election. After all, Dewey ran two years later, and he thought he was in, and they thought Truman was all done. It was a whole different world.

Eventually, the Republicans controlled the House and the Senate, because eight Democrats decided that they'd had enough of the treatment that they received in the party fight the year before, or two years before, and they formed what they called a "coalition," and they persuaded the Republicans to go along. The Republicans had nothing to lose, so they made a coalition together. They called it a Republican majority, but actually, the people who were in the big power were the eight in the middle, who were quite close-knit because they were kind of cast-offs from the Democrats.

Up until that time, the Republicans occasionally had chairmanships. They'd be chairman of a committee, and so forth. When Governor Wallgren had come in two years before, he'd been a congressman, and then he'd been U.S. senator, and he believed in the caucus system, which they had in Washington, D.C. So he persuaded them to take the chairmanships away from anybody who didn't play ball. If you didn't play ball, why then you didn't get any chairmanships, or you didn't pass that legislation. He played hardball. There were a lot of very, very hard feelings. I wasn't a part of that.

Ms. Boswell: Did Governor Wallgren play any role in the Democratic losses in Washington?

Sen. Greive: Mon Wallgren was governor for only two years while I was there. He apparently had been a staunch party man. He'd been elected to Congress from up in the Everett area, Bellingham, up through there, then wound his way into the U.S. Senate. I'm trying to think of who he ran against to get that job. He was very affable, knew everybody's name, and he was the best pool shooter in the United States. He was a pool champion. He just liked to drink and play cards, a typical type to be one of Truman's buddies. He was very close to Truman.

He felt that the party was dominant. He said that if someone didn't go along with the party, he'd cut them off. They'd become very bitter. There was always a certain conservative strain in the Legislature that wouldn't go along. This strain seemed to center in Eastern Washington because they were always a little less liberal. He took it out on those people, and they were very sore at him. Wallgren tried to take over the Game Commission—which was supposed to be independent—so that he could appoint the members of the Game Commission. There were some other things that he attempted to do; I don't remember them, but they were generally all rejected. So, a campaign was conducted against Wallgren. Over that long period of time he was repudiated. He was later defeated. They dragged down a whole lot of people with him.

Ms. Boswell: When you ran, did you have any particular groups that supported you?

Sen. Greive: Obviously the church had something to do with it because there was only one Catholic Church in the West Seattle area, and that's a very substantial part of the district. I had gone to school there, and the priest was a friend of mine, and my mother had been active in the church for years. I'd coached the very successful debate team. My campaign manager was my star debater.

Ms. Boswell: So the church was a big factor then?

Sen. Greive: Well, it wasn't so much in the formal sense, but the priest was quite political, and he did anything he could do. I was a good Catholic, had phenomenal success with the debate team, and that helped me, I'm sure. Fact is, we mailed a note to every one of the Catholics. It was a little card that said: "Vote for our coach."

Ms. Boswell: Was your district heavily Catholic?

Sen. Greive: Oh, heavens no—anything but. The advantage we had was, in a primary, there was only one church. If you have pieces of your district in the city, the parishes overlap, and they don't follow party lines. If you look at the map of West Seattle, you can see it's a peninsula; it's got water all the way around it, so there was only one church. If you were active in that church, then you knew an awful lot of people.

Even when the Republicans controlled, we had a fellow by the name of Charles Moran who was a Catholic. There again, the way the districts were laid out in West Seattle, he had the same acquaintanceship, only he was on the Republican side. So, there was some advantage to being Catholic, but there was also an advantage to being a member of the Chamber of Commerce, of which I'm a past president from some years ago.

Eventually, I was integrated into the Senate, but at that time I wasn't, and it was an advantage being in a lot of other things. There were a lot of forces. The unions had strong tentacles over here, and that's where a lot of the communists came from. They came out of the union movement—the so-called communists. I hate to use the term because those people were never what they were painted to be. They were never heroes of mine, but they were just liberals.

Ms. Boswell: Did the church continue to be a strong area of support for you?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I suppose it did. It certainly must have. It's hard to tell. Once I was running for re-election I had labor lined up for me, and I had a whole lot of other forces that supported almost any incumbent Democrat. It was a pretty heavily Democratic district, so the church itself became less of a factor.

Ms. Boswell: I read an article about when you won the nomination, and you said that you were, "generally an independent," but if you were anything, you were "pro-labor" at that time.

Sen. Greive: That's typical. West Seattle, especially in those years, was separated from downtown by a couple of bridges. The tendency was for labor people to live over here. In other words, they weren't poor, but they weren't rich. There were an awful lot of them who worked on Harbor Island. You see, they had the shipyards down there; we also had Boeing, and it was convenient to the original Boeing plant, which is very close. All the people that worked on Harbor Island and areas like that, they had a tendency to live in West Seattle, so West Seattle had a labor base.

Of course, I thought that was a very strong position to be in because, from a Democrat's point of view, I wasn't going to get any votes out of the business group—at least that's the way I imagined it. So, if you're going to be nominated, that's what you had to be.

First of all, you had to be nominated—that was a big fight—because they generally went Democratic. Now, the secret to the nomination by the Democratic Party was not in West Seattle. The secret was in Skid Road. In those days, the district extended on down and took in Pioneer Square and eventually took in the courthouse. We had Chinatown and all that. There were several precincts—not exactly Georgetown because we were a little north of that—but it was called South Seattle, with three or four precincts. And there were some around Riverside, a couple of precincts down there, and a precinct up on top of the hill, Delridge, and so forth. That part of the district went very heavily Democratic, heavily, like three- or four-to-one, five-to-one. I learned that early on, and I campaigned and doorbelled all of that area.

So, when I doorbelled, I didn't doorbell all of West Seattle. I doorbelled the areas outside of West Seattle. That's what fooled them because Paul Thomas had thought that, no matter what happened in West Seattle, he was going to carry all the rest. He never realized that I was undermining him all the time. I came out even, but I would have been beaten, seven, eight, and ten to one if I hadn't put an awful lot of effort into it. That's what made the difference. I wouldn't have won if I hadn't neutralized the area outside West Seattle where Paul Thomas was known and I wasn't. When it came to the area in West Seattle, I did better.

See, part of the problem then was there was a third candidate who was very prominent here, too. It was a three-way Democratic race. He was a fellow by the name of Jerry George, and he was supported by the business people here. I didn't run from either of them. It was a three-way race, and I came out ahead. The less liberal vote was split two ways, and then there was a Republican running.

Ms. Boswell: What about Skid Road? Did you spend much time there?

Sen. Greive: I sure did. My father had a business office down close to Skid Road so it wasn't that foreign to me. I knew that was going to be a problem, so I went down there and doorbelled and had all kinds of fun.

Ms. Boswell: Wasn't liquor an issue in that campaign, too? In Washington at that time it

wasn't legal to sell liquor by the drink. Instead, they had—what did they call them, "bottle clubs," or something like that?

Sen. Greive: Bottle clubs were very much alive during that period of time. I don't quite remember. If somebody would refresh my memory a little, that may very well have been a part of it because Wallgren was a liberal, easy. I was always a "wet," never a "dry," even though I don't drink. I've never had a drink in my life to this day, and never expect to.

Ms. Boswell: Why were you a "wet," then?

Sen. Greive: When I first ran, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union was a force in those years, just like the Catholics were a force. They would send out questionnaires and then you would have to say what you were. Now, prohibition had gone away by then, but they were still—they're something like the anti-abortionists—crusading and they felt that they were going to get prohibition back again. There was a sizable vote; it wasn't just a little vote. They sent out questionnaires, and when my questionnaire went back, I was on the wrong side of all the issues, so they endorsed everybody but me.

I had two Democrats running against me. I had not only Paul Thomas, but I also had Jerry George. I took and made a circular or flyer, I think on a mimeograph, that said, "The only man not endorsed by the Woman's Christian Temperance Union," and I went to every tavern. I kept doing it not once, but I might have gone twenty times, and eventually I got acquainted with those people. They'd come in and they'd say, "Oh, here he comes now," and they'd shake my hand, and I got quite a few votes that way. So, I was a committed "wet" before I ever went down there, and I always voted "wet."

Ms. Boswell: Was it just a personal ethic that you didn't care to drink?

Sen. Greive: Part of the reason I didn't want to drink was the expense, but the most interesting part is that when I was being confirmed, the bishop in those days—a fellow by the name of Shaughnessy—wanted every Catholic young person when they were being confirmed to take the pledge that they wouldn't drink until they were twenty-one. I wouldn't take the pledge. I didn't want to be in the position that I couldn't drink if I wanted to drink, so I just never took the pledge, but I never drank.

Ms. Boswell: So, by the time you were twenty-one, you just never did?

Sen. Greive: They made such efforts to make me drink, to kid me and to give me a hard time, and to get me drinks that had some liquor in it. They tried all of these tricks down in the Legislature, but it got to be a game with me. I was damned if I was going to drink. Plus the fact that I had two uncles who were drunks. One was a rich drunk, and one was a poor drunk. One was just the poorest he could be; he and his wife just had nothing. The other one was quite successful, but they were both drunks, and I figured that might have changed it. But whatever it was, I always voted "wet" and drank "dry." That was somewhat of a contrast, because several of the Republicans and several of the "dry" senators really drank "wet" and voted "dry."

Ms. Boswell: Now what about the West Seattle papers? Did they usually support you?

Sen. Greive: The first time I ran, they had their candidate, who was Jerry George. And they didn't like Paul Thomas either, but they were going to replace him with their man. They were going to give him all kinds of front-page publicity, articles, and everything. He was a local real estate guy, and he was a moderate Democrat, and on and on and on. I was just

sort of left out.

Well, it became apparent that I was campaigning harder than everybody, and I became a factor. So I ran an ad that said: "*The West Seattle Herald* says you need a change. If you need a change, have a real change: elect Bob Greive, state senator." Well, the publisher, Clyde Dunn, phoned me up and said, "Wait a minute, you used our name, and I'm not going to run it." And I said, "That's unfair." He says, "I'll tell you, you've got your choice. Either I put you on the front-page and expose you—we're not endorsing you and this is misleading—or we don't run your ad." And I said, "I'll take the front-page."

It was the greatest thing that ever happened. Dunn and I became pretty good friends in years gone by. And he always would say, "Greive, I elected you with that damn front-page publicity." It just hit right. He probably did elect me, I don't know. It certainly didn't hurt me, that's for sure, because the other guy ran third.

Ms. Boswell: Once you got through the primary, was the election pretty easy?

Sen. Greive: Well, it wasn't. We thought it would be, but it was a Republican sweep, and they got the wind of it. So they were running big ads: "Had enough? Vote Republican."

Ms. Boswell: Did labor begin to back you more forcefully?

Sen. Greive: I became a strong labor advocate. When I went down to Olympia, there was a coalition in which some Democrats went with the Republicans to control the Senate. Well, I didn't go with them; I was one of the few who wouldn't go. I stayed with the loyalists, with the old-timers. So, naturally, the party people thought it was terrible that the others deserted their party, and I was on the right side of that situation.

The Democrats had controlled the so-called "courthouse crowd," and they had some workers out here, employees. There were some Democratic clubs. There was more of that than there is now. I had made friends with the liquor interests, the beer interests, and they had some votes. So, it is a whole combination of things that make you successful.

Education—I'd become a great friend of education by that time. They were endorsing me. Also, I was very friendly with the teachers. They were a force. Not anything like they are now, but Pearl Wanamaker was a force. She had been a state senator, and she was a teacher, and then she became Superintendent of Public Instruction. The teachers were not organized like they are today, but they had some organization. Pearl Wanamaker had as a part of her appendage the PTA, and her friend Ma Kennedy was the national president of the PTA. Her son runs the funeral home here in West Seattle, the Kennedy Funeral Home. They wanted higher appropriations for education, and I was for higher appropriations.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me about Pearl Wanamaker. Was she fairly effective?

Sen. Greive: Oh, extremely effective—very, very effective. She was almost a genius. She would put you in the corner, and she wanted more money for schools, and she got it one way or another. They'd turn her down, and then she'd go around and put the pressure on the governor, or she'd have Ma Kennedy and her forces down there. She was a very effective woman.

She didn't like Catholics. That was my problem. At one point, she tried to get a bill through the Legislature that said you had to have permission to go to a Catholic school. I remember we all exploded over that. It was defeated, and the guy, the poor devil who she got to put his name on it, was from Spokane. He got up on the floor and said that he'd been

misled, and he moved to kill it himself. He got defeated the next election. Spokane had a strong Catholic population, and they felt he was a Judas Iscariot. He'd also switched to be a Republican from a Democrat then. Oh, she was very effective, but she was very anti-Catholic, very much so.

The Catholic issue and the liquor issue are so different today than they were then that you have no way of comparing them. That's the one thing that just floated in the atmosphere and doesn't exist any more. They were really affected. The left, right, anti-communists, those who were anti-liquor—those positions were much stronger. Words meant something politically and there was a lot of feeling, and that sort of thing—a lot of feeling. When you get endorsed by all these people, it makes it a lot easier. So, the church becomes less and less of a factor. The church is much more important when you've got a three- or four-way race and it's focused.

I'd also become quite friendly with Albert Rosellini. Fact is, I had done some fliers and things for him because he was in a real terrible campaign, a very close one. The Republicans took after him with a great fury, and so he had a much tougher time in the finals than I did. The Municipal League was after him. The Municipal League was after me. They said I was energetic and youthful, and that's all they'd say, but they said a lot of things about him.

Ms. Boswell: How did you get to know him?

Sen. Greive: He was the majority leader. When I got nominated, I went down and got acquainted.

Ms. Boswell: This is all in 1946?

Sen. Greive: In 1946, before the election. They would meet and they would talk over issues, and they would talk over what they would put in their campaign literature. Of course, I was invited to the meetings because I was now a Democrat. I was the designee. I was the nominee of the Democratic Party, and I guess I just felt more comfortable with them. But I think it was mostly that I felt a certain loyalty to the party that elected me.

Ms. Boswell: So you said that the election was held when? In May?

Sen. Greive: In May. The primary had to be way ahead, and the final had to be way ahead. They had to have so many days to mail the ballot back.

Ms. Boswell: The men overseas?

Sen. Greive: To the men overseas. Then they had to have them all in place, and they had to count them, so it was a long summer. The election didn't heat up until just before the final election, but it had gone Republican. And so that's why there were such drastic changes. It was Democratic in May when I was running for nomination, and it turned Republican in the finals. May to November is a long, long time.

Meanwhile, I'd gotten acquainted with Rosellini, and he and I had become good friends. Anyway, by the time the final election came, I was helping various other people get elected, too. When we began to get worried, then I had to get back to work doorbelling again. For one thing, doorbelling was a lot slower then, because you doorbelled every house. You don't doorbell every house anymore.

Ms. Boswell: Do you just pick a certain section and go from there? How did you doorbell successfully?

Sen. Greive: No, you pick the good voters, the people that are likely to vote. You have a set of cards, and you do it by address. Today

you go about twice as fast, or three times as fast. Also, I didn't have car, so I had to go by commuter bus and public transportation.

Ms. Boswell: Were you expecting to win, yourself?

Sen. Greive: I don't know what I expected. I know I was a little surprised, but somehow, I think everybody who ever runs for office thinks they're going to win. Sometimes, at the end, people know they're going to lose, but you get delusions when you run. All your supporters tell you how well you're doing; you keep pumping each other up. So, I can't say. I must have thought I had some chance, or I wouldn't have done all that work.

Ms. Boswell: Can you remember your feelings when you found out you'd won?

Sen. Greive: You're always elated when you've won, especially the first time.

Ms. Boswell: Did you have any kind of a celebration?

Sen. Greive: I wasn't married, and I was still in school. I don't remember. I never was much of one for election parties because there can be real sorrow when you lose.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me about when you got down to Olympia. Was it what you expected?

Sen. Greive: That was a whole new experience. Well, there were a lot of interesting things. In those days we didn't have offices. They had a secretarial pool: you'd call a secretary out and she sat by your desk, and you dictated to her. My first secretary's name was Marge Mundy. She was a young divorcée, about my age. I think I was twenty-six then. She came out, and I was having a terrible time dictating. I can't remember, but I'd never dictated before, and I finally said, "You know, I have to confess, this is the first time I've ever dictated." She said, "It's the first time I've ever taken dictation." So, we got along fine.

But, I knew the importance of writing home and taking care of my constituents. I made sure that I made a mailing to everybody in the district a couple of times—to everybody, not just to the people who voted for me. My opponent had never done that, and so I took care of some correspondence to people who were interested in legislation. You build up a lot of things just by being down there.

Ms. Boswell: When you started out you were fairly young. Did people take you seriously?

Sen. Greive: They had to because the sides were so close. The Republicans took a coalition. There'd been so many Democrats that even though the Republicans had almost a sweep—except for me and Rosellini, two or three of us who survived—the Republicans didn't have enough without a coalition to control things. So, when I went down there the first time, they had a coalition running. In order to get a two-thirds majority, they had to have one more vote; either that, or they had just enough votes, but there was always a chance that somebody would defect. So, of course, I was very important to them. And so, I was right in the middle of everything.

Ms. Boswell: Was Governor Wallgren, in your view, somewhat responsible for the creation of this coalition?

Sen. Greive: There were some hard feelings. A fellow by the name of Miller and, I think, Rogers kind of got together with some of the conservative lobbyists. Miller, who later on became a very good friend of mine—very, very good friend of mine, and was later, in fact, the editor of the local *West Seattle Herald*—in those days was from Eastern Wash-

ington. He had a little newspaper there in East Wenatchee where he was from, which is across the river from Wenatchee. It's in a different county.

In that time, the coalitionists still had lingering in the background a fellow by the name of Joseph Drumheller. Drumheller had been a Democratic leader in his day, and they called it the "Joseph Drumheller machine." They kind of ran the Senate with these lobbyists, and they came around and they called on me—I think it was Miller that called on me, but Rogers may have been there.

Ms. Boswell: And this is Jack Rogers?

Sen. Greive: Yes. And they talked to me and wanted to know if I'd go along and how I felt, and so forth and so on, and what my views were. But I just didn't want to switch parties—which I felt was switching parties—by joining the coalition, so I stayed with the "Futile Fifteen." They called us the Futile Fifteen because we had fifteen senators in our group—the regular Democrats—and we would vote against the others. They had the two-thirds because they had the coalition. They had eight Democrats, I think, along with the Republicans. The Republicans elected a lot of people that time. They controlled the House. I think there were twenty-six Democratic votes in the House—something like that—out of ninety-nine.

Ms. Boswell: What had persuaded you to stay with the loyal Democrats rather than be part of the coalition?

Sen. Greive: Because I figured I was a Democrat, and I figured they were Republicans, and the coalitionists were deserting the ship. I couldn't see going along with them. And that I was a friend of Rosellini's, I suppose, was one of the reasons, too. Although at home I'd been a conservative, down in Olympia I wasn't conservative, because what was conservative in King County was liberal in Spokane County. They were several degrees more conservative in Eastern Washington.

Ms. Boswell: When you came in, did you feel pretty comfortable? Had your experience in campaigning prepared you to be a legislator?

Sen. Greive: That question has no real answer. The only requirement for being a senator is that you've got to get elected. You don't have to know anything. I don't think I'm unique. I don't think that Senator Patty Murray and a lot of other people were prepared for anything. When you get there you learn the issues and learn what it's all about. If you're willing to work at it and learn, it isn't all that hard.

Ms. Boswell: How do you learn? Did you have a mentor?

Sen. Greive: Everybody wants to be your mentor: lobbyists, labor leaders. We had caucuses, and we discussed issues in caucuses all the time. You have staff people. I don't know how many we had in those days. I think we only had one staff person, but we'd talk over issues and stuff we were interested in. I don't think that was all that unusual.

Ms. Boswell: Were there certain senators who you could talk to, discuss ideas with, or trust?

Sen. Greive: If there was a mentor—and I don't think I had one as such—I had an ally, and he's been an ally more or less all my life: Al Rosellini.

Ms. Boswell: What did you emulate? Was it his political style?

Sen. Greive: He was one of the smoothest guys I ever saw in my life. He didn't look it

or act it, but he was smooth. He could maneuver his way like nobody I ever saw. To that extent, I really admired him. I don't think he's heavy on principle, or what he believed, but he had a general belief with the party that elected him—he should stick with them. But he wasn't that heavy a thinker.

Ms. Boswell: Was his style to operate from behind the scenes?

Sen. Greive: His style would be getting things done. He could put a deal together; he could get things even when he only had sixteen votes. He had a way. Mon Wallgren was the governor then; he was a Democrat, and Rosellini was a friend of Mon's. Rosellini was an excellent floor leader, but he was majority leader only once—only one year—and that was before I got there. I was always in the minority during those first years. I was the first majority leader after that because the coalition was in control until Rosellini became governor, and then I got to be majority leader. But Rosellini was there for years and years. He'd been there probably eight years by the time I got there. He's ten years older than I am. He was elected at about the same age I was.

Ms. Boswell: Were your ties to Rosellini, in part, as a Catholic?

Sen. Greive: No. I used to tell Al, "You never saw the inside of a church." He's a non-practicing Catholic. I'm sure—I know—he was married in the Catholic church, and surely baptized in the Catholic church, and I would expect that when he dies he will be buried in the Catholic church; that's the kind of Catholic he was. He was a great social Catholic. He was always at every Italian dinner, and he would show up at any kind of a social function. I don't think his belief was all that deep as far as he was concerned. His son, though, is a member of the parish out here in Holy Rosary. He was a state legislator. He's quite an active Catholic. His daughter-in-law is also an active Catholic. That's John Rosellini's wife. I don't know about all the rest of his children because most of them were born when I knew Al, but I suspect that they may be more active than Al. I know his wife went to church fairly regularly.

Ms. Boswell: What do you think it was that caused you to be friends?

Sen. Greive: I think he went out of his way to make sure we were friends. Plus, we were both dancers and went out every night, and there was lots of partying in those days, lots of drinking and partying. I didn't drink, but I partied. We'd go out almost every night. We were called the "Night Wildlife Committee."

Ms. Boswell: Who else were members of the Night Wildlife Committee?

Sen. Greive: There was a bunch of them. Jack Rogers used to go out quite often. The Night Wildlife Committee was bipartisan. We were friends at night. They had a bottle club—the Esquire Club I think they called it—and we went there a lot of the time. And they had some clubs downtown. They'd have these unusual names. They just made up organizations so they could get licenses to serve liquor.

There was a lot of going out, eating, and rejoicing. We'd go out every night, and go out at noon all the time when we were down there. We'd laugh and think up things to torment somebody with. It was a real fun time. Vic Meyers went with us a lot of the time.

Ms. Boswell: Were they all politicians, or were there lobbyists that went with you?

Sen. Greive: Oh, no. We were pretty much just the fifteen of us. We got to be awfully close.

Ms. Boswell: Did you live full-time in Olympia during the session?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes, at the Governor House Hotel. It's still there, what do they call it now? It's on Capitol Way—I think it's now the Ramada Inn.

Ms. Boswell: Did a lot of other legislators go there, too?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes, a lot of them. I bought a room by the week, and I stayed there. It was a nice place. By today's standards, it may not be very great, but in those days it had a nice lobby, and we thought it was as good a hotel as there was in town. We got compensation, forty dollars a day, for living expenses when we were down there—for our food and lodging. We got five dollars a day in pay, so a total of forty-five dollars a day.

Ms. Boswell: Was that a living wage?

Sen. Greive: No. It wasn't supposed to be a living wage. It was supposed to be a part-time legislative wage. That's what it was. You never had to buy your own meals if you didn't want to; there was always someone wanting to take you to dinner. It's easy when you're in a situation like that, and there are all kinds of parties where they'd have cracked crab, or they'd have almost anything you can think of. Vic Meyers was in his heyday at that time, too.

Ms. Boswell: Could you tell me a little about Vic Meyers?

Sen. Greive: He was a delightful fellow. Awfully smart, to the extent he wanted to be smart. He was kind of a jolly, playboy type of guy. He was practically the best parliamentarian down there—marvelous parliamentarian. He decided to learn how to do it, and he surprised everybody. He was a bandleader before he learned parliamentary law, and he did it very well. Drunk or sober, he could do it. He was drunk a good part of the time. He'd be drinking all the time. There were always some open bottles in the lieutenant governor's office. People would go in and out, Republican and Democratic. Although he was a loyal, regular Democrat, he kept pretty good relations with the Republicans. That's something I learned early on: it paid off to be friends with the Republicans. To be too partisan didn't pay off.

Ms. Boswell: How do you view the notion of partisanship?

Sen. Greive: I think partisanship has a real place, especially in the legislative process, because otherwise everybody goes off on their own end. And, from what I understand in some legislatures, the railroad lobby owns five legislators, the truckers own two, and the cattle people have seven. They even get to trading—the lobbyists trade, "I'll give you these seven," or that sort of thing. We never had that sort of thing. You've got to have some cohesion.

Now, on the other hand, I think that the party is usually a lot more radical than the elected officials, on the right or the left. The religious right has no great support in the Legislature, but it is very strong inside the Republican Party. When we had radicals and communists and so forth, they were a real power, especially in the Democratic Party in Western Washington, and yet they didn't reflect the legislators. The legislators have a tendency to go toward the middle, so I think we probably needed them to give us some vision and give us some leadership. Somebody has to tack up the signs and raise the money

and do all the things it takes to get elected.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me about a few of the coalition members. Who they were?

Sen. Greive: I can remember, generally, who they were. There was Ted Schroeder; he's long since dead, I suppose. Jack Rogers. Eventually there was Edward Riley, but Riley was still in the House at that time. He was a right-winger and they called him Saltwater Riley because he represented the coast. But I'd forgotten, at the same time there was another Ed Riley who was Speaker of the House. We called him Freshwater Riley. Other coalition Democrats were Howard Roup, William Orndorff, Dr. David Cowen, Don T. Miller, and Thomas Bienz.

I didn't have bad relations with the coalition people, except on one or two votes, but I didn't think very much of them for having deserted the party. They didn't meet with us or anything. They tried to humble us by giving us one little committee room, and one or two staff members is all we had. One of the staff was my friend who helped me get elected—Hayes Elder. I was so important that they wanted to make me happy, so I got one of the patronage jobs. We had two patronage positions, and I was allowed to choose one of them. The coalition members thought they'd make fun of us, but we turned out to be the stars of the game. We would do all kinds of things. We'd make moves and motions, and Rosellini, of course, knew a lot of parliamentary law, and the Republican leader, a fellow by the name of Harry Wall, didn't. Rosellini just ran rings around him.

I remember one time they had a big basketball game, and a lot of them went to the basketball game, and we voted to take over the Senate. So we took it over for a couple hours. We had all our people stay back. It was my idea, as I recall. We had fifteen votes, and they didn't have a quorum. All you needed was twenty-five to keep the Senate going, but they were short, and we had one more vote than they did, so we changed the seating, and we did all kinds of things. We couldn't pass any kind of legislation because we didn't have a majority—you had to have twenty-five votes. But we had a great time. We made the newspapers.

Ms. Boswell: It only lasted for that one night?

Sen. Greive: Yeah, when they came back the next day, they changed everything. We would think up any darn thing. We'd filibuster. We were full of the devil. They called us the Futile Fifteen at first, and then, eventually, before the session was over, they called us the Feudal Fifteen, like in feudal days.

I liked Vic Meyers and Rosellini, and I eventually got to be the second man. I got to be the caucus chairman behind Rosellini. I had that position when he got elected governor.

Ms. Boswell: Was that, in part, because you had been loyal along the way?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. The coalition existed up until the time that I was elected majority leader. They always controlled everything, all the appointments and so forth. The coalition didn't last for one session only, it lasted for ten years—I think it was ten years. Every year they managed to get enough people together to control it, even though there were some changes and shifts around. But the coalition people, they were the favorite people; they got everything they wanted.

CHAPTER 3

EARLY LEGISLATIVE CAREER

Ms. Boswell: We discussed earlier the rise of the Futile or Feudal Fifteen, and how you first got in touch with them? Can you tell me more about that?

Senator Greive: Al Rosellini is a remarkable man. He has many sides to him, and I've seen all of them. But, one of the things that he could do, he could see what his base was. If he was going to be leader, he had to have control of the caucus. Here I am a new member, and one of his supporters was knocked out, and so he decided to become a friend of mine. He invited me to meet, and then he would try to get other people. Lady Willie Forbus would be the other one—she got defeated—but she was one of the ones. There were various people. Dr. J. R. Binyon was one who got defeated that year.

Ms. Boswell: When you got down to the Legislature, the coalitionists wanted you to join them?

Sen. Greive: They did that before. They tried to pick me up almost immediately. They thought that because my mother was a Catholic—my father was too—since I had that background, since I had beaten one of their strong radicals and very loyal people, that I probably didn't even fit. Not only that, I was the youngest member, and they thought they would flatter me, and they would bring me right along, and I could join up with them. But I never would do it.

Ms. Boswell: They needed you—why?

Sen. Greive: That's an awful lot of years ago. As I add it up now, I think they needed me because I was a vote to override the veto. Whether they had thirty-one—with the eight of them and the Republicans, they needed one more vote to be able to override a veto, and that would make it an enormous power. It wouldn't be that they could override the veto, but it gave them enormous bargaining power with Governor Wallgren because he would have had to get along with them. He couldn't make his vetoes stick on anything.

However, that wasn't the only problem they had. The other problem they had was McCutcheon. John McCutcheon had been a liberal Republican, and he was out of the tradition of the liberal Republicans, the Progressive Party, Hiram Johnson, and people like that. He never considered himself really much of a Republican. It just happened, but for the grace of God, he could have very well been a Democrat. In fact, he eventually became a Democrat when he served in the Legislature, and died in office. He was a Democratic state senator. He was a very close friend of mine. So, he presented a problem with them, too, because they just couldn't sit down for meanness, or for political reasons—just say they were going to override a veto—because they had to get two votes.

Ms. Boswell: How did this split affect the caucus system?

Sen. Greive: I think they had a caucus of sorts before, but they didn't caucus daily, or weekly, or monthly. There were fifteen of us and we had one room. We had no committee chairmanships, and we wanted a strategy,

whether it was bedevilment, or whatever we were going to do—filibuster—we did a whole lot of crazy things. We had a need to meet, and we got a big kick out of it. We'd sit around, and we couldn't win. It was a "What can we do today?" type of thing. We would meet up there—we got to meet every day—so we began to have daily caucuses. That was the beginning of the daily caucus system.

Ms. Boswell: You had mentioned earlier that Governor Wallgren had admired the caucus system, too.

Sen. Greive: Wallgren was a product of it. Apparently they had a much stronger caucus system than we did, in Washington, D.C. Even now, they don't have a caucus every day. That's unheard of anyplace I've ever heard about in the United States. I'm sure there may be some other states where you'd have a caucus almost every day. We have it here, and we have a caucus almost every day.

Ms. Boswell: So the Futile Fifteen really started it?

Sen. Greive: We started that because we did a lot of things to get the press to notice us. We did a lot of things just to give them a hard time. They started off being so repressive, and all that sort of thing, that we didn't care. We got a big kick out of it, almost like college kids. We had a need to meet to set our strategy up.

Ms. Boswell: Who instituted that?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. All I know is that it was either that year or the following year we divided the leadership between the caucus chairman and the floor leader. So Rosellini was the floor leader, but the caucus chairman was Earl Coe, as I recall. I think I made the motion to do that because I thought that Coe was just the guy to keep us together, and Rosellini kind of led us. We would meet all the time, and we would discuss legislation. Lots of times we'd try to get amendments on; we'd try to keep our votes solid. That was a very important thing to us.

Very often, most of us went out to dinner together. There was no lunchroom or anything attached. Now there's a lunchroom attached to the Senate and House for the members. That didn't exist at that time, and so we would go to a restaurant somewhere, and we'd get a back room and we'd laugh and have lunch. If we were a little late in getting back, we didn't worry about it. We figured we weren't going to change anything anyway. But they never wanted to go without us, so they always delayed until we got back. Sometimes we'd take Vic Meyers with us.

The whole thing was almost like, from my point of view, being a young man and being introduced into a whole new game. It was fascinating. It had facets that I'd never dreamed of. Not only that, when you were in caucus, there was a serious side. There was always somebody who had served as chairman of this committee or that committee before, or something, and he knew something about the legislation, and you got a lot of pre-briefing that you otherwise wouldn't get. Or, there was somebody who was serving on the Appropriation Committee, or serving on a committee that considered the bills that were going to come up, and we would be given a briefing—a persuasive briefing, I might add—as to how we should vote and why we should vote. It kept us together as a block, too.

Ms. Boswell: How long did these caucus sessions last?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. In the early days they were shorter, and then they got longer and longer, and now they almost stifle the whole system down there. There were no two or three-hour caucuses; they were toward the end.

Ms. Boswell: Would you, generally, in those early days have consensus in the caucus?

Sen. Greive: Oh, it wasn't very hard. We didn't amount to anything. Everything was greased. When it got on the floor it was going to pass anyway. Mostly, you'd present your amendments and your opposition to the other side's amendments more than anything else.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds like there was a lot of good camaraderie there.

Sen. Greive: There was a tremendous amount. Tremendous.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me a little about some of the coalition Democrats.

Sen. Greive: They were generally pretty good people. Their caliber was very high as legislators. They were people who had stood up against Mon Wallgren. Miller was a very capable guy, very capable guy. And then William R. Orndorff—he had made a lot of money; he was a lawyer and I didn't know him that well. He was a Catholic lawyer from Spokane. Thomas Bienz—there're a lot of stories about Bienz. He became a Republican. David Cowen had the biggest advertising dental practice in the state of Washington. He took extensive radio ads. He had eighteen dentists over in Spokane. The fact is that people would come from Alberta, from Idaho, Coeur d'Alene, from Montana and various places to get their dental work done there.

Then there was Schroeder. Ted Schroeder was a newspaperman. And Jack Rogers was a newspaperman. And then we had Keiron Reardon, who thought he was something of a law unto himself. Reardon was a very capable guy. He was an obstinate character, but he knew and understood things, and he was very, very, very sly. He was a newspaper editor. There were all kinds of stories about him. He was newspaperman, too, so that's four of them. Four out of the eight were newspaper people.

Ms. Boswell: That's interesting. I wonder why.

Sen. Greive: Well, they were the darlings of the press. The press didn't like us at all. When they had a chance, the people who wrote for the newspapers—not the news services, but the folks who reviewed for *The Seattle Times* and so forth—they were real partisans. They liked the newspapermen, and they gave the coalition all kinds of publicity. They were the darlings of the press, and how independent they were, and how they were above party, and how they believed in principle—all a good deal of which was nonsense. But that was the image that they were given. So, there was an advantage, press-wise, to join that kind of a group.

Ms. Boswell: You could be assured of press. Did they caucus, too?

Sen. Greive: No. As far as I know, they didn't, and that gave us an advantage. But eventually, it became a tradition. Eventually, when we controlled, we'd be into caucus, then they wanted to caucus, too. Well, there was no room. We caucused in the Appropriations Committee room, if it was big enough. They didn't have one. The only place that we had was the women's restroom, so we took away the women's restroom and we added a big foyer to it, or a big room. I think that's what they still use today.

Ms. Boswell: When you say "we," that was when the Democrats ran the Legislature?

Sen. Greive: It was the whole Legislature. I think I was partly responsible for that. I always believed, very firmly, that we had to distribute the spoils evenly. I was always for giving them the help they wanted and the rooms they wanted, and things of that sort.

Ms. Boswell: Was that a reaction to their parsimoniousness?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I don't know. I thought it was so unfair when I first went there. It just shocked me that they would be that crazy to get even with each other on a personal basis. I suppose I also benefited because some of the Republicans agreed with it. For instance, in the years I was there, we never would raise the question of consideration on the other side in making a speech, and that sort of thing. We did it to A. L. "Slim"
. We couldn't do it to anyone else.

Ms. Boswell: We had talked earlier about Perry Woodall and the House doing that. Tell me a little more about that.

Sen. Greive: Of course, Perry was a very capable guy, and he was one of the funniest men I've ever known in my life. He was a lawyer, and he was very outspoken, but he was a real straight shooter. In other words, he wasn't devious or you didn't have to worry about him. Really, he was one of the finer legislators when it came to crafting and things. He wasn't a very big man on details, but on principle; if two sides had to make a compromise, why he'd work out the compromise. He wouldn't work out the language—maybe somebody else would do that, although he might, on occasion. He became the minority leader and then the majority leader. At least, by the time I knew him, he was the majority leader of the House. He had all new people. See, the sweep of 1946 just took everybody out. I think there were twenty-six Democrats left out of one hundred, or ninety-nine. So, he had sixty or seventy people—sixty-some people—and he could have a two-thirds majority.

The Democrats and some of the people saw what we were doing, having a fine old time in the Senate. They weren't going to have that nonsense over in the House, so if they didn't like what someone was doing, they would get up and raise the question of consideration. Now, in the parliamentary scheme of things—Reed's Rules we use, not Robert's, but Reed's Rules—the question of consideration meant that you could stop any person in the middle of a sentence, because it had priority. It was like a question of personal privilege. And you just raised the question of consideration, and that meant you couldn't consider it any more. Then they put it to the House, and the House voted "aye," and then you just sat down. You didn't even get to finish your sentence. So, Woodall started doing that, and the Democrats thought that it was a great tactic because it was so unfair, so they encouraged and goaded him on, and they made him do it all the time. In other words, once he went down the road, it was almost like taking narcotics. He couldn't get off it. That was the crutch he had to have, so they just raised it on everybody.

Of course it hurt Woodall's image with a lot of the Democrats, but it didn't with me because, when I had a piece of legislation I wanted having to do with the law school and some other things, he helped me. I had gotten acquainted with him socially, and I liked him. I visited one time over in Eastern Washington, and we became friends.

Ms. Boswell: One of the issues that you did link up with him in your first session was over the law school?

Sen. Greive: Yes. I was a student at the law school and Dean Faulkner was the head. His father-in-law had founded the law school and he more or less inherited it—well, he became a professor and then married the old man's daughter, so he was a legitimate professor.

Washington was the only place that I know of that had a four-year law school, rather than three. The veterans didn't like the idea of having people go longer to law school in the

state of Washington than in other places. Even I didn't like the idea, and I kind of stirred them up. So I introduced legislation to reduce it to take two quarters off. I didn't want to take the whole year off; I did feel that was too much. But that would mean that you'd have to go one quarter more, and then you could complete it in three years.

This proposal struck happiness in the hearts of students because these students were people who'd been through wars, and all the little funny traditions that somebody had didn't faze them much. They came down and wanted to know what to do, so I put them to work lobbying. So they went and lobbied everybody. That was part of the reason why Woodall and I became friends, because he had a very close friend who was going to law school and who wanted that done.

Ms. Boswell: So that's why he joined with you?

Sen. Greive: Well, it was more than that. I'd gotten acquainted and friendly with him, but that was probably the binding thing.

Ms. Boswell: And you got in quite a tussle with the head of the law school as a result of that?

Sen. Greive: I was flunked out. I guess I was flunked out twice, and no one will ever know. I think maybe now, in my old age, that I was legitimately flunked out, but at the time, it was always a question as to whether or not they had it in for me. Even when I tried to transfer to Gonzaga, they didn't want to take me. They said that I was a Catholic, a layman, and they were very happy to have me, but that they were afraid because they had to be okayed by the National Association of Law Schools. See, they weren't accepted at that time, and they had an application pending. They said they'd write me a reference to some other law school, or do anything, but they didn't want to get crosswise because they'd heard about Faulkner and they hated him. Faulkner never came back to the school. He came back for a short period of time and then left it to teach at Columbia. He took the defeat so personally, so I understand, terribly personally. So, who knows whether I legitimately flunked out.

However, on the other side, you've got to look at it this way. I was a young state senator, the youngest state senator. I was a state senator in a law school; I was a factor anyplace you go, and who knows? I had all kinds of interests and so forth, and probably I never did really very well in law school. So, I went away to law school and then I did fine. Actually, I graduated from the University of Miami in Florida.

Ms. Boswell: Did your opponents try to take on that issue of your flunking out of law school?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I don't remember. Well, for one thing, that's pretty hard because only twenty-five percent of the people got through in those days. I know because I've got the figures. When I got in my fight, I found out that thirty-seven percent were knocked out as freshmen. That was the system. His system was to let anybody apply, but they would just eliminate them in the first year. I got the statistics through the Committee on Education. I don't know whether it was in that session or subsequent sessions—probably subsequent sessions. But, I know that my figures on that year that I looked at were that thirty-eight percent had flunked out. That was pretty standard. About forty percent flunked out the first year, and about twenty five percent ever completed.

Ms. Boswell: That legislation that you sponsored, did it pass to eliminate two quarters?

Sen. Greive: It passed. Two quarters. Then the school itself, because it was different than

every other law school in the United States—it was cumbersome and different in the catalogs, and they didn't want it—so they just went and took the year off. We had it like every other law school. So, I think the bill said two quarters, but I don't think there was ever two quarters; it was just a year.

Ms. Boswell: It looks like a lot of the other legislation during the first years of your service in the Senate involved veterans benefits.

Sen. Greive: I don't know, but as I look here now, I know that would have been my attitude and that I'd like to be on veterans' things. But you see, I did a lot of solo sponsoring there. We always had a lot of people on the bills I had. But, at that particular point in my life, nobody was very anxious. I didn't pack any wallop. I'm not saying that, on occasion, our vote wasn't needed; there's always going to be a close issue that doesn't go along party lines. Generally speaking, I don't think anybody ever thought that I was of sufficient importance or influence that they had to pay much attention to me.

Except, I made a lot of speeches, and I became quite good at parliamentary law. I decided that the only time I could win was on parliamentary points, so I made a real study of it. I went back and made a study of the past rulings, and I put them on flash cards so that if that situation came up, I could stand up and immediately make the objection. So, I got to be more expert than almost anybody there. So, in the first two or three sessions I did a lot of work on that. In my later years, I used to teach a course in parliamentary law. I did that for a long time.

Ms. Boswell: Wasn't Rosellini also a master of parliamentary law?

Sen. Greive: He wasn't very good at parliamentary law at all. The person who was good at parliamentary law was a guy by the name of Vic Zednick. He was a Republican. That was another good thing about my learning parliamentary law: I could make the motions I wanted. Rosellini made speeches, and he liked planning things, but he was never very sharp on where the motion fit. However, if he made the motion, Vic Meyers might try to be on his side if he could because he was a more prestigious person.

Ms. Boswell: How did Vic Meyers fit into all this? Was he respected, or not?

Sen. Greive: Until you said "respected," I don't know. He was, like so many people in this world, a very complex guy. On balance, he was a hell of a fine public servant. He had many weaknesses. He liked to drink way too much. He knew parliamentary law and was excellent. That's why I took up parliamentary law. It put him kind of in a spot because when I was right, he wouldn't always rule with me because he just felt that he couldn't carry the day, or that they'd try to overrule him, or something. But he used to rule with me most of the time because he knew I knew what I was talking about.

I got the idea of learning parliamentary law from Vic Meyers. He's the one that thought it was a good thing for a young senator to learn. He said that if you wanted to get somewhere, learn the rules. It set me up to be floor leader because I knew all of the rules a lot better than anyone else. That's why people like Bob Bailey weren't comfortable on the floor. I was because I was always making objections, and I understood this particular point. It was a great thing for a young law student because, while it has very little to do with law, it's something like law. It helped me in various clubs and organizations. It just was a good thing to know.

Vic, for all of his drinking and for all of the bad things that he did, tried to make himself a lawyer. At one point, he said that if you serve

so many times as president of the Senate, you had a right to a law degree. He got it passed and signed by the governor. But, he never tried to take advantage of it because he figured the Supreme Court wouldn't honor it. He did a lot of crazy things. He was appointed one time as chairman of the Parks Commission. We created a Parks Commission and made the lieutenant governor chairman. He put all of his money in a state park at Sun Lakes because he thought that was the coming thing. Turned out that he was right. There wouldn't be a Sun Lakes, probably, except for Vic Meyers.

So, he had a lot of things that he did that weren't right, but generally speaking, he had a good, jolly way. He could bring sides together. He'd say, "Come in and have a drink, sit around." He had a big office. He sat on Rules, and when he wanted something, he had a way of lobbying for it. Generally, he did a good job in that sense. Of course, there was very little money in it. It paid practically nothing. Eventually, he became Secretary of State. He could always tell a joke, or some comic relief, and he always knew about how far he could go. If he felt it was something that the coalition wanted, and they were going to have it anyway, rather than fight them, he'd go along with them. But he didn't try to be a strong partisan leader. Mostly, he was the presiding officer, and tried to bring sides together.

Ms. Boswell: Didn't he end up being Lieutenant Governor both under Democrat and Republican governors?

Sen. Greive: He used to always say that he'd have been governor long ago, but they kept bringing in replacements. "If it weren't for those damn substitutes, I'd be governor." Of course, he called every succeeding governor a "substitute."

Ms. Boswell: There was a piece of legislation that you sponsored during that first year that you thought was a mistake. Tell me a little more about that.

Sen. Greive: From my vision, and my viewpoint, I thought that the country had changed in 1946, and that we were in for a period of Republican rule. It had been Republican until 1932, or in that area, and then it had been solidly Democrat, and now it had made a dramatic change. It was the first major change, and in my vision, I didn't see the Truman victory of two years later. I didn't foresee a lot of things.

So, I thought that the less we had of straight party voting on the ballot, the better off we were because the straight party vote is what killed you. The Republicans, and Vic Zednick, had attempted to get rid of the straight party vote before, so I put it in as a bill. Of course, the Republicans thought it had been part of their platform, and they didn't know they wanted it either. But they were kind of embarrassed because it was part of their state platform, and they said they wanted it, so they voted for it. Governor Wallgren didn't know whether it was a good or bad idea, so he let it go, too, so it got through.

But I was dead wrong, because if you look at statistics since—I haven't looked at them for this purpose, but I'm perfectly sure, off the top of my head—that you'd find that the vast majority of the straight party ballots have been Democratic. Democratic people usually had a strong hold on the less educated and less affluent people, and you could get them to pull one lever for everybody. So then, it would cover everybody, all the way down the line. This new way, they'd get a few top ones, and then they'd trail off because they didn't know everybody else on the ticket.

Ms. Boswell: Did you ever go against the Futile Fifteen during that first year?

Senator Greive: The only thing that happened

is that the appointment of the University of Washington regents came up and Governor Wallgren had three nominees. There was Dave Beck of the Teamsters and a fellow from the grange by the name of John King and another fellow who was the head of the inland boatman's union, Captain John Fox—all were up for approval. The Republicans tried to block their approval by holding the nominations in committee and the coalition Democrats didn't like that so they wanted to join back with the other Democrats. They pow-wowed and negotiated

But the Democrats—maybe it was just a majority they needed—were all going to vote together. And they needed me to be the deciding vote if they controlled. You see, nobody agonized. They just assumed they had my vote.

But then I saw a bunch of people that had deserted us, and I felt they hadn't been with us, and they had been voting with the Republicans. Now when they wanted something, we'd give them what they wanted and they weren't giving us any *quid pro quo*. I figured that we were selling out too cheap and that I needed to keep the fight going. I know I voted the other way on the thing, and got a lot of publicity out of it.

Both Fox and King were friends of mine, and I liked Dave Beck, but I figured I was helping the coalition if I voted with them. Fox and King didn't take my vote personally, which was amazing. I supported them when the Senate voted on confirmation, although Fox was turned down.

Ms. Boswell: You were in the Legislature in 1948, when the election came around, and Governor Langlie got back in. How did that affect the Futile Fifteen?

Sen. Greive: The coalition held; the coalition continued to rule the Senate. It amounted to a three-party system. The coalition held until Rosellini became governor. He followed Langlie. Langlie came back and he served two terms, so it held for eight years.

Okay, now with all those years the coalition held; however, it became more and more difficult for them because we weren't fifteen anymore. We got a lot more members. But then they were much closer, and it was tougher for the guys that wanted to collate; they felt more exposed. They would try to make some accommodation with us, and they picked up some new people—Riley from Seattle. Ed Riley was a coalitionist. But, most of those coalitionists kept getting re-elected because they were darlings of the press. They stayed coalitionists pretty much all of their lives—all of the time they were there—until Rosellini finally became governor in 1957, and I was the floor leader, and then they came over.

Ms. Boswell: Did the Futile Fifteen, as the sessions progressed and they got bigger, did they have some successes against the coalition?

Sen. Greive: As was certain to happen, Langlie wouldn't be able to get enough votes for all his programs. He needed votes. The various senators needed votes, and it wouldn't always break down so that the coalition would hold. The Republicans had a remarkable ability—and I guess they still have—to stick together. They'd go into a caucus, and they'd come out solid and didn't have to worry about it.

The Democrats didn't. I used to say that I'd only had two bound caucuses in all the time I was in the Legislature. We wouldn't be bound. We wouldn't stand for a bound caucus. That was the device that they used in Wallgren's administration; they would have the bound caucus, and that's how these people became dissidents. They would tell them that they had to vote or walk out, and they'd walk out. They'd say that to anybody who was in this room—we had to vote to do a certain thing or vote for a certain bill. It would always have to be a major bill, for you couldn't make it on the smaller

bills. But on a major bill everybody votes, and we're going to go with the majority, and many people found they were bound.

Ms. Boswell: How were the Republicans able to maintain that firm unified stance?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I spent many, many years of my life trying to figure out what was that cohesive thing. You'd probably have to talk to some Republican. From the outside, I imagine that there were several reasons. In the first place, I think it was the status quo. Then, like anyone else, they had a certain *esprit de corps*, camaraderie. It is pretty tough to be the guy that breaks the thing. They would occasionally let somebody off the hook if they had to, maybe. But a guy like John McCutcheon wouldn't stay bound—that was part of their problem. I don't know why they had such success. It was a phenomenal success to keep our people glued in.

Ms. Boswell: Was the leadership involved at all? I mean, how much of a role did they play?

Sen. Greive: Well, the leadership switched a lot of times. Bill Goodloe was leader of the Republicans for a while. Jimmy Andersen, who had just retired from the Supreme Court, was leader for a while. Woodall was the leader for a while. See, I stayed as the leader for eighteen years, and Rosellini was the leader before I was. So, from the time I was elected, in twenty-eight years we only had two leaders of our group. At the very end, I was out and Augie Mardesich was the leader for one year, but he had lots of problems. The Republicans didn't have that experience, but they were still always solid, even when their leadership kept changing.

Now, when the Republicans got Jeannette Hayner, she was leader for a long time. That was the first long-time leader, I think, that they've had. Jim Matson was the leader for a while. They used to switch leaders. So, I didn't attribute it to that, and I don't know why they stuck together so well. Like I said, I think it was their status quo that they felt that they had to protect each other. They were really a minority party and that was where their strength came from. That's the way we felt with the Futile Fifteen. But I don't understand how they stuck together.

Incidentally, in our first session down there, they wouldn't put any member of the Futile Fifteen on Rules. So, we had no representation on Rules—we had no committee chairmanships. So, naturally, we had nothing to lose, except we had a lot of camaraderie and fun.

The Rules Committee in those days was secret. You had to take a pledge that you wouldn't vote to take a bill away from Rules. I always thought when I got on Rules that I could do anything, so I was always a great one to move to take a bill away from Rules. We were never successful. Everybody would be afraid that they would retaliate against them in some other way. But we would always try to take a bill away from Rules. That would probably be a subject of a story when I finally became floor leader, but I always objected to it because you didn't know how people voted. I thought it was undemocratic and said a whole lot of other bad things about it.

Ms. Boswell: Why was that rule in place?

Sen. Greive: That was where the control was. It wasn't in the caucuses; it was in the Rules Committee. Drumheller and Earl Maxwell and the Langlie machine, they would populate the Rules Committee by their own people. If you didn't go along, that's when they took care of you. Your bills didn't get out, or somebody else's, or your bill with somebody else's name—they did all kinds of different things in the Rules Committee. They were supposed to set the agenda, but it, in effect, became a committee that was more powerful than

anything else.

No senator who wanted to get his legislation through dared vote against the Rules Committee because he might be taken care of later. At least that was the tradition. Then, they all had a pledge that they wouldn't talk. You had to take the pledge: "I pledge not to tell." They went right around the table. I saw part of that happen later, and it got to me when I became majority leader, but I never actually saw it in the early days. But that's what they all said.

Ms. Boswell: How would you go about getting bills out, then?

Sen. Greive: This usually happened late in the session. You'd have something that was in Rules. It had gotten out of committee because the committee could be covered by the press, or the press would know about it, but it was in Rules and it didn't come out, and nobody would know why it wasn't coming out. Nobody knew who to fix the blame on. They didn't publish anything. All you knew was it sort of disappeared in a black hole, and that was the end of it.

Ms. Boswell: What about Governor Langlie? How would you characterize him?

Sen. Greive: I thought he was a pretty good man, generally. I didn't necessarily get along with him because I was in the Futile Fifteen. I wasn't one of his favorite people or anything. I thought he was a pretty fair governor. I think he was fairly progressive, but he had his foibles, too.

Ms. Boswell: I had read a quote by a Democrat who called him a "stiff-necked, self- righteous, narrow-minded, smooth operator."

Sen. Greive: Probably Albert D. Rosellini?

Ms. Boswell: No, actually, I think it was Yantis, George Yantis.

Sen. Greive: Well, Yantis was Speaker of the House at that time. He wasn't a senator. Yes, that probably could be. Well, I think that those adjectives are all true, but that doesn't make him a bad leader, does it? He was stiff-necked, there's no question about that. He was overly religious. Well, during those years I went to church every day, but I never felt it necessary to call upon the Lord to do things, and that sort of thing. He was more of an old-fashioned Protestant-revivalist type.

Ms. Boswell: Were there any issues where you were particularly at odds with him?

Sen. Greive: I'm sure that if we went back and looked at it, there were. I just don't know what I did. But, as I look back on it, I think I probably supported a lot of this stuff because I thought it was in the best interest. I did that with Evans—I didn't like Dan Evans very well, but I did support a lot of his stuff. I was one of the best friends he ever had, legislatively.

CHAPTER 4

ANTI-COMMUNIST CRUSADES AND THE POST-WAR ERA

Ms. Boswell: I think the first year you came into the Legislature in 1947, the Canwell Committee was active.

Senator: Greive: Was that the first year? I thought it was the second or third year, but I remember I was one of the four Democratic votes against it.

Ms. Boswell: Could you tell me about the atmosphere during that time?

Sen. Greive: I thought it was wrong. That was a matter of principle. You don't know what the issues are, but once you get down there, and you put your full time into it, and you live in an atmosphere where every hour you're awake, somebody's talking about the issues. You become very knowledgeable in an awful hurry. It isn't like going to school and then going and doing something else. You lived it from the time you got up in the morning until you went to bed at night. You were in a political dither all the time. Everybody was talking to you, giving you various sides. It's one hundred percent politics, and you learn the things.

I was convinced. I didn't think much of Senator Joseph McCarthy. I felt that he was wrong, and he didn't have any proof. We should have done the same thing with Albert Canwell. I objected to it. And I felt I was protected because I was a Catholic. It was pretty hard to call me a communist. So, maybe that was the reason, but, whatever it was, there were seven votes against, as I recall, and four of them were Democratic, and I was one of the four. Rosellini, and a lot of other people, voted for the Canwell Committee, and they put an apology in the Senate Journal, telling why they had voted the way they did, explaining the vote. I didn't do that; I voted against it because I didn't believe in it. I was always very proud of that.

It is a popular stand today, but it wasn't popular when I came home. I was also an active Legionnaire, too. If you're a Legionnaire and a Catholic, it's pretty hard to be a communist.

Ms. Boswell: You said you had a pretty good-sized "communist element" in your district.

Sen. Greive: What they did, they were masters at moving in and taking over organizations. They'd get on the board of directors, or they would get a group, a small group. Everything was engineered for themselves. They'd have a cell in there, and that cell would reach out, and eventually, they would be speaking for the organization. They'd get them to pass resolutions, and so forth.

Ms. Boswell: So, there were some people that you would classify as communists around here?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yeah. There were secret members of the Communist Party, but let's get it straight: what they believed in, and what we think they believed in, are two different things. I think, generally speaking, they were pretty loyal, decent Americans. They would fight against Russia, if there was a fight, or anything like that. They were just liberal people that, in that particular era of the Depression—most of them were a few years older than I was—that's the way they were brought up. They got into a cell in school, and it was like the gangs are now.

It was an important thing, and they were all involved in the communist line. You can't judge them by today's standards, or by the Cold War's notions of ideology; you've got to judge them by how they were during their time. They were people who really thought there was going to be a change in the system. They felt that they were working for the underprivileged, and they didn't get anything out of it in the way of compensation or anything. They were sincere people. And, of course, they didn't like the church because the church was an anathema. It's the "opiate of the masses." They especially didn't like the Catholic Church because it was so blatantly anti-communist. McCarthy was a Catholic.

Ms. Boswell: Cardinal Spellman had come out fairly strongly against the communists.

Sen. Greive: He may very well have. It was the whole atmosphere of the church. They were fighting communists, and they were afraid it was going to take over—not over here, but Spain or Italy. It was a worldwide movement.

My mother, of course, was one of the right-wingers. She thought she was pretty liberal. But she'd come from Canada where she'd been active in the Liberal party. And she knew that's the side she was on—the Liberals, not the Conservatives. In this district, they pretty well controlled the precinct committee organization. They ran people for precinct committeeman, worked like hell to have control, and they made alliances with people who were not part of their group. They always said everything is a coalition sort of a thing with them.

The Old Age Pension Union started out in what they called the Commonwealth Builders. That was their front, the Commonwealth Builders. They did have, I'm convinced, a secret organization. And I'm convinced that they met secretly, and that they voted as a unit, and they worked to control things. But, my problem was, if they controlled things, what terrible things were going to happen? So they controlled. So we had some left-wingers up there. Were they going to promote things that were going to ruin everybody, or send everybody to prison who was going to steal something? They weren't going to do any of those things, so it didn't bother me particularly. The fact is, many of the things they wanted I was for, but I certainly didn't want to be associated or controlled by them. They seemed to be obsessed by the fact that you had to be controlled.

Prior to that time we had a fellow by the name of John C. Stevenson. He ran for the United States Congress, Senate, and for governor of Washington. He was very close every time. He was on the radio commenting for L.R. Clark chain of dentists, and eventually he went over to the Republicans. Then another fellow by the name of Howard Costigan came along, and he was a commentator. Commentators were hot property. They were like talk show hosts are now. They'd be commenting on the radio and people would listen to them, and they had a following. Costigan was the big man in their group.

Another person who was a big man in their group was Marion Zioncheck. I think he came from the left-wing, University of Washington group. He had been an attorney, and when he was up for re-election for Congress he'd gotten drunk and eventually went off the deep end. He committed suicide, but was always kind of a crazy man. Warren Magnuson ran for Congress after him.

In any event, this was before I was elected, and they had one state senator from Snohomish County. I don't think it included Everett. There're two districts up there and he got expelled from the Senate for being a communist. That was before I came.

Ms. Boswell: Now, how could that work?

Sen. Greive: Well, they voted to kick him out. They had a trial and said he wasn't fit to be a senator, and refused to seat him because he was, supposedly, a communist. You have to be seated each time you're elected. They wouldn't seat him even though he'd gotten the most votes.

We were living in an atmosphere that was already ripe with problems. There was a reaction to that, and they used to say they were "Farleyists." The fact is that big Jim Farley was the national Democratic chairman. He says, "We've got forty-nine states; no, we've got forty-seven states and the Soviet state of Washington." And so apparently, the Communist Party was strongest in the states of Washington, New York, and California. They didn't control the whole of California, but around San Francisco and places like that, where they had the docks and so forth.

And a part of the impetus for the communists to get into the unions was the maritime unions. They were very, very strong, and there was more than one. There was the Maritime Union and then there was the Sailor's Union of the Pacific. The Sailor's Union of the Pacific was a conservative group. There was more than one maritime union on the votes. And they were in fights. And then there were various longshoremen. They were very strong there and they were big in the ship scalers, the people that did the rigging and all that sort of thing. They had them in their pockets, and their leader was Harry Bridges.

Now, I don't fully understand all of the details as to how they worked. I was certainly vitally interested in these fights as I grew up. My mother would talk about how she would confront Howard Costigan down at the conventions. One of their favorite tricks was to extend the thing so late that everybody went home, and then they controlled the conventions. They were able to do this because they had better discipline. They loved conventions. They liked conventions or meetings where they could stall and just carry on and on and on, and then their people were disciplined and they would stay. They were tremendous workers.

Well, when I was elected, the fellow that I ran against was named Paul Thomas. As an actual matter, once I got elected, I realized he was a pretty good legislator. But, in my mother's eyes, he was a bad man. He was anti-Catholic, there was no question about that. He made various statements about the Pope running this and that, and some other things. I don't know whether I explained that, at least locally, we used to call one side the "commies" and the other side, they called them the "Pope's men." My mother did—that was before my time. Well, all the Pope's men weren't Catholics. They were left over from the Al Smith campaign, but they were the focal point. And all of the commies weren't communists by any means. There were one or two leaders, and a sort of a left-wing contingent following them. That was the background of when I first ran. That was the fight.

When I first ran, it was a three-way race. There was a conservative Democrat running by the name of Jerry George, and the business community backed him. I was really backed by myself. But I worked a lot harder than they did. Paul Thomas, who was the third candidate, was at a disadvantage because he had infantile paralysis when he was a kid. He couldn't get around. He couldn't doorbell and do the things that I did. I won out in a three-way race.

But, see, it was actually a four-way race, but the Republican, John A. Buck, didn't have much chance. He ran several times and eventually became a good friend of mine. I've always been proud of the fact that virtually everybody I ever ran against were eventually friends of mine. It may have taken a little time, but I always went out of my way to make sure that we were friendly. I knocked myself out because I always felt that it was tough enough

to lose, but you're very vulnerable, and anybody that wants to be a friend.

But anyway, that was the atmosphere when I was elected. Of the Futile Fifteen, we had one or two that were probably part of what we used to call the "commies." They were part of the underground network in the state Legislature.

Ms. Boswell: You made the point earlier—and it's an interesting one—that what were people really afraid of, those people who were out there, trying to expose the communists?

Sen. Greive: That was the ridiculousness of it. And because I had never been a part of the party fights, maybe that's why I didn't see it. I could never understand what horrible thing they wanted to do, that we thought they were going to do. I'd have no doubt in my mind but what these people were loyal Americans, that they would fight for the country, and that they were people who would not stand for a dictatorship. Maybe there would eventually be the International—the communists called it the "International"—some sort of an international organization that they were working toward. If there was, I didn't know anything about that.

But the allegations were so overblown and so blown out of proportion, that there was nothing you could do to bring any sanity to the people on both sides. Everything was black and white, in the sense that you were with us or you were against us. There didn't seem to be any middle ground.

Ms. Boswell: Washington was considered by some, at least, as a hot-bed of radicalism. How could a Canwell Committee arise in that kind of environment?

Sen. Greive: Deadly fear. In my first election, they turned them all out. It was twenty Democrats in the Senate, and thirty Democrats left in the House. There were fifteen incumbents who got defeated.

But I got elected. I was the only Democrat that got elected, and that was because I wasn't associated with any of that sort of thing. There was a sweep: just throw the bums out. Now, a great number of those people were re-elected later.

It's a funny thing. A fellow like Mike Gallagher was thrown out then, but four years later he was back in the Senate. Two years later he was in the House, and then he went back to the Senate. There were a number of people in that position that they tried to sweep out and didn't sweep out, or didn't stay swept out. The idea was someone had the fear that they were anti-God and that they were anti-America, that sort of thing. The fact is that I didn't know then, and I still don't know now exactly what they were "anti." But according to my mother, they were bad people, and I was brought up with it.

In our district they had almost as many, sometimes even more, than the radicals. In other words, it was not a one-sided fight. But the commies—who we called commies, maybe they would be called liberals now—they had good discipline. They would all show up at a meeting at almost any time or place. And they'd be part of the planning and they would get various other people who were friends of theirs, and they'd bring them to work part of the thing, and they worked hard at it. They loved meetings. Their ideas—they wanted something when they were in control of the meeting. If they had the chairmanship of the party, or if they had the club, or if they were the president of the club, that was something. Because their whole structure seemed to be heading toward a take-over, little by little, and they'd climb on each other's shoulders to control. That's the way they were going to control things.

And of course, they were involved in a number of things that were controversial, such as the Spanish Civil War. Now, looking back

on these events and with what I've read since then, I may think differently, but right or wrong, in those days I knew I was for Franco. I was a Catholic and that was the side I was supposed to be on. I didn't know; I was in high school then. They were concerned about the shipping of scrap iron to Japan because they were killing off Chinese. Well, I think they were probably right on that. Most of the other things they were for were things on the subject of race, which have long since been accepted. They were very concerned about the unions and the right to organize, the right to strike, and picket. All of that's been accepted.

I never felt that communists posed that great a threat. The things they generally pushed, their agenda, I was for, and I think the vast majority of Democrats supported. I know, as an actual matter of fact, my first vote was for Norman Thomas; it wasn't for Roosevelt or Wilkie. I'm sure that if we had somebody here from the right-wing, maybe Canwell or somebody, they'd bring up a lot of stuff I'm not for because I don't remember all the things they were for. I just have a sort of a feel, now. I haven't made any study of it.

Ms. Boswell: And what about the national politics?

Sen. Greive: Now, okay, that's my next step. That was the atmosphere here, but it was also very pervasive. It was in a lot of other states, too. This wasn't the only place. It was prevalent, especially in the big cities: Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Chicago. Chicago, to a lesser extent, because that city had a real machine and the machine ran things. And so the left-wing never got very far. Chicago had a big Catholic population, which made a difference, too. They didn't have the racial mix that they have now. The blacks didn't control forty percent of the vote or anything like that.

But in this general atmosphere, that was the beginning of McCarthy. McCarthy just came along, and he was actually an easy-going guy and a great campaigner. He campaigned by going door-to-door for a judgeship, and then he would take out a dictating machine and plug it into his car and dictate a letter back to them and tell them what great people they were. And that's how he won. He was a very good judge after that. And then he ran for U.S. senator. He pretended he'd been a fighter pilot and a lot of things he wasn't, which I don't need to go into. But the point was that he then made his charges against the State Department, they got all kinds of publicity, and he had everybody petrified.

For one thing, he beat Millard Tydings. Tydings thought he was safe in Maryland; he was an old-line Democrat, a rather conservative fellow. They beat him by taking composite photographs of him with Browder and with the communists, just outrageous things, and ran these in the newspaper. They had him eating and various things that turned out later to be composites. They got away with it. It was a newspaper that has since gone out of existence—I think it was the *Baltimore World*. But they had these composite photographs of him palling around with the communists, and while they tried to protest, it never really came to light until after the election was over. Eventually, Tydings' son-in-law became Secretary of State.

For my part, after I was elected, I got in a big fight at the University of Washington Law School, and I ended up going to the University of Miami. And then I ran into the same attitude down in Florida. Claude Pepper, Congressman Pepper, was a big radical, big left-winger, and he said nice things about Joe Stalin and so forth and so on. Tremendous campaigner, and they ran a fellow by the name of George Smathers against him, who had been a congressman. But Pepper had been Smathers' godfather by getting him all kinds of things, such as an Army

deferment, and helping get him elected to the House, and everything. In those days they spent one million dollars, I think it was over one million dollars, which was unheard of.

And I was a part of Pepper's campaign. I was in some of the parades for him. And he would come to the meetings and he would take his coat and throw the collar around, and he'd walk across the stage and he'd say, "Is Stalin in? Hey, Joe, I got some secrets for ya." And he'd try to make fun of it.

And not only that, but there was an episode described in my book on campaigning,* where Pepper had all kinds of personal letters written to him by Smathers, saying what a good guy he was and wanting him to run for Congress in those days and asking him for favors. They were very embarrassing letters. And as a final pitch Pepper was trying to distribute those letters, and he couldn't distribute them because every time they tried to distribute them, they'd be picked up. There was a standing offer out at the University of Miami, where you could earn twelve dollars a day by going out and picking this stuff up behind them. The newspapers wouldn't accept his ads—it was that bad. So, the whole atmosphere was just completely out of kilter, and it wasn't until eventually McCarthy's story broke, and he was exposed for the bum that he was. Then the atmosphere changed.

But times changed. You can't really appreciate how things were then because I've never seen anything quite like it.

Ms. Boswell: Do you see Canwell as a local or a regional McCarthy type?

Sen. Greive: I learned things about Canwell from you that I didn't even know. I always viewed Canwell as a kind of quiet, sort of a secretive guy that I thought just hit popular tenets, just about the time when that was a popular thing to do. And he had fantastic support from the *Spokesman-Review*, and of course they owned the *Chronicle*, too. They were two different papers both owned by the same people. But, the *Spokesman-Review* had different editorial policies and was much broader; it covered all of the outlying areas around Spokane. The *Chronicle* was a home paper mostly for people in Spokane. It was delivered at night.

There was a guy by the name of Ashley Holden who was very much of a right-wing guy. He eventually got mixed up with a bunch of nuts when he retired and bought a paper over in Okanogan County. He was the person who got all involved with the Goldmarks. There was big deal in all the papers about that. Goldmark had been the state representative from there. His wife was supposed to have been a member of the Communist Party, and so forth.

Well, Ashley Holden just fanned the flames, and he painted Canwell as a great man. Well, then the paper did, too. They just gave him all the publicity he could use. And so at home he got to thinking he was a pretty important character. Eventually, of course, Ed Guthman exposed him, and his balloon popped, so he didn't enjoy the notoriety very long. A year or two is all, and then he was history.

He was very much of a right-winger. Of course, he was a Republican, and he came from an area that was basically Democratic, and that was his problem. Had he come from a district that was more Republican, he'd have stayed in forever, and he'd never been defeated. He was defeated in 1949 partly because he was in a

**Editor's note: Senator Greive refers to his book* The Blood, Sweat, and Tears of Political Victory. . .and Defeat, (University Press of America, Lanham, MD: 1996)

Democratic district. Later, in 1952 and 1954, he ran for congressman-at-large, but he was turned down. The fellow who eventually won that seat was very clever. He was a real genius. I always said that John Cooney was born twenty years too soon. He should have been an old-line politician. Never made a speech. He didn't believe in speeches.

Ms. Boswell: Never made a speech?

Sen. Greive: No. I never heard him make a speech. He wasn't a speaker. He was a maneuverer, and he knew what he wanted. He wanted very basic things for his district, and he wanted to be a state senator. He and I were very close friends. He was just a very quiet guy that most people didn't know very much about. He's the one I mentioned had the seat in the Senate. So that's what happened.

So Canwell had targeted these people, especially the University of Washington professors. Nothing could be a better target for people from Spokane than the University of Washington. And apparently they had a number of people out there, including a number of professors, who were in part of the group. Whether they were communists I don't know, but they were part of the group. And some of them—Burton James is one of them, and I'm trying to think of his wife's name. They were an actor and actress, and they had the Seattle Repertory Playhouse. And they were off-campus, so the university had no control over them, but they said they were trying to influence the voters and so forth. There were several professors out there who were very prominent at the time and were sucked into the fight.

You understand, it was just before World War II that the communists were cooperating with Hitler. That was another thing that shocked everybody and embarrassed a bunch of the local leaders, and so, at that point, a lot of the left-wingers left the party and didn't want anything to do with it; they thought it was bad news and so forth. But the communists were an organized functioning political group, and they didn't have a lot of money, but they had barrels and barrels of hard work. They had several of the statewide initiatives that they solicited signatures for, and they ran them across the state because they found they couldn't get things through the Legislature that they wanted.

Ms. Boswell: So they were very overt. They certainly weren't hiding what they were doing.

Sen. Greive: They were not hiding their beliefs, but they were hiding their affiliation. Every one of them would swear that they weren't communists. I don't know if they'd do any swearing because they'd be afraid of conviction, but they didn't say that they were communists at all. They would play it down. They would say what I was saying: "What are you afraid of? What are we going to do? Are you for this or for that?" They were great ones to hang on the issues. Issues seemed to be everything. They were heady readers, and they had two or three bookstores around that they frequented a lot, and that was a meeting place a lot of times.

Down in the House, so the story goes, they had a fellow who was chairman of a committee called "Dikes, Drains, and Ditches." Now I don't know if that was a real committee, or one that they made up, but in those days it was the custom for the chairman to stand up and say. "There'll be a meeting of the Ways and Means Committee," and so forth. It wasn't organized as well as it is now. "At such and such a time this afternoon," he'd say, "there's a meeting of Dikes, Drains, and Ditches," and he always called it at noon. And the people who showed up would be the left-wingers who were in there plotting, if you want to call it that.

We'd call it strategizing now, strategizing to get the things that they wanted. They, of course, tried to get appointments, and they tried

to get various things that they thought helped them. They were always in the forefront of any kind of a march. They had a song that they would sing, and they had a lot of the elements of a fraternal organization, almost. They had to keep quiet to protect each other, and they extended their influence quite widely.

Ms. Boswell: What about the leadership?

Sen. Greive: Well, as far as I'm able to discern, the leadership was a kind of a fluid thing. The two leaders that I thought of as being the most prominent were Bill Pennock and Tom Rabbitt. But William Pennock, he was editor of their paper, the *Commonwealth Builder* paper. Eventually, they dropped that name. And that's what he did, and he also had some other support from various things.

And Rabbitt, I don't know exactly what he ever did. The story that people whispered around was that he was an FBI man, but that was some years later, when they came and demanded testimony and he wasn't called to testify. But in those days, people weren't saying that. He was out there leading the fight. He was always the most radical of the radicals and so forth.

They ran people and endorsed people for city offices and for county offices. They just wanted to be a part of the action, as far as I'm able to determine. They were very strong in some districts. They were quite strong in my district, especially around the Alki area. What always amazed me was that they had a tendency to be strong in areas that voted Republican. But that's probably because it was easiest to control the organization there. See, if you had a basically Democratic constituency, there would be other Democrats with other ideas. But if you went into an area where there were only Republicans, and Democrats were the people who stood up against them, then it was easy to elect your people. So they controlled several of the districts, some party and state conventions, and things like that. And they made various types of deals.

There was a fellow named Jerry O'Connell who'd been a congressman from Butte, Montana, and who had been defeated, as I understand it, because his constituency didn't go for the fact that he was radical. Plus he had a girlfriend, and he left the home hearth, and so forth. By that time he was married to her, and they came out here together. He was the state chairman of the Democratic Party for a short time, and then after the disastrous defeat of 1946 when they removed him, he ran for state representative, I think, and some other things. He was one of the leaders.

The most visible of their leaders was a fellow by the name of Hugh DeLacy. Hugh DeLacy was a very handsome young man at that time, an assistant professor out at the University of Washington. He ran for city council and got elected, and then he ran for Congress and got elected, but then he got wiped out. There was a massive effort to get him out of office. He left shortly after that time to be the chairman of the remnants of Wallace's Progressive Party in Ohio. He was there for a few years, and as I understand it, he ended up married to a woman who was a TV or radio commentator. Eventually he drifted off to California and left politics. He ended up just working with his hands. Didn't use his education at all. He was a carpenter, at least that's what his obituary said when I read it.

But he was a very good speaker and very personable. He was handsome and they called themselves "New Dealers" and all that sort of thing. As far as an ideological leader, I think he'd probably be the leader. I don't know how the structure worked on the inside.

Ms. Boswell: And then Canwell, when he came in, how did he build himself into being a leader?

Sen. Greive: Well, in 1946 there was a sweep, one huge sweep. I don't remember how many

Democrats were left, but the Republicans controlled just about everything.

Along came Canwell and he wanted a communist investigation committee. And so everybody was afraid, very afraid—bordering on outright fear—that if you didn't vote for it you'd be cast as a communist. One of the proudest things I have done in my life is not voting for the Committee. I think that there were eight votes against it.* There were a couple of Republicans and three or four Democrats, as I remember, and I was one of the Democrats.

But anyway, they set up this committee and one of the hardest things for people to conceive is that all of the protections we have in our state, the Bill of Rights, didn't exist then. When you say that, people can't believe it, even though the Bill of Rights goes back to the founding and the Constitution. First, they passed the Constitution. Then the Founding Fathers promised the states a Bill of Rights in order to get the votes for it. All right. Almost immediately the question became, did they have any power beyond the federal government? And, of course, those were the years of states' rights. Even after the Civil War and all that, the judges were still the old-fashioned conservatives. The states' rights prevented them from doing it, so if for instance, if it was a federal crime, you could prosecute them and you had your right to take the Fifth Amendment. But you didn't unless you had to confront witnesses. But you, as a witness, didn't have it.

We didn't have that, and this was a state committee operating within the state. We had laws like that in our state constitution and we had some restrictions, but they didn't have the same force. In fact, they weren't enforced by our courts like they are now. So, what they would do is—Canwell had a whole package of bills he was promoting to prosecute Reds. That was the basis.

In other words, you had this committee, and it was investigating communism. The idea was that they were going to suppress the Reds, and they had newsletters put out by the right-wingers. They said they had undercover information, and I don't know whether they did or not. But the whole atmosphere was ripe, and Canwell got a lot of publicity, and so he just took off.

Now, to say he was a leader depends on how you describe a leader. He was a leader in the sense that he had a committee and they were going to investigate and make life uncomfortable for people. I don't think he sent anybody to jail. I don't think that he ever tried to lop over and say that you couldn't vote for this bill or that bill because of what he did. So, to be fair to him, just like you tried to be fair to the communists or to the people who were in the secret society, what he was doing was mostly ruining reputations and knocking heads together. But he wasn't passing legislation, and he wasn't saying, "Well, you've got to vote for this—you can't vote for an accommodations bill for the blacks." He didn't get into things that—fact is, he may have even voted for a lot of the stuff. I'd have to see his voting record to make sure. I might be disappointed if I saw it. But I didn't think of him as a leader in the sense that he was running the show.

Ms. Boswell: So, he really didn't have any additional agenda other than his committee?

Sen. Greive: The committee was his thing. Now, you told me today what I didn't know

**Editor's note: The 1947 Senate Journal records twelve votes against the formation of the committee.*

before, that he had a background in investigation. I didn't know that.

I think Canwell was just a fellow that loved the publicity and loved investigation and I don't doubt that, as you said today, he got information from the FBI and so forth. I believe every word of that.

I believe that J. Edgar Hoover was a lot of things. He may have been a good thing in the long run because he stamped out crime, but he had an agenda all his own, and he wasn't a bit bashful about enforcing it. I don't doubt that they supplied Canwell with a lot of information. The story goes that they'd get together and they'd say, "Well, wait a minute. There's three of us, but we'd better wait for the FBI man." The FBI was shot through the entire organization, had informants in all of the meetings, and so there probably was a lot of plotting and so forth. But I never heard of them murdering anybody or stealing anything. As I said before, I don't know what were the terrible things these communists accomplished. Maybe they were going to overthrow the government, but I never head of any insurrection or anything like that.

Ms. Boswell: Did you ever attend any of the hearings?

Sen. Greive: No. I was willing to vote against it, but I wasn't going to get any more involved than I had to. Plus the fact that I was trying to go to school then. I was just too busy.

I have a cute story on that. It seems that along about that year, I was going to school at the University of Washington. I had a girlfriend, and I would take the streetcar over and then I would meet her in the library. Then we'd go over and have breakfast, and we'd come back. You'll just have to take my word for it that I never had intercourse with her—and that's going to become part of the story. She was in Canwell's district in Eastern Washington.

On this particular day, they had said that the people they called had to answer the questions, that the Fifth Amendment was not protected in the state court. The Supreme Court had handed it down, or the Superior Court, or one or the other. I remember we were off campus and I was talking to her. We were arguing, and she said that, by gosh, if she weren't a communist, she'd be willing to stand up there and say so. "Why are they wanting to take the Fifth Amendment?" and so forth. I said, "Well, let's think of it this way: supposing there was another committee investigating the morals of college students? I'm not saying that you've had intercourse with a man that's not your husband, but say you had, and you were asked. In one way you'd be guilty of perjury, and the other way, everybody in the state of Washington would know it."

Ms. Boswell: What did she say?

Sen. Greive: Nothing happened. We must have walked—it seemed like an eternity—but it was about two or three blocks, and she went to the regular library, and I went to the law library, which was across the street from it. Well, the day that Wallgren lost, she was in the next room—she'd been my date that night—and we came out, and she was having a terrible argument with a fellow by the name of Sullivan. Sullivan had been a former legislator, but he'd been a right-winger, and now he was a Democrat. He was saying that the reason Wallgren was losing the election was because he'd cozied up too close to the communists. She started talking about the Canwell Committee, and that whole ball of fire. She said she was a Republican, and she hated the Canwell Committee. She was just really giving him the business. I thought to myself, "At least I know where she learned that!"

Ms. Boswell: That's a great story.

Sen. Greive: Oh, she was just telling him, she says, "I'm not even a Democrat; I'm a Republican, but right's right." She was telling him what a bad guy Representative Canwell was. And she had it all down. She knew there was no right to the Fifth Amendment. Of course, we didn't call it the Fifth Amendment then, but there was no way you could answer the committee that wouldn't be unfair. They didn't have a right to cross-examine. Once they did the damage there was no way of repairing it. They didn't give you your day in court; they didn't have to call you. She really had them down.

Ms. Boswell: And you were her teacher on that one. That was a good analogy you made. As a freshman senator, what made you take that stand?

Sen. Greive: I just thought—here's what I knew: I felt that you couldn't cross-examine; you couldn't refuse to answer; you didn't have control over what you wanted to testify to, that you just didn't have any rights—and it was wrong. I have to confess that what I say now isn't much clearer in my mind than what I thought then, but I thought I had sufficient reason. I thought it was plain unfair that they could ruin somebody's reputation and that a person couldn't fight back.

If you accused a person of being a communist, they'd put that in the paper. He could be a nice guy and that never made the paper. Or if you said someone was a communist, they didn't get a fair shot to rebut the claim. I felt they were just ruining reputations.

Ms. Boswell: What was the precedent for that kind of investigation?

Sen. Greive: I think that it was all sprung about the same time as McCarthy, or right before McCarthy, but when the candle's there to be lit, and you've got a match in your hand, somebody's going to do something.

Before McCarthy, you understand, there was the Dies Un-American Activities Committee, and that had been going for several years. So it wasn't like McCarthy was the first to do it, although he made the accusations and received front-page publicity. He was the most prominent. But it may be that this was before McCarthy's era even—what I'm talking about—because we thought of Martin Dies from Texas who was a Democrat, a right-wing Democrat, as being the big investigator in those days. But he really didn't have the credibility that McCarthy did. Somehow people weren't as afraid of him. Of course, he was a congressman from Texas, and that was the South, and McCarthy came from Wisconsin, which was a fairly liberal state.

It had a history of being a progressive state. The Progressive Party started there under the LaFollette brothers. One was governor and one was a senator. Their father before them had been a U.S. senator, and actually he'd run for president on the Progressive ticket, the old Progressive Party—they had been called the Progressive Party then. They had Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives. So he came from a different background and so forth, and was much more credible, I think, than Martin Dies.

Ms. Boswell: Was there any precedent in Washington itself for that kind of investigation?

Sen. Greive: I don't think for the investigative committee. We did have a situation some years before that—before I was down there—and I can't remember the senator's name, but he got elected in Snohomish County. In those days, as I recall, they had two senators, one from Everett and one from the rest of the county. But in any event he had been expelled—they refused to seat him after he was elected. And that meant, of course, all kinds of publicity.

They accused him of this and they accused him of that, and asked him if he believed in the Bible and a lot of things that today would seem a little ridiculous.

Among other things, the man I ran against, Paul Thomas, made a speech in his behalf. I'd forgotten all about that until just now. He had more left-wing people supporting him, but they voted him out. They refused to seat him. And he went back, I guess, brokenhearted. But he got a lot of publicity out of the thing. The word "communist" ruined everybody. It was a broad brush. Just like if you had somebody known as a Mafia figure, what chance would they have of getting elected now? It was a kind of a contrived thing. Those were the years when they did things that we would just shudder at.

Ms. Boswell: In Washington who else stood up against Canwell?

Sen. Greive: A whole lot of people had to link arms and stand together because they were left-wingers. They probably weren't communists. Like I told you, there were a number of other local politicians that had been communists or were associated with them or were active in the unions.

I don't remember the things they wanted now, except I knew that they wanted to integrate hiring and they wanted the right for blacks to eat in restaurants and have equal accommodations in hotels. Things that they wanted seemed so much a part of the fabric now, it's almost unreal, but they didn't then. Most of the things that they wanted were the right of unions to organize and strike and various other things. I can't remember all of the things now. But generally speaking, they were worried about the unemployed.

Old age pensions was a big thing as well. They wanted a state pension for everybody. You had no Social Security then, you know. They did eventually get a state pension. That's one of the initiatives that they carried. But it was a very modest state pension, like one hundred dollars a month or something like that. It wasn't very great. The things that they were for didn't seem all that bad to me. Just because they were for them, that made them bad as far as I can tell.

Ms. Boswell: Was it the press that really brought Canwell down, or was it just the change in the times?

Sen. Greive: I think both. I think that McCarthy, who was only prominent for a few years, had a tremendous influence during the Eisenhower administration for instance. Eisenhower didn't want to be too cozy with him. Prior to that it was Truman who didn't have any use for him at all. What do you say, they'd sort of "play out the string." Once the war was over, why then the Cold War began, and Truman was leading the fight there. There wasn't any place for them to go, to merge into the political arena. They weren't the threat that everybody thought they were.

Ms. Boswell: The reporter, Ed Guthman, is often attributed with having opened up some of the negatives of the Canwell Committee.

Sen. Greive: Wonderful man. Wonderful man. There were two or three reporters that I really admired in my time in Olympia. I'd say three, maybe four. If not number one, he's very close to it.

Ms. Boswell: What did you like about him particularly?

Sen. Greive: He was a man of real integrity. So many of us were swept up in what was happening, thinking that everything was going to go right-wing, that we didn't dream that it was going to level out the way it did. I never would have predicted. We thought it might happen thirty or forty years from now, but we

just thought we were in a right-wing slide. Ed Guthman looked through that communist thing, and he went out of his way and proved that there were lies and that they had falsely accused some people. I don't remember the details at this point, but we were really shocked. I had very little or no regard for *The Seattle Times*; I think they were very biased and unfair. And Ross Cunningham was one of the worst guys down there, but he was a friend of Guthman. He thought the world of Guthman. He let Guthman investigate it, and Guthman got the Pulitzer Prize for it. From there he became press relations man for Bobby Kennedy and that took him to the Justice Department, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, and so forth.

Ms. Boswell: Was it dangerous for him to take that position at that time?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. Anything could be dangerous. We were living in those crazy times when they'd just take little or nothing and make something out of it. There were all kinds of instances of it. They ruined careers.

Ms. Boswell: Did they try to go after Guthman as a result of this?

Sen. Greive: No, Guthman had all the evidence. He had the registers and the places where Melvin Rader had signed in. What happened is that this evidence had all been presented to the Canwell Committee, and a lot of it was faked, and Guthman proved that it was faked. He found that there were errors in how they recorded things, and the dates that they'd used. I forget the details of how it was. But I had great admiration for him. I used to talk to him a lot. I thought he was a great guy. He was one of my favorite people to talk to.

However, there's no question that the Guthman story hurt Canwell, personally and professionally, because it proved him to actually be lying and to kind of be setting people up. Now I don't know what his explanation is because I haven't heard his interview, so I couldn't tell you, and I can't remember anything. But Guthman went on to win the Pulitzer Prize, and then he was in Philadelphia, and the last I heard he was on the desk for *International News* out of Los Angeles. He was editor for a long time of the *Philadelphia Inquirer*. So he became a very prominent man in his own right, and I thought a very fair man. I was very taken with him.

Ms. Boswell: How did other legislators respond to his exposé of Canwell?

Sen. Greive: Everybody was scared all the time. They were afraid that they were next. Now mind you, I don't think myself or Al Rosellini ever thought, for instance, that we were going to be singled out, but we felt for the people who were. We felt that the Canwell Committee just didn't care what they did to people.

For instance, they were after Lady Willie Forbus. She was a woman legislator that got defeated the year I got elected. She'd been with the left-wing people on a lot of things, and she got accused of being many things. And she reacted very stridently, and said she wasn't a communist, and that it was a smear and Red-baiting, and that entire thing.

I'm trying to think of some of the other prominent people. There were a lot of prominent people that the committee was after. They even took out after Mike Gallagher. They didn't make it stick, but they said that he was a left-winger.

The radicals or communists, whatever you want to call them, had a ring of friends and people who were not necessarily on the inside, but had a rough alliance with them. There was a House member—I'm trying to think of his name—he was a young man, very quiet and so forth and probably a communist from Mike's district. But there were very few people that

were deep enough into it to be that much involved, in so far as I know.

Ms. Boswell: I think there was an issue, in part—the basis of Guthman's exposé was over Mel Rader who was a professor at the University of Washington—whether or not he had been at these communist meetings.

Sen. Greive: Well, for instance, it was part of the times. We got a new president of the University of Washington, a fellow by the name of Raymond Allen, and Allen had made himself famous by saying that he thought it was legitimate to fire a professor if he was known to be a communist—a terrible thing to do, tenure or no tenure. Maybe there wasn't any tenure in those days, and Rader was just one of that group of people. Several of them, just like down in Hollywood, were blacklisted. They were people with fine educations that couldn't practice. If you named some others, I'd probably remember the names, but I wasn't that deeply involved, but I remember Rader now that you mentioned it.

Ms. Boswell: It's my understanding that Charlie Hodde was at that time the Speaker of the House?

Sen. Greive: That was after. That was following Canwell. Canwell was out of office by that time.

Ms. Boswell: Okay. But he later had tried to get the records from the Canwell Committee and Canwell had said, "No," and so he sent in the State Patrol to take the records?

Sen. Greive: Yes. As I understand it, Canwell was out of office by that time, and he said the committee's records were private. Hodde said he had a right to them because they were public domain. I don't necessarily admire Hodde for that, although that's typical of him. He was one of the really fine men, in my opinion, that we've had in all the years he was there. He knew and understood taxes; he was a sort of realistic guy. You'd sit down and talk to him and he knew what he was talking about. He was a farmer, but he was a very brilliant man and quite a student in his own right. Not a lot of education, but he was really something. He probably should have been governor. But old Charlie, he didn't have the popular appeal. Running from Okanogan is not the greatest place in the world to begin a campaign. He was a legislator's legislator, but he wasn't popular.

The other one that they tried to damage and hurt was Mitchell, Hugh Mitchell. He had had been Wallgren's secretary or his right-hand man in the Congress, I forget. When Wallgren got to be governor, he appointed—his first act was to resign himself—and then he immediately appointed Hugh Mitchell as U.S. senator. And Hugh Mitchell ran and was defeated. He was defeated by Harry Cain, who was another right-winger, who later turned out to be something else again in his later life. But at that time he was a big right-winger. In fact, in my book, I've got an illustration there that shows one of his campaign signs: "Take the right road with Harry Cain."

Mitchell had served for six years. They tried to Red-bait him; in fact, they did Red-bait Hugh Mitchell. He kept getting elected back to be a congressman on two different occasions. Pelly eventually defeated him. He may still be around. I used to see him once in a while. But he was really one of the better men, I thought. Canwell just took reputations and crippled them in two really good people.

But Hodde was a kind of guy with lots of guts and lots of determination. His attitude was that if he thought it was right, he did it.

Ms. Boswell: I believe Canwell said in his interview that he felt that Hodde literally cried

on the floor trying to convince people not to vote for the Canwell Committee.

Sen. Greive: That's probably true. I wouldn't be at all surprised. I really wasn't aware of much that I can remember about the Committee when it was in the House. It became paramount in my life when it came to the Senate because I was a senator; I wasn't a House member.

But I can believe that because Hodde was a really fine man. For one thing, he became almost a resident expert on taxes. Anything he took on, he took very seriously and worked at very hard. He was really a superb tactician and a fine man. He's one of the eight or ten best people I've ever known in politics. And incidentally, I thought so much of him, that he had some effect on me.

Ms. Boswell: Canwell goes up to the point, but doesn't quite say, that he thought Hodde was a communist.

Sen. Greive: That, I'm sure, would be just a lie. If he's got the evidence, I'd want to see it. I hate to call anybody a liar because sometimes in my lifetime I've been completely fooled by things that I thought were one way, and in reality they were not. And that might very well be true in this case if I saw the evidence. But I don't think Hodde was any communist.

Conceivably they may have helped him, but my gosh, the district he had in north Spokane—he had north Spokane, Okanogan and Ferry counties—what kind of communist is going to come from there? It was just completely foreign to anything you'd want. If he was going to be a communist, he'd come to downtown Seattle or Everett or Tacoma, or he'd come someplace where there were unions, where there's support for this sort of thing. Not out in a rural area like that, but in areas that voted overwhelmingly Democratic, where you had some margin to play with. That district up there was always close. I don't believe that at all, but I may be wrong.

Ms. Boswell: Who else was involved with Canwell? Were there certain other legislators?

Sen. Greive: I don't recall certain legislators. I always had the impression he picked his own committee, and he picked people that were first-termers and were not strong. He didn't pick a Perry Woodall, or he didn't pick people who would argue with him about civil rights or the right to have anybody testify. I think he was pretty much a one-man show.

Chapter 5

Political Allies and the Role of the Press

Ms. Boswell: Now, what about your own interests during these early years in the Legislature? You mentioned your respect for Hodde and others. Who else were you involved with during the early part of your career?

Senator Greive: Let's put it this way. I was a lot closer to Rosellini than anyone else because Al and I went out every night together. We were part of what we called the Night Wildlife Committee. We liked to dance, go to dinner, and enjoy ourselves. We had no responsibilities. We had fifteen votes, and we couldn't pass anything. It wasn't like I had to rush back to a committee meeting because you'd be in the minority no matter what you said, anyway. It was just an enjoyable time. I liked Al and I thought he was one of the ten most memorable people I've ever known, too. But Al was a politician, smooth as glass. He was a great maneuverer. Hodde, I always felt was a man of principle. Hodde proposed several taxes, and generally I supported him. They would call it the Hodde Plan. There was always a Hodde plan. And in those days I wasn't in the leadership, and I supported Hodde on his stuff that came over because I thought his plan was well thought out and that it was the best we could do under the circumstances. I don't think Hodde was ever much aware of me because I was a small fry at that particular time. Now Hodde became Speaker again in 1951, when I was up in the structure—I think I was caucus chairman. During that term Hodde and I got even better acquainted, but I don't think I was ever a key to anything as far as he was concerned.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of your own interest in political matters, did you see modeling yourself after Rosellini?

Sen. Greive: No, no. Al was a much slicker operator than I was, and he had ambitions to be governor and so forth. I had ambitions, to be sure. I was a state senator and a lawyer. I figured I had to make a living.

When Rosellini got elected, we had a falling out during his first term, and then in the second term we made up and got along fine. I wanted to be a regent at the University of Washington.

Ms. Boswell: You wanted to be a regent at the University of Washington?

Sen. Greive: I wanted to be a regent, and I was going to quit and be a lawyer. I'd gotten a law degree, I was in practice, and I figured it was time to get out and quit politics, and Al wouldn't appoint me. I understand now he had already promised it to someone else, had it all signed, sealed, and delivered before I ever came along. But I thought that for all the things I'd done for him and his campaigns and helped him get to be governor and so forth and so on, that he should make me a regent, but he wouldn't do it.

Ms. Boswell: Why did you want to be a regent?

Sen. Greive: I was looking for something that was prestigious, part-time, and gave me the opportunity to still practice law. Because I could see that politics, like Archie Baker—a

state representative when I was first elected and Augie Mardesich's law partner—used to say, "This is all built on quicksand." Archie served one term and then he quit. He said, "Politics is quicksand. You don't last. Nobody lasts." Well, a few of us are exceptions, but then that's the story.

That was part of my interest in campaigning. I decided that the only way you're going to last in this business is if you are a superb campaigner. You've got to know what you're doing. So, I was looking for something prestigious, and when you're going to school you think of regencies. It was a big, important thing. And then you had this metropolitan university, which had to renew the lease, and there was a lot of stuff going on, and I thought that was a good thing. I was wrong.

It's funny how things that are so important to you at the time become faded as you go along. I just can't remember the details. I know that I thought that's one of the things I wanted, and Al wouldn't do it. And it's to his credit; he shouldn't have. I didn't need to be a regent.

Ms. Boswell: Now, was that your major falling-out over that?

Sen. Greive: Over that, and over taxes. I can't remember the tax issue. He wanted some things that I didn't want. I remember that Ross Cunningham had talked to me two or three times, and they wanted me to take a position, and I took the position they wanted. But truthfully, I can't remember what the issue was.

Generally speaking, I voted for taxes. Nearly always I took the position that if we were short, we had to either cut the budget or we had to balance it, and we always had to balance it because we had no choice. My attitude was that if you don't vote for somebody else's tax, you'll never get it through because it's the easiest thing in the world to say that I'm for a graduated net income tax, and I won't vote for any other tax. And every time they would accuse you of being irresponsible you'd say, "No, I'm voting for an income tax." Well, you knew there weren't the votes for that; it wasn't going to pass. Somebody had to be man enough or stand up and walk over there and say, "Well, I'll vote for some of these other taxes because it's the only way we're going to finance the government." Unless you were willing to cut education or the budget, which I generally wasn't willing to do.

I don't remember my experience with Rosellini in that one term. I would have to go back and research because I just don't honestly remember what the issue was about. I know I had asked him to appoint me as regent, and he didn't do it. I know that there were some fights, but Al always treated me very affably. He was always a friend. He never got mad at me and told me I was all done. He was a real gentleman. Al was a consummate politician. Not only were we friends, but he always knew he needed somebody later on. And he could always use somebody who was willing to stand up and speak, and we were in various fights together.

By that time I had become an expert on the rules. I knew more about the rules than anybody did. To become an expert, I went through the journals, and they would present parliamentary situations and rulings. And when I didn't go by what Vic Meyers ruled, I would go to the books, the rules and so on, and see what the correct ruling was, then I'd put them on cards and I'd memorize them. Flip cards, and so with a snap of a finger I could tell you what the parliamentary position was. And I loved that, and I was in my element. Nobody else could compete with me. Even when Vic Meyers would rule against me, he'd admit that I may have been right, but it wasn't the right thing. It just didn't fit.

Ms. Boswell: Was Rosellini a master tactician, too?

Sen. Greive: He was a tactician, but he didn't know the rules. He knew some of them, but he didn't want to put that much effort into it. He wasn't going to learn it backward and forward. He encouraged me to do it, though. He was a masterful tactician.

I remember one time they tried to amend a bill of his. I think it was to do something to the private schools, and they'd decided they'd fix Rosellini because he had a bill, and they were going to put it under his name. He took the floor, and before he was done, they shamefacedly withdrew the amendment. But Al was really powerful when he got going. But he doesn't speak too well; he always had a kind of funny accent and so forth. It wasn't a foreign accent, it was just for some reason he had this accent that was unusual. You always knew it was Al.

He had a network of friends that wouldn't quit. Al Rosellini knew everybody. He always knew the cook and the person who parked the cars. He went out of his way to make friends. He didn't get mad at you; he'd put it aside and be back to fight another time. He was personally very popular.

Ms. Boswell: Is that part of the criteria? You called him a consummate politician, is that part of the criteria?

Sen. Greive: Well, for example, he went to visit the *West Seattle Herald*. In those days it was much more powerful than it is now, and not only did he talk to the editor, but the first thing you knew he disappeared and they found him back there talking with the pressman. He never went to a restaurant but what he always shook hands with the kitchen help.

Ms. Boswell: How sincere was the interest?

Sen. Greive: I don't know how sincere, but he was the consummate politician. In other words, he had more personal friends and more personal contacts than anybody in the state. He didn't always win for a variety of reasons. They tried to label him as being mixed up with the Italian Mafia and things like that, and he had to overcome that. He did that by having his own committee, the Rosellini Committee, patterned after U.S. Senator Kefauver, in which they investigated crime. He got that off his back, and that's how he got elected—statewide publicity.

Ms. Boswell: You weren't involved in that, were you?

Sen. Greive: No, no. I wasn't on the committee or anything, but I knew Al and I went over to Tacoma and listened for a couple of days to testimony, and it was in the paper every night. I was around Al and I kind of basked in the reflected glory of being part of his entourage and so forth. So I knew an awful lot about what went on. You understand we just had TV then, and people had just begun to have TVs. It provided us with tremendous publicity.

He had run for governor in 1952 and lost, beaten in the primary by Hugh Mitchell, and Mitchell lost in the final to Langlie. The next time Rosellini ran in 1956, he was nominated, and elected. But he was a tremendous politician. And he knew everybody. He just plain remembered everybody, and he's got a real charming way about him. People just plain liked him, male and female. He just had a way that was pleasant and easygoing, and he could laugh through it all. He was smarter than hell.

The instance that I recall the most happened when Langlie wanted to line up votes for a tax bill he had to have, and he had the three of us in. He had the three committees; he had the Democrats in the House and Senate, and the Republicans in the House and the Senate. Well, I was caucus chairman, so I went down there with them, and when it was all

done we couldn't arrive at a conclusion. We disagreed, and Langlie called a press conference and he said, "We got the craziest bunch of Democrats I ever saw in my life. As an example, we've got that guy Rosellini; Senator Rosellini won't vote for any tax for any reason under any circumstance. We've got that nut Greive who says he'll vote for every tax we've got." Well, I told him later, I said, "Governor, couldn't you have just said that I wouldn't vote for it?" But I said then what I've always said, if I'm not willing to vote for somebody else's idea, we're not going to have a tax. You can't tailor the taxes the way you want them.

Ms. Boswell: You talked about Hodde as being a legislator's legislator. How did Rosellini rate among other legislators?

Sen. Greive: Hodde was a man of principle and a real thinker. Al Rosellini was not a researcher or thinker. Smart as can be, but he'd have somebody else to do the research. When we were in the Senate it might have been me because I was young and had the energy to do it. But it was usually staff people. We didn't have many staff people at first, and that's why he had to depend on whomever he could get. He would understand what he was doing, and he'd support the legislation, and it was usually somebody else's legislation. Then, of course, he got to be governor, and that was a different story. Then he had the responsibility of holding the balls and shooting them.
Al's the kind of a guy that did what you'd expect a politician to do. He would bend to whatever had to be done. A lot like Clinton, I might say.

Ms. Boswell: You mentioned Ross Cunningham earlier. I know you mentioned that Ross Cunningham, who was from *The Seattle Times,* and Rosellini did not get along very well. Could you expand on that?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Al had been there when Ross was secretary to Langlie. Ross had it in for Rosellini. I don't know exactly why he had it in for Rosellini, but if you go back and look at his writings, he had very few good things to say about Rosellini over the years. Because he was a columnist, he didn't write hard news. If it was a big issue he might get into it with his column, and he might write something based in reality, based on facts, but basically he was giving his opinions all the time, and usually they were anti-Rosellini. When Rosellini was elected, he dedicated himself to getting him out as governor. He was really after him.

Ross was very opinionated, and I think in some ways he was kind of bitter. He was obsessed with the idea that he wanted to run the show. He wanted to be more than a newspaper reporter. He wanted to be *the* man. I'm sure that most reporters had views, but they didn't publish them. So he ran the editorial page, and it was Ross Cunningham who spoke and Ross Cunningham who controlled. Ross Cunningham himself told me that he went around and visited with various reporters when he wanted something done, and he'd talk to them and he said he'd influence them. That's how he extended his influence. I, one time, asked him how come he seemed to set the policy, and he laughed and said no, he didn't set the policy. He said, "When I want something I go around and convince the people doing the spadework. I convince the boys and the troops to see it my way." And I think that generally they did. That's how he did it, although he had no official control and, theoretically, they were not answerable to him. They were answerable to the editor, but he influenced their views because he sort of took it upon himself to speak for management.

I've got several explanations for his role during the Canwell Committee, and I don't know the truth. In the first place, I think that Woodall didn't like Canwell's committee ei-

ther, and even though he was very much of a right-winger in those days, he was a man of some principle and a lawyer, and he just didn't think it was right. And I think that was very common among a lot of the old-line Republicans, and I think that probably that's where Cunningham fit.

I don't mean to say that Cunningham was not a principled man, because he was. I think he believed what he wanted. He just had an ego that was very big, and he wanted to run it as best he could from where he was. But I don't think he was a bad man in the sense that he was—you know—he probably just didn't like the whole flavor of this thing. Plus, you've got that little factor of jealousy between the two biggest papers in the state, one always wanting to out-do the other. It was the *Spokesman Review* and *The Seattle Times*. The *Chronicle* in Spokane and the *P-I* in Seattle were not the papers. Here this was, sort of a production run by and covered in great detail by the *Spokesman Review,* and he may have been a little jealous. I don't know that, though. But I just surmise that may have been a reason. I've forgotten whether he supported Canwell or not, but I can't recall Cunningham ever supporting Canwell.

Ms. Boswell: His role, then, given that there were only essentially two major papers, was really quite influential?

Sen. Greive: Well, there really were three. The *P-I* was always a good-sized factor but they had a fellow that was quite fair, by the name of Stub Nelson, who'd become the political reporter for years, and he didn't feel he answered to Ross Cunningham at all. He'd frequently disagree with him. That was the *P-I* man.

Ms. Boswell: Was it uncommon, though, for somebody like Ross Cunningham to wield that much power?

Sen. Greive: I don't know of anybody else that well, now.

Ms. Boswell: You said you were close to a number of the reporters who covered Olympia at this time. Could you expound on that a bit more?

Mr. Greive: I'm a very, very good friend of Shelby Scates. I always thought he was a whale of a fine guy. I still do. In fact, he lived across the street from me for a lot of years. And, I was very, very close to Leroy Hittle and Lyle Burt. Eventually, I became quite a friend of theirs.

Ms. Boswell: What made a good political reporter in Olympia?

Mr. Greive: I think people who were willing to be fair and honest. They had all kinds. They used to have a guy by the name of Jack—I'm trying to think of his name—he was a friend of mine; he treated me all right. He wrote for the *Tacoma Tribune*—Jack Pyle. Jack Pyle wrote fiction; I believe it was too much fiction. What he'd do, if it had Tacoma people in it, he'd write a whole story and make them the center of the thing. It wasn't remotely what happened down there. It had some general relationship to it, but it was so skewed. One time I remember coming up to him with the paper and saying, "Gee, Jack, I don't object to what you said. It didn't hurt anybody, but it isn't what happened."

He could tell a hell of a lot better story than what happened. He just liked to write fiction. It would be a fictionalized account of what happened in which the Pierce County legislators were doing all of the good or bad parts, whatever they were. Or it would be on some show that they were involved in, and it wasn't the main order of business. Other people thought it wasn't important at all, but he wrote it for his paper and it ran in the

Tacoma Tribune.

Ms. Boswell: How much did the papers dictate or have a style themselves, in terms of whom they chose to be reporters?

Mr. Greive: I don't quite know, but in my opinion, the worst one down there was a fellow by the name of Ashley Holden who wrote for the *Spokesman Review*. He was vicious. He always called me the "Seattle Pinko," among other things. But that wasn't the worst epithet; he had better epithets for some people. I guess I wasn't the only Pinko, either. They ran him on the front page. He was Mr. Right-Wing. Eventually, he bought some newspaper and went really right wing up in Okanogan after he retired. He got mixed up in the Goldmark case up there. That's another whole story.

Ms. Boswell: You could live with being "Pinko," then?

Sen. Greive: Because he didn't put me in the headlines or anything like that, I was just one of the references he made. But I wasn't the only "Pinko." Anybody that didn't agree with him was probably a "Pinko," at least anybody on the subject of communism. I often worried if someone would pick it up in an election and run it, but they never did. He had a lot stronger terms than that for a lot of other people. In other words, in the scale of things that wasn't all that bad.

The reporters worked all the way down. Most of them were very right wing-oriented—except for the AP and UPI people. That's why Leroy Hittle and I became such close friends. Leroy was the AP guy and he played it straight. Tremendous integrity. He was there for twenty-one years, and then he got to be on the Liquor Board. I had a hand in helping him to get there.

Ms. Boswell: When you started, or early on in your legislative career, were those political journalists more influential or important than they became later on?

Mr. Greive: I don't know. Historically, the times—not the Seattle newspaper, but the era—were Democratic, and so they had an uphill road to convince people to be Republicans. And they had a Republican tinge to them. You could look at it that way. So, they were Republican-oriented, and they would slant the stories, and they'd go very much out of their way. For instance, I was defeated one time simply because *The Times* led the way.

The trouble is, you see, the newspapers have more—and they still do—much more influence than TV. They don't have the impact, but they have the influence because the people on TV read the newspapers. That's where they get their information. They don't know any impartial source, so they read it. So, the newspapers get more in-depth, and they've got people full-time down there. Very often, what they do is pick up the AP or the UPI, or they'll read this columnist or that columnist, and they'll think that they're pretty good, and so they influence the others. They have influence way beyond the paper. If you get *The Times* and the *P-I*, or *The Times* and the *Spokesman Review*, or a couple of leading newspapers—because people don't read every newspaper, they have a couple of favorites—why, then you've got a lot more influence. So, the newspapers are much more powerful, and they were much more powerful then, obviously, because radio was around, but no TV. Radio had some commentaries, but as far as the Legislature was concerned, we were just a little spot in the news, and that's all.

Ms. Boswell: Was *The Seattle Times* the major paper at that time?

Mr. Greive: Yes, certainly in my area. The

P-I had about a third of the circulation that *The Seattle Times* had, I thought. What I think was true in those days, and still is, that a good part of *The Seattle Times* circulation wasn't necessarily the city edition. Among the readers in the Seattle area, they were much more influential because the *Post-Intelligencer* had a lot of readers, but they weren't all concentrated. For a long time this was the only market in the United States, practically, that the evening newspaper dominated. In pretty nearly every other place it's a morning newspaper that dominates. And, the reason for that is people don't have time to read when they come home; they want to look at TV now, and I suppose radio, then. The morning paper is the big paper. It is true in Los Angeles, and with the *Oregonian*, and even the newer papers, like the *Tacoma Tribune*, have now become morning papers. The *Everett Herald* has become a morning paper. Almost every place you look, it's the morning papers.*

Ms. Boswell: How did you feel about coverage generally? I guess I'm speaking about these early years now, and your views in the media. Was that important to you?

Sen. Greive: Well, I never thought I got a fair shake, but I don't know that I'm unique. Maybe a lot of other people felt the same way.

Ms. Boswell: Why do you think you didn't?

Sen. Greive: I thought Ross Cunningham was out to get me for one thing. He thought that I was an ally of Rosellini, and we both ran in his paper's domain. I don't know how it is now, but in those days I think that a third of the people only took the *P-I* and probably half of the people took *The Times*. *The Times* was the paper. But I learned over a period of time that they can say bad things about you, but the people didn't read it. They didn't read all that stuff. When you're down there at first you think every word, somebody's going to read it. At least your opponents are keeping a scrapbook, and you think a lot of things they don't do.

When I was disagreeing with Rosellini, I got some good publicity out of Cunningham, but I eventually got back together with Rosellini and then Cunningham was not a friend anymore. But he didn't go after me every week or anything. I just felt that given the opportunity he'd give me a slap as well as a push. Most of the publicity I got was from the *AP* and *UPI* and people like that.

Ms. Boswell: Why was that?

Sen. Greive: I got well acquainted with Leroy Hittle and I got well acquainted with Schultz who was with *UPI* and various other people. There were other ways of getting your name in the paper besides going through Ross Cunningham.

And then too, I got bigger jobs and I was a more important factor, and then they gave me more publicity. It just went with the position. I didn't have to do anything. If you were the floor leader and you sponsored something, then you made news, as Bob Dole later found out. It's true on the national level, too.

Ms. Boswell: Did you seek publicity?

Sen. Greive: I think everybody in the back of their mind hopes they will make a favorable

**Editor's note: After this interview was recorded,* The Seattle Times *also became a morning paper.*

impression. But you soon learn that what you said on the floor didn't do it. That's why I took up parliamentary law. No use wasting your time with speeches, you weren't going to change anything unless it got that far anyway.

The control was in the committees. When I got to be floor leader, then I had a hand in setting committees up, and if there was a particular committee I wanted influence on—there was always one at least—why I'd want to be sure the people who were on it were people I could influence. It's just the way the system works.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of the impact of the press, do you see these columnists like Cunningham and the others during that time as being more or less powerful than today?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I think we've got so many competing influences now that the newspapers don't have a true stance. I remember some years ago that we had a fellow by the name of Ray Olsen, who's dead now. He had been a state legislator from the Thirty-fifth District, and he was a great friend of Cunningham's. And somehow, someway, he got Cunningham and I in the same car together, and we went somewhere. And I was making remarks about how the television and radio were playing an important part in politics now, and Cunningham did not like that very well. We ended up with sort of a snide truce. We got along, and that's all we did. I forget where we went and what the situation was, but we didn't get along because I was sort of rejoicing in the fact that he was feeling the pinch now that television and radio had come so far and had become so important, and they didn't have that. And he wasn't very happy.

See, Cunningham, he somehow had the influence to control the placement of his column. His writing, although he didn't call it a column, often ran on the front page: "Cunningham's Comments." But if the issue was one he wanted to talk about, he'd put it where he wanted to put it. He seemed to have an influence with the editor on where things went. Maybe I'm all wrong on that, but that's the way I envision it now.

You know, when you sit here and talk about a thing like that, you want to remember that what you know now gets mixed with what you knew then.

Ms. Boswell: What about the perception of the Olympia papers, for example?

Sen. Greive: They had little or no influence. For a long time they used to distribute the Olympia paper free to us. I soon found that whatever they said or did, it didn't make any difference. Sometimes I could remember them getting awfully rough on me or on an issue, but it didn't seem to affect the other legislators. They just figured it wasn't going to be circulated in their area, and so what?

The same fellow that owned the *Tacoma Tribune* and the *Bellingham Herald* owned the Olympia paper, I think. At least he owned two or three papers. Eventually he sold out to Gannett. Now it's a Gannett paper—the people that put out *USA Today*.

Ms. Boswell: I didn't realize the *Olympian* was a Gannett paper.

Sen. Greive: It was the first one they had. For a while they had their big press there, the big color presses, and all the *USA Today* was put out there. Now they've located presses in Federal Way, too. They have several of them, and they do it all electronically. They have some in Eastern Washington and various places, and they can put the thing together and even change stories to get the local flavor and so forth. They do it all electronically without ever being in the same city. But in the early days they had to have a press like everyone

else. They had big color presses there.

I'm trying to think of the guy that owned that paper, but he was also a big operator in the political world in those days. He encouraged various people to run for office and promised them support and so forth. The press was pretty important.

Ms. Boswell: What about endorsements, though? Did you really need the endorsements of the papers?

Sen. Greive: Well, I never got any. The best I ever got was—in fact, I have kind of an interesting story—over a fight with the Municipal League. The fact is that I introduced a resolution, I think, seven, eight or ten times that the Democrats not appear before the League. I'm the only one I know of that got a good rating at the level they changed them, even up to the last time I ran. It made the papers. They broke tradition; they wouldn't change it. The people who ran the League were always my enemies.

They were always cutting me down so I was below my opponent. Not a bad rating, but they'd do it. I was very much an enemy of theirs, and when I ran for King County Council, I went down and appeared before them. I was contacted at least seven or eight times by different people who were on that body and who said that if I'd only show up, that they'd give me a good rating. And they did give me some fairly good ratings when I didn't have any opposition, but I never was a favorite of theirs by any manner of means. And I never had gone to their parties that they held after election day or anything like that.

Ms. Boswell: Can I ask you why you were so opposed?

Sen. Greive: The best way I can explain that is by telling you the story.

One year the Municipal League went wild. They called me—what did they say I was?—they said I was erratic. And they said Rosellini was a cunning politician and his sincerity was doubted. They said that Mike Gallagher was something like a party hack—I forget the exact words. So we had a meeting, and I was invited by Al to come to meet with him and Mike Gallagher. They said that we've got to do something about it. I agreed. The fact is, I think in that election when they were against us, I'd raised some money. I drew the cartoon, and we put a paid ad in the paper. But anyway, we had strategies like we would call them in if we were going to have an interview with them. We wanted to have the rating committee come in and talk to us so we could see if they were fair and to see who wanted to rate us. We did various things.

We were discussing our plight, and we were all unhappy and everything, and Mike Gallagher said, "We've got to do something. We've got to fix it so that the party comes out and doesn't let anybody go." Well, that was all fine and so forth, and Mike says, "Of course, I'm party chairman of King County. I can't very well do it. It's really a sort of a partisan thing." And I agreed with that. Rosellini says, "I want to run for governor, and I don't think it's really the right time for me to be taking it on." And I said, "Well, wait a minute now, we were going to do this, and we were going to do that—who's left?" And he said, "Well that's how come you were invited." So it became my job to introduce these resolutions, which in those days passed because they didn't like the Municipal League. They're now hard on right-wingers, but in those days the more right you were, the better.

When I first ran for the King County Council, I went before the Municipal League and I said, "This is an historic occasion. I've had an ongoing disagreement with the League, and I'm now here to tell you." I said my thing, and somebody says, "Why are you here?" I

said, "I'm finally running against somebody that you hate just as much as you hate me." And that was true; they didn't like Heavey, either. Ed Heavey—he was later a judge. Fine guy, real fine guy. His nephew is a state senator from this district now.

Ms. Boswell: So you didn't really mend your fences with them?

Sen. Greive: No. I had one occasion that they rated me, and the committee resigned. They sent it back to them to change the endorsement on the rating three times, and they wouldn't do it. So they resigned, and the League just ran it their way and forgot about the whole thing. And that made the paper, too, with a small article. The last time they admitted that they'd broken tradition and that they had changed the rating. They put it right in the paper. They justified it by saying that the committee didn't know what they were doing and so forth. So, I made some permanent enemies there.

Ms. Boswell: What was the kind of legislation that you introduced relative to them?

Sen. Greive: I don't think I ever introduced any legislation as far as they were concerned. What can you do about freedom of speech? What I did was to introduce resolutions at the party conventions, I think, about six times. That would be over a period of twelve years. I always had my resolutions, and they'd be seconded, and they'd be passed that nobody should go down there. We tried to discourage the Democrats from appearing. And I think that had its effect because I think they're a much more liberal body than they were then. Much fairer.

It started out as a bunch of stodgy conservative businessmen who wanted to run the show; that's all. But they weren't all that popular with Ross Cunningham, because Ross Cunningham would rather have his endorsements be the thing rather than their endorsements. But he ran the stuff, especially if it was unkind to me, or to somebody like that.

Ms. Boswell: What do you think of rating, whether it's the Municipal League or in the paper?

Sen. Greive: I think they have their place. There are all kinds of snooty people who don't know what you are and what you've done, but they know they want to be with the good people from Mercer Island and Bellevue and the fancy parts of a district. I think it has a real influence on those people. People in the professions and occupations like that, they don't go and make a lot of study, but they'd like to be with the good people, with respectable people. And I think it lends a certain aura of respectability to you. I think it's important if you can get it.

Chapter 6

Uncommon Personalities and Issues of Legislative Ethics

Ms. Boswell: You have told me a little about the folklore of the Washington legislature and some of the amazing characters that have been there over the years. There were also some very different ethical standards and practices in the past. I understand there is a story about spittoons. Could you tell me about that?

Senator Greive: Governor Roland Hartley was a tremendous speaker. He was a little, short guy, but he was angry all the time. That was part of his thing. He was the governor at the time they built the Capitol. They ended up with these spittoons, and everybody had a spittoon by their desk. But I'm talking now about the four big spittoons, and you'd have to look up in the Rotunda and you could see they were at the top of the stairwells on four sides. They were huge things. Back then, they were $1,000 a spittoon. I suppose even by today's prices, they probably would cost $10,000 a spittoon. Well, he got one of those spittoons, put it in a trailer, and took it all over the state of Washington to show how extravagant his opponents were, and how they had ordered these huge spittoons when they built the Capitol.

Ms. Boswell: He carried around the spittoons?

Sen. Greive: Yes, he traveled around the state. You'd get in trouble for that now, but in his day it was pretty normal, although, he was quite an unusual man.

Ms. Boswell: You were saying there's a lot of folklore?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. He was someone that they talked about. You see, when I first came here, Hartley wasn't that far in the past. He had been defeated in 1933, I think it was, and I came in 1947. So, it was fourteen years.

Ms. Boswell: Were a lot of people still serving who had served in that time?

Sen. Greive: Lobbyists, mostly. Most all the politicians around Hartley were gone. After the two campaigns, the campaign of 1929, and then 1932, there weren't any Republicans left. There was only one Democrat or something, in the Senate, and one in the House, or something like that. Jack Rabbit Jones, I think, was one fellow's name. He was from Okanogan and he had survived from the Republican period. Anyway, they were the only two Democrats under Hartley. Then they had the Roosevelt landslide and it just wiped every Republican out. So, most of the stories came from the lobbyists. The lobbyists were still there. Of course I was interested, so naturally they told me.

Ms. Boswell: Did anybody else have that kind of "larger than life" personality that people used to talk about?

Sen. Greive: I know they've got different types of things that recommend them, but there were a lot of characters. You could do wonders with Rosellini, you could do wonders with most everybody one way or another. I'm trying to think of people who were unusual. We've talked about Vic Meyers already. We had a guy by the name of Davey Cowen who was a

tremendous character. He was a very wealthy advertising dentist. See, we had advertising dentistry here, long before anyone else did.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me more about that. I don't know much about advertising dentistry.

Sen. Greive: Nowadays, dentists can advertise if they want to, and so can lawyers. In those days you weren't supposed to, and so most of the states had passed legislation that prevented dentists from advertising. The state of Washington maintained it. Davey Cowen was there in Olympia, the years I was there—he had to be there about twenty or thirty years. I think he was there from 1935 to 1967, and his purpose in getting elected was to preserve advertising dentistry. He was a complete zero as a senator—he'd be in our caucus and then we'd look around and he'd be gone, and be over in the Republican caucus. He didn't care what he did. He voted with the Republicans all the time rather than the Democrats, and he was part of the coalition. He was from Spokane, but he spent tons of money, just tons of money, and he would give watches or something to all of the pages on a given day, or he'd do some other grand gesture; he loved grand gestures. I don't think he took any money, what little he earned from there. He was very wealthy.

He had Peerless Dentists in Spokane, and there are dozens of stories about him, the things that he did. I remember one fellow by the name of Edwin Beck, who ran and was elected for one term from Spokane, and he hated Davey Cowen. He used to call him, "the little man south of Palestine with the built up shoes." Cowen was very short and he had built up shoes. They hated each other, absolutely hated each other. They'd call each other names and all that sort of thing.

Davey Cowen's attitude was that he could buy anything with enough money. I don't know that he ever bribed anyone, but I heard all kinds of stories that he did. I don't know that to be true. He was apparently philanthropic and gave things away. He had a half hour on radio in Spokane. He had a big dental practice. A great number of his patients didn't come from the state of Washington. They came from Alberta, Canada, Montana, northern Idaho, and British Columbia, where the radio waves went.

Ms. Boswell: And they'd come all the way to Spokane?

Sen. Greive: Yes, and they'd stop at the Peerless Dentists. He'd fix them up with teeth, and so forth and so on. Made a lot of money.

We used to go and have a meeting, and if we had a meeting in Spokane, Senator Keefe, who was one of the senators from Spokane, would order drinks or coffee for everybody, and he'd just put it on Dr. Cowen's bill. I don't know if Cowen knew it or not. He'd say, "This is on Dr. Cowen." Keefe would just say, "Dr. Cowen will take care of it." They'd just write it down and go on and serve us the stuff. So, Cowen must have been paying for it.

Ms. Boswell: Was he a decent dentist?

Sen. Greive: I don't think he ever pulled a tooth for thirty years. He employed a bunch of staff dentists. He had fifteen or sixteen dentists that worked for him. He was a big operation.

You see, advertising dentistry is another whole story in itself. Over here, in the Seattle area, we had a dentist—prior to the big controversy, when it was in flower—an advertising dentist whom I worked for while I was going to college. His lab was handling 240 plates a week! He never believed in anything but pulling everybody's teeth and putting false teeth in. You go in there for anything, and you got your teeth pulled. And a lot of them were immediate restorations, where they immediately put a set of dentures in and let your mouth grow to it. It was terribly painful.

Ms. Boswell: Were they considered to be rebels in the field?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. The other dentists didn't like them, but Doc Brown, the mayor of Seattle, was an advertising dentist. He was one of the more famous people. He was also a lawyer. They had to do things to attract attention, and one dentist had a fellow that could pull a car with his teeth. He'd take and put his false choppers in—it was a small car—and the crowd would gather around, and then he would pull the thing. I suppose it was engineered so it was pretty easy to pull, but that's a feat.

One of their favorite tricks was that they would have a store window and have it all hooked up, and get people to come in and have their teeth pulled. So the story was that they gave them cocaine or hard drugs of some sort, and they'd just be silly, and they weren't protesting, and the dentist would pull their teeth. They didn't want to pull too many teeth because that wasn't very interesting, so the idea was to keep people entertained.

We had a circus pitchman who came to town by the name of John C. Stevenson. He was a radio speaker who later ran for governor and U.S. senator. He was a King County commissioner in the radical times. He almost made it both times. He had a program on the radio and talked about politics, and he advertised this dentistry for L.R. Clark. So, this guy came to town, and he looked at this demonstration for quite awhile, and then he went to see L.R. Clark, who was the big one over here. That's whom I worked for as a lab man, but I was just an apprentice. So the story goes, you were considered a success if you'd keep the crowd without pulling too many teeth. And he kept the crowd for an hour and ten minutes. They asked him if he knew anything about dentistry, and he says, "Hell no, but I know a lot of big words." But after that, he took a correspondence course and became a lawyer, and ran for U.S. senator and ran for governor. Then they found out they had a warrant for him in Ithaca, New York, and Martin refused to extradite him. So, they never did prosecute him. After he was done with politics, he went south and became the lawyer for the Teamsters Union in Los Angeles.

Ms. Boswell: What a scam artist he must have been.

Sen. Greive: Oh, he was something else again, but he was a great talker. Just a great talker.

Ms. Boswell: Was Cowen a great talker, too?

Sen. Greive: No. He just spent a lot of money. He hardly ever made a speech. His old trick was to get hold of the Medicine and Dentistry Committee and make sure that nothing got through that he didn't like. He would go into the Rules Committee, which in those days was secret—which I very much objected to—but Cowen would be the first one out to tell people what happened there.

As a man, nobody had any respect for him. He was just a rich guy that did a lot of favors. For instance, several of the senators had teeth that he made for them. He was always very thick with Vic Meyers, and so the story goes, he bought his way onto Rules. He was just a disgrace. But he got by.

Ms. Boswell: Do you know how long he was there?

Sen. Greive: Oh, a long time. Many, many years. He had massive advertising. He charged it off to his dental office, but the story goes the Republicans never ran anybody against him. All the poll workers would have lunch via Cowen. If there were thirty poll workers, there'd be a lunch delivered to all of them when they were voting in order to get them to vote for him. He depended on massive advertising—everything was advertised.

Ms. Boswell: You talked a lot about sign making, but was there much advertising, for instance, in the papers?

Sen. Greive: The book that I've written on campaigning deals with an awful lot of that because it's still used. If you come from Seattle, you can't afford to be on television because your market is so big it isn't feasible. For what little time you would get on TV, you'd cover twenty or thirty Senate seats. Our TV goes from almost Bellingham to Vancouver, Washington. There are a tremendous number of seats that would be involved, so you can't do it.

So, you still have to doorbell, and you still have to mail, and so forth. They didn't do a lot of mail, but they always used signs, and I suppose, they have always done some doorbelling. And, of course, the parties were more of a factor than they are now. The party had a few votes here and a few votes there, and you knew the leaders; it was sort of a consensus.

When very few people vote—like if there's a twenty percent turnout—all you have to do is win ten percent of the electorate; that's the way you look at it. Usually there's more of a turnout than that. I think more people are registered now. You didn't have to worry about them. You could write off the people who aren't registered; after that, it was the question of who was eligible to vote.

Ms. Boswell: I was thinking about Cowen. By putting out a little money for advertising, would that have made him highly unusual?

Sen. Greive: Well, yes. When he would run against somebody, he would spend ten times what the other guy did. The job paid, a good part of the time he was there, five dollars a day, and some expenses, and he'd spend $15,000 or $20,000 to get the job. The other guy would be spending $800, $900 or $1,000. He just overwhelmed people.

They would be completely mesmerized. If somebody's got the radio waves, that's what people did. You're too young to remember, but I can remember when we used to sit around the radio and listen to it like TV. That's what we had. It was a comparatively new thing for everybody to have a radio when I was a kid. In the Forties, television was just something we talked about. And then, incidentally, when television came in, Cowen would take massive chunks of television time, too.

Ms. Boswell: Was it worth it to him just to be in Olympia?

Sen. Greive: I think it was a combination of ego and self-interest. The Republicans liked him so well they didn't run anybody against him, so he would win the Democratic primary because they'd cross over. That's what he depended on. He was what would be called a conservative Democrat. As far as legislation, in my opinion, he was just a zero. He was a great one to ingratiate himself. If you only want one thing and you're in the Legislature, and you've got a lot of money and can entertain and can be a big operator, you will get just about everything you want.

I've been in that position, too. I represented the osteopaths for a long time. We didn't want to be taken over by the M.D.s, but that's another whole story. When you want something, and you start out to want that thing, and if it isn't of major importance, and that's your focus, you almost sell your soul to keep it. Why should anybody fight with you?

At one point the chiropractors did well in the Legislature. We had Big Daddy Day and we had Al Adams, both chiropractors, supporting us. We had a series of other people. I can remember one time the Medicine and Dentistry Committees in both houses were headed by chiropractors. The doctors didn't find it profitable enough to run, so the chiropractors did. Big Daddy Day was Speaker of the House at one time, and he was a very

substantial legislator.

Ms. Boswell: So once there, he did move beyond this issue?

Sen. Greive: Big Daddy Day went beyond that completely. But Cowen just limited it to this issue. He had some detractors, of which I was one. I remember when I was a young legislator, one time in the lobby of the Olympian Hotel—that was where they hung out, that was everybody's hotel. Lobbyists got their drinks there; legislators stayed there. The Olympian is no longer a hotel, it's—I call it an "elder hostel"—sort of a rooming house, now. Cowen came up to me, and we got talking, and I started telling him what I thought of him—that he wasn't much of a legislator, so forth and so on—and I gave him a real hard time. I was kind of a damn fool to do it, as I look at it now, but I was all imbued with this and that. And then he says, "You know, I like you. We can do business." He was charming in his own way. He didn't take offense at all the stuff I said about him. He didn't say it wasn't true; he didn't get his back up or anything. He just says, "I think we can do business."

Ms. Boswell: So, whenever the whole issue of advertising dentistry came up, he was always out in front?

Sen. Greive: It didn't come up. Nobody introduced a bill, and if they did introduce a bill, he closeted it in committee. If it got away from the committee, he was on Rules; he caught it in Rules. He just made sure, and I presume he had lobbyists too, but I never dealt with them. It never came up. I never voted or tried to promote it; it wasn't my fight. The few dentists, they didn't do anything for anybody.

I had worked part time in a dental lab making false teeth when I was going to college. But I wasn't all morally worked up about the issue. As an actual matter, I'm not at all sure that the plates made by those people weren't just as good as the ones other dentists made. It was just the idea that he could advertise, cut the rate, give them an extra set in case one broke, or some other kind of a special he'd run. It was kind of hard on the local dentists because their prices were a lot higher, and the other guys were doing it in mass production. That's where I came in. Somebody set the teeth, and then we did the other work. That is how they kept their prices so low.

Ms. Boswell: You mentioned osteopaths earlier.

Sen. Greive: Yes. I was always close to the osteopaths. But, you see, in my day the world was so different. I never made any secret of the fact that I represented the osteopaths. Teachers didn't make any secret of the fact they were teachers; they were going to fight for teachers. You ran for office and you're a union person, then you're going to fight for the Teamsters, if you were a Teamster. Well, now we have this conflict of interest and all that stuff. If they didn't like it, somebody made an issue out of it.

Now, if you were slinking around and taking money, or if somebody was doing something secretly, that'd be another story. We were part-time legislators. Citizen soldiers. We weren't getting much for our time, and if we represented an interest, or if I worked for a brewery and I was for the brewing industry, so what? That's what I was. All the legislators from Olympia were always red hot for the breweries. The brewery was their biggest industry. The world is different now.

See, politics has cleaned up as it's gone along. It's better now than it was before. Believe me. But we were open about it. Mine happened to be osteopaths. I was a lawyer, and they hired me as a lawyer, and I didn't make a lot of money out of it, but I got a lot of referrals. That's how I got in the injury business, more

or less. There weren't very many of them—there were one hundred and forty of them in the state—so I made no secret of it. I made sure that I controlled the committee, and Cowen and I got along fine. He didn't want anything against advertising dentistry, and I didn't want anything to hurt the osteopaths.

If I'm on a committee, and somebody is absolutely committed, it's like stabbing him with a knife. He's going to hate your guts for it, and his friends are going to tell you you're out of line. It's almost like swearing. Why should you put the bill in there and get people upset?

And so what happened is, if you were a lawyer, pretty near everybody represented somebody. A lot of them got a lot of insurance business. Insurance companies were going to have to hire a lawyer for something. I was on the other side because I handled personal injury, so I never got any of those retainers. But there were retainers all in place.

At one point—I think I was in this office by that time—the small loan people were very anxious to get some legislation through. They couldn't charge more than twelve percent because Joe Davis, the head of the AFL-CIO, had gotten a bill passed by initiative, and they wanted it repealed in the worst way. The loan outfit came around to me and asked me if I would do some legal work for them. I said, "Of course, I'm in the business." And they said, "Okay, it will be $5,000 a year." I said, "Wonderful, a retainer. What do I do?" He said, "Absolutely nothing." And I said, "Absolutely nothing? I can't do that. I want some work to do." "Oh, no," he says, "We've got several of these around." And so I said, "Well, I can't do it." Then he said, "I'll tell you what we'll do. We'll give you our business, but we will make it for Dollar Rent-A-Car." I said, "Where's the Dollar Rent-A-Car?" "We own them, too," he says, "You'll be their lawyer." I said, "What do I do?" He says, "Nothing." I said, "I'm not going to do that." And then the fellow puzzled for a while, and then he snapped his fingers and says, "Sprouse Reitz fifteen cents stores. Nobody will ever put that together." I said, "What about for them? What's the deal?" He says, "Same deal." I said, "I can't do that." He just shook his head and walked out.

You can retain a lawyer and then he can't take a case against you. One of the tricks is, if you've got a lawyer that's particularly knowledgeable in a very technical field, people like EXXON or someone like that might retain that particular lawyer because he was the best around or because he's the most knowledgeable, and then pay the retainer and then pay for any service over and above that.

Ms. Boswell: But he can't speak out against you, then?

Sen. Greive: There's nothing that says he can't, but it would be an awful conflict of interest. He'd have all kinds of trouble. But coming to me with the $5,000 retainer was open and shut. I wouldn't take it. I don't know how many they had, but apparently the fellow was only dealing with lawyers because they could take a retainer.

Ms. Boswell: Where can you draw the line? Let's just say that he had been able to give you some kind of piddling work that didn't amount to much but provided a big retainer?

Sen. Greive: If I did work, and you have to work, chances are that I may very well have been on his side. In this case I probably wouldn't have because I was very, very close to the AFL-CIO. I was very, very close. Joe Davis—I was his boy in a sense.

Joe Davis was the most unusual labor leader we've ever had. He was no more for labor than you and I, unless you're active in the union. He was a statistician, and he was very brilliant. He could read a book in almost an evening.

He was just absolutely brainy. At one time, he'd been assistant director of the Department of Labor and Industries. Another time he was assistant director of Employment Security. He couldn't be director because his brother was director of Employment Security. He then got off into selling equipment, and he worked for IBM, and he sold equipment to the state. He never dreamed of all the progress they would make in the equipment. He thought once he'd sold them, that the equipment was good for twenty years, and he wouldn't have any more business. So, he fixed it so he received this money over a period of time. He had a staggered income for tax reasons. Then, he was looking around for something to do, and he got in with the AFL-CIO.

He was a tough, rough, mean labor guy, but he was a real good guy and a good friend of mine. He was from West Seattle, and they hired him for their facts and figures guy. He held the reign for most of the time I was there, probably ten, fifteen years. He'd go to these darn hearings, and he'd run rings around these industry lobbyists in his field because he knew them. He knew that thing so much better than anybody else.

He'd spend hours when I was down there, and he'd practically rehearse me when I had to make a speech on one of his bills. I handled all of his bills. And when it came time, I made the wrong speech on the bills, but they both passed. He came running down, and he says, "Beautiful speeches, just like we rehearsed, but you had the bills mixed up." I said, "They both passed." "Yeah," he said, "but nobody else knew what you were talking about, either." See, I had a reputation at that point of understanding labor things.

We'd be down there until one o'clock in the morning, half past one in the morning, because I'm a night-owl type. He'd go over the thing, I'd argue with him, and he'd show me this provision, show me that provision. I'd underline it; I'd tab it and everything. By the time I was ready to talk there wasn't anybody who gave me much of an argument. Somebody would try to make a half-assed argument, but they weren't prepared like I was. But I was only prepared because he prepared me.

Ms. Boswell: How did you develop this kind of relationship with him?

Sen. Greive: Oh, he was a great guy. We became very, very fast friends. He was president of the AFL-CIO for twenty years. He finally retired; he wasn't defeated. After he retired, even, he had many, many trips where they'd have him be an arbitrator in some city where two labor unions were having a problem. The Bar Association had a citizen's committee, and they appointed him. He had a good education, incidentally. He was an academic. But he was also a very good speaker, and he was just a good guy. People like that wouldn't happen very often.

The president of the AFL-CIO now, Rick Bender, is a former legislator whose also got a law degree. He served five terms in the House and two terms as a senator. His father, Jim Bender, was head of the local labor council in the city of Seattle. The father ran against Joe Davis and his son is president now.

Labor is not stupid. Some people think of them as a bunch of dockworker-type people, but they're not in this day and age. In fact, not in that day and age either. A lot of them had good sense, and they had sense enough to choose somebody that they felt could best promote their interests.

Ms. Boswell: Why you? Why not somebody else?

Sen. Greive: Because when they got me, they got the Senate. For sixteen years I was the floor leader. For ten of those years, the Republicans controlled the House. For twelve of those years, they controlled the governorship, but never the

Senate. So, we just controlled it. I got a lot of pressure from them—that's the reason they liked me—and a lot of people were always giving me such a hard time. Because on that twelve percent interest issue, they couldn't get it through the Senate. Not that I did it all by myself because labor can endorse or not endorse, but I got them to contribute a few bucks, and I had some say in to whom the money went. It all got melded together.

But I became their man, and I wasn't ashamed of it. In fact, I thought it was pretty good. They'd say I was his "office boy" or they'd say that I was "next to the labor movement," and that was fine with me. The world was different then than it is now. Now, you'd struggle to say you're independent and all that sort of thing. I never made any secret of the fact that I was for labor.

Ms. Boswell: Was your reason for becoming so close to labor primarily for your constituency?

Sen. Greive: I don't know that I just sat down and just decided to do it. Chances are they wanted things that were similar to my district's interests. I was a lawyer, and I understood better than most what the important issues were, and before I ever got to be floor leader I was on their side. I'm sure they probably helped me get there because I was acceptable. They had several legislators with whom they had an awful lot of influence, and we cultivated each other.

Politics is not logical or laid out. It's a combination of friendships and of political power, and a variety of things that make the world go round. Lobbyists—even the most honest of the lobbyists—tried to bribe me once. Not that I'm so holy, but I didn't take bribes, I'll tell you that for damn sure. I had better sense than that. The one guy that did, I got him kicked out as a lobbyist. He was a very minor lobbyist, and I felt a little bad about it because he was just kind of a "stringer" for somebody else that didn't have nerve enough. So they sent him around, probably to see what he could do, and I got him barred and that sort of thing. A guy has to advertise to be a crook.

Ms. Boswell: Meaning you really have to let people know that you are one?

Sen. Greive: You have to give the feeling. The best illustration that I can make has nothing to do with politics. I worked for the Washington Athletic Club on weekends when I was going to college. I worked in the commissary, the kitchen, just on Saturdays and Sundays. I got acquainted with a bellhop, and he had what looked like a huge diamond ring to me, although it might have been glass for all I know. He'd say, "Sonny, you see that? People see that ring and they know they can get what they want. I'm available. Broads, liquor, you name it." He says, "That ring is worth so much a week, a month, or a year to me. They know where to go. Nobody else wears a ring that big." I asked him, "Gee, that's an awful big ring. What's a man doing with a ring like that?"

The people that are crooks, or we suspect are crooks—and I'm morally sure were crooks—there were several of them in the Legislature. They were people who let the world know that somehow they were available. You go tell the wrong guy, and you get the wrong reaction. It had to be somebody who let the world know that he could be had, and maybe they'd have some drinks together, and they'd cultivate a friendship, and they'd talk the thing over. The fellow would say, "Well now, if this happened, why maybe I could do this." And then they'd get down to doing business.

The most blatant experience I ever heard about was told to me by a man by the name of Cooney, God bless his soul. John Cooney was from Spokane, and he was a very close friend of mine. He served twenty years, I think. I always said that he was born thirty years too soon because he didn't belong in that political

age; he belonged in the old days when you went in the back room and you divided things up. Never made a speech. He was an excellent campaigner, getting signs out and doing mailings, and he always got re-elected until they redistricted him out. Then he had to run against James Keefe. They put two of them in the same district.

We were making the seating up, and being floor leader, I sat in on the seating. I can remember there were three or four people that I thought were crooked. They would talk things over. They were talking about this stuff right on the floor. Now, I didn't hear it myself, so I don't know that it would be true, and he's dead, so he can't testify, but he told me on four or five occasions that this is what happened. He says, "I was always for the little things. Washington Water Power was a big force then, and they would put on a feed for me, or they would help me with my campaign, or they'd give me a buck or two when I needed it." He was a lawyer; he had a practice. He says, "People had influence with me, but I never saw anything like this. Bob, you have no idea how these people operated. They were trading votes." He had a reputation for keeping his mouth shut and that's why they had him nearby. He was right in the triangle. He could hear everything they were doing.

Ms. Boswell: And they were seated in a triangle around him?

Sen. Greive: They had suggested putting him there, as I remember. He was my close personal friend, always voted for me, and he wasn't one of their gang. And when they put him there, they said, "Bob, do you object if Cooney takes this spot?" But he was known as a person to keep his mouth shut. He just wasn't that type of guy. He used to say, "You know, Bob, I'm no angel, and I have my faults, but you have no idea what those people are doing. Selling votes, trading votes—it's absolutely scandalous. Talking over what the lobbyists said and asking, "How much did they offer you? How much did they offer me?" He said, "It was enough to make me sick on politics."

Those were three of the smartest people in the Legislature. The crooks are pretty near always smart. In my experience, the people that were suspected, or I thought were crooked, were pretty near almost invariably brilliant people.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think these were people who would come to the Legislature with that intent, or were they people who were corrupted while they were there?

Sen. Greive: No. They just drifted off and first made one deal and then another deal—like the famous wine bill. I'm sure somebody's told you about that before now—the Washington wine bill?

So much of this I don't know because I was on the other side. You understand, we weren't all clean either. For many, many years we had a wine bill where they made fortified wine. In other words, they put brandy with the fruit, and they'd sell it. It was rot-gut, and it was sold cheap, and they called it "Washington's wine." Almost from the day you'd get elected to the Legislature, they came around and made contributions and helped both sides, Republicans and Democrats.

Ms. Boswell: "They" meaning the makers of this wine?

Sen. Greive: The wine, yes. They had a lobbyist called Ivan Kearns who was just a delightful guy, and he'd take people to dinner. It was his job to curry favor and to keep Washington wine in the stores. Well, Gallo—or at least the California wines—wanted this market, and they wanted the grocery market. They could put their wine in the liquor stores, but there wasn't anything for sale in the grocery

market in the way of volume, and they wanted that particular market. And they probably made a better wine. They just came up here and just bought their way in. I never saw anything quite like it.

We heard stories of one particular legislator, who's no longer down there, who supposedly went in a telephone booth and was signaling some other people the number of thousands of dollars he'd get for his vote. The bill passed the House and then it got lost. Nobody could find it. It absolutely disappeared. Somebody had pocketed it.

Ms. Boswell: The bill itself?

Sen. Greive: Yes. And so another bill was brought out saying the same thing from the Senate, and it passed. The guy who supposedly was engineering the whole deal voted the other way. He voted against the bill so you couldn't say he did it.

But, these were brilliant people. These were people who knew how to make things happen. They were smooth operators who understood and grasped the intricacies of the situation. People owed them favors, and, I presume, the lobbyists had retainers from various people. My attitude was that it wasn't up to me to decide the morals of the other people. You dealt with who was there. For one thing, it wasn't exclusively a Democratic problem. Dishonesty crosses party lines. I just don't want to go into all of the machinations of the things that the Republicans did.

Ms. Boswell: Was it essentially personal greed, ultimately, that swayed them over?

Sen. Greive: Oh, no. They never were caught. They got defeated like everybody else because they got older, or because they ran for something else, or because they were lazy and various things. They were never exposed.

Ms. Boswell: What was it about the times that they were so different?

Sen. Greive: Well, because it was accepted. Who's to say? What a lobbyist would say is, "I'm not going to buy your vote. I will be good to people, to everybody. You take this campaign contribution, and I want access. I want a chance for you to hear my argument." That's what they would always say, and you were running, and you didn't have the money.

But that's just the way the world is. There's no way you could sit here now and know how it was then. My guess is, the way you're acting, nobody's ever told you the real inside story.

Ms. Boswell: That's true. I think not. I think it is important to understand it within the context of that particular period of time, but it's really hard to be able to do that now.

Sen. Greive: Essentially, you're electing people who are intelligent, who have some foresight, who have integrity. Like I used to always tell them, one of my favorite things was to first put my arm around a new legislator, and say, "There are no signed contracts in politics. You can do anything you want to do, but if they can't take your word for it and think you're pulling something, then you've got a rough row to hoe. You've got to have your reputation because that's the thing that's going to keep you in the Legislature."

Politicians are so used to having a false front that they walk around and act like they mean it. I know they don't mean it because when you get right down to it, they change. Everybody down there probably has six or seven things that they want and that they would give a very high priority. But you can't have a position on every cotton-pickin' piece of legislation. You don't know it's even going to come up.

Ms. Boswell: It's not a question of integrity,

but of compromise?

Sen. Greive: You have to compromise. You have to give. In the first place, you've got to have some integrity. If you're a guy who's completely for sale, or you've got one issue like the dentists I was talking about, those people don't count. But, if you go to hire a lawyer or a doctor, or anyone else, you expect them to use some judgment. Integrity is one thing, and judgment is a very close second.

Ms. Boswell: Would you say that the majority of people in the Legislature have that?

Sen. Greive: I think the vast majority of the legislators have integrity, but they're not committed. What difference does it make to me about Washington Water Power's fight in Seattle? I've got Seattle City Light covering my district. I didn't have any Puget Sound Power and Light. I didn't care what their big argument with somebody was—that's a contrived thing. It was important to them: low cost public power, and who got this market and who got that market. That wasn't important to me or to my constituents. My people didn't care. Why should I go marching because it was the liberal thing or the politically correct thing to do?

Now, there were some issues that I never varied on. I was always for minority rights, and I don't think there was ever a women's rights issue that I wasn't on the women's side. Well, they're pretty basic. That's something you could say. But whether or not we put a tax on beer might be very important to me because I represent the Skid Road. But if it probably didn't affect somebody in Okanogan, he could care less. It was a burning issue to me, not to them.

Fact is, we had a very cute thing happen one time. We had a beer tax coming up, and the breweries were just fighting it with everything they had. They kept coming around to me and asking me if we were going to have a tax on beer. I said, "Now, gentlemen, I just don't know. I know what I'm going to do, but I don't know." "Why don't you?" they'd say. "Well," I said, "I don't know; I don't care." They wouldn't buy "don't care," so for about two weeks these lobbyists—I knew them and they were friends of mine—were just driving me nuts. Finally, I said, "Get off my back. I don't know." They said, "You've got to know something." I said, "Why?" They replied, "Your dad just sold 30,000 shares of Rainier Brewery stock." So, I phoned up my dad and I said, "What's this all about?" "Sure, I did," he says, "I know why. There's going to be a tax on beer. I read the newspapers." I didn't know about it at all. I hadn't the slightest idea. And it turned out that there was a tax, but the tax didn't go on the taverns. Because I had the Skid Road in those days, I had all the taverns; they were friends of mine.

Ms. Boswell: So it was not that you did not support the legislation, but that you just didn't take a position?

Sen. Greive: Well, see, I don't drink. I've never had a drink in my life, to this moment. I just don't drink, but that doesn't mean that I'm anti-liquor. I've had a bad experience with a couple of uncles, and my mother didn't want me to drink, so I just never drank, although she'd take a drink and my father used to have a drink every night. There's nothing wrong with that.

The trouble is that you want to put words on something that has no words. You just can't explain or define what it means to compromise on some issue. You're just one player in a big stew of people, and you've got all these competing interests. How are you going to bring these competing interests together?

Let's say you have a bill on a particular issue—number one, you'll have a committee, and usually it's made up of knowledgeable people, and that's why they ask for that

committee. For example, I was on the Judiciary Committee throughout my Legislative career. I'm a lawyer, yet I never attended the meetings. What I always said was, "Put me on the Judiciary Committee, and when the chairman is short a vote, I will show up." I couldn't run the Senate and do what I had to do and take care of that detail. I couldn't go to the meetings all the time because I had to go somewhere else.

However, if it was tipping the balance, you'd call on me, and I'd cancel whatever I was doing. Whether it was the governor or whoever was around, they'd just have to take second place. I'd be there and vote for you, if it was something I was for or something important. Not on an amendment, minuscule things. So, I might be called three or four times in a session. They had control of the thing.

But, anyway, they have a position. Well, they don't know—that bill's filled with language. That language all means something, and it's very, very important to somebody, whether it's the janitors, or whether it's the Holy Rosary, or whether it's an optician or an optometrist. When I was fighting with the opticians and optometrists, my local pastor phoned me up several times because he had a friend who was an optician. He had a lot more influence with me than with Slim Rasmussen, for example, but I couldn't do it. He'd been my friend for years. He had been there thirty-six years, and I'd been his parishioner. So, you're not all wedded to every particular detail.

Take health care. They've got all these different provisions and you're trying to put something through. These are complicated things. You can't have a preconceived notion on everything there. You've got to be flexible and listen; see what's reasonable; see what they'll do and what you'll do, and how you'll get along.

Woodall and I, we ended up being very good friends. But even before that, we'd sit there if we were on a conference committee, or in a leadership conference, or whatever it would be, and I'd want something and he'd want something. So we'd say, "Well, now if you do that, I've got enough votes to block it because there are three Democrats that will vote with us, or seven Democrats, if you do it. You don't have your own caucus." He'd probably know I didn't have my own caucus; he can count, too. There were only fifty people there. So I'd have to give some way.

One place that I regret giving, and I run into this all the time, is on third-party, self-insured. That's not the whole story, but the point is that you have to give somewhere or you can't get what you want. It couldn't function any other way. If everybody marched down there like soldiers going to war in some sort of formation—making them go right or left like robots—Legislatures aren't that way. It's not like the battle of Gettysburg, where people went running up that hill, getting shot and killed. It is ridiculous to us now. Legislatures aren't that way. You've got to persuade them to go up there.

But, when you're going to get something through, you're not talking about one bill. You're talking about three or four hundred bills. You're talking about appropriations. I can remember one fellow, who came to me—I'd done some wonderful things for him because he was a public official in another office—and he said, "Face it, Greive, I sold my soul to you, but it was the most profitable transaction I've ever made."

I doubled his appropriation. He'd done something that I'd wanted done very badly, and he didn't have to tell me to do it. I just did it.

Ms. Boswell: So you helped people who helped you?

Sen. Greive: Yes, but the same thing is true in the Legislature. You do things for people that you like, and the people who are allies and have done things. And also, you might have women's rights. I was brought up by my

mother. She was the politician, not my father. So, that's the side I'm on. The same thing with labor. I was brought up in an era when labor was, as far as Democrats were concerned, the most important thing. And, of course, Seattle is a labor town, and we had a big percentage of the union people. Certainly not a majority, but they were a significant group.

Ms. Boswell: I understand the point you're making about politics, and in order to accomplish something, you have to give and take. Ultimately, when you're talking about doing all this, what's in it for you? Why is it worth it?

Sen. Greive: What you do, you measure at the end. You don't measure as you go along. Then you say, what did we accomplish, and who was instrumental in getting that? It's a whole world of ego and power. What's in it for anybody?

Ms. Boswell: That's what I want to understand. What is in it?

Sen. Greive: Talk about anybody in politics. They don't do it for the money, even the poor ones. The money becomes a by-product. As money becomes more and more important to them, they might do something, but people do it because they want to be part of the melee, because they believe in things. And virtually, everybody who runs has some things they believe in.

Let's be realistic about that. I was fortunate on the drinking issue; the Catholics don't have a position on that. But if I'd been a hard-shell Baptist, I'd probably have had a hard time. I could be wringing wet, and it didn't bother me any as far as my religion was concerned. But you have religious principles laid over your background, and what your father does, and what your mother did, and who influences you, and you get caught up in whatever your leaders are saying on the big issues.

They go to these conventions, and the platform is always written much more radically than the legislators. They sit there, a bunch of people all convinced—the zealots—and they make their mind that this is the way it should be, and they write it all up. These are the platforms. Usually the people that adhere to them have all kinds of problems—for instance, abortion or things of that sort—that are hard issues. But if you believe in it, then you have a right to follow it through.

When somebody believes something, and you're convinced they believe it, you don't put any pressure on them—at least I didn't. "God bless you, if that's what you believe, you should do it." We're not going to come around and threaten you unless you're one of these weak willy-nilly types who has been known to change with pressure. One of my favorite things was to tell both sides I was against them. If I knew it was going to come to a vote, at least half of them thought I was a good guy. And the others weren't surprised.

Chapter 7

Senate Leadership and the Greive Fund

Ms. Boswell: You had many years in a leadership role in the Senate. I 'd like to talk about how you got into that position and, particularly, how you saw your leadership role. Didn't you get your start in the Senate leadership as the caucus chair?

Senator Greive: Yes—well, no, I got to be what they call the "whip" first. We created it. There wasn't even a whip, and then I got elected whip, and then the caucus chair. I think at first it was Earl Coe—he got to be Secretary of State or something—and there was an opening. So then, Rosellini was the floor leader and I was the caucus chairman. Then he became governor, and I progressed onto the next step.

Ms. Boswell: So, you started as whip. Tell me how that position evolved, and why?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I wanted a position in leadership and they had whips other places, so I thought we ought to have a whip.

Ms. Boswell: What did you mostly do in that position?

Sen. Greive: It was just a title. At least it got me elected. We had a contest and it was close. I ran against Clyde Tisdale, of all things. He was a real character. He's a colorful character. He's one of the most colorful human beings I've ever known in my life, but he's dead. When I got elected—once I had a position—then I was somebody. I had a position, and next came the caucus chairman. I ran for that, and somebody ran against me—I forget who it was—and I had that for a couple of years. I did real well at that because I was very neutral, and I didn't pick on people. In other words, I established rapport with the right-wing guys. They had walked out on us, but I wanted them in the caucus, and I wanted to get along with them. I didn't attempt to put them down and that sort of thing. Then Rosellini got to be governor, and, of course, we were all Democrats then. He was from the Senate, and so forth.

Ms. Boswell: You were the caucus leader when Rosellini was the majority leader, right? How did that relationship work?

Sen. Greive: Rosellini did everything by personal magnetism. He didn't do all the things I did, but he was always minority leader. He was only majority leader once, and that was before I was ever there. All the time he was the leader, it was split. There were always seven or eight Democrats who didn't vote with him. I had to stop that.

Ms. Boswell: Was that a lack of leadership on his part?

Sen. Greive: I don't know what control he had. He was, personally, a very charming and an extremely popular guy. I think even the people who didn't like him politically liked him personally.

The coalition is another whole other story. It started before I was there, when we had Wallgren in there. As I understood it, Wallgren was used to strict party lines in Congress, and he talked them into taking all the spoils and kicking out everybody they didn't like. If you

didn't play ball, you didn't get anything. He cut off things, and he just plagued his whole administration. He always took the hard line: "I'm a Democrat, and Democrats control, and Democrats have everything."

Ms. Boswell: And so he just pushed those people out?

Sen. Greive: And once Wallgren did that they got mad, and they revolted. Then they got to be the darlings of the press, and got oodles of publicity. We didn't like them, but everybody else did. They could be minor members of the coalition, but the press wrote them up good, and they enjoyed the situation. You couldn't get them back. That's the way I look at it now, anyway.

There was some philosophy involved there, too. Generally, they were not necessarily labor people; they were private power people, and so on.

Ms. Boswell: Weren't they primarily Eastern Washington people, too?

Sen. Greive: Yes, but I pretty nearly always had the Eastern Washington vote. No matter what Hallauer or Gissberg or those people did, they couldn't get Herrmann, and they couldn't get Cooney—they couldn't get the Eastern Washington guys. At first they went their own way, but over a period of time I participated in their campaigns and made friends with them. I always had six or seven votes over there because Eastern Washington had a big revolt of public power people. My opponents couldn't do anything with them, but I had the votes.

Ms. Boswell: How is it you were more successful with them, and Rosellini, for example, was not?

Sen. Greive: Well, Rosellini didn't have a chance. They revolted against the governor. He was the governor's man. He didn't try. He never raised money for people or went out and beat the pavement and so forth. I learned about raising money when I was raising money for Rosellini, when he ran for governor.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me about that.

Sen. Greive: I finally decided that I was in the middle of the campaign, and I was for Rosellini. He was my personal friend and mentor, and we were great buddies. Fact is, his son, in later years, ran for state representative—not in his district, but the Thirty-fourth. That was because I was here to help him. He lives here in West Seattle. Fact is, he's tried several times to come here and be a partner with me in my old age, thinking he'd take it over. I'm really not quite ready for that yet, that's all. Maybe I will in time. He's an awful nice young guy.

But, anyway, Rosellini and I were very good friends, but he never campaigned for anybody. He always went to the meetings and smiled. He'd make a speech, and he had kind of a funny accent. He pronounced some words differently, and so forth. Other than that, he made a pretty good speech, but mostly, he was just a nice guy who people liked. He'd fight for the principles. He'd be glad to stand up on the floor after you had made up your mind.

The greatest revelation to me was after I got into the caucus, and I realized he wasn't running it. From the outside I thought that Rosellini—before I was elected—was running that thing. I remember telling my wife—well, I wasn't married at that time, but later—that he never said a word in caucus. When they made up their minds, he went out and led them. He didn't shape the caucus; he let the caucus shape itself. I remember the first time I was there, feeling I had more power than he did inside the caucus. They had to have fifteen votes to sustain the governor's veto, and I was the fifteenth vote. If I wanted something, the caucus people would go along with me. But to

go along was kind of empty because they had nothing to give me. We didn't have any committee chairmanships, we didn't have any private secretaries, and we didn't have anything. We had one committee room; that was all we had.

Ms. Boswell: That was the time when the Futile Fifteen was in the Senate?

Sen. Greive: Yes. We got to be good friends, but Rosellini held it together because he was a hell of a nice guy. He was jovial and friendly and very earthy and very human and very smart. Very, very smart. There was nothing to hold together; we weren't controlling anything. When he wanted something, he had to find a way to work it out with the Republicans or the coalitionists, who he had good relations with. He'd work it out with them.

Ms. Boswell: How did you two work it out as caucus chairman and floor leader?

Sen. Greive: All I had to do was maintain peace and be sure that everybody had their say. If one guy was talking too much, I had to tell him to hold his question and let somebody else talk, so that everybody had their say. I could do that real well.

Ms. Boswell: You were also saying, earlier, that you came up with the idea of the "Greive Fund" by your fund-raising for Rosellini.

Sen. Greive: The first time Rosellini ran for governor, he was defeated, and I was very close to him in the campaign. We were down at the end, and I decided I'd go and try to raise some money for him. So, I picked the lobbyists. Probably several of them had already contributed to his campaign. I phoned them up and I raised $2,000 or $3,000 over the telephone—$4000 or whatever it was. But it was quite a sum for me. So, the next time there was a campaign for the senators, why then I used the same technique. It worked again. It sort of evolved after that.

Ms. Boswell: What kind of tactics could you use with the lobbyists to say, "You may have already given Rosellini money, but I want you to give more"?

Sen. Greive: I pretended like I didn't know they'd given to him. "I'm raising money for Al Rosellini. He's running for governor, and he's in a tight spot and has come to the end. And, of course, he's going to be back. You're not giving to a dead cause. He's a state senator, he's not giving up his state senatorship." Words like that.

Ms. Boswell: And so they mostly would go along?

Sen. Greive: And not only that. If you wanted to be a friend of mine, you figured I was going to get some Brownie points. Why not then give me some money for me, and contribute again, so you kind of made friends? So, I owed them something later on, probably.

Ms. Boswell: Were lobbyists ever sort of specific about, "If I give you this, I expect this," or did they not do that?

Sen. Greive: I had a guy do that with me once, and I refused to accept his contribution. He was just shocked. That was before I ever took office.

Ms. Boswell: You mean when you were just campaigning?

Sen. Greive: Yes. I was nominated, and sure there was a Republican landslide, but we didn't know it. See, that year we had the soldier vote. I got out a little ahead of the others, and our primaries were held in May, and the finals

weren't until November. And so, everybody assumed, since it had always been Democratic, I was going to be in. So, if anybody came to me and said, "Here's the money, you've got to do so-and-so," the answer is, "I'll have no part in it." And I'm not alone. They just didn't do that.

The hardest people to explain the process to are people from the outside who know a lot, but don't realize this missing piece and how it worked. People think they know an awful lot about everything else, but how the thing really operates on the inside, nobody wants to talk about it. They always want to say, "I was down there fighting for the rights of the working man, or the poor people on the welfare roll. Or we have to attract industries to the state of Washington, and I did my best on this string of bills. Or I was for ethics, or I sat on the ethics commission." That's all true.

Ms. Boswell: But that's not the real reason?

Sen. Greive: It's just as much a part of the process as anything else. I'm not saying it isn't the real reason. They are real reasons, but they're not the whole reason.

When we talked about Jack Rogers earlier, who now has departed this earth—well, Jack Rogers would put a high-sounding name and title on everything he did. If you had a personal conversation with Jack Rogers, he would convince you that everything he did was logical, intelligent—he always was intelligent—that his voters were high and mighty-minded, and he always did the right thing. I'm absolutely sure that's what he'd say. And I'm sure Bob Bailey said something almost the same. Both of them were Democrats. They wore different stripes. Both of them were excellent legislators, and probably both of them told the truth.

They're not going to see it any other way. They're not going to tell you the whole truth; they're going to tell you the truth they want you to hear because that's what they're proud of, and that's what they remember. I don't think they probably remember all the machinations they went through. Bob Bailey probably didn't do that very often; he expected me to worry about that.

He might not be nice to everybody, but at least was nice to all the Democrats in the caucus—the people who were his constituents. He didn't have to get involved, but he's almost like a preacher. Jack Rogers was the same way. They do what's right. What God said is right, or whatever rationale they used. And another high and mighty soul, like he's preaching the gospel, is John L. O'Brien. He preaches from the pulpit on things, too. I think he believes it; he talks that way.

They're not wrong. It is the truth. But that's the process. But to say that I'm all wound up in the process or they are not isn't true, because those high-minded things never happen unless you do some other things. That's how you have to hold the votes together. We all have a tendency to want to remember the things we're proud of and not the things we're not, especially if we think it's going to be recorded forever. Because the things we are not the proudest of are usually distorted completely beyond of all sense of reality.

Motivation is just an impossible thing. All I can say is, nobody runs for the office if they don't have motivation. And nobody goes down there that doesn't want to be a chairman. And, virtually nobody goes down there that doesn't want a position of leadership. There are all kinds of people who want to get a leadership position that don't go because they can't get it. They might not be willing to pay the price, but that's what they want.

A lot of times the person who did all the things that I had to do—maybe they weren't done in the House. I don't know how they worked the House. I only know what my job was. And I only had to worry about twenty-six votes. I had to have twenty-six at all times. And the closer it was, the nicer we had to be to

the dissidents. If we had thirty-two votes, we could have had a little play. But, first of all, you have to convince the whole group that you've got their best interest at heart. It would be nice to say that you have to convince them that they must follow the principles of the Democratic Party and everything, and that's a part of it, but they've got to be convinced that you're interested in them.

Ms. Boswell: So people were convinced that it wasn't just a question of partisanship, there was more?

Sen. Greive: Yes. And I did the same thing the lobbyists did. I didn't say, "You have to vote for me to get the money." Lobbyists gave money to people all the time, and they repeatedly gave some of them money, even when they voted against their interests. If nothing else, it may temper their opposition. And maybe they can't vote with you. Maybe there are ten votes, but there's one crucial vote where they'll come over and do you a favor. It's a very, very complex thing, and I don't know that anybody's ever going to make it clear enough so the public can understand it. Their approaches are all going to be like your question, "Isn't this crooked?" that seem logical and intelligent. But, it's not. I mean, is it close to being crooked? Well, everybody had to make up their minds for themselves. You have to draw the line somewhere. People don't care about most of the issues. They're not into it.

But I've never arrived at a legislative meeting without somebody giving me a list of the things we're going to do this session. The governor in his message, he'd want this and want that, and it depends on who the governor was as to how specific they were. Usually, they tried to put a lot of things in the message that you were going to do anyway. You've got to do something; you're not going to go down there and do nothing. You're going to change things, whatever you do.

Ms. Boswell: For you personally, as Bob Greive, why was the leadership role important to you? What did it give you personally?

Sen. Greive: Why do you do anything? I think it is so firmly ingrained in human nature that there's no way you can separate that out. Everybody wants to be the leader. Everybody wants power; everybody wants to be important. I suppose the word is "ego," but it's more than that because there'd be some things that you believed in that wouldn't be accomplished unless you were there to do it, or somebody like you was there to do it.

Ms. Boswell: For you, what might that have been?

Sen. Greive: I was generally for labor. You see, when I came in, labor legislation wasn't developed. We developed a lot of important labor legislation, especially in unemployment and workmen's compensation. They were important issues to me.

I know that we had terrible fights over redistricting, and I felt I had to save the skin of a number of people. That's going to be another whole subject if we have time. Redistricting became an exceedingly important concern of mine.

I'm sure the death penalty was important—I've always voted against the death penalty. I didn't make an issue out of it, and I spoke against it a few times. I was in the minority, but I don't believe in the death penalty. I don't believe in abortion. Absolutely don't. Well, that would be important to me. I always was very sympathetic to the poor because that's what we Democrats were supposed to be. We were brought up to believe that we were interested in the people on welfare, and they had to be protected against people that always said, "Cut welfare." You cut it, and the people don't have anything. That's a terrible thing to do. On the other hand, it can be just a lot of

abuses, too. I don't know what the real answer is, but I know that's the side I was on. For instance, I had never wanted to see the liquor stores turned over to private industry. That's an issue today—that's why I brought that up. So, I had a lot of things that I believed in.

I don't suppose I had them before I got there, but I acquired them over a period of time. But you're talking about simply thousands of things that I had views on, and very often they didn't run head to head. If I were absolutely convinced that I was going to fight abortion, and the opposition had the votes, then they'd just leave me alone. I wouldn't take a part. I'd vote against it, but I didn't have to start trying to chain myself to the podium, or some other crazy thing.

Ms. Boswell: I have heard at least one person say of you that he thought you enjoyed the process more than the product. In other words, that what you got out of it most was just the whole essence, the political game of it, rather than one particular issue or issues. Is that fair?

Sen. Greive: Let's analyze that. What was my job? Most of the time it was the floor leader. What's a floor leader supposed to do?

Ms. Boswell: That's what I want to know.

Sen. Greive: Is he standing on the mountain and propounding sets of principles? Is he propounding that we're going to have universal health care? He's not doing that at all. He's got a group of people who have divergent ideas. Your first responsibility is to make them function as a unit. If you don't do anything, you do that. You see, until I became floor leader, there were two Democratic parties. They always had coalitions. So, my first responsibility was not to see my caucus break up. You might have to swallow pretty hard, but you did it. I had to keep them happy, and that's part of the drift toward private power, because the private power people were at the bottom of the coalition. That was the biggest single force, so you'd make an accommodation trying to hold them together.

Incidentally, before I left, public and private power interests were together. They've been together for twenty-five years now, and they work beautifully together. They supplement each other. They protect each other legislatively. There's no fight. But it was such a big fight at the time.

So, first of all, you had to keep the sheep in the flock. If they're not in the flock, you don't have anything. You've got to understand that if you're going to be effective, you are going to have to get everybody to work together. Otherwise, they have a series of people that get titles down there that don't mean anything. They're not powers.

If you're the Speaker of the House, you're a power because you appoint the committees, but in the Senate we don't appoint committees. The Committee on Committees does that. What do you care? Why not let the thing be bedlam? Why not let us go in and be all split up, and just let the lobbyists run everything? First of all, you've got to have a force. You've got to keep your soldiers together, and, of course, that takes some give and take; otherwise, you don't have any soldiers. There are all kinds of jealousies, and there are all kinds of problems for many on the inside, and there are pressures. Somebody could get your help, and maybe they'd get a twelve percent interest repealed. See what I mean? So, what the floor leader has to do is keep them together, marching in the same direction. You've got to be popular enough with them that when they're presented two propositions in the caucus, and they've a right to go either way, they don't say, "I want to fix that son of a bitch."

Karl Herrmann said one time, "You know, I'm trying to think of the little red hen." It's some sort of parable about when she wanted her children to do this and that, and she said,

"Who does the little red hen love the most?" So, a certain member remembers that you did a favor for somebody. It might not have been important to anybody but him, but maybe he had a bill, maybe he needed some money and was desperate at the last minute, or he maybe needed a piece of advice. Maybe he had to have somebody put his arm around him and say, "I voted the other way because I trusted you."

The greatest floor leader in my time was Lyndon Johnson.

Ms. Boswell: Was he kind of a model for you in some ways?

Sen. Greive: I don't know if he was or not. I think I was well along the way by that time, but I certainly was influenced by him. Nobody could ever say he wasn't a great legislator. And you could say that he was more interested in the process than the results. But you remember him because of Vietnam, not because he was a great floor leader. That's the problem; it's not one thing. And anybody who tries to simplify the role simply either doesn't understand the situation or is not telling the truth.

There are a lot of people who don't understand the process—they really don't. I wonder how they can be so stupid. You sit down and talk to them, and it's like they're not interested in what John Cooney or Jimmy Keefe, or somebody else wants; they just want what they want, and that's it.

We had a woman, Julia Butler Hansen. She was a House member, tremendous power on roads and bridges and so forth and so on. She was just sheer power, and she tried to roll over me one time, and we blocked her in the Senate, and she just became evil. Even Ross Cunningham of the *Seattle Times* came around and lobbied with me. I said, "No, she's wrong." She was just going to run over everybody, and I didn't believe she should do that. So, once in awhile, you get in a fight like that, but you try as much as you can to stay away from that. It didn't make any difference. If she wanted something, she wanted it. She limited what she was interested in. She was only in roads and bridges, but when she wanted that, it didn't make any difference who was against her, she was going to have it her way.

Now, for an example, when the Republicans took over new leadership and they decided they were going to toss all the Republicans off Rules that were on there—Raugust and Woodall and various people—because they had a new, clean sweep. I remember going to the leadership and telling them, "Well, now look, you do it anyway you want, but we appoint the members of the Rules Committee. You don't, and they're going to be there whether you like it or not. You better like it." I didn't say that they were not going to get a piece of legislation or this or that, or threaten them, but they got the picture. What was it John McCormack of Massachusetts used to say to the congressmen when they were first elected? He says, "You can get along by going along." Those issues—a lot of them—were formed and you've got no control over them. All you can do is impact them, approve or disapprove of them. If there are things you can't change, the only chance you've got of changing them is the process. When else do you do it?

Ms. Boswell: How do you draw the line between what's trading and what's the important part of compromise, and what's really crooked, selling your vote?

Sen. Greive: If you figure somebody's got a financial interest in something—I don't say it never happens, but people come around and say, "I got a big contribution from them; we've got to do this." If you got into that level, you'd turn everybody off. It'd turn me off. I don't want nothing to do with that. That's just plain crooked, even if they just do it for a campaign contribution.

Now, you might know that this is their big contributor, especially if it's from their district. How do you decide whether they're doing it because Washington Water Power gave them a sizable contribution or because they've got the aluminum plants in Spokane and they want cheap power? The two issues had to be held together. Now Washington Water Power didn't service them. They bought their power direct from Bonneville, but there'd be somebody trying to make sure they didn't get it unless Washington Water Power got it. Somebody's always grabbing one issue and trying to lever it onto another issue. You'd listen if a guy had a real problem like that. He'd get up in caucus and explain, and he'd tell them, "Now fellows, this is awful important to me: it's in my district, or for my people," or so forth. But nobody ever got up and said, "I've got a $2,000 contribution from these people, and, by gosh, we've got to do it." Holy Christopher! The whole place would come unglued.

Well, you have to have some discretion and some intelligence, some integrity. Somebody's sleeping with your secretary, now what? Have I got to protect this person because my secretary wants him protected? Holy Christopher! Nobody would listen to that. They might know it. It might be common knowledge, and it very often was because a lot of the jobs down there kind of depended on who wanted them and all that goes with it. But you didn't get up and say that. Somebody might snicker, "All he's really talking about is 'Betty,' and the two of them sleep together, you know." Or, one case a guy got to be a judge in Eastern Washington, "because the governor's secretary, that's her boyfriend. That's why he got it. She's sleeping with both of them." We had statements like that, but nobody ever said it publicly.

The process is what you're there for. That's what a majority leader is. Were we better off when we had three factions? Or if we had four factions? Is Italy the paragon, or the French, where they come off with many parties and with different factions? They eventually have to come to some point where they compromise, or they'd get nothing done. It's going to be a compromise anyway. The process makes you compromise earlier in a lot of things. It makes it a little easier. The only way I can answer is, if you believe in democracy, and you believe in the system we've got, the process is part of it. Without the process, it won't work. The other answer is that somebody becomes so strong that their will controls. That isn't a good system, either.

Ms. Boswell: It would just divide everybody up. There are some people who are good at it and should be making the process work, and there are other people who are good at it and should be worrying more about a particular product that's coming out. Is there that division?

Sen. Greive: That's an oversimplification. It's a process as old as this country, and probably older than this country. You have a number of issues, and no one person is an expert in all of them. Some of them, like Slim Rasmussen, thought they were. He was a highly intelligent guy—he was no dummy. But, if you have something you're interested in, and somebody else is interested in also, well, eventually you've got to bring those issues together.

I can't believe that the same thing isn't true in Washington, D.C., that's true here. I think the reason we had Tom Foley as Speaker of the House for so long was because he happened to be a genius at taking the high road and bringing conflicting interests together. That's how he got there. After all, the Texan that got sort of drummed out of there—his predecessor—was pretty raw. He did it by sheer power. That's what he believed in. It doesn't work that way. You can control a session. You can have a machine that keeps everybody in place, but it's going to break apart the next session. The way you stay is to direct as best you can and try to

ride somewhere—up and down—on the good and bad days.

But there's no way you can categorize it, and that's the reason they have such a problem. The anger that we're hearing now from the right wing—it used to be the left wing that said the same thing. It always amuses me. The right-wingers now are acting just like the left-wingers used to. They were in the minority, but they had a sizable group, and both sides want to force their views on people. They came down there when Hillary Clinton came to town and roughed up her news conference and all that sort of thing. Typical of what we used to call the "commies" or the left-wing people. And then you listen to those radio stations, which I often do, and they're congratulating each other: "And we stood fast, and it was a wonderful experience. It was exhilarating to see us standing shoulder to shoulder." I can just close my eyes and hear talk about the solidarity of the left. Same statements, absolutely, except the issues—they're on a different side now.

Process is a part of it, so the real trick—number one—is understanding the process. And that means understanding the members. Can you move this guy? Can you move that guy? And you don't go around shaking your fist in his face. If he can't do it, somebody comes to you and says, "We're three votes short." Then you get down and you look the whole thing over, and do you say, "Well, I'll go down there and he's going to change his vote or we'll boot his ass out of here"? You'd never do a thing like that. But you'd sit down and talk to him, and you'd say, "Maybe we'd better not try him. Let's look at the ones on the other side; maybe there's a Republican we can get over here, or maybe we can compensate another way. Maybe what he wants can be put up in a procedural issue, and he won't be here, so we can indefinitely postpone it. Or we can knock that amendment off, and he won't have to vote."

But you've got to understand who you're talking to. If you're questioning somebody's integrity, then that person's going to come back at you. You have to understand the process if you're going to be effective. Now, don't tell me Jeannette Hayner didn't understand the process; she understands it very well. I'm not a great admirer of hers, but she understood.

An awful lot of brilliant people just don't understand. Some of the best technicians and people who have the biggest degrees, or who you'd think would be tremendous, they really aren't very effective. At least not anything like what they should be. In the first place, you usually have some brains. You've got to be recognized, and the goal is to have people, even your enemies, say that you'll keep your word, and that you're not just steering the way that you want them to go, that you're trying to look out with some broad vision. After that, you've got to look at the issue. You need some integrity, some broad visions, some smarts.

But if that's all you've got to offer, why should they go with you? Maybe because you helped them in a campaign, maybe because you got them a trip, maybe you put their girlfriend on somebody's payroll, that's possible. Maybe because you happen to be a drinking buddy of somebody that's a friend of theirs, and he's waxing enthusiastic because you're doing something for him, so he goes and tells them what a great guy you are. Maybe it's because you've got a House member that's close to somebody who will come over and put a little pressure on. That's all part of the process.

Ms. Boswell: Where's the degree where you separate giving somebody something, getting them a trip, getting a friend a position, and then doing something that would be considered crooked? It seems as though it's just a question of degrees?

Sen. Greive: Isn't that always true? Isn't that life's battle? Well, all right. Two people don't mind sleeping together. They're both married to somebody else. That's a horrible sin to

somebody. Somebody else figures it's just life. It's always a question of degree. Philosophy gets involved in a lot of this, too. Another thing you have to understand is somebody's philosophy. Some things they won't do, and some things they will. So and so is close to the timber industry. If there's anything that's going to cross the timber industry, you just better leave him out of your plans, or you better make a compromise with him because when all is said and done, he has a timber industry district and that's important, and he's got to do it.

Ms. Boswell: But, what if you know for a $100 contribution to his campaign, he might switch his vote?

Sen. Greive: That isn't true. There are limits. People have to draw their own ethical limits as to what they'll do and won't do. And, there are things that they will or won't do, but ninety-nine percent of the people don't get involved in that. There are a few crooks. In every legislative body, I'm convinced that there are some crooks—people who learned how to make the thing work for them—and they do a lot of things they shouldn't do. It's all the process, and the process is a multi-faceted, complicated thing. They have to feel you're taking care of them and looking out for them. They also have to feel that the time may come when they need you, even though they don't need you now.

Ms. Boswell: At the root of somebody who's crooked as opposed to somebody who's not, is it usually money?

Sen. Greive: No. I'm convinced that what happens is that some of the brightest people just figure they can get away with it. And they do get away with it. They get the benefit of whatever it is. There're land deals; there're all kinds of different things.

Ms. Boswell: But it's personal gain?

Sen. Greive: Oh, no, I don't think they get a personal advantage—they may get a charge out of it—when it's all done. You pick up a piece of legislation. It doesn't say that you got up in caucus and you persuaded them to vote for it when they didn't want to do it, or that you maneuvered this or maneuvered that—nobody knows about that. They just know the bill passed or didn't pass. The exercise of power is that way. If you have a dictator or you have a king, he has to think about what people want and try to make some compromises.

You want it to fit into a pigeonhole that it doesn't fit into. You start off with pigeonholes—and most people do—and you say it's going to fit in that pigeonhole even if I've got to drive it in with a hammer. But that's a square peg; it's not going to go in there. Anything else I tell you wouldn't be the truth.

Ms. Boswell: It's not that. I don't think I have a pigeonhole; I just want to understand. Is it a personal decision, then, how far you can go before it becomes unethical or wrong?

Sen. Greive: Moment to moment, day to day, there are personal decisions of that nature. They're always there.

Ms. Boswell: There are certain people that you've described, and you said that they were crooked.

Sen. Greive: Yes, but they weren't crooked on every issue. You misunderstand that. They were only crooked on the ones they could get away with, but on ninety percent, or eighty percent of them, they were like everybody else. They were giving logical arguments, they were voting, and they were voting their convictions and everything else. They weren't totally corrupt; they were just crooked. But that doesn't mean that they had certain areas where,

if there was money to be made, they were making some money.

Ms. Boswell: If somebody was willing to take from the majority leader some campaign money, even if was just a little bit, did that bind them?

Sen. Greive: No, the only good thing about contributing to their campaigns, and, incidentally, the Speaker and all those people all get their funds the same way—Tom Foley and Tip O'Neill and all those people. This isn't anything unique that I had or different than they have other places. I just developed it early on—we didn't have it around here, but I didn't think it up.

But the most important thing you do—see, an awful lot of those people voted against me. Fact is, when Slim Rasmussen accused me, I stood on the floor and I told them, "Show me anybody that had the pressure to vote for me," and three or four of the guys got up. Senator Nat Washington, for instance, said he didn't vote with me, never voted for me for floor leader, voted against me three out of four times. He said he always got contributions. We gave it to anybody that wanted it. When Senator Bruce Wilson was elected, we gave him more.

One of my big enemies, although he was absolutely honest, was Senator Hallauer, Wilbur Hallauer. He ran against me a couple times for floor leader, and he was a thorn in my side. Hallauer and I disagreed on a lot of things. Yet when he quit the Senate, his replacement came to me—a fellow by the name of Bruce Wilson—and he told me, he says, "Bob, I want you to know I'm with you." And I said, "That's great." And he says, "You want to know why? Hallauer told me you could be trusted."

Ms. Boswell: So, he respected you even though he opposed you most of the time. Now, Senator Bill Gissberg was another example. He was in the running against you for floor leader, too, at one point. I think he stepped in when Rasmussen started attacking and said, "Hey, this isn't right." Is that correct?

Sen. Greive: Yes, because he thought he might be next.

Ms. Boswell: So, you think he had other motives, too?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes. I know he did. He's a very respectable guy, and I'm not going to say anything bad about him. He was a real genius in so many ways. I won't go any further than that.

Ms. Boswell: But getting back to the issue of ethics in politics, I'm just trying to think from the perspective of the voter. If, as you say, that some of the smartest people end up being the crooks because they figure out ways of not getting caught, how does that look to the average citizen?

Sen. Greive: Well, they figure they won't get caught, and they're careful, usually. There are one or two who are so bold that they make a mockery out of it, but there's so many ways you can be compensated around the corner. There are contracts that can be had; if you're a lawyer, there's a chance. Insurance premiums, there are a hundred different ways. Nobody is thoroughly corrupt. Pretty near all have some principles they believe in. That's why you can't just say that they're for sale. It depends on the issue, but the process is important.

How do you end up with legislation? The people want it all put in pigeonholes, but if you turn around the other way and say, "Okay, how would you do it?" Well, the long and short of it, they're going to do it the same way you did. Only they're going to say that they did it for principle, and that they did it because they believed in it. They're going to mouth all the

things that politicians always mouth, and that's why people have such a low esteem of politicians. They don't believe they're telling the truth.

Ms. Boswell: But, in essence, you're saying they're really not, though. They don't have these high-minded goals.

Sen. Greive: I don't say they don't have them, but they're only one part of the puzzle. They don't talk about the real world.

Ms. Boswell: Looking at today, you've made it very clear—and I think rightly so—that it was different then than it is now. What do you see that's changed?

Sen. Greive: The process is different but it doesn't mean that there isn't a process, and that it doesn't operate with the same human forces that they have now.

Ms. Boswell: Has society's definition of what is acceptable changed?

Sen. Greive: No. I think there has been steady progress to clean the system up. I think we expect more and we get more—and we should. I think that probably because the public is paying better attention and because they haven't left it to a few lobbyists to raise the money, that there's some mass giving, and so forth. For example, the biggest fund that I recall was the women's fund. They contribute only to women candidates as far as I know. Now, I say that being on the women's side, so I'm not criticizing them for that.

But the system has to work the same way. Somebody has to give in. People have to be convinced more.

Ms. Boswell: What you're describing seems to me to be what we might call pragmatism.

Sen. Greive: I think that's probably true. But, on the other hand, you have to have some direction. Even lava, or water, is going to flow somewhere. It's going to flow in a direction. And what people have is a sense of direction, what side they're on, or what they believe in. If they didn't believe it before they started to run, they end up looking at somebody else's campaign literature and putting it down, and then they believe in it after that. But a lot of it is acquired. They just want the job, and they happen to know a couple of things they're interested in, and they don't know anything more than that. So, then they look around and see what people are saying and copy from each other, and pretty quick they're on that side. They're adopting arguments.

I know an awful lot about workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation—at least I did then. I'm not that sharp now. Well, I didn't know anything about them before I started. I knew it was something labor wanted, and I knew it was very beneficial to the labor man, but before I started I didn't know that. They were just words. Those words take on meaning, and part of what you do is because you are with a group.

We have in the Catholic Church what is called the Blessed Trinity—three people and one God. Well, when you ask me to define the process, it isn't defined that easily. You just have to take it on faith or on observation, that's the way the system works. Now, was I involved in the process? Of course I was. I was part of the process, and I think I was pretty effective. Now, would I ever be remembered for great speeches I made, or for some great thing I did? No. I'm lost in those laws. The guys who made the great speeches and walked around with all of the rhetoric, were they effective? No. Probably on one or two issues, and that was it.

Ms. Boswell: Would you say that you were striving for just a broader effectiveness in government?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I think, pragmatically, I saw my job as, first of all, to keep the group together. Without that, you've got nothing. Because when they had coalitions, then that body of Democrats and the Republicans controlled everything. The regular leadership had no control. So, your first problem is, you've got to keep your votes together. Even if they hated your guts and even if they ran against you. And if they think that you're just for sale or you don't have any integrity, they're not going to be for you. Now, they may be against you because they want somebody else—there's a difference between that and being against you. It's also a difference between that and—well, for instance, in Nat Washington's case, I always contributed to his campaigns. I always contributed to Jerry Hanna's campaign. He didn't vote with me. I always contributed to anybody. Just because they were enemies of mine, or hadn't voted for me, that wasn't the criteria.

Ms. Boswell: Why would you give it to them, then?

Sen. Greive: I gave to them because I wanted to have the majority and because I wanted to see them elected. No matter how much somebody dislikes you, or is on the other side, if you do nice things for them, then when you have to have the vote they might remember you. I don't know why you do it, but I didn't just contribute to my side.

Ms. Boswell: Ultimately, then, were you so convinced that the Democratic Party was worth all this effort? All this trouble?

Sen. Greive: Well, no, there is no Democratic Party as such. We're elected as Democrats, but when we get down there, there are issues that are beyond the comprehension of the people who do the platform. There's a whole lot of detail that they don't even know about. They give you that much in the platform—a couple of lines. They're interested in Soviet Russia, and Hitler, and they're interested in Vietnam, and they're interested in Rwanda. They're not interested in the bread-and-butter small issues down in Olympia.

So, you're fashioning a thing yourself. You're not given any direction from the party. Some party leaders would come down there, but unless there's something significant, you just let them roll off your back. They're not going to control you, but they've got some influence. Especially if they've got two or three people who are very, very close to you, then you try to get along with them. The party doesn't grow from the grass roots up, as sensible people like to think. The grass roots are important, but they aren't figuring the issues; the lobbying groups are figuring the issues. The party is a coalition of a lot of people. The Democratic Party revolves around labor and various other people, but labor is the big thing. Religion has quite a little to do with it, too.

The Republican Party, of course, right now has the Christian right. Neither labor nor the Christian right get everything they want, but they've got a powerful influence. That doesn't bother me. I'm not put off by the fact that I don't agree one hundred percent with the Christian right.

Ms. Boswell: They take over and dominate, then?

Sen. Greive: Well, maybe it's a good thing—who knows? If you get right down to the brass tacks, it wouldn't be a bad thing, from my point of view, if they made abortions very difficult to get. Would it be a bad thing to do if they limited liquor, if they got rough on lawbreakers? Most of those things I don't object to. Would it be a bad thing if they let it get out of line and started picking on poor people just because they're poor? Then that's bad. I'm not

persuaded because somebody says, "Come on, this is what we stand for." You see, the whole thing is the process. The process is in the Legislature. The process starts from the day you go to vote.

I don't think that the religious right are bad people or have bad programs. The fact is, a lot of it is very acceptable to me. I wouldn't want to be in their pocket, but I never wanted to be in the left-wingers' pocket either, and I got along very well with them. But you had to have an accommodation. They just knew that you would go just so far, and you wouldn't go the rest of the way because it ceased to make good sense, and they were going to shove it down your throat. I always found the left and the right to be very close together on their tactics because they had the idea, somehow, that because they had a piece of the action, they could force you. The same thing is true of any other dominant group. It may be very, very important to them, but it's all just a bunch of allies. The lobbyists have an awful lot to say about what happens to the Legislature, too, as they do in Washington, D.C.

But everybody comes up with a new plan, and with every new plan, somebody's doing the best they can to bring everyone together. Of course, you have to give, and sometimes it costs. Sometimes the price is too high, and you can't do it. But, in most things, you try to find some way to get along if you want to. That's what the process is all about. It isn't a whole bunch of icebergs lined up in a row. It's much more of a collection of things—you pick up support here, you pick up some support there. Some people who weren't with you before are with you now. You've changed some minds. The press has an awful lot to do with that, too.

So, was I involved in the process? Of course I was involved in the process. Anybody who wasn't involved in the process was ineffective, no matter how brilliant or how scholarly they were. I can think of a couple of people like that, but they weren't effective. They could take all their papers and come and tell you their views, and the caucus members would sit back and listen, or talk about what they did last night, or the dinner they had with a lobbyist. They didn't pay much attention.

Now, there are a few exceptions to that. We used to have a fellow by the name of Vaughn Brown, and he was very much an issue guy. When he came, he talked good sense. He was practical. He'd tell you what the fallacies were, and he was an excellent lawyer, and I listened to him. He might convince me when nobody else did, simply because I had tremendous respect for the man. He's dead now, but I just had a real respect. I thought, "If Vaughn Brown said it, and it was something I wasn't going to vote for, I'd better listen." But he was never effective at congealing the group or putting the thing together. But if he influenced me and Bill Gissberg and Bob Bailey, he had accomplished his purpose. I'm not the only one that would listen to him. What I meant is we listened to him, the ones who were doing the leadership.

We don't think up all the ideas. We get the ideas from some other people. That's where Joe Davis came into play a lot of times. He had to have somebody to carry out his ideas; he was on the outside.

Ms. Boswell: What did you get your most enjoyment out of in being floor leader? Was it making the process work and seeing that you could bring the group together?

Sen. Greive: The way you phrased that question, there's no way to answer it. You're part of the process or you shouldn't be there. At least you won't be effective unless you're part of the process. Some people are smart enough to be very effective at the process. Some learn how to use it, and some of them have an agenda that they're only interested in a couple issues. But anybody who was effective

understood the process or was a part of it. They might deny it. They might say they're above politics—they don't believe in politics; they only believe in principle—and all that sort of thing. That doesn't mean that any of us believe them. They don't say that in caucus. That's what they say on the outside when the press is listening, when the camera's on them, or when they're running for office.

The trouble is that people—the public—doesn't understand or has little or no grasp of how the thing is done. And they punish people because they're politicians. It's a dirty word. A politician is a liar and a cheat, and a guy that doesn't keep his word. Promises one thing and does another. "Does your congressman lie?" People say, "Oh, not him. He's different. But most of them do." Most of those congressmen are all a bunch of honest, upright people.

Ms. Boswell: Why is there that attitude, then? I don't understand.

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I don't know. It's simply because we've pounded away that politicians are bad people. The other reason why is a very fundamental reason—you don't get elected without somebody else tearing you apart. That's part of the process. You get your job by beating somebody else. He says rotten things about you, and you say rotten things about him. And so, a little of that sticks.

I had an interesting thing happen to me one time. I was campaigning for a fellow by the name of Gary Odegaard. He was a state senator and he didn't have a chance in hell. We picked him up and raised the money, and we elected him. I was doorbelling in Chehalis, and I go to this door, and a guy comes out to me and he says, "Oh, you're here for this guy. Well, I'm going to vote for your man." I wanted to go, but he practically had hold of my shirtfront. He says, "You want to know why I'm going to vote for your man?" He says, "Because that Chytil, that Joe Chytil, is in with that bunch that are in control there. I've been down to the Tyee." That's where for a while we used to hang out, and he says, "I've seen those drunken senators hanging around and carousing and everything. We've got to get rid of all of that tired blood." I didn't tell him who I was. I often wanted to go back when it was all over and introduce myself as the "tired old blood." And Joe Chytil went home every night because he lived in Centralia. He wasn't a part of any of that. The man was dead wrong, but he had the concept. He believed he was a bad guy. He just didn't like his senator, but he was wrong.

Chytil was a good senator. He often stood up against us, especially on power issues, because he lived in a public power area. As Republicans go, he was one of the best men down there. Unfortunately, since I was campaigning for somebody else, I didn't tell the voter that. But I remember Chytil as a good man. He owned a radio station down there, but he went to sleep, and we snuck up on him. He thought he had it made when he had won very heavily in the primary. But what Odegaard was able to show me was that the last guy who ran against him came very close in the final, but had done poorly in the primary. We looked up the statistics, and we decided that he was worth a try.

So, we went down there and we muscled his campaign. I doorbelled; my wife doorbelled; my kids doorbelled. I had a big crew from here, and he had a crew. We were down there working our heads off, and we put him over the top the first time.

Ms. Boswell: That's impressive.

Sen. Greive: That's another thing. I said that we controlled the Senate when the Republicans and their governor were controlling the House. The people in that caucus weren't stupid. In other words, I didn't stand up and pound my chest and say, "You wouldn't be here but…." I

talked to them in depth, and they figured as long as I was there, they were going to win their campaigns.

Their jobs, their committee chairmanships, and all the little prerogatives depended on control of the Senate. If they quit doing that and only worried about their own little world, and didn't look out for the group as a whole, why then they wouldn't be anywhere. That was a substantial factor in why I was continually elected as floor leader. Now, if you want to call getting out and campaigning for somebody part of the process, why I was right there as well.

I had an experience—I think I told you this story before—where I was doorbelling for a candidate, who lost incidentally—an excellent candidate. He had a doctor's degree and he was head of Western Washington University or Eastern Washington University, or something. He was running, and I was doorbelling. It's 8:00 P.M. or 9:00 P.M. It was dark and they're waiting in the car for me, and I go up to do this last door and somebody comes to the door and says, "Senator Greive." I was so startled that I almost jumped off the porch. He says, "How come I've been doorbelled twice, and you're both of them?"

Ms. Boswell: You were tremendously dedicated. That's interesting to me. If it's not the party philosophy so much, it's just the notion that that's how the job gets done.

Sen. Greive: That was my job. If you're going to be effective, you've got to have control. You've got to keep them together; you can't have them fighting each other. If you're going to be effective, you've got to have all these things.

Now, we talk about philosophy on issues after you're elected. You've got to have some sprinkled around like Vaughan Brown's, and some tin gods that you wouldn't listen to normally because you don't think they've got all that great a judgment. But if you get them on an issue, and you think that they're smart and that they will take an interest in you, you've got to listen, whether you agree with them or not. And chances are they've got an excellent chance of convincing you, just by sheer personality, because they knew you and they understood.

That was the way with Joe Davis. He was a brilliant man, an absolutely brilliant man. So, I'd listen to what he had to say. The trouble is, he represented organized labor, and many of them didn't like it—even the Democrats, a lot of them, were very restive—that labor was pushing them too hard and "threatening me with my election." They wouldn't dare vote against him, but they didn't like him, so they may not want to be bothered with him. They'd rather go out and eat steak with the lobbyists from the wineries. Why be bothered with a guy like that? He only wants to talk issues all the time.

However, if Joe Davis convinced Bailey and convinced me and convinced a half-dozen others—Gissberg and some others—he won his point. Plus the fact that we didn't dare not go with him. We drew the line, and we said, "You're not going to pass this type of legislation," and they couldn't get it through the Senate. Of course, that really rankled organizations like *The Seattle Times* because they were anti-labor in those days. They've changed since then, but they just really figured you were owned by the labor unions.

Ms. Boswell: I'm thinking of people like Dave Beck, though. I know it's different than the local unions, but I thought the unions had a reputation as being "big spenders."

Sen. Greive: Well, Dave Beck is a different world. It was all penny ante with labor; they didn't have any money. He wasn't corrupt in the money he gave to the legislators. Instead, he bombed dry-cleaning plants, and he strong-

armed people and slashed tires. That's the corrupt part of Dave Beck. When he got into the higher echelons, he'd fool around with the money. He is another example of a very brilliant guy who was doing it.

The labor union people usually didn't have anything at all; they were just working people. Most of them hoped for a pension but died poor. They were never going to make it. There were a few among them who were real smart people. Joe Davis was not an example. He had outside interests. But generally, that was the concept. That isn't true at all now.

Now, I hear stories about the East Coast. I don't know about the Longshoremen's Union on the East Coast, but on the West Coast we had Harry Bridges and that was a separate union. He was as honest as the day is long. He was probably a communist, and he probably wasn't someone that I'd be comfortable with, but I'd never think of saying that he wasn't an honorable or an honest man. Fact is, he was probably too honorable for his own good. He wouldn't give in. He wouldn't change his views. Why did he stay in power? He stayed in power because his people respected him. They weren't communists. They figured he had their best interests at heart. They would go further with him as their leader than they could with anybody else.

Ms. Boswell: Is that why you stayed in power, too?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I don't know. I think it's a combination of things, but I think essentially it was.

Ms. Boswell: But you said that you must have stayed in power because the people knew and understood both you and your motives.

Sen. Greive: Well, sure. It isn't all that simple, and again, I'm talking about the pigeonhole. You're not going to get me to pigeonhole and say, "Well, that's the reason." But it's a combination of things. They thought they were better off with me than with somebody else. And, I didn't get up and pound my chest and try to make them vote this way or that way very often. If I thought something was essential to the group, why, I acted. But a lot of it was simply negotiating the package. You didn't go to the caucus until you had the package. While I was in there, I was negotiating all the time. Sometimes we did good things and sometimes we didn't. That was also a good part of redistricting; they figured I was protecting their majority.

What's a floor leader? Do you elect a business agent that doesn't take care of you? You go back to Congress, and you'll find the same thing. If somebody's got a reputation for being a loner, or a Rasmussen type—there are a lot of people who are great individual people, but they were never elected leaders. The reason they weren't leaders is because they weren't worrying about everybody else. They wanted to make their profound statements on their own.

And when you get to the United States Senate, there are only one hundred people, and the press will quote you, so there's a tendency to get more of those kind of people because they get more publicity. But then, they can't hold the group together. I don't see the majority leader running around making profound statements all the time. His job is to get the votes together, round them up, to polish off the rough edges. The greatest floor leader of my time was Lyndon Johnson.

Ms. Boswell: Lyndon Johnson ultimately used that position as a steppingstone to the presidency. I'm curious—did you ever think you might go further? Were there other jobs that you were interested in?

Sen. Greive: That's another whole story. Only once, and that was very briefly. I understood from almost the beginning that if I was going

to make a living, I couldn't make it in politics. I had to have a law practice. So I had to work at being a lawyer. What I did is, I managed to put an awful lot of hours in being a lawyer. There just wasn't any way that I was going to make it in politics, and I never was willing to give up my—remember, I had six kids and I had a pleasant life in West Seattle—I wasn't going to go blow that. I worked hard. Even now, I get up 8:00 A.M. and go to church or something, and I come in here, and I leave at 11:00 P.M. Well, I've always worked long hours. I got in the habit of it. To sacrifice all that and run for a full-time job wasn't in it.

I did have a full-time job at one time, and that got me a higher pension. My pension depends on the last two years, the high years.

Ms. Boswell: That was at the King County Council?

Sen. Greive: Yes. But my point is the pension wasn't the thing that drove me at all. I wasn't even aware of it until the very end.

The point that I want to make is that the motivation becomes very complex, and if you're going to be broad-brush, you've got to say ego, but it isn't, really. It's much more complex than ego. If I didn't want the job, then I shouldn't run for it. If I ran for it and became floor leader, I wanted to be the best floor leader I could. And the best leader you could be is somebody who kept the people together. No, you didn't make anybody so mad that they walked out. Even if you disagreed, you tried to keep some sanity in what the group was trying to do.

There are an awful lot of legislators who are just crazy. They all want you to do something that even they aren't for, if they can think of it in broad daylight. They would say, "Let's do this. We'll go out there and show those sons of bitches. We'll do this, and we'll do that." "Now, wait a minute," I'd say, "another issue is going to come along. We're going to need some Republican votes, and then what are we going to do? The six of you aren't going to vote?" They'd say, "No, we're not going to vote." "Wait a minute," I said, "take it easy fellas. Let's have some sanity." Bob Bailey was a very leveling influence. Sid Snyder will be now. Of course, he wasn't in our caucus in those days. Here's Sid Snyder. He was already caucus chairman, and he'd only been elected one term. I'm sure he understands that process backward and forward.

So, you have a chance to disagree in certain areas. For instance, I was never going to be in a bound caucus. I was never going to have a secret vote that I couldn't reveal. I'm not going to take a bribe from anybody. I've got a general direction. I'm for labor on most things, but not one hundred percent. And, I want to keep the group together so that we can fight another day. Well, I think those are pretty good objectives. Of course, I made my share of speeches in which I propounded this or propounded that and gave my reasons. Especially on the labor issues because I was a lawyer and I understood them, and I had somebody coaching me and telling me what to say—sitting and looking at everything I said, and seeing how it came off. So, you'd have some moments. Was I all wisdom? No. And did I say, "You son of a bitch, you're never going to get elected to this again if you don't go along with me!" Hell, I'd never say a thing like that. You have to say, "Well, you've got a right to a point of view."

Ms. Boswell: What is the relationship you had with Bob Bailey as caucus chair? Did you have to be able to work together?

Sen. Greive: We were not close, but we worked together well. I suppose, maybe, if you look at it in the broad view, we were close, but he, of course, wanted to keep everybody with him. He was more interested in being popular than almost anything else. And so the other group that wouldn't go along with a lot of things, he

got along well with them. They never challenged him for caucus chair. They never ran against him. See, when I had an opponent, if I had not had Bob Bailey, then I would've probably had trouble. He manages to be everybody's friend, and it was real easy to do because he was chairman, and he didn't have to take sides. But on the essential issues he helped, and he was a good legislator—a real good legislator. But, he didn't want anybody running candidates against him. I'd be the focal point, not him. He was never the focal point, so he was in a much better position. He was given to not speaking very often, but to be very windy, with a high-morality type of approach. Maybe that's the way he is on everything, I don't know. He didn't speak but only three or four times a year. Most of his function was all in the caucus and the committees.

Ms. Boswell: In the caucus, would you say that the caucus chairman has essentially the same kind of goals that the floor leader has out on the floor, and that's to get everybody together and get that consensus?

Sen. Greive: Yes, I think so.

Ms. Boswell: Was there a lot of planning between the caucus chair and the floor leader ahead of time, before you ever got started in a session, about what you wanted to accomplish?

Sen. Greive: Not very much. We had an understanding. Bailey and I went to a lot of meetings together, and we'd meet with the House leaders and with the governor and with the Republican leaders, and so forth. There was a lot of work done at those things, and Bailey was very effective there because he was respected and liked. My problem was that the Republicans didn't like me because I was campaigning against them.

Bailey never said anything bad against Republicans. For example, he wasn't raising any money to run against Frank Atwood. Atwood got to be a leader of the Senate. We almost beat him one time. I was up there doorbelling, leading a crew of doorbellers. We had seventy or eighty of them out, I think, a couple of times, and we had a dinner for them, and we took them up in cars. I worked the whole plan out. Rosellini wasn't trying to defeat him, either. But, if somebody's out trying to defeat you, that gets to be pretty personal.

Ms. Boswell: So you became much more the target of more people?

Sen. Greive: Oh, absolutely. Bailey, he could make these nice, high-sounding speeches a few times a year, and he conducted himself properly. He did a lot of the planning, and he did an awful lot of good work, but he didn't get stuck with the dirty work. One of the worst things that could happen to you was when you tried to defeat someone and failed.

The whole fabric of the thing is wound up in friendship. Friendship is from beginning to end. That's what holds the Mafia together; that's what holds the College of Cardinals together. I'm trying to use extremes. Friends have got to be people you like and are comfortable with, and that's the core of what you've got. It's awful easy to be friendly with people when they think you've got their best interest at heart.

My trusted workers and I had made a bunch of signs for Perry Woodall, and we just shipped them over to him. He put them up and never said a word. We became friends, and I figured he wasn't doing well, so instead of just making them for my side, I made a few hundred for him—or a thousand or whatever it was—and I sent a lot of them over in four-by-eights or four-by-fours.

Until you make another sign, the stain is on the screen. You can still go through it, but you can see what the sign was before. I can remember some of my workers coming in and

saying, " My Lord, Greive, what's this?" I'd say, "It's a Woodall sign." Well, they'd say, "Well, isn't he a Republican? It says right here: Republican." So, then I had to be careful who saw the signs after that. We made the next sign over that one and it was all gone. I was careful. I hid everything and had them all shipped over to him. And, I don't think—maybe I phoned him, maybe I didn't—but whatever it was, he put them up.

Ms. Boswell: Could you have done the same thing that you did as the floor leader, and made the caucus chair the powerful, sort of behind-the-scenes position?

Sen. Greive: If Rosellini had not been elected governor, that could have happened. It didn't, so I can't tell. But, as caucus chairman, I was collecting money already. I had the fund going. That's when I started it. So, I think that could have happened. But then, Rosellini had a charming and very powerful personality. Very persuasive. They thought he was smart, politically streetwise, and what was more, they would have a tendency to listen to what he had to say more than anything else, I think.

See, for one thing, they don't know or they've never heard about a lot of these issues, a lot of them, before they got down there. If they are veterans, they have heard of the issues, but they don't know how important those issues are. They don't have a sense of perspective. Like I told you, one thing I always kept telling them—I don't know whether I used the word perspective, but that's what I meant to say—you have to look at this in perspective. You've got to know what you are. "We fight down here, and we're living and dying, the world's going to end." It's not going to end. They don't know what you're doing back at home. There are only a few things that are going to filter through to them—very few things.

Ms. Boswell: And you could usually predict what those were going to be?

Sen. Greive: Well, I don't say I was always the one. I used to say it all the time, but that doesn't mean that they always listened to me. They'd go along their merry way, but when I stood up, the world didn't come to an end. And when anybody else stood up, the world didn't come to an end. You didn't stand up there and suddenly there was a hush over the audience. The hell with that. You were just one of the guys who keep talking. It wasn't like that at all: "Boys, this is the marching agenda." Now, if it was redistricting, or if it was on some labor thing that I had a lot riding on, I practically could say that, but that would only happen one or two times a session.

Ms. Boswell: You'd save some muscle for the big issues?

Sen. Greive: I don't know whether I saved it or not, but everybody understood those were the big issues. If those were the issues in which you had expertise, or something like that, they might listen to you. But that's very rare. Most of the time they'd ignore what I said just like they ignored what everybody else said. It was all kind of a mix. It sounds like it was confusion, and it was!

We shouldn't have had daily caucuses. When you've got daily caucuses, the minutia gets mixed up with the important stuff.

Ms. Boswell: So, you think it's better to have them less frequently?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I think we'd be better off if we didn't have daily caucuses, but we had them, and we had to work with it. They would ignore what I said all the time. But when I really wanted something, then my job was to go talk to the right people and talk to them individually. Sometimes you'd get right down to one or two votes. You weren't going to leave

it to the caucus because my speech just sounded like a lot of other speeches in caucus. I'm sure if you asked the people what took place, most of them don't remember. They probably remember two percent of what took place because it wasn't a very impressive place.

Ms. Boswell: The caucus room?

Sen. Greive: No. The other things I did. I even came down with a photographer, and we had the fellows come down, and we made the brochures, the tabloids, for a lot of different districts. We'd put you at the head of the table one time, with the other senators as your props, and the next time it would be the next guy, and so forth and so on. I supervised the angles of the photography, made the paste-ups, and got the things printed at a reduced rate so they could distribute them. I set up their mailing, a lot of them, and told them what to do. I did a lot more than just doorbell for them.

Ms. Boswell: How did you have time? You weren't a full-time senator; you had a law practice. How did you make time for all this?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I honestly don't know.

Ms. Boswell: It was remarkable that you could get so much done and be sort of everything to everybody.

Sen. Greive: In the first place, we'd start planning our campaigns in March, not in November. We'd go down to Ocean Shores—of course we'd take a little equipment from the Senate, which we probably shouldn't have done—with typewriters and so forth, and we'd type up a lot of stuff. We'd begin to flesh out our campaign and get them interested.

Ms. Boswell: "We" meaning the caucus?

Sen. Greive: Me and maybe seven or eight or ten people, the ones that wanted to go, and especially the ones who were up in the next election. If they got to figuring that I could get them elected, they wanted to do what I wanted to do, even though some people, like Hubert Donohue, were not necessarily great friends of mine. But, they'd go down there because they figured that this is important. And so we'd have several sessions down there, and we'd even write the news releases that were going to be released when the time came. We'd try to have a store of these things, and we'd make designs. We had some people on the state payroll that might lay them out for us and help us. We'd get our stuff laid out the way we wanted it. We'd have stacks and stacks of pictures, photographs, and so forth and so on.

Then, we'd worry about mailing lists, and we'd have to preach to them things like, "Find out who the frequent voters are and only mail to them." Well, they don't know all those things. We would talk to them about what you do between elections. How you set up a series of coffee hours. You tell them all these things. They didn't know all these things to do.

So the campaign was over a longer period of time, and a lot of it took place during the session. They'd get away. You'd go home to the Democratic group, and there are fifteen to thirty people there, and people don't show up. So, you've got to find a way. So, what you do is, you mail to a whole area and invite them to a coffee hour. You get somebody to give you a coffee hour. But if you don't make the mailing, you don't get the people. So then, you have a coffee hour and talk to them about the problems, and give them some cookies, or have your wife tell them how interesting it is, the social part of the thing. Some of them are caught up in the social world part of it.

Ms. Boswell: "Some of them" meaning the candidates?

Sen. Greive: Well, a lot of us. I used to go out almost every night and dance somewhere, with somebody. My wife would go out four nights a week, probably. That's part of the reason I got a lot done is because I worked an awful lot of hours.

Ms. Boswell: How can you go out, and then you'd go back to work after that?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes. I do it now. I won't go to bed until 2 A.M. tonight, and I'll get up at 7 A.M. tomorrow. But, I'll steal a nap during the day sometime. I've always done that. I go to the dance hall three times a week now.

Ms. Boswell: Did very many people keep the kind of schedule you did?

Sen. Greive: Probably not. That's another thing that happened. You didn't do all your business during the daytime. An awful lot of the contacts you made were at night, but there were never more than three or four different places where they went. You'd go to those places in the evening, and you'd pick out people you wanted to meet. You'd just go sit with them. Take your wife with you and sit down, and talk, and then you'd get your talking in. I had to worry about the people who didn't drink. You had to treat them a little differently. Better get them in their office.

Ms. Boswell: It didn't bother you? You could go there? What were those places?

Sen. Greive: Well, it depends. Every session was different. One time it was the Elks; for a while the Tyee. Evergreen it probably is now. There were just certain places where they hung out. You'd get to know who was going to be there. There was a lot of circulating around, and I might have a dance with my wife, or I might with a secretary or a mistress or the guy's wife, or whoever happened to be there.

It was pretty informal. We'd talk a little politics. You can't pound away at an issue. Pick out the part that you think is going to be persuasive, and the thing you want. You try to get your licks in there and see what you can do. And, probably, you don't ask them for a commitment. We didn't try to get commitments all the time.

Ms. Boswell: Just to get heard?

Sen. Greive: Get out your message, and at an opportune time, when somebody was in a position to listen. And you traded gossip. I always knew what was happening over there; they knew somebody who knew something else. I wasn't unique in that. We all knew. We traded gossip and stories. They were doing this, and we were doing that. You establish a friendship.

I would usually go to take a nap at 6 P.M. or 7 P.M., and I didn't do it up in the Senate. I had a room with a bunch of books and stuff in it—a storeroom. I'd go in there and nobody knew where I was. I'd have myself a little nap, and about 9 P.M. I'd go pick my wife up. We didn't eat dinner together because she had six kids down there, and then we'd go out from there.

Ms. Boswell: It had to be hard on family life, though, to have that kind of rigorous schedule? Have your children picked up politics?

Sen. Greive: Well, I think they like politics, but they're afraid of it. They didn't like having to work their heads off, not only for me, but for all my buddies. I used to tell them, "Listen, if you were born to a farmer, you'd do farm work."

Ms. Boswell: They probably missed having you around some, too.

Sen. Greive: They were always down there with me.

Ms. Boswell: So they really did participate?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes. The family moved down there. The fact is, the Catholic school down there used to keep places for them. They knew they were coming.

Ms. Boswell: That was pretty unusual, wasn't it, to move your whole family down there, especially with six children?

Sen. Greive: When they were all in school—we'd have five or six of them in school—and they had friends down there. They knew they were coming, and they'd congratulate them, saying, "We figured you'd be here." And they'd go to school down there for a while.

Ms. Boswell: Usually, how long would you go? Would you just go for the session, or would you go a little bit before?

Sen. Greive: No, we'd just go for the session, but I usually did not come home. I did a lot by phone, and my law partner did the personal contact.

One of the guys I respected the most, incidentally, was Gummy Johnson. He was a real technician, a marvelous technician. One smart thing that Dixy Lee Ray did was hire him, but she wouldn't listen to him. A very brilliant man. He came down there for Weyerhaeuser and ended up lobbying for the teachers' union, later. I have a high respect for him because he was my counterpart. He tried to put some organization in the Republican side. He managed so much of their campaigns—the same things I was doing. I'd worry about what he was doing, too.

Ms. Boswell: I suppose that you would not only have to marshal and keep your forces together, but you would need to know as much as you could about what the opposition was doing?

Sen. Greive: Yes, you do. And we'd do an awful lot of polling and so forth. Of course, we used to use the state facilities, which would be terrible now, but wasn't then. We could do it all now; we'd just set it up privately. We tried to keep track with polling. You'd get an idea of how you were doing. We did a lot of monitoring, and it seemed like there was something to do every time I turned around.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds to me like you were really creative in thinking about all the different ways that you could handle things.

Sen. Greive: We perfected mail before anybody did, really. We were big on mail, on mailing to everybody and getting mailing lists. It turned out to be much bigger later. We got some resistance, all right. We'd try to get a list of all the nurses so we could have a nurse's letter, and we'd try to get the list of jobs where they had licensing or something to get a mailing list with a common interest. Or, we might look up and try to find everybody over sixty-five for an old-age pension or old-age issues. We did a lot of that sort of thing. We'd have seven, eight, or ten letters that we'd put out almost every campaign, and they'd be the same.

Ms. Boswell: The same constituency group?

Sen. Greive: Yes, but they'd all be the same from one district to another. We'd call it our "blue letter," or whatever it would be, and we'd send that one out. The candidates did a lot of that themselves, but I'd show them how to do it, and we'd make mailings. It may be that nothing filtered down to these people, and they liked to hear from you. We also wanted everything personalized if possible. We encouraged some people—if they wouldn't doorbell—to phone, and do it logically, reverse directory. We'd also go through telephone books, the yellow pages, and try to get

groupings that way. All the sheet metal people, for example, or if we had a hot issue, we'd try to get those people. People like the barbers and the beauticians. They stand out, and you could mail them. So, we did a lot of that sort of thing. That's what my book is all about—how to get elected.

But from a purely individual point of view, the most important thing is keeping your job. And so the ones that were on the bottom rung, that were not in the leadership or anything, and that were the most vulnerable, they were pretty interested in having somebody who had moxie tell them what to do.

And I had the advantage that my opponents, I guess, didn't. They didn't even doorbell their own district, let alone lead a crew of doorbellers from anybody else's district. So, there were a whole lot of things that did it.

Ms. Boswell: Some people that I've talked with have particularly admired you for that—that you were willing to go that one more step. You were willing to get out there, yourself, and do it for them, and that's pretty impressive. It's easy to send somebody else, but to really go out and put that effort in, personally, is quite difficult.

Sen. Greive: And this is one of the funniest things—to get somebody to doorbell is like moving earth. They don't want to do that. They're not about to do that. They won't have a thing to do with that. But, if you push them hard enough, they'll do it. We had people like Don Talley, who was bland, but had been mayor of his hometown in Longview, or Kelso. He kept getting elected. But, he relied heavily on the consulting service I operated. People were phoning me during the campaign to ask, "What do we do now? What's our opponent doing? How are we coming along?" So, money was important, but it's not just money. That's the part that people want to focus on.

Ms. Boswell: Did you ever consider, once you left the Legislature, going into that line of work on a full-time basis?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I suppose I've considered everything, but not seriously. I'd rather practice law.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think your legal background helped your consulting ability?

Sen. Greive: No, it's the other way around. I was a senator before I was a lawyer, before I was married, or anything else. I got elected real early. I was the youngest one in my day.

Ms. Boswell: So you had that instinct about how to campaign from the beginning?

Sen. Greive: I learned distributing for Al Smith. I campaigned. I always campaigned, until I quit. The reason I don't do more of it now is that you can't write a book and put yourself up there, and then get defeated or get too deep into it. I've got to look like I'm apart from it, now. Otherwise, I would probably make more of an effort, but when I retired, I decided I wouldn't do any more. I knew that my book was coming out, and it was on my mind. I wanted to be sure that I didn't look real partisan now. Hopefully, the Republicans and Democrats will both be interested in it. If you're going to play the part, you've got to act the part.

I did a lot of other things. I encouraged them to get elected to positions in their community, and things like that. You may think that's second nature, but it isn't. They would run as Democrats and so forth, but they wouldn't even do anything with the business people. They would have been all against them; they were a bunch of Republicans. Well, the Elks were all Republicans, but for every one of those people, not only do you get one vote, you take one away from the other side—it's worth two votes. So, I came with more than money.

That's important.

Ms. Boswell: Right. Was the fund necessary? Could you have done it without the fund?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I know how I did it, not what would have happened if I didn't do it.

Ms. Boswell: But you must have thought at some point that the fund was necessary?

Sen. Greive: Everything is necessary. If you don't have a majority, you don't control. Your first obligation is to have a majority. Your second obligation is to direct them. You start directing the minority, but you can only go so far. Remember, we were in the majority all that time I was floor leader in the Legislature—sixteen years.

Ms. Boswell: So you were never minority leader?

Sen. Greive: No. We always won the elections. We could take a guy that was in a weak position, and we thought had a good chance, and we could take fund money, partly, but we could also take all our expertise. We could just move in with him and give him a boost. I could go back to the contributors, and I could ask them for extra contributions for that guy. They could give them to me because I was going to be there, but they wouldn't have given to him.

Ms. Boswell: They had to trust your discretion that you were going to give the money to people that were going to be there, or that you were going to get through?

Sen. Greive: That's what you talked about—winning. What your chances were. Where the votes were going to come from. Once you establish a reputation of winning and knowing what you're talking about, then everybody listens to you. In those years I had that reputation.

Well, what is the process? The process starts from the day they file, and it ends the next time they file. Then they start all over again. And, they weren't stupid. They could see that the Republicans were in control in the House, the Republicans controlled the governorship, and they all had opponents running against them. And, especially the ones who were in trouble, or the less imaginative ones, were hook, line, and sinker doing the stuff I told them to do. So, was it money? I don't think money. It's just one of the many elements. It's a fabric.

Ms. Boswell: That's fascinating. I've never had anybody be able to explain it to me as well.

Sen. Greive: Well, I'm not at all sure I explained it. But, to say I was interested in the fabric, I'm sure that was true. What is the fabric?

Ms. Boswell: It's everything?

Sen. Greive: Yes, it's everything. It's their job. It's the minor things they want; it's the major things they want. It's issues. It's relationships. Then, the other thing I could do—the guy's in trouble—he didn't vote with labor. He needs the endorsement, but who do they talk to? Go talk to the labor leaders, maybe. But, they talked to me, and then maybe I'd help them out.

They owed me something, and they wanted them pushed. And I'd say, "Well, now look, we're not going to get him on five issues, but there's some stuff here that we could get him on. He doesn't have to vote with us, and we're going to need those, too. Maybe we have got somebody else we could get there." Well, then the endorsements would come along, and they wouldn't have as good a record as someone else, but they got endorsed. And, nobody

would know why. Well, I knew why, because they sat down in silence in their own caucus and repeated what I said. Or, because they said it themselves, maybe, and they figured they would give them an endorsement.

They'd say, "Well, Joe is in a shipwright's union, and he wants to run. He thinks he's labor. He should have the money." "What would you do?" I'd say. They would reply, "Well, I don't think he's going to win." "You don't?" I'd say, "Well, no," and so I'd go through my process. Joe would get a contribution, but it would be $200 rather than $500. If that got out, Joe isn't going to be a friend of mine, that's for sure. "That Greive dinged me; I'd have been a senator except for him." So, the fabric is very complex, but everything is interdependent upon something else.

Ms. Boswell: Was a lot of the stuff you did hard? You described it earlier as the "dirty work," and, to a degree, it was. Was it hard?

Sen. Greive: If you don't want the job, you don't do the work. If you want to be effective, you do the work.

Ms. Boswell: Did you sometimes wish that it were a little easier?

Sen. Greive: Well, I've never done anything in my life that there weren't some bad parts to it or things I didn't like. Some things I liked better than others. I never really enjoyed doorbelling, although I've done an awful lot of it in my time. But that's part of the deal. You don't take the job unless you want to win. When it's competitive and somebody's racing with you, and you figure it's important, you just keep moving and pushing. If I'd been successful before, everybody—including my own workers who hated it or my own kids—figured I knew what I'm doing, so they'd do it. Otherwise, they wouldn't do it.

But, it didn't all happen in the Legislature. That little emphasis on money is just because I had publicity about it. It's misplaced, although it sure was important. But, I don't think anybody got more than $10,000 from me at any time. I never raised that kind of money. I'd have to look it up and see, but it was more than they would have had otherwise from me.

So, it wasn't money. It was awfully hard for anybody to persuade some guy who had depended on my advice and was out there pushing, organizing and helping, to go for somebody else. And, if I wanted the thing bad enough, I put my arm around them, and I said, "Look, I know how you feel, but I just gotta have the vote. We counted it; we'll go over it again." "Oh, I tell you what I'll do. I won't vote with you the first time, but I'll change my vote at the end," they would say. I'd reply, "Well, if you do that, you'll look bad." "I'll look bad, why?" would be the standard reply. "Well, they'll say you changed your vote. You don't want to do that. Vote with me the first time." And they'd say something like, "Well, I'll think it over." You never said, "Tell me now." You just said, "Just think it over," and the next day he was back. "Well, have you thought it over?" I said. "Yeah, I've been thinking about what you said. I really wouldn't want everybody to think that I switched votes, and you twisted my arm. Maybe I'd better vote with you the first time." It's all woven together.

Ms. Boswell: What about this interpersonal relationship? To have that touch of not seeming too pushy or overbearing, but getting what you want. Is that something that comes naturally, or is that something you learn over time?

Sen. Greive: Sometimes it doesn't work, you understand. I didn't always have one hundred percent success. Sometimes it doesn't work. You do it. It's like advertising: you do it in hopes it'll work, and sometimes it does, and sometimes it doesn't. But you go through the ritual, the fabric, or whatever you want to call

it—the process.

Ms. Boswell: Do you become inured that some bad things are going to be said to you or about you? Do you let that roll off your back if you're doing your job?

Sen. Greive: What can you do? There's nothing you can do to make people say nice things about you. The only way to have them say nice things about you is to make these grandiose, lovely statements about what you're for and what you're against, and get quoted in the paper, but don't get involved in all this dumb stuff. Because, if you do get involved in it, then you become the boss. You don't want that. You don't want to be the one with the job twisting arms, and that sort of thing. You do what is necessary to stay away from that. Nobody really wants it all that bad. Everybody would like the glory of being the majority leader, but nobody really wants to do the hard work. Then, the guy who does the hard work has got an advantage. It's just the way the system works. I never had any competition. I never saw anybody else out there raising money, but I never saw anybody that was against me. I was helping them with their campaigns or making signs for them. One year we made 58,000 signs.

Ms. Boswell: You said you always had to take the bad with the good, but did you really love it? Was it something you really enjoyed?

Sen. Greive: If I do something, it's because I want to do it. Whatever it takes, you've got to do it. If you say, "Well, I'll do it, but I'll only do so much"—well, that's up to you. If you want to win, you better do what it takes. You don't say, "Am I loving it?" I'm sure you're not loving every minute.

I also worried about their districts, and whether they could get re-elected. They all worried about that. So, there's nothing magic about what I did. Not a bit of magic.

Ms. Boswell: Were you able to get to a point in your own district where you didn't really need to campaign?

Sen. Greive: No. I always had to campaign in my own district. There were some of these campaigns that were pretty easy, but if I was running, I was campaigning.

Once, I had a campaign where the guy was going on the rocks, so I took my whole crew over and supported Senator Frank Connor. He was one of my faithful supporters, but he wasn't very brainy, and we just ran his campaign for a month. He won, I think, by one hundred and one votes, or something like that. It was very, very close. My campaign crew just ran his campaign. We just went from here over there to the Rainier Valley. I doorbelled myself. My wife doorbelled. Everybody doorbelled but Senator Connor.

Ms. Boswell: Was that ever a problem? Your ultimate goal was to keep your majority and keep your people together, but what if your people weren't always the best people?

Sen. Greive: Well, if you feel that way about it, you don't belong in politics. We're not picking the best people. A majority of Republicans doesn't do me any good. That wasn't my job.

I figured I was involved in about one hundred and fifty campaigns. There would be two when our guy ran—there'd be a primary and the final. So you cut that down to seventy-five. There'd be ten or twelve of them every time. That isn't very remarkable. I had twenty of them that would be my own campaigns. So, I've had between one hundred and fifty or one hundred and seventy-five campaigns.

Ms. Boswell: Well, I think it's pretty remarkable.

Sen. Greive: But, you see, my detractors, or the people who talk about it, they don't know anything about this. Gissberg—I never did anything for. I didn't have to. He doesn't know anything about this part of it. He knows I helped some people and did some stuff, but he didn't participate. He may have had his picture taken with me on occasion, and we said some nice things, but he didn't need it. We didn't bother with him.

Ms. Boswell: I didn't mean to imply, earlier, that he was a detractor, because he wasn't at all.

Sen. Greive: But you see what I mean? He doesn't know this about me. The only people that know this are Senators Connor, Cooney, and Keefe—people who may not have been elected otherwise. Cooney probably would have been elected anyway. He knew a lot of this stuff. He and I, we collaborated on a lot of this stuff. But our favorite book was *The Real Majority*. We used to talk on and on and on about that. It's a fabulous book, but it talks about all these things. We knew and understood how to run and win campaigns.

Suppose it was just a poor, middle-of-the-run guy like Senator Connor who got a grade school and high school education. I presume he got through high school. He worked for the government down at the courthouse and things like that, and then he had a quite unsuccessful appliance business, and just sort of plugged along. Where's he going to get the money and the time? He got nominated the first time because when Rosellini became governor, he got appointed senator because John O'Brien didn't want to take it. See, he was a House member, and O'Brien was too big in the House. He didn't want to go to the Senate. So Connor got to be the senator. Well, he didn't know how to campaign. He didn't have the slightest idea. He just knew that you put signs up. In fact, he really didn't know how to campaign until he got in that real tight race, and we pulled him through. Then he got real cocky and kept saying, "Well, I should run for Congress." Well, he couldn't run for Congress; he wasn't responsible for his own victory.

Ms. Boswell: Did you get some people that were that way? That once they won, they all of a sudden sort of forgot how they got there?

Sen. Greive: I had them both ways. Senator Connor never forgot. He was my loyal friend until the day he died. Senator Reuben Knoblauch didn't forget. See, these aren't big names. Senator Gordon Herr is running for the House, now. He's hounding me to death all the time. He let his pension go, and he says he has to get back in to activate his pension. He could pay back the payments and keep it—at least that's what he tells me. I don't know if that's his only reason, but he's running. He's been around to see me a dozen times, but I kind of discourage it. I'm out of it, and I should be. But he's running in a split field, and I think he can make it.

And then there're a lot of other things that went into it. You'd have to tell them, "Don't tell lies." They think that when they're running for office, they can just say any damn thing and it goes. Sounds pretty stupid. So, there're some other things involved in there. Like, get your church list. You've got to get your church list. Get a list of your taverns. Let's get every tavern on that list.

Ms. Boswell: Do you miss all the campaigning?

Sen. Greive: Oh, you do, and you don't. I'm active, but I've got something else to do now. I wouldn't want to be set up now so that it looks like I'm actively running campaigns. Once you write a book, you can't do that.

Ms. Boswell: I can't imagine the book won't

be successful. It contains too much valuable information.

Sen. Greive: Well, if I reach the political people—I want to get the people who are running for office when they file. But, they have all kinds of silly laws, like you can't use that information. What constitutional right do they have to say that you can't use it? We've got a statute—they all have statutes—that says it's a misdemeanor to use a list of people who have filed to run for office. I may have to go to court before I'm done. If I could mail every one of them when they file—you understand 250,000 people run for office every year. In a presidential year, 500,00 run. So, there's got to be a market.

Ms. Boswell: Can you go to the party precinct or committeemen, or something?

Sen. Greive: No. Well, once I do that, why, you are helping the Republicans. There are bad things and good things said about everybody in the book.

Ms. Boswell: So it shouldn't matter. You can go to all of them, both parties.

Sen. Greive: Well, there're a lot of other books that are poorly written and don't help anybody, but they're usually aimed at the fellow running for Congress, or some mayor, or something big. Nobody's much interested in the city councilman in Tukwila. He or she has to run, too. And the school board member in Kent has to run, too. And that's awful important to her, or she wouldn't have filed. Where's her handbook? See, I have a handbook for them.

Ms. Boswell: So you developed a handbook for people who wanted to run for office?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes, but a lot of it I borrowed from other people. I mean, I didn't steal it, but if I thought it was pretty good, I put it in there. And I built up a thing that I was just handing out to my people. Then, I ended up rewriting it. But that was the genesis of the book.

That's why I got a political science degree. I thought I'd make it a thesis, but I got into the program and found out it wasn't acceptable as a thesis, so I had to wait until I was all done and then develop it. See, the thing I've got going for me in the academic community, and the reason these people are so interested, is I'm a Ph.D. The only time anybody calls me here and asks for Dr. Greive, I know it's them. I've never put on saying I'm a doctor, but I've got a real, live doctorate from a real, live university that's a good one: Claremont Graduate University. I display it in my office. But the book wasn't my thesis because that couldn't be a thesis. It didn't prove anything, and so forth, so I had to put it off.

But, my mentor in those days, who is dead now, kept encouraging me to write the book. He said there was nothing like it on the market that he knew of, and I don't think there is either. There are an awful lot of "how to win" books. In fact, I could just walk to different shelves here and pick them up. But they just really don't get down to the real guts of the thing, or else they're good in one area, but they're very poor in every other area. I've tried to make a comprehensive book, telling somebody how to run for an office below Congress. If some congressman or U.S. senator wants to use the material—Godspeed. I don't object to that, but it isn't designed for a high-profile campaign. Most people, unless they're interested in running, are not going to be interested in that book. But if you just had an interest in politics, generally, you'd love to know what Goldwater did when he first got elected, or you might be awfully interested in George Wallace.

But they're in a different world. I'm talking about the world of Greive, Knoblauch, Connor, and Cooney.

Ms. Boswell: As you say, there are hundreds of thousands of candidates out there. It's just a matter of reaching them.

Sen. Greive: Well, the advice and the setting up of the campaigns is probably every bit as important, if not more important, than the money. But, Slim Rasmussen would not get on the floor and say, "He's got a manual that will tell you how to get elected."

Ms. Boswell: You did get attacked for setting up the "Greive Fund?"

Sen. Greive: Oh, of course I did.

Ms. Boswell: What did you see as the basis of that attack?

Sen. Greive: That was Slim Rasmussen. Rasmussen loved publicity, and his attitude was that you pick the biggest guy you can find and take an issue with him. And he wasn't on the fund because he never wanted to be. I'd have collected the money for him. The fact is that I'm not at all sure he wasn't on the fund a few times in the beginning. But he came over to the Senate, and they gave him all this publicity, and so we had no way of shutting him up. He started talking on the floor, and nobody wanted to be the bad person. I couldn't talk. I felt somebody else had to defend me.

I kept challenging him to say the things that he was saying off the floor, so I could sue him. You see, you've got immunity on the floor. But he wouldn't do it. The funny thing was that when he was giving me a terrible time, just a terrible time, I was the majority leader. The minority leader was Perry Woodall. I get quite emotional when I talk about him. I remember his statement. He said that he disagreed with me. Sometimes he thought I was kooky, that his friends and my friends weren't the same, but at no time—Woodall told me for thirty years or forty years—he said he knew I meant no harm. That I was just helping out the party. We became real good friends after that, real good friends. When Woodall died, they couldn't understand why I was one of the pallbearers.

Woodall hated Rasmussen. So after Rasmussen gave me a bad time, Woodall just turned. You could shut somebody up on the floor. You raised the question of consideration, and even if someone was in the middle of a sentence, if you raised the question of consideration, it's zip, he'd have to sit down. Terrible motion. I never used it. I thought it was a terrible thing. In fact, when I first came to the Senate, Woodall was the majority leader of the House, and he was using it. That particular year he had used it one hundred and thirty-two times.

Ms. Boswell: Was this when you first came into the Senate?

Sen. Greive: The year I got elected it was a Republican landslide. And so Woodall took over, and the Democrats kept wanting to filibuster things. So he just used that to just knock them off the fence. Absolutely wrong—he shouldn't have done it. But, it was a legal motion, and he did it.

Well, then, when Rasmussen came to the Senate—Woodall preceded Rasmussen to the Senate and Rasmussen had been in the House, too—and Rasmussen, at one point when he was being attacked by Woodall, he said, "Mr. President, point of personal privilege." That also stops everything because motions are done in a pyramid and that's the highest one. Consideration is number one, but personal privilege is equal to that. And so he says, "State your point." He says, "Mr. President." In this case that would have probably been John Cherberg. And Rasmussen got up and said that the Republicans had raised the question of consideration on him one hundred and thirty-two times. He was raving on and on about how

horrible that was, and what a terrible farce this guy was, and Woodall got up and said, "Senator Rasmussen's new here, and when you get better acquainted, you'll realize that it's necessary." Then he sat down. The place went nuts! Nobody had any respect for Rasmussen.

Ms. Boswell: Why did he take you on as this crusader?

Sen. Greive: When he was taking me on and giving me a hard time, we understood that he'd been elected to some local office as a national representative of the railroad union. He was a railroader, and we were sitting around trying to figure out what we could do about it. Finally, four or five of us were talking and I said, "Well, I'll tell you what, we get the support of labor, and we've supported the railroad unions and everything. I think I'm going to phone the president of the union." So, the guys said, "Sure, okay." So I phoned him up and said that I was speaking for a group of legislators and that Rasmussen was giving us a hard time, and I wondered if they couldn't do something about him. The guy said, "Do something about him? That damn son of a bitch, all he does is spend his time talking about my expense account and giving me a hard time. He won't let us conduct business. I thought he was real popular out there." So, he was doing the same thing to them. It was just his style. He got reams and reams of publicity. They just publicized everything he said, and a lot of it was libelous as hell.

Ms. Boswell: "They" meaning the media?

Sen. Greive: Yes. The media gave him lots of play. It was a nothing thing, like Vince Foster's death, in my opinion. There was nothing to it, but it was something. It didn't hurt me; I got re-elected, no problem. I was worried to death about it.

The way the thing came about, and the reason why he got sore at me in the first place, was that he was close to the opticians. Now, an optician is somebody who grinds glasses. An optometrist is somebody who fits glasses, and he might also grind them. Nowadays they just order the glasses from a house. The prescription is sent to somebody, and they just send them out. They don't do that anymore. The optometrists' lobbyist was the secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in West Seattle. He was a close friend of mine, and so the opticians wanted this thing, but Rasmussen came to me and told me if I didn't change my vote he was going to take me on—going to ruin me. He was going to talk about the fund and everything. I told him I hadn't done anything wrong, and he could go to hell. We beat him. Close vote. That's what started the whole thing off. He tried to threaten and bully, and it didn't work. He got publicity, the more publicity he got, and the greater he was.

I can remember another Rasmussen story. We had a very close vote. In those days, public and private power divided the Senate and the Legislature. It was a big issue. I had originally been a public power man, and as an actual matter, I did art work for them. I was a commercial artist. Over a period of time, I became convinced that public power wasn't all that magical. And I became friendly with Jerry Buckley, the Washington Water Power lobbyist, and a variety of things, and I changed my stance. I wouldn't pound my chest and go out for either side, but I would quietly vote for private power interests.

In this case, it was the Columbia River Commission, which was a nothing thing, but it got to be a big political issue. Supposedly, they were to bring together the interests in the Columbia River and private power would get a piece of the action. It's all lost in antiquity, but it was a tie vote because August Mardesich was absent. There was no way to break the tie because the lieutenant governor can't vote on final passage. He can break a tie on procedural

motions, but he can't do anything else. And so we had these roll calls, and we looked up and we had a crowded gallery. We had everybody going crazy, speeches, newspapers and everything.

Suddenly, we couldn't go any further. We got to "R" and Rasmussen didn't answer the roll. When you've got a motion like that, you lock the doors of the House or Senate, and they post guards and you can't leave. So, we knew he had to be in the building somewhere, unless somebody had let him out. They put out a search and everybody sat around, and nobody could find him. He held us up for an hour, and we just sat around reading magazines or talking. The lobbies, everything was full, and the galleries were full. It was a big issue. Finally, they found him in the men's lavatory, so that you couldn't see his feet.

Ms. Boswell: So, he was hiding in the lavatory with his feet up so that nobody would know that he was there?

Sen. Greive: So you couldn't see the top of his head. The Sergeant at Arms, he couldn't find him because he was squatted down. And the stall door was locked. They got suspicious and so they looked under there and he saw him, so he had to bring him in. So, he brought him in to vote because he was under call of the Senate. We'd had several votes and he'd voted, and there was no question.

He came into the Senate Chamber with his suspenders hanging down around his knees, pulling his suspenders up one by one, and he says, "I was in there on a call, and you made some sort of an asinine speech," like he was there on a call of nature and that he was rooted out, and he thought this was ridiculous. He was raving on and on, and so up got Senator Woodall and said, "Every human being has the privilege of being stupid, but Senator Rasmussen is abusing the privilege." Woodall had a tongue like nobody else. He was a very humorous man, very humorous.

We got started on that optometrist issue, and he told me that I wasn't to block that bill. Well, I wasn't about to block it; I was on the other side. And so, in a sense, when he attacked me, he attacked me with the right guy, because I was incorporated with somebody from West Seattle, Ted Best, who was the most prominent guy. Ted later was a city councilman. He's been dead now for several years, but he was about the best guy for me to be associated with back home. And so, Rasmussen was attacking him, too. It's one thing to talk about a lobbyist that lived in Spokane or downtown Seattle, but somebody from the West Seattle Chamber of Commerce, who also represented the optometrists—he was a great bedfellow.

Rasmussen called us bedfellows; he linked the two of us together in a lot of his comments. The optometrists contributed to my fund, but not exorbitantly. They might have put in five hundred dollars, or something like that. Anybody they had influence with, when you ran for floor leader, they would be on your side. Several times they tried to defeat me; we had a lot of inner fights over the years, but I pretty near almost always won. People like him, he didn't have a legislator he was close to, and everybody was putting pressure on everybody else.

Ms. Boswell: What was the consequence of giving money to these people?

Sen. Greive: I was the floor leader. What was I supposed to do? If you're going to be floor leader, you're also going to be business agent.

Ms. Boswell: So, that's what you saw yourself as, a business agent?

Sen. Greive: Sure. I used to say I was *the* business agent.

CHAPTER 8

REDISTRICTING: 1956-1957

The foundation of redistricting is based upon the census as mandated by the Washington State Constitution:

"The legislature shall provide by law for an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five and every ten years thereafter; and at the first session after such enumeration, and also after each enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and the house of representatives, according to the number of inhabitants, excluding Indians not taxed, soldiers, sailors and officers of the United States army in active service."

Article 2, Section 3 Washington State Constitution, repealed by Amendment 74, 1983; Substitute Senate Resolution No. 103

Ms. Boswell: While you were in the Senate leadership, you became, according to most accounts, "Mr. Redistricting." There were actually several different phases of redistricting in Washington State, and I'd like to explore in some depth with you each of these efforts. Let's begin talking about redistricting in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Why did redistricting become a significant issue in Washington politics?

Senator Greive: Because we were supposed to redistrict every ten years and from 1901 to 1930 they didn't redistrict at all. It was just too painful and for one reason or another they couldn't get the Legislature to do it.

At that time a few elements from King County had an initiative sent to the people, and they passed a redistricting bill. But it was much simpler then because they had fewer districts, number one, and number two, they didn't have to be as precise as we did. The United States Supreme Court case decided you had to redistrict, and that's a big factor.

In that particular election, I only won by 795 votes, so it was very close, even then. That was in 1956, and then the League of Women Voters pushed the redistricting issue again.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me about the League of WomenVoters.

Sen. Greive: They were a very well-meaning group of people on a lot of issues. They don't take on many issues, but usually when they take on an issue, it's something they can understand and grasp. There's nothing wrong with entertaining the issue—I think that's fine—and analyzing and informing themselves. I'm not anti-League of Women Voters as such, but when you take on redistricting, a job that's highly technical—again, I repeat, highly technical—with a little move here and a little move there, why you really have to have a lot more expertise than they did. It takes more experience than understanding welfare or the budget. It's got all kinds of details. They have never tried to take on the drawing of a budget for the state of Washington. When they stick to issues that are important, but easily understood, that's fine.

But their motivation in redistricting was simply because they said it hadn't been done,

and they thought it would be a neat thing to do, and it should be done. And to that extent I agreed with them. The problem was that they weren't equipped to take on what they did, and when they got into it they made some shortcuts, and in making their shortcuts they left people unrepresented in the one instance, and in the other instance they didn't follow precinct lines so people couldn't figure out what had been done to them. In other words, if the legislators could sit down and look at precincts to see how that went in the elections, they'd have a different attitude. But by taking census tracts, all of which were temporary census tracts—they've been changed since then—there was no cohesion. There was no way legislators could understand what they were doing.

Ms. Boswell: How did they prepare themselves to do this job?

Sen. Greive: I think that they had one woman by the name of Mrs. Leonard Goldberg, whom I had a lot of respect for. I used to talk to her all the time. I would like to have been against her, but she convinced me that she was sincere. She drew it, and I think she did the best she could, but she undertook what turned out to be a monumental job. After all, you're talking about fifty different seats, the configurations, and how they go in the elections and various things. For example, they had seven legislators in one district in Spokane. When they realized their mistake, they called in some consultants to help them out.

Here is what they did in King County. First, they called in some consultants. Their first consultant, of course, was Ed Munro, a county commissioner, a state legislator, and a very bright man. In fact, he was a King County councilman after that, and generally respected. But he was the one who went to their convention and urged them to do something like this.

The other person who went to their convention was Bill Howard—we called him Bull Howard—who represented the pinball people. He was a lawyer. I went to law school with him and his wife, and I knew them very well. They're not bad people, but they wanted to do something in the Thirty-third District. They used to say things like, "The only thing Rosellini ever did for me was such and such." Rosellini, before he was elected, was very proud that he was the father of the juvenile department, and handling juveniles different. They said, "The only thing he ever did for juvenile delinquency was grow up." And they wanted to change the nature of the Rainier Valley district, because that's where they were from. That's where they had their following, and Bull Howard was the district chairman.

The other person they finally called in was John Ryder. He was really a very fine man. He was vice-president of Washington Mutual, and he was more than a little interested in any banking legislation for obvious reasons. That was his long suit. But he was also a good legislator. He really wanted to be left alone. He didn't want his district changed at all if he could help it. So what each of those people did as they drew lines—so-called helping the ladies—they drew lines that helped themselves.

In my case, I exempted myself because I had a personal interest, and if I did it the other way, they'd say I was trying to play games. Ed Munro had nothing against me. I was a friend of his, but he wanted a district that included Burien, and he also wanted White Center, but he didn't want a heavy Republican area, Arbor Heights, right close to the border. Then it went further than that out to Three Tree Point, which is a small town out there that has just a police force and practically nothing else. It's a real fancy bedroom community. Well, he didn't want those, so he gave them to me, because I was on the border. If you look at maps, you can see that my district

originally cut straight down, and you can see how he stair-stepped it along and I got all the stuff he didn't want.

So he gave me the Republicans. As a part of the deal, he took the Skid Road away. Well, maybe they should or shouldn't have taken that away. I can't defend it on any basis, but it was always a part of the district when I ran. I didn't particularly want to lose it. But losing the Skid Road, which had eight or ten precincts, wasn't at all that bad. I must confess, however, it's the only time I got all the votes in one precinct. They had people, but they didn't have that many registered voters.

He took away that with one hand, and then he gave me Republicans with the other. And he gave me Vashon Island, which is heavily Republican. Now Vashon Island, even today, has a mortal conflict with West Seattle because West Seattle doesn't like people trafficking through to get to Vashon. They think they should go from downtown or someplace else—any place but in their backyard. And so the ferry is a bone of contention, and the two areas don't belong together. The only thing you can say about them is they are Republicans.

Now what did they do with the Thirty-third? That's where Rosellini came from. By this time he was elected governor, but prior to that, Bull Howard, who was a Republican, desperately wanted to change the nature of the district, so they put Mercer Island with Rainier Valley on the theory that they were connected by a bridge. Well, the interests and the aspirations—what they want in Mercer Island and what they want in Rainier Valley—are not cohesive, and they shouldn't be together. I don't think any reasonable political scientist would disagree with that statement.

So they did that, and what did they do for Ryder? They just left him alone. Of all the districts in King County, he had the smallest population, and it varied as much as 20,000 from the largest of the districts. And on the average, for instance, my district was 57,000 and his was 41,000.

The one that they really varied—they gave it three representatives, so maybe that doesn't count—was the Thirty-first District at 64,000. That's certainly 10,000 to 15,000 out of line. In other words, what the League did is, they let some professionals come in and these individuals just conned them. They drew their own districts the way they wanted, and they redistricted everything else the other way. And that certainly is not good redistricting.

Ms. Boswell: What prompted you to get involved?

Sen. Greive: I understood that they were doing things in my district. I wrote them several letters and told them that I thought that they should—I remember I made one statement I regretted—I said they should cut some of the dark and some of the white, cut it straight across either way. And they acted like that meant race. Race was never a problem down there. What I meant was that they should go straight and not load the districts for the people who wanted to run for office.

I said, "Well, if you're going to do it, just go straight south, that's fine. Or if you go east, you can go east." Now my district is located with water on three sides; there's no way you can just go to the south, so I had to go east or else you skip north to Magnolia. Nobody was thinking of that. They could have very easily have put me over on Beacon Hill or put me over toward Rainier Valley in that area. Or they could have gone south and taken in White Center, but Bull Howard wanted White Center for himself, as I understand it. I don't recall him ever having the gall to try to convince me of anything like that because I knew better. I knew that was unacceptable.

And, of course, when I objected to it, then the ladies got mad at me, and they said, "We'll

fix Mr. Greive." That's a quote from Martin Durkan. So I protested what they were doing.

Ms. Boswell: So, what did you do then?

Sen. Greive: Of course, I didn't want the initiative to pass; I hoped it wouldn't. It barely passed. Let's see, it got some 448,121to 406,287 statewide. So it was close, no matter what they did.

They said that I was the leading opponent to it. Well, I was a pretty quiet opponent until after it passed. But at that particular point, I felt that I was going to both have to move or run in a district that I would have to fight each time, and so I could afford to take chances.

Ms. Boswell: So beforehand, what was your rationale? Why wouldn't you be a vocal opponent before it passed?

Sen. Greive: For one thing, what little I knew about it was unfair. But I also was concerned. I didn't have a lot of information, truthfully. Nobody had much information. In other words, it wasn't anything you could focus on. When you read Gordon Baker* and some other articles, they talk about stuff that they got confused with things I said after the whole thing occurred.

Before it passed, I didn't go around making any speeches or trying to line up any votes or anything like that, in the precincts of King County. I talked to Mike Gallagher some, who was the county Democratic chairman, a real hard-bitten politician who knew his way around, and he was against it. I talked to Rosellini. I talked to some other people, but I wasn't out there pounding the deck. And I never did attempt to get myself—make public—my views anymore than I had to.

My attitude was, I think, that I was on the unpopular side, and the more I associated myself with the unpopular side, the more trouble I had. So my attitude was that the next best thing to do was keep my mouth shut, and speak only when I had to, and do most of my negotiating with the legislators on a one-to-one basis or in caucus.

Ms. Boswell: So once it did pass, what was your plan of action?

Sen. Greive: Well, we didn't know there was nothing else we could do. Prior to 1956—I think it was the election prior to that one—they had passed an initiative that said we could amend initiatives. We had some initiatives put up by the pension union and the more radical forces, and they had quite a success in getting some things passed that allegedly broke the state. The state didn't have the money to take care of these things. The newspapers and the more conservative elements felt that they had to be for an initiative because before that, you couldn't repeal an initiative; it was good for two years. I guess that they still didn't take that away.

An initiative had to be good for two years; however, they said you could amend it. So we set out to draw up an amendment. Even then we had to have a two-thirds vote.

Ms. Boswell: So, did you do the legal work first of all, to determine that you could, in fact, amend it?

**Editor's note: Senator Greive refers to a pamphlet entitled* "The Politics of Reapportionment in Washington State" *by Gordon Baker (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960).*

Sen. Greive: I don't know that I did it. We had a number of different lawyers available to us down in the Legislature. I'm sure I didn't brief it; even today I don't do a lot of briefing. I usually hire that out. So I'm sure I had it briefed, but we were convinced we could do it, and so we set out to draw up an amendment. In order to do that, you had to first assemble a staff and get down to work.

Nobody else in the Democratic caucus wanted the responsibility. In fact, as far as I could tell, nobody in the Legislature was willing to make a whole plan, but they all wanted to put in something for their district. Well, somebody had to look at all the districts and make them fit. You can't leave some out.

So we began to assemble a staff, and we had to go to each precinct, each district. Then we tried to convert the census tracts to precincts so that we had some sense of how it was going to go, which was a monumental task. For one thing, the census tracts frequently cut right through districts and precincts, so you wouldn't know how much to allot one and how much to take off from another. So you had to create a grid first, and that was a big job.

Once we got that, we began to draw lines. We'd have people come down one by one and try to see how many we could please. Of course, at first you got unreasonable people who would come down and say, "I don't care what you're doing, leave me alone." Well, if you're ten thousand or fifteen thousand short like John Ryder was, you probably couldn't do that because you wouldn't be within the limits. And then little by little, our limits got wider and wider. We found we couldn't draw it that way and so we erred. Some districts were considerably larger than others, but they were all within twenty percent, which is what we aimed for.

Ms. Boswell: The philosophy was that you wanted to have the same proportion of legislators to voters, right?

Sen. Greive: Yes, in the precincts. I had three or four tenets that I believed were essential. The first one was that you had to make a deal with whoever was there. You couldn't compromise with somebody to help somebody waiting in the wings to run against them. Sometimes two people would come down and they'd say, "Well, I'll tell you what to do. I'd do this and I'd do that." Well, very often it was somebody who wanted to run because they had a power base there or where they lived was a strong area and so forth. But you had to deal with the people who were there whether you liked them or not. And you had to do as much as possible to try to satisfy as many as you could. If you didn't do that, you couldn't get the support, because it was not a popular vote, especially in the House.

Ms. Boswell: Why was it so unpopular?

Sen. Greive: Because the big gains were all in King County—King or Pierce County and some in Snohomish. Those counties had shown the lion's share of the gains since they were redistricted in 1930. That's quite a period of time; that's twenty-some years.

Ms. Boswell: So the population growth had been in the cities and not the countryside?

Sen. Greive: The cities and the bedroom communities, yes.

Ms. Boswell: In the old redistricting, were the rural areas favored?

Sen. Greive: There was a popular movement at that time, and it persisted for a while. We could make each county representative; I mean each district would have representation: one senator and then they could have House members. In some states they're not the same.

In some states the county borders and the district borders for the House are different than the Senate, so it's hard to run for the Senate. And some states have done all kinds of things, and at that particular time there were a number of states that had a district, and the district had one senator, and the House members would be divided. In other words, one district would have one or two or three parts or something like that.

So there were all kinds of different ways proposed, and they justified the one senator on the basis that the senatorial seat should not be proportional anymore than Congress should be. Why should the United States have two senators for each state, if you stop to think about it. We think that's a great system here in Washington, but New York and California don't. They would think that they should have ten or fifteen senators, but they don't.

So we've got people who are a little schizophrenic. So these people, especially the rural people said, "Land should play a part, and you should have one representative for each county or we should have, in the big counties, one for each district." Some of them wanted one for every county; well, with thirty-nine counties, that would take up pretty near all of them. But then that would mean some legislators with three or four thousand people in their district would have as much say as a district in King County, so as we negotiated, they came away from that perspective. Instead, they said, "No, we can't make that stand up, but we want some form of rural representation."

And that became more of a factor during the second redistricting when Don Moos came up. He was from Eastern Washington, and he came up with the idea of rural representation and thought it was a great plan. In fact, he tried to get the plan passed over the one we were working on.

So we had all of these different forces converging in different ways. You had to offer them something; you had to offer them a plan that was better than what they had. By now they were all so terrified because they figured they had to go back and run in areas they weren't familiar with. Even if it was still Democratic or Republican, and they were either Democrats or Republicans, different people would take part. Maybe it would be a PUD [Public Utility District] commissioner, or maybe it would be a sewer commissioner or the mayor of a city, or something like that. Maybe it would be a county commissioner who was going to run against him. It just wasn't real simple for either the Democrats or Republicans, and they had all these different fears.

Somebody would come down and want it redistricted a certain way, and he'd say, "I'm not as much interested in how it goes politically because it's Republican, and it will be Republican anyway they go, but get him out of my district." Well, that might be a motive, so the motivations were different in each case.

Ms. Boswell: I kind of sidetracked you. You were talking about the four basic tenets that you followed. So the first is deal with the people who are already there.

Sen. Greive: Number two was to be trustworthy. If you told them it was so, it was so, and you could back it up. They might understand their own district and might even understand the district next to them, but they were not going to understand the impact statewide, countywide and so forth. They had to trust you for that. And if you said it was going to go a certain way, they had to really believe you were telling them the truth.

Ms. Boswell: How do you convince them of that?

Sen. Greive: The only way you could do that

was unquestioned integrity over a period of time. If they believed you, that was all that counted. Who else were they going to believe? You'd have people that argued with you, but then when somebody would argue with you, what you would do was take up the map and look over there and say, "What about this place or that place?" Well, they would only know about a couple of districts, and they hadn't done their homework. And if you had a reputation for telling them the truth before, then they'd believe you. They wouldn't otherwise.

Ms. Boswell: You were majority leader at that time?

Sen. Greive: Yes, I was elected majority leader. I'd been the caucus chairman before—that's the number two man—for two terms. And then I became majority leader when Rosellini got to be governor.

Ms. Boswell: Did you feel that redistricting was part of your duties to handle, then?

Sen. Greive: Yes. That was one of my principles. One of my principles was that I was essentially the floor leader for my colleagues in the Senate. Apart from everything else, I was their leader; I was the Democratic leader. I wasn't chosen by God to be leader; I was chosen by these people, and I felt I had to do what I could to protect them.

Ms. Boswell: When redistricting came about, on the other hand, you said earlier it wasn't truly a partisan issue.

Sen. Greive: I'll give them that. I don't know how partisan they were. Anybody who got involved like Ed Munro or John Ryder or Bill Howard—they took care of themselves and their interests. But generally, the others had nothing to do with the drafting. They just took it the way it came. Sometimes redistricting did things to their districts they didn't want, or it did something to their bosom buddy's district that they didn't want. Then it became unpopular in the district.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me about the process that you developed in order to do your own redistricting.

Sen. Greive: First of all, I had to assemble a staff of five people. And I never thought to myself that I was all that bright. I know how to pick them, and I got a person who was a brilliant, absolutely brilliant young man. I've known him for years. Hayes Elder was Phi Beta Kappa and so forth. He was on the Law Review when he went to law school, and he had a real grasp of politics, a really young genius. And so I brought him down, first as a page and then we got him other jobs because he was interested.

In all the time I was down there, I only had a page once. Traditionally, legislators brought pages down there, but I always took the attitude that it was a little lazy. I moved my family down when I went down, and I said, "It may be good for legislation, but it's a terrible place to try to bring kids up morally." And I didn't think paging did any good because they would see all kinds of sexual advances—maybe just shocking for the period, maybe it wouldn't be anything now—but little "footsy" things going on. There was an awful lot of drinking, and so I normally didn't want a page.

Ms. Boswell: Was Hayes Elder a West Seattle person?

Sen. Greive: He was a West Seattle person. He eventually became a CIA member. He was secretary of the World Youth Conference, but he worked for the CIA at the same time, and

we figured he was murdered in Europe just before he was supposed to come home.

Ms. Boswell: Oh, no! When was that?

Sen. Greive: That was many years later—maybe like ten or fifteen years later. As an actual matter, he and his wife were both murdered. The official story is that it was one of these streets that had a cutoff, and he went over the side of it in his car. I don't believe that. But I knew he was secretary of the World Youth Conference. He never told me he was CIA, but I found out later what I had suspected at the time.

But he served as a state representative from this district before he did that. He got elected after he helped me. We went all out, and he did a lot of it himself. He was very brilliant.

In fact, one time he was my campaign manager, and I had him and I had some others. I don't know whether Dean Foster was a part of that deal or not; I think he was. Eventually he became secretary, but he was later. When Hayes graduated to other things, why then Dean Foster took over as my right-hand man. And then we assembled a staff of people who knew what they were doing and could run the adding machines and so forth and so on.

First, you had to convert a district into blocks and then precincts to know where you were. And, of course, we found all kinds of horrible examples—precincts cut through people's bedrooms and so forth.

The people who drew the census tracts didn't do a very good job. They had no interest in doing a good job. It wasn't like it was going to be an official boundary; it was just for their purposes for accounting. At first, they didn't worry too much about it because what they wanted was something more flexible than counties and political boundaries. They wanted to study urban effects of populations, poverty, race, and things of that sort. They felt they had to have finer units, so they just went out and almost recklessly or off-handedly made decisions that they would draw this district maybe this way and that way, and they used existing borders. For instance, they'd be trying to use the district borders of a city, and if the city gained a lot of population, why then they wouldn't know whether that population that they added belonged to the new district.

Theoretically, when you passed an initiative, the borders should be what they were as of that date. But that's not the way it was drawn before or intended to be before. Well, the city of Seattle borders had changed. And all in all, there were 120,000 people that the Secretary of State, Earl Coe, couldn't figure out what district to put them in. We discovered that and brought it to their attention, and the Secretary of State didn't like what they did anyway, so I'm not saying that there weren't other factors involved.

Ms. Boswell: The federal employees who did the census districts had one agenda, and then you decided to use the precincts as a more understandable boundary?

Sen. Greive: We decided to use precincts because we knew how they went. Now I suspect—nobody's ever told me so I can't prove it—but I suspect that part of the reason they used census tracts was that they didn't want people to figure out what was going on.

A legislator, no matter how intellectually slow he was—because a lot of people were just running because they were popular, so consequently they had less tools and expertise at running—could understand the importance of changing precinct boundaries. You were the local jeweler, or you were the local grocer, and you had run some ads, and you were active in the Kiwanis Club or the Lions Club, or you belonged to the St. Patrick's Catholic parish, or you were a Congregationalist, or whatever

you were, it gave you enough status, and you just ran and got elected. And a lot of them didn't understand precincts, particularly, or care. It wasn't necessary in their election. Even the ones who had made a study of it, didn't make a thorough voting study. They'd only look at their race. They wouldn't look at two races, so we had to figure out and do it different ways.

It was difficult to track districts that went Democratic or Republican in our particular state. We've got a long history of people who cross party lines and jump different ways and vote inconsistently. There's no straight party voting. For instance, in that particular election in which Initiative 199 was passed, Eisenhower won the state by 100,000 votes. There were six Republicans and one Democrat who made Congress. They just happened by a landslide victory. You remember the Eightieth Congress before them? They all came in then, and they all got reelected.

Magnuson ran for United States Senator against the most popular Republican in the state of Washington—Arthur Langlie, three times governor—and yet he won by a quarter of a million votes. Now, when you've got the president winning by 100,000 votes, Magnuson by 250,000 votes, and a bunch of Republicans being elected to Congress, you can see how hard it was to figure out. So you had to go to lesser races. You had to go to things like Secretary of State, or you had to find some criteria that you could use. I don't remember the criteria, but I know we struggled mightily with that, so that we would have some uniform way. So when we explained it, we'd say, "This is a Democratic or a Republican precinct." You couldn't go by the people who were elected because you might have poor opposition. So, we had to work out a criteria that could be applied across the board because if John Cooney was running, and he was very popular, and he didn't have much opposition in the primary, or if he had no opposition and the Republican had just filed to fill up the ticket, he'd get a huge margin. He might not get that huge margin in a contested race.

So we had to work out a grid—something that we could apply as well in Stevens County as we could in Clark or Whatcom or King County. That consumed quite a little of our time, and I had various devices we used to do that, but I think it's all technical now. So for one thing, Gordon Baker had written his thesis on this topic, and I got a copy of that to see how he tried to analyze it. He was a big Republican, an advisor to the Republican Party and so forth, but he was doing it at Washington State University. He was attempting to get a doctoral degree. We felt that was very good.

Ms. Boswell: Did you essentially develop a formula, which you could use then to predict the political affiliation of the districts?

Sen. Greive: Well, we tried to make some sense of it. We would come in and some legislators would say, "Well, I wanted that because my sister-in-law lives down there." "Well, did she carry it for you?" "Well, I'm sure the reason I did well down there was my sister-in-law." And we could look it up and decide whether his sister-in-law did any good for him or not, or if he did just as well as the other legislators who didn't have a sister-in-law. It wasn't that picky in most cases, but when people worry about their districts, and they want to know what's going to happen to them and ask you all kinds of questions, you've got to be able to answer them.

Ms. Boswell: So, you developed this grid, and I'm assuming you had to just play around with maps and boundaries all the time.

Sen. Greive: And then our next step would be to try and eliminate no one if we could help

it. I don't care if it was my worst enemy, you would gave to be careful trying to change their district. If I took on Slade Gorton, for example, and tried to keep him out with some sort of a maneuver, it would become an issue. And, in fact, it did become an issue, subsequently, because he got a Republican elected from my district, and that became a problem. I was a Democrat and the House member was a Democrat, and then we had a Republican. He and I became good friends through the years, and that's not the whole story.

The important thing was that no matter how you did it, it was going to be controversial. But my attitude was that if we knew what we were doing, and we had a rationale, what did they have?

Ms. Boswell: "They" meaning the initiative framers in the beginning?

Sen. Greive: Yes. They came down and wanted to testify before the legislators and so forth, and I understand that they were denied that chance. I didn't actually do that. John Cooney, I understand, argued with them, and there was some rhubarb about it. Cooney drew the part for Spokane, but I was very happy that he did, and I'm not trying to sell you the idea that I was all that wonderful. I wanted to win, and I didn't want to have them generating more publicity in the newspaper.

Ms. Boswell: Did they ever get to testify?

Mr. Greive: I don't know.

We had to defend our plan when they came in. My attitude almost from the beginning, but especially later on, was that you couldn't do a thing like this in secret. If they wanted to come down and talk to you, you had to let them.

Now the first time around we were probably pretty secretive because we had to offset the ladies, and we didn't want to argue. But they would come in and they'd argue with us a little because when we finally published some borders, and they could see as well as we could—and we had it converted to precincts—they could see how it was going to go. But they didn't know enough about it to be specific. Most legislators didn't either.

Ms. Boswell: You had mentioned to me earlier that legislators of both parties would come down and go over it with you.

Sen. Greive: Especially the first time we tried redistricting because it was a coalition. Either that or we'd pick some Republican out, Bill Goodloe or Tom Copeland, or somebody, and he'd go back and sell his people and talk to them about it. But I had to develop it. It was developed for the Senate, but then it was sold by myriads of other people.

Ms. Boswell: How were you able to build this coalition of both Republicans and Democrats?

Sen. Greive: Stark-raving fear! They all were afraid of what would happen to them if they had to run in these new districts, and they were in a mood to accept some compromise. And they were in the mood, in some instances, to give up a little power. And even if I didn't happen to need it, my seatmate or my best buddy might—you see, the Legislature's all shot through with friendships—they're buddies. You get people that you deal with—mostly it was people that voted with you—and you'd vote with them, and they'd get your bill out of committee. They'd go out drinking with you, or they'd go to parties where we'd have big dances, or there'd be a certain camaraderie, and that went a long ways. And they might be afraid that their buddy would get knocked out, so they would be willing to accept something in order to be sure he was taken care of.

Ms. Boswell: Who were your more vocal public supporters?

Sen. Greive: Nobody was publicly supporting the idea except the people in Eastern Washington. Mike Gallagher said a lot of things because he was King County chairman, but he kept a low profile. Everybody kept a low profile because they simply felt that it wasn't popular. At least that was my philosophy, and I think I sold it to all of them. If John Cooney or August Mardesich or somebody in Eastern Washington who was popular wanted to take credit for it, more power to them. We had considerable support from people all over the state. One man, for instance, who was very helpful was a fellow by the name of Robert Timm. He was from Central Washington. I don't know if he's still alive or not, but he was a wheel—a good leader.

Now, at this point in my life I can't without more study—I could if I had more time—know some of the events from one redistricting on into another redistricting. There were three of them, three major efforts.

Ms. Boswell: Was there much public opposition to the first effort?

Sen. Greive: Well, the newspapers didn't like it very well, and so the only thing we could do then is keep it under wraps. We had to sell it individually and so forth. Now, I'm not saying that we never had some sessions where we showed these people first, but we felt that if they were from the Seattle area, or King County, or Pierce County, they were going to be "anti" anyway. So we weren't going to lose anything if they just got mad at us once.

Ms. Boswell: Why would they particularly be against you?

Sen. Greive: Well, they were enamored of the women in the League of Women Voters, and rightly so. The whole process made a wonderful story. This is the sort of thing that novels are written around. The ladies going out on their own, putting their own money up to file, and working hard on getting the signatures. The hard-bitten politicians sat back and said, "You can't do it." They sneered and said, "You're cutting out paper dolls." The whole little scenario that they'd go around the politicians was popular.

Many, many things are popular at first until you get on the inside of them. It's popular if you cut the budget or balance the budget—absolutely, very popular. It became popular, like Medicare. Congress wants to cut Medicare to give a break to the wealthy people. Now it gets much more complicated and it gets even more complicated if you're young enough so you may not ever get Medicare, because you're so young you're better off doing it another way.

So you get all these interplays. None of these were a factor in redistricting, but I'm just showing you how they proliferate. Part of the skill of being a legislator is getting to know the people and seeing what they'll do. It is somehow persuading them to see your point of view. It may not always be the prettiest thing in the world, but it's essential.

Ms. Boswell: Was other party leadership helpful?

Sen. Greive: At that point we had the leadership from all the parties. Everybody was concerned. King County legislators weren't. They were against this effort, generally, because the Republicans were all going to support Initiative 199; they liked what it did. To some of the Democrats, it didn't make much difference, but it was, as I recall, six and six—we had six and they had six legislators. Myself, Al Rosellini and Mike Gallagher were three of them, and Frank

Conner took Rosellini's place and we had Patrick Sutherland. Who was the other one? We had one more—no, that's six. You had to sit down with each of them and show them what the initiative did to them, and what kind of trouble they were in.

For instance, one of the things that this Initiative 199 did was to put seven legislators from Spokane County in the same district because they all couldn't get reelected. And incidentally, one of my tenets then always was that you had an investment in a legislator. It's all right to defeat somebody you don't like on a particular individual basis, but let's be realistic. If you want the thing to run differently, you get rid of the legislator. You also get rid of an awful lot of naval bases or business for your state: dams and bridges and so forth. Right out here in West Seattle we have a bridge that was paid for because Warren Magnuson, who was at that time chairman of Ways and Means, decided to back it. They had a bridge fund, and he took half of it for West Seattle. Somebody complained and he said, "That's right, half for West Seattle, and half for the rest of the United States." That's the way the system works. Maybe it isn't pretty, but that's the way it works.

And so you want to have some people with some expertise, people who know how to make it run. When you get a bunch of idealists and there are too many of them, they get all wound up and nothing happens. They do a lot of crazy things. In a sense, I think that's part of what happened with the Republican's "Contract with America," but that's another whole story.

Ms. Boswell: So, you developed your own plan for redistricting, and then what did you do?

Sen. Greive: Well, I didn't develop it all by myself. I developed it with constant talks and consultation with Republicans and Democrats—anybody who was willing to be in on the thing. You had to have two-thirds, so we couldn't afford to leave anybody out. Anybody that would listen, we'd tell them what we were going to do, unless they had some other motive.

Ms. Boswell: Can you explain how that worked? Tell me a little more about the boundaries and borders themselves.

Sen. Greive: I saw an article in *USA Today* once that showed some of the congressional districts that were drawn to accommodate race, and how ridiculous they looked. Nobody in the state of Washington, whether the League of Women Voters or Republicans or Democrats, would have guts enough even to suggest such weird combinations. You had to make them look compact, and I think all of us did that. I don't think that there was ever a Democratic or a Republican plan that did it perfectly.

We were probably more careful than anyone else because we were under a lot more scrutiny. We did ours in the open. The Republicans conducted most of their efforts, in all instances, behind closed doors. But it had to look reasonable when you saw it on a map, and we all tried to do that. In so far as possible, you tried to follow rivers and major streets in the city. You tried to follow county lines or you tried to develop a rationale. It could be east of the mountains or west of the mountains—we ran into that problem eventually in subsequent efforts to redistrict. We had districts that we couldn't quite make fit, and we had to run part of them across the Cascades. Republicans didn't want us to do it; we didn't want to do it, but it was a question of how you did it and where, what was the rationale for it, and how it came out.

Ms. Boswell: So generally speaking, not only does it need to be compact, but does it need to

have a common economic base or anything?

Sen. Greive: Now, we talk about my differences with some of the Republicans. I've always felt that there should be some economics as a basis and so forth. In other words, you try to keep city districts together; you try to keep rural districts together. If there are bedroom communities, you try to keep them together. It doesn't mean you always succeed, but it makes better sense. One of the things about a democracy is that it works best when people are represented, not when people are ignored. Just to put them all in a block and say, "That's it," is a little ridiculous. You also had to be concerned because if you made too many heavily Democratic districts, then the rest of them would all be Republican, or vice versa. Too many Republican districts and the Democrats would get angry, so if you packed all of them in, it might be fine with the incumbent or the person who got that kind of a district, but it might be a horse of another color who ends up with the final representation.

Now, in Europe, for instance, and in Australia—a prime example—they have minority representation. You vote for three or four, and you get your first choice, or if you don't get your first choice, your second choice or your third choice; that way minority parties can emerge. Is it good to have minority parties? I don't know, but that didn't get to be much of an issue here. Philosophically, this is not the greatest system in the world, but it's the system we use.

Ms. Boswell: When you developed the plan for redistricting with all these other people, what happened to it?

Sen. Greive: In the first place, we had to get it through the House and the Senate. When we came to the Senate, we got a lot of cooperation, but we put so many controversial things on that bill that we couldn't accommodate the newspapers that day. So we got some publicity, but it couldn't make the headlines because we wanted to extend the closing hours for taverns, and we had a lot of other controversial things that we did at the same time. We'd be criticized, but tomorrow's another newspaper day. The House didn't do it that way and they had more trouble.

Ms. Boswell: What do you mean when you say "trouble?"

Sen. Greive: Well, they got more publicity and there was more heat on them and so forth.

Ms. Boswell: And you got the two-thirds? Was that expected? Did you expect that much?

Sen. Greive: No. The big advantage was that nobody thought we could do it.

Ms. Boswell: And was that a big challenge? Did you take that as a challenge?

Sen. Greive: Very much so. Very much so. I kept telling them we could do it. Every once in a while somebody would come and say, "That's impossible, you can't do it." And if they were an enemy of redistricting like Web Hallauer, or if it was a supporter of the League women like Ed Munro or somebody, I'd just as leave have them think we couldn't do it. But we thought we could do it.

Ms. Boswell: To what do you attribute that, ultimately?

Sen. Greive: Fear, number one. We had a receptive audience. Number two, an awful lot of hard work. Some people had different prices. Somebody would want something of their own, and it might be more important to them than redistricting, but if I agreed to

support that, then they'd support me. Insofar as I was able, I never made any deals like that. But I know this is what they wanted us to do. That'll come into play the next time around, next redistricting.

There were all kinds of motivations. You just didn't know. That first time nobody thought we could do it, so it was kind of an advantage. Everybody got a shock. They knew we were going to try, but nobody ever thought we'd get two-thirds. But then we challenged the public to vote for or against.

Ms. Boswell: And so when you got that two-thirds, then what happened?

Sen. Greive: We had taken control of both houses. Then our redistricting plan became the plan that was adopted. They took it to court because there was a question of whether it was an amendment or a repeal—in other words whether it was really an entirely new law. An initiative had to stand for two years, but you could amend it. The legislature did that because some years before they had some disastrous financial initiatives, so they said you had to have two-thirds. Nobody had ever done that before. It's only been about four years or something since we've done something like that.

Ms. Boswell: So the League of Women Voters, then, took you to court?

Sen. Greive: Well, they did. I think that George Prince, if I recall, he and his wife and the League of Women Voters, they'd probably say they did, yes. I don't know that the League of Women Voters as a group really understood it. What they understood was that they redistricted and the politicians did it. Did they understand whether it was better than theirs or different? I don't think they did, generally. One or two might.

Ms. Boswell: And were you fearful that the courts would knock it down?

Sen. Greive: Of course we were. We hoped they wouldn't, but we didn't know. And the court decided it just before Christmas, I think—Christmas Eve, or a few days before Christmas. There wasn't much business, and they just sort of floated over it.

Ms. Boswell: And the Supreme Court's verdict was?

Sen. Greive: That it was legal. To amend is to change, and we made changes, and that was well within the meaning of amendment. The decision seemed to revolve around that particular phrase.

It was kind of interesting. The minority and the majority were both written by former legislators or justices, one from Spokane County and one from Ritzville.

Ms. Boswell: Who had been legislators before?

Sen. Greive: The one from Ritzville had; I don't know if the other had or not, but I think he'd always been a judge. I think it was the only elective office he'd held, but I don't remember. I just know that he wrote the dissenting opinion. Incidentally, I think our plan was quite a little better than theirs.

Right or wrong, you could argue whatever you want. Number one: we accounted for everybody. Number two: people knew where they were. They could look at precincts and they could decide where they were. Number three: I think that we listened to the incumbents. The people were better represented because they knew who was representing them. When you're cutting paper dolls out and you don't even know who is across on the other side of that ravine, there's going to be a whole different class of people.

Look at the city and the difference between the fanciest housing and the poorer districts. Hell, look at the differences between the richest districts in the city. Some areas, just by the nature of where they are located or because they have restrictive covenants, have a certain attitude. But if you look at a place like Washington Park or just north at Broadmoor, an area of beautiful homes, they're right next to the Black section, so how do you represent the people? If you have a little pocket of people who were out of sympathy with their neighbors, then those people are essentially unrepresented. Insofar as possible, you try to keep groups together that see eye to eye.

It is a natural process that happens. When you call in the legislators because they have more information, they may not know exactly how they got elected or where they got their votes, but they have a feeling for what this area is and that area is and what it does.

Ms. Boswell: Did you ever see race entering into any of these decisions?

Sen. Greive: No. It will eventually. The last time around we had racial groups get into it quite deeply because they were under-counted.

Ms. Boswell: That was a different redistricting fight? In terms of this particular one, I just wanted to clarify about the extra people involved in the Secretary of State's counting.

Sen. Greive: I don't have the letter, but what happened was that they drew census tracts along what seemed to them at the time to be logical boundaries. And they loved city limits. Well, there was a vast influx of population, especially in Western Washington. For instance, all of Lake City wasn't in the city of Seattle at that time. It is now. So they left out thousands of people there, and these people didn't know whether they were in the old census boundaries or whether they were within the city limits when they drew the census boundaries or not. Theoretically, they were really messing with the old boundaries, but they didn't say that. When you read the Initiative 199, it just says the census boundaries. Well, the census boundaries speak as of the date that they're interpreted. They don't speak as to what's in the back of somebody's mind. And that's one of the reasons why the Secretary of State felt justified. He didn't like the fact that they hadn't followed precincts, and nobody in the whole election process liked that. The county auditors and the politicians didn't like it. Everybody would like to know where he or she was. But that wasn't the rationale. The rationale was they were left unrepresented.

Ms. Boswell: So the number of people who, because of growth and other things, weren't counted fell into some gray area?

Sen. Greive: They probably would be counted if you pulled the count in the precincts, but they just took what was there by census tract. Well, a part of that census tract may not have been in that district. In other words, if the borders had been moved and there were 5,000 people involved, then those 5,000 should be counted in the next district. They shouldn't be counted in that one. But they hadn't looked at the problem.

Ms. Boswell: So as a result, what did the Secretary of State do?

Sen. Greive: All they would have had to do to solve that problem was base the census tract districts as of whenever the census was taken—1950 or whenever it was. They'd say, "All of them shall be interpreted with the census borders as of that date," and that could have solved it, but they didn't. That's the important point. Certainly, the legislators were

fearful. The only problem we had is that some people thought we could beat it in court and wanted to keep what we had and not do anything. So we had the task, of course, to convince them to go along. In other words, if you had a pretty good district and you were sixty years old or sixty-five years old, and you enjoyed being a state senator or state representative, what the hell. Your attitude might be: " If I get four more years then I'm not going to worry about anything else."

We had a certain amount of that.

Ms. Boswell: What did this letter from the Secretary of State say?

Sen. Greive: This was the first letter written by Earl Coe in which he points out the problems with the census districts. While he doesn't get down into detail, there's certainly enough here so that you can understand what the issue is, and I'm sure there are follow-up telephone conversations and things that went with it. But he was alerting them to the fact that he felt that this plan was not viable, that they had made a mistake when they'd drawn it. The unfortunate thing is that in all of our discussions—and I'll challenge you to read anything—you'll probably never even hear of this letter. The press wasn't a bit interested in publishing it, and of course the only way we could get it published was if we had a news conference and waved it around and so forth. But then we'd have been tagged, and I didn't want to be tagged; I'd rather just hope for the best.

But we had this rationale, and it was a very important part in our operation because we were able to take this letter and show it to the various legislators, many of them who wanted to do it and wanted to know what their rationale could be. They weren't concerned about anything else, but they were concerned about overriding the ladies who had done such a wonderful job for humanity and mankind and all that sort of thing, and this gave them some ammunition, some protection. In effect, this was like the big artillery protecting the ground troops as you were going along.

Ms. Boswell: Now, was this an issue at all with the court when they took it up?

Sen. Greive: I don't rightly know. I'd have go back and read it in detail. But I don't think that that would have been an issue anyway, because the question of whether we had an amendment or not—whether this process was legal—would be another one.

There were several actions that were examined. But this was the big one because the chief election officer in the state is the Secretary of State, and the job then had two functions. One is the corporate function, the corporate seal, and the other is the elections division. So this is better than the governor or anybody else saying something about somebody whose job it is to do the same. And everybody knew that Ken Gilbert wrote this letter. In other words, there was never any question. Well, at this particular time, 1957, I think Earl Coe had cancer and didn't run again. He died shortly after that. And when the position was open, Vic Meyers got elected. But Ken Gilbert was the chief election officer for the State of Washington for many, many years under both of them. See, Ken Gilbert was respected as being the election officer who got along very well with both sides.

Ms. Boswell: In looking back at this whole first redistricting fight, how do you assess your role and what came out of it?

Sen. Greive: You have to separate your feelings from winning and losing, just like playing the World Series, and so forth. I thought I won a major victory as far as legislators were concerned, and they were, of course, happy and I was happy. On the other

hand, I was scared as hell because I felt that it would probably be used against me personally.

As you know from reading those articles, I hardly appear in the newspapers at all. I ran the show, but I didn't run it publicly, that's for darn sure. Because I felt that I could never get a good break. To be known as the guy who redistricted some incumbent out of his or her district—everybody would hate you. So the less attention I received, the better I was. So my best bet was to keep my participation quiet, even when we went to things, like conventions and so forth. We made no real concerted effort to do anything there because otherwise it would have generated publicity that we were trying to override the ladies and so forth and so on. We kept our mouths shut. Very much hush-hush. We may have objected on parliamentary or technical grounds for some reason, but we certainly weren't going to get out in front. At least I wasn't, and I don't think Mike Gallagher was either. We just tried to keep our heads down, and the bomb wouldn't explode on us. And incidentally, we were all re-elected.

Ms. Boswell: All of you were?

Sen. Greive: Yes, all of the Democratic legislators. And that's because we all kept our heads down.

It's a good deal like the pro-choice and abortion debate. Nobody in their right mind gets themselves out in front unless they happen to be somebody who is protected or else is running for president. You have no choice. You have to take a position on one side or the other, or you can't get the nomination. Nobody likes that issue because it's just fraught with people you can't convince. The more publicity you get, the worse you are—and there wasn't a popular side to this.

See, in abortion, there's a popular side both ways, depending how you look at it. But nobody had any sympathy with legislators. "Defeat them all. What difference does it make to us? Let them take care of themselves. They're just a bunch of politicians."

Ms. Boswell: So, in a lot of ways, it's really an in-house issue, then?

Sen. Greive: That's right, yes. But we still got lots of publicity. You can tell it got a lot of articles. It was written up a lot because it had permeated everything that happened that session. You could hardly separate anything from that issue. I've got all kinds of stories that I can tell you about things that happened as a spin-off from redistricting—all three redistrictings. That's where the action was. It may not have been a popular side to be on, but it was a fascinating side simply because that's where it took place.

Ms. Boswell: Now, you have mentioned to me about articles that had been written about it, particularly the Gordon Baker article. Can you tell me about that?

Sen. Greive: I honestly feel that Baker had a bias before he started and had definite thoughts about how he wanted the issue to come out. All of the newspaper reporters had the same feeling, all of them. They liked the idea that a few ladies on their own could upset the powers and the wheels of government, and they could change it, and they could be determined. They were lonely, and they were in the minority. They took those politicians and grabbed them on the front of their shirt and shook them hard, and all of this. They never got into any of the side play of who benefited and who didn't. They just always portrayed how hard it was to get the signatures and that they had to have cookie sales, and all of the minutia that goes with a story. The technical details ruin the story. The most they would say is that we weren't pleased with it or something like that.

But I had good staff. Hayes Elder was

steeped in politics. He knew what it was all about, and he understood it more thoroughly than almost anybody I have ever known. He got in there and actually did the technical work. I had to have somebody who was bright and good, but even then we had plenty of people to help. We had a staff of three, four, or five people working on it.

Ms. Boswell: How do you find staff like that?

Sen. Greive: You don't. They just come as part of the Legislature. These people all have other jobs in the Legislature.

Ms. Boswell: And they're just willing to help?

Sen. Greive: Well, with an issue of this importance, you just commandeer the people you want. You simply say, "I want so-and-so." "Well, you can have him," they'd say. "Fine." You had to have some place. I don't know whether Judge Faith Ireland was involved. She was down there for quite a while and I don't know whether she got into this fight or not, but she got hit in the next one. But I had a lot of talented people down there.

Ms. Boswell: I have heard it said, however, that if anybody did all the hard work, it was you. I don't know how you would respond to that.

Sen. Greive: True in a sense. I made the deals, contacted the people. I was the salesman, but I didn't do the technical work. I certainly supervised and had something to do with it, but I had given them orders to be straight. The last thing I wanted in any redistricting that I had anything to do with was for anybody to juggle it and make it different than it is. If the precinct went that way, we'd go that way. We had to have some criteria because secrecy was the worst thing we could do. I never was out to screw the Republicans. That, I think, was the worst mistake I could have made.

Another thing is, we didn't try to attack people on the floor, at least not publicly, because I felt that was bad, too. We had to stick to our single issue. You don't shake your fist at somebody you disagree with. When we talked to people and they couldn't see it our way, we didn't say, "We'll see you in hell," or "We'll get you," or anything like that. If they didn't see it that way, we tried to change their minds by negotiating and leaving the door open, and we did that.

Now, in the sense that I lined up the votes, and I talked with the leaders and that I sold the plan, I did an awful lot of work day and night. But I don't think I worked any harder than any of the staff people. They all worked hard, too. Legislators didn't spend a lot of time with them. They wanted to know what happened to their district, and they wanted to know what kind of district they had. They'd look at what they had before, and if it looked a lot better to them than that, then they were sold. We didn't get into who won and who lost so much that first time. You'd be getting very political if you started to do that. But I decided to please enough people to get a two-thirds majority.

Ms. Boswell: Was there any particular direct fallout after it was passed?

Sen. Greive: I worried about it when I went out for re-election, and so did Mike Gallagher and so did all of us, but we all got re-elected in King County. I don't know other parts of the state; I'd have to make a lot more analysis.

Ms. Boswell: But you didn't have many of your constituents coming up and saying, "You did this."

Sen. Greive: I had it a few times. My attitude was, "Well, they wanted to take this away from

me." If it was a Democratic meeting, they wanted to take the Democrats away and give us Republicans. Well, that's enough for them. You know what I mean? Or somebody would complain and say, "They wanted to cut you out of my district." "Oh, oh!" So, it wasn't that hard.

The bad part would be that you did terrible things to the ladies who cut out the paper dolls or who changed the world. That was the issue: were you or weren't you against the League of Women Voters? I'm certainly not against the League of Women Voters; I never have been. They certainly have got a place in the world and I think that they're doing generally a good thing. They probably did a good thing there, because without them we wouldn't have redistricted.

Somebody who brings up an issue and takes on the issue may not always succeed, but then they've got a real place in the history of the situation.

Ms. Boswell: Did you ever hear from them afterwards, the women themselves? How did they react?

Sen. Greive: When we tried the second one, they were all mixed up in the second one, too. Some of them became quite interested. Things run together, and I don't recall Lois North ever coming down the first time, but she certainly was down the second time when it was happening to her district. She ran for state representative or state senator and then King County Council. She had ambitions for a political career. Mary Ellen McCaffree did the same thing, and she was active in the second redistricting.

In this business, everybody's human. And when you get to how they are elected, they're awful human. Nobody wants to commit suicide, and nobody wants to give an advantage away that may help him or her achieve office. Now, what they do after they're in office is another story. But you're talking about getting elected.

Ms. Boswell: Well, it makes sense. If you were going to start your process with these individuals who were already in office, why would they fight their own election?

Sen. Greive: That's right. You try to give them a better deal than they had before. We tried to iron out some of the difficulties, but one thing that the ladies did is that they put up some horrible examples because there were great needs. It's easier to sell people on something when somebody else has done it. In other words, the problem was before them and they could see that you had to do something.

Just like we have to balance the budget now. Well, we haven't balanced the budget for what is it, twenty years? Maybe it will be another twenty years if somebody doesn't make an issue out of it. Once it's made an issue, then you begin to feel like you've got to tighten your belt, and you've got to do something. Now, do you want to do exactly what Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the House, wants to do? But the question is that you've got to do something, and you can't knock people like that. Sometimes they do a service; they become part of the plan to solve the issue.

The hardest thing about redistricting is that there are individuals involved, and they get hurt. And then some people see a chance to achieve notoriety by attacking or by doing this or that because they know the newspapers will publish what they say. Anytime a politician thinks he's got a thing of sufficient importance or popularity, he's going to say all kinds of things because then he gets publicity out of it. It may not be the right thing to do.

This particular plan was easy to attack if we got to the facts, but we didn't get into the facts anymore than we had to because once we sold it, we just had to get it through. The

reason why it was so predominately Democratic was because of Initiative 198, "the right-to-work" initiative of 1956. We had two right-to-work initiatives here, and they were overwhelmingly defeated. They got thousands of people out to vote who would never have otherwise voted. There was a large turn-out. So the districts that were heavily Democratic because the Democrats had made big sweeps, and then the governor was a Democrat.

Ms. Boswell: So when the redistricting happened, it helped to solidify those Democrats?

Sen. Greive: Well, when they were all elected, then every one of them wanted to look at their districts. Even somebody elected for the first time has considerable interest in what we were going to do in this part of their district or another part, and how they carried it, and so forth. In other words, when we sat down and talked to my people after we developed our plan, why, we could tell them what the precincts were and we could tell them how we arrived at them. I don't remember at this point in my life, thirty or forty years removed, exactly what we did, but I know that our knowledge was vastly superior to theirs. We had actually looked at the thing and did the study. Then somebody comes in cold and just knows they got elected from Grant County. Well, that's easy because Grant County's a rural community, but if you're elected from Seattle then it goes all kinds of different ways, Democratic or Republican, depending on who you put in that district.

Ms. Boswell: Once you'd finished all this, did you think it was over and you wouldn't have to deal with it for another ten years?

Sen. Greive: I think so. I don't think I ever thought that far ahead. I started thinking of it ten years later, or whatever it was the next time around. It wasn't quite ten years.

I'd like to put on the record some of the other things that this bill did that the women concocted and I'm sure they didn't intend, but it turned out to be very difficult. First, we had two senators in Snohomish County at the time. Well, as the women were adjusting and drawing the borders, they put both of them in the same district. Now, that would have been one thing if they could have run against each other, but the more powerful of the two—the guy with the greater seniority—was Senator Bargreen. They chopped his term off in this way. His term would expire, but the number was on Bill Gissberg's district. They transferred it over, and it didn't expire for two years, so he had to be out of office for two years before he could run again for reelection. And that was just one of the mistakes that they made.

It's like putting the seven legislators in one district. What we did is pinpoint every legislator so we knew where the legislators were, and then we took that into consideration.

Then, I also said that there was some argument over the Cowlitz Dam.* It was Tacoma's dam, which they said they needed for public power purposes, but the fish people, especially the sportsmen, had said that they were cutting off the fish run. I was never a direct part of that controversy. I don't recall right now absolutely how I voted; I may have

**Editor's note: The Tacoma municipal power company wanted to build a dam on the Cowlitz River in adjacent Lewis County.*

voted with the sportsmen, but the fact remains that they made some sort of a deal in the House that I wasn't a part of, and that became a part of redistricting. The price for supporting the dam was to pass the redistricting bill.

Ms. Boswell: And that was to get Tacoma senators in particular?

Sen. Greive: Yeah. I think they would have gotten them anyway, but now forty years later, I can't tell you for sure.

Ms. Boswell: And then, what about the role of Governor Rosellini?

Sen. Greive: Governor Rosellini had said that he was for what the League of Women Voters had done. Governor Rosellini had said that he was for the initiative because he was running for re-election as governor at the same time, and he said that he supported it. He was in a very difficult position for a variety of reasons. Most of the legislators were for our plan, and he finally let it become law without his signature based on this rationale. He said that two-thirds of the people had voted for it, and they could have overridden his veto. However, there was not going to be another session for two years, and it would be too late for the next election—they'd have to use the other districts. So, he felt that the only fair thing to do was to let it stand, since it had such overwhelming support. His action made no difference anyway. He let it become law without his signature.

Ms. Boswell: You told me a great story about how you encouraged him along. Would you like to tell that story?

Sen. Greive: It seems that we were concerned about him signing it, so what we did—what I did really—was to get hold of the leaders. We got all of the legislators we could find who were on our side, and in this case it was close to a hundred—if it was two-thirds, then great. Well, we had a conference with the governor and when we opened the door, all of us trucked into the governor's office, but we couldn't all get in. And he was just shocked. There's a boardroom next to his office, and you could see all the faces.

I said to the governor, "Governor, about this veto of this legislation?" And he told us at that time that he wasn't going to veto it.

Ms. Boswell: That was an added incentive, all those people staring at him?

Sen. Greive: I'm sure that he had a lot of things that they wanted him to do, and it was the most difficult position for him to be in, but he gave a pretty good rationale, I thought.

Ms. Boswell: Was John O'Brien, at that time, heavily involved in this issue?

Sen. Greive: Yes. He was on our side. He was concerned because, of course, these were the people who elected him Speaker, just like we were. He was the Speaker, and he supported it. But I don't know that he played a very vital part in putting the plans together.

Gordon Sandison did more. He was the majority leader, and a fellow by the name of Robert Timm was the Republican leader, and was very heavily involved in it.

Ms. Boswell: And you said also that both Republican and Democratic organizations supported it?

Sen. Greive: Yes. First of all you have to understand that at that time the central committees of both parties were chosen one or two from each county, so it was not unusual that the small counties had a vote. So the Democratic and Republican central committees were both asked if they approved

of what we were doing and supported the changes, which gave us more cover. You could say that it didn't truly reflect their views. Maybe it did and maybe it didn't; we'll never know.

In King County they voted to support Initiative 199, but I don't think there were three people on that floor other than maybe the one or two of us, like Mike Gallagher and myself, who knew what it did. All they knew it was good for King County and gave us more representation. The Republicans, I think, were a good deal better informed. They unanimously supported it.

Now the Young Democrats also didn't support it, but that was because of a Young Democrat House member by the name of Andy Hess, who later became a senator from Ed Munro's district. He went before the Young Democrats and gave them a big speech and so forth, and as far as I know there was no opposition or no intelligent discussion of exactly what the district did. So he had the interest, and he got an awful good district.

Ms. Boswell: The League of Women Voters believed that the changes you made to the redistricting plan far exceeded the powers to amend an initiative granted to the Legislature. They filed suit in the state courts, but the state Supreme Court ultimately upheld your amendment. Can you tell me a little bit about that action?

Senator Greive: In the final analysis when this went to court, we had a funny situation.

George Prince was appointed as a special assistant attorney general and compensated by the Attorney General to bring the action, because the Attorney General never approved of what we were doing. Before the initiative the Attorney General was pretty much on the other side every chance he got. He was about to run for governor, and, in my opinion, was very prejudiced and wanted to be on the popular side.

Ms. Boswell: And that was John O'Connell?

Sen. Greive: Yes. From our point of view, we didn't, of course, agree with John O'Connell. He also got a chance to appoint the lawyers to defend the state, and he appointed Marshall Neill. Now Marshall Neill was a state senator. He was with us, and he eventually became a judge. I knew him very well, and he wasn't particularly an expert on constitutional matters and played little or no part in the thing. I objected to being in a position of having our own defender be from the state Senate. And so they finally agreed to name Lyle Iversen. I don't know whether they took Marshall Neill off or not, but basically Lyle Iversen had represented the election department from the attorney general's office in years gone by and was an expert in election matters; he handled our case. And that was because I asked them to. I went over and made an issue out of it.

Ms. Boswell: And so John O'Connell got involved enough to have Prince be the attorney for whoever sued?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Well, Prince's wife was very active in the League of Women Voters, and, interestingly, he also played a part in later redistricting actions.

After the redistricting battles of 1956 and 1957, the heated conflict surrounding redistricting cooled for a few years. But 1962 saw the reemergence of redistricting as a major divisive issue in Washington State politics, with new players and new pressures such as the involvement of district and federal courts.

CHAPTER 9

REDISTRICTING: 1962-1964

One of the few published accounts of redistricting efforts in the state of Washington is Howard E. McCurdy's* A Majority of the People: Factional Politics and Redistricting in Washington State (1970). *McCurdy was an assistant to then-State Senator Slade Gorton during the redistricting period and offers his perspective on the process as well as the behind-the-scenes motivations of participants. In this interview Senator Greive often refers to McCurdy's work, sometimes agreeing and other times disagreeing with its conclusions based on his own remembrances. Relevant passages from Howard McCurdy's manuscript have been added to this transcript so that readers can have a fuller understanding of Senator Greive's commentary.

Ms. Boswell: Earlier, we talked about the first phase of redistricting, and now I would like to discuss the second big redistricting effort in Washington. Shall we begin with the *Baker v. Carr* decision, handed down by the Supreme Court in March 1962, and the impact of judicial decisions about redistricting?

Senator Greive: Basically, *Baker v. Carr* told the various states that they had to have one-man, one-vote districts, and the districts had to be within certain proportions. They didn't set out the proportions. All they did was enunciate the principle of one man, one vote. This state, along with every other state, felt they had to redistrict. I think by now all of them have been through it. This is just our second big redistricting in the state's history.*

Ms. Boswell: So this new redistricting effort, *Baker v. Carr*—I think the decision was in March of 1962—had a case in this state follow it later that same year: *Thigpen v. Meyers*. In the Thigpen case the court said that redistricting didn't have to result in absolute equality among districts, but that there had to be a rational basis for the distribution. I believe the court argued that the districts drawn in 1957 were not "rational." Is that what forced you into redistricting so quickly?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. We just knew we had to do it. I don't think that we put a lot of

**Editor's Note: In the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that malapportionment of legislatures served to debase the votes of citizens and thus denied them the equal protection of the laws. The court held that the Federal courts have the power and the duty to pass upon the validity of distribution of state legislative seats. Prior to that time, it had been assumed that such matters were political in nature and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. In a subsequent series of decisions, especially Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), the Supreme Court set forth the standard which would henceforth apply to all state legislatures, as well as the U.S. House of Representatives: that, as nearly as practicable, "one person's vote is to be worth as much as another's." This is the principle of "one man, one vote."*

effort into it. It was an accomplished fact as far as we were concerned.

Ms. Boswell: The League of Women Voters had been the impetus behind the earlier redistricting move that we discussed. What was their involvement this second time?

Sen. Greive: They again tried the initiative route in 1962, Initiative 211. They had various people in to consult with them. One of their advisors, Ed Munro, came back and talked to them. Bull Howard—he was a lobbyist for the pinballs and a variety of other issues down there, former Republican district chairman and so forth—spoke with them as well. Yes, they eventually, as I recall, did put together another initiative and try it in the Legislature. I'm not sure about all my facts and my memory on this, but they couldn't get enough signatures for it, so it didn't go anywhere.

But by the time we got to Olympia for the 1963 session, we knew that we had a problem. In other words, this was no surprise to us. We had assembled our staffs and we began working on it.

Ms. Boswell: You said you got your staff assembled. Who was involved this time?

Sen. Greive: This time it was Dean Foster. It had been Hayes Elder the time before. But he was a state representative by now, and Foster had worked with him or for him. I forget exactly which it was, but I think Foster was involved with both redistrictings. He was my principal man here this time. The next time it would be Cough. Steve Cough was my wife's cousin.

Ms. Boswell: So you were prepared that you were going to have to deal with redistricting?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes. We knew we'd have to deal with it. It was never a question of putting it off. We just felt that there was no question that we had to do it, and we might as well get it over with. Of course, we didn't realize it was going to be so dominant and hard to do, or that we were going to have to go after it on two different sessions of the Legislature. All of the discussion would take place, but we knew we had the job and we set out to do it.

By now I was majority leader, and I wanted to keep my majority together, and I wanted to be responsible to it. Furthermore, I felt that I was by far the most experienced person around.

Ms. Boswell: The most widely known account of this whole redistricting effort was in a thesis by Howard McCurdy called *A Majority of the People: Factional Politics and Redistricting in Washington State*. He essentially indicates that your motivations in getting involved were very political. He argues that the margin that you had to keep you as majority leader was very slim, and that redistricting was a way of getting more loyalty. How did you feel about that?

Sen. Greive: I think that's in part true. First of all, let's talk about McCurdy. McCurdy was the staff advisor and chief of staff for Slade Gorton. Mary Ellen McCaffree, who was a state representative, later replaced him, but he started out as the chief of staff for Gorton. His loyalty was to Gorton, and Gorton and I, of course, were squarely on opposite sides. Gorton was in control of the redistricting issue.

It's impossible to talk politics without making it political. We're not talking about some statute that takes care of poor people, or some tax thing because you need revenue, or about repairing a bridge or something like that. We're talking about the make-up of political office, and you have to be political. It wouldn't be worth anything if you weren't.

Ms. Boswell: Did you feel at that time that your hold on being majority leader was rather tenuous?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I always had problems from the very first time I ran until the last time. There was a group of people that I didn't necessarily get along with, that I had to get along with. We made peace pretty well in the Senate, but they were always out to see a change. When you've been there twenty-eight years or so, as I was, and sixteen as majority leader, why I'm sure that could have been a part of it. I just don't know. I think that McCurdy assumed some things he doesn't know.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy kind of characterizes you as somewhat of an independent in the whole spectrum of Democrats at that time. How do you feel about that characterization?

Sen. Greive: Probably true. I got along well with Rosellini, but I didn't feel that I had any great overpowering reason to follow him. In other words, I always felt this way: if you added up the balance sheet, I did an awful lot more for Rosellini than he ever did for me. He was the governor.

He did help me once when I was in trouble. I don't know whether I was in trouble at that particular time or not. I had various times when they would rise up and try to put together a coalition. I never did get along very well ideologically with the people in Central Washington. I also didn't get along well with Martin Durkan and August Mardesich and that group. They were powerful people. It may very well be that they were after me, I don't remember.

Ms. Boswell: In the characterization of you as an independent, where did you see yourself fitting into the whole spectrum of Democrats?

Sen. Greive: Independents are relative. I was always a Democrat, and I voted down the Democratic line pretty much. Was I part of their drinking group or various activities? The people in Central Washington—I eventually became fairly friendly with Washington Water Power and the private power people. As the differences evaporated, toward the end you understand—the people of the PUDs were all together with Washington Water Power and Puget Power and Light. They wanted legislation they would agree on. There was little or no controversy. Well, that metamorphosis was taking place at the time, and there again, unless I see an independent line as to when that was taking place, it's hard for me to match it up now.

So I had my problems with Central Washington: with Nat Washington, with Wilbur Hallauer, with Jerry Hanna and with Mike McCormack. There are four votes there. I had my problems with Durkan and I had my problems with Mardesich, so there're two there. We had about thirty people in the caucus, and I've talked about four, five, six, seven very powerful ones. And that's where my opposition would come from.

Did I need redistricting? Actually those people were not very interested in redistricting. Only Hallauer was. Eventually McCormack became interested, but I think that was more to make him a leader than anything else—to give him presence. He wanted to run for Congress, as did Moos and several other people at the time. I felt redistricting was necessary for that reason, but I may be wrong. I'd be willing to admit that if I could research a little and determine where I was in the caucus. I've got to remember how the caucus felt. That isn't recorded anywhere, it's a secret vote—a written ballot, but a secret ballot. But I did have a couple of close elections, and that might have been one of them, I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: What about the forces arrayed against you in this particular redistricting fight? Slade Gorton was involved. Tell me how he became the other side.*

In 1962 leadership in the Republican Party was shifting from the business-oriented 'old guard' to a progressive 'new breed' team…They were young and vigorous, generally well educated, and many were politically active. For many reasons they found no room in the Democratic Party, although at that time its policies were closer to their own interests. So they made their own party…revitalized local political clubs and began to run candidates for the state legislature. In 1962 they aimed to control the House of Representatives, wanting a base of power from which to capture the governorship in 1964.

McCurdy: 6-8

Sen. Greive: Let's step back one step. No matter who had been floor leader, I would be the redistricting chairman. There would be no contest to that. I had the experience and I was recognized as the one that knew what it was. I'd assembled a staff, I knew about the figures, and I knew the weaknesses of the people. Even Gorton said that I had a sixth sense or something, but I tried to understand each guy and what he needed. And I usually had all of the lesser people with me. That is why my strength was what it was with the leaders.

Ms. Boswell: Can you tell me why Slade Gorton got involved in redistricting?

Sen. Greive: Well, for one thing, he wanted to change the make-up of the Legislature, which they eventually did. You want to remember that they were out of power, and as I see it, he felt that if he could get more Republican districts, they had a better shot at it. Plus the fact that I think he felt that he was talking for the new majority. He thought that the "new breed"—McCurdy called it that in the book, although I never heard anyone else refer to it in that way, but that's what McCurdy says—why, that new breed consisted of people who were ambitious politicians. Look at them: Pritchard retired from Lieutenant Governor, Slade Gorton was a U.S. Senator, and Evans got to be an U.S. Senator. They were all allied.

Ms. Boswell: You had a different name for them besides "new breed?"

Sen. Greive: I called them the "tennis court Republicans." I didn't think they were any new breed at all. They were a bunch of rich kids, so to speak, from rich parents and a rich constituency that was solidly Republican, and they were going to get re-elected. And this was their new advertising gimmick, just like you launch a new advertising campaign for a soap, or for tobacco, or whatever you're doing. Why you paint it all up, you give it a name, and you sell it. That's what they were selling. They sold it first to the newspapers and media, and then they used that to sell it to the people.

Ms. Boswell: So, you don't really think they were a "new breed" at all?

Sen. Greive: No, they had this in common: they were pretty intelligent people. They weren't dumb, and they were reasonably pleasant as far as getting along day to day, but they were determined to control. The House and Senate was a battleground, and I just happened to be one of the gunmen that got

caught in the crossfire.

Ms. Boswell: So, they could see redistricting as being an area where they could really make a public impact, or an in-house impact?

Sen. Greive: If they could control it, then they'd get the jobs and the Speakership, and they'd be the big operators of the Legislature. They wanted to take it over. It isn't like a storybook, which is why I say there was nothing very unusual about them. I'm sure that there were other people who acted like that before. I've been a part of coalitions like that, myself, on occasions.

Ms. Boswell: What was their relationship to the League of Women Voters?

Sen. Greive: I don't know that they had any great relationship with the League of Women Voters. As an actual matter, I didn't have any trouble with that group the time before in redistricting, when we overrode the League of Women Voters. But they had made a temporary alliance with Mrs. North—Lois North—who incidentally was a damn good legislator and a pretty competent politician, although I disagreed with her. And Mary Ellen McCaffree, I'd say the same things about her. They meant to be politicians, and their way of entry into politics was the League of Women Voters, in my opinion. Pure and simple. They kind of became part of the new breed or the coalition to accomplish their ends. But I don't think that there's anything unusual about that. They just wanted to control.

You see, Mary Ellen McCaffree came from a very questionable district, and Lois North had no place to run. They carved a new district out, and she ran in that.

Ms. Boswell: So both of them were Republicans?

Sen. Greive: That's right, they were Republicans. When you've got as many legislators as you have in the House and Senate, everyone works in groups. You don't do much as an individual. Somebody may make a speech and make a sensation on occasion, like in the movie *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*, but the day-to-day workings of the system are such that you have to deal with somebody and you have to have colleagues. You've got to have friends. And if you've got any brains, you've got to have friends on both sides of the aisle, even if they don't vote with you.

Ms. Boswell: But technically, when the League of Women Voters took this project on, wasn't it supposed to be a nonpartisan effort?

Sen. Greive: Originally it was their plaything. They wanted to dabble in politics, and they were looking for an issue that was unique, an issue that would catapult them into the public eye where they could be somebody. They would not just be a group of women who studied issues and did nothing about it. That was the reputation they had before—they studied things to death, but you never really got any bang out of them. They wanted to change that image, and they did through redistricting. It became a vehicle. There's nothing wrong with that—that's one of the levers of power.

Ms. Boswell: And because you had essentially opposed them in the past, you were their target now?

Sen. Greive: Of course, I opposed them in the past. I felt that they were wrong, plus they were trying to shake my world down. That's all. Maybe not my world, but certainly my legislative world, and I didn't think they were any holier than anyone else. But they had to have this; they wanted to have redistricting

done.

Ms. Boswell: When you got into it, having been through it once before, did you look forward to it? Did you enjoy doing it?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I probably did or I wouldn't have put that kind of effort into it. When I think of it now, it was like a task that just went with the job. I used to tell the fellows on the second time around that I was their business agent, and I had to look out for them. That's what they elect you for. Somebody had to have that responsibility, and either I had to do it myself or have somebody that I trusted to work at it. I figured I'd work as hard as anyone else.

Ms. Boswell: And that you did, right? Tell me how you set up this whole second redistricting effort. How was it organized?

Sen. Greive: In the first place, I had a very close friend who was very independent—a guy named John McCutcheon. He was chairman of the committee that dealt with redistricting, I think. But essentially I was in charge of redistricting. But when there's somebody like that, you don't just take over his functions. You let him function as publicly as much as you can.

My ally from Eastern Washington, John Cooney, was the chairman the first time around in 1957, and McCutcheon was the chair in 1961. Cooney was very interested in redistricting. He was very fearful of it. And you had to have somebody that would get along with you and do what you wanted. It had to be somebody that you could sit down and reason with because even though it looks like, in a situation like this, that you're making all the decisions, in reality you're making decisions after you talked and sounded out how your friends felt. How many votes you had, and all of the considerations you had to take in any move you made. You didn't just function independently.

Ms. Boswell: So, you operated your office, and then said what you were thinking to these people?

Sen. Greive: I set up a staff of people, and we set out to know more than anybody else did about the districts—how many people were in them, where they were, and so forth. You'd go through exercises—you'd clip a little here and you'd put a little there—and all that has a ripple effect in other parts of the state. We began to make redistricting bills out of it, to construct them and talk about it, and see how many votes we could get. We'd have people overseeing what they wanted to do. It was an intensive, one-on-one situation. They talked to me—everybody in the Legislature talked to me or my staff at one time or another—because you just couldn't do it without them. I was always convinced—I'm not sure that I was right in that—but that if they wanted to stay in office and, if you had something reasonable and took care of the people sitting in those seats, that you could do it. How, I don't know.

What happens is that you get all kinds of by-play; people used these as vehicles for other things and that becomes a part of the whole story.

Let's be clear: there's no great political profit as far as the people outside the capitol are concerned in working on redistricting. You don't get any stars in back of your name in West Seattle or in Ballard or Cheney or Vancouver because you're on redistricting. It's an in-house sort of function.

Ms. Boswell: If so much of your time and attention was devoted to redistricting, did it take away from the issues that would have been more popular with the voters?

Sen. Greive: As a practical matter, I've always figured I worked twice as hard as anyone else, so I didn't have to worry about that. You get up in the morning and you go to sleep at night, and in between, you work.

Ms. Boswell: So, you didn't think that redistricting really took away from that? It was just an addition to your other duties?

Sen. Greive: I didn't think of it in those terms. When you've been there for quite awhile—as far as the floor leader part of the thing—an awful lot of that is somebody else's ideas that are being pushed. What you're doing is scheduling and controlling the flow as much as you can. What you're doing is trying to rub off the rough edges, and on the big issues, you're trying to work out coalitions and things like that. But the issues aren't all new. It isn't something you haven't heard of before. They're issues that you're familiar with because you've been living with them.

From one session of the Legislature to the next, there are issues that look an awful lot like the ones that came before. You have budget problems, maybe in a little different place, and you have social problems—usually the same social problems of abortion, or free choice, or whatever it is, still left over from the last session. So it isn't something new that's going to hit you out of the blue. If it is, you have to get in a study—if it's workman's compensation or unemployment compensation. You have the advantage there that the other people on the floor don't know as much as you do. So if you've got a particular problem like that, then you have to sit down and learn about that one.

Ms. Boswell: There was a group of dissident Democrats at that time who switched sides. Can you tell me about that and the whole fight over the Speakership?*

The House Democrats caucused two weeks after the November election. John O'Brien was renominated as Speaker, but two dissident Democrats, William S. Day (Spokane) and Robert A. Perry (Seattle), insisted that they would never vote for O'Brien. Their announcement was an outgrowth of a series of conflicts between O'Brien and the dissidents, each generating irreconcilable hostilities, many purely personal. O'Brien's opponents tried to deny him renomination as Speaker in 1961 and, after a protracted battle, had failed by only a single vote. This time [1963] the Democratic margin in the House was so tenuous—two members—that the dissidents could deadlock the election of Speaker simply by withholding their votes.

The Republicans, relegated to the minority position, were keenly interested in the conflict. Ever since the 1961 session, when they had teamed with the dissidents, particularly on behalf of private power legislation, the "new breed" had closely followed the split and had met occasionally with Perry. In November Perry, Slade Gorton, and the "new breed" chief strategist, Joel Pritchard (Seattle) agreed to secretly bring together the dissidents and the Republican House leaders.

The group met at Gorton's home in early December. The dissidents claimed support from six Democrats and sympathy from a dozen others. All agreed that O'Brien should not be Speaker. The only viable alternative seemed to be election of one of their own. The Republicans were tempted to

continued on next page

continued from previous page

put Evans in the Speaker's chair, but feared the "old guard" representatives would not support such a potentially unstable arrangement. The consensus settled on Day. He was gregarious, well-respected, and might generate support from many who would vote for O'Brien.

For their part in the coalition, the Republicans requested full control of the House redistricting machinery, plus "some" committee chairmanships and half the membership of the powerful House Rules Committee. The dissidents, in turn, were promised control of the Legislative Council—Washington's interim legislative committee—and assured continuing support from all forty-eight Republicans.

McCurdy: 17-19

Sen. Greive: First of all, part of the reason they called me an independent is that I retained a good relationship with those fellows. I figured that we had to have all the Democrats or we wouldn't get anywhere. It was painful to me when they split off, but I didn't have any choice over it.

John O'Brien was one of the toughest and most capable people that Olympia has ever known. He was something else again, and he liked to run things with an iron hand. He was never very fond of me because I was way too independent for him. He kind of felt that the Senate should be a part of his domain, which we never were willing to accept. But, nevertheless, he was an awfully capable and bright man, and usually right.

Let's put it this way, only O'Brien ever got elected Speaker three times. As Speaker you have a temporary coalition of people, but it's awfully hard to keep that together from one year to another. It's easier in the Senate to keep a group of folks together because they run every four years. You only have half of them.

Number two: we had a crack political operation with which we helped our candidates a lot more than they did. We controlled their advertising and helped them get elected. Nothing like that existed in the House at that time. And so it was just one of those things, almost inevitable, that you won't serve as Speaker for so many times because there are other ambitious people.

Ms. Boswell: Who was part of this dissident group that formed after the '61 session?

Sen. Greive: The private power interests organized this particular dissident group, I think, more than anything else. As I look down at them, Day was a private power man, McCormick was a private power man, Mrs. Hurley was private power, Bob Perry was private power, Kink up in Bellingham was voting with the private power. So, they were all pretty much private power people.

In those days, Washington Water Power was by far the most powerful lobby in Olympia. They were more generous with campaign contributions, and they had better lobbyists. It comes and it goes, but this was their finest hour as far as influence. Public power was pretty much on O'Brien's side. I think that there was some ambition involved there with Evans, too. The two got very competitive, and so forth.

But in any event, Bob Perry eventually went to the penitentiary for income tax evasion, but he was another very, very capable man who knew what he wanted. He was in labor, in the electrician's union, when I knew

him initially. He got in the Legislature, and he got on Washington Water Power's payroll, and he got to be their spokesman. Now I know all that because it came out in the subsequent trial, and they were pretty much supporting him. But he also had a lot of organizing ability. He figured they'd be the pendulum, and he wouldn't have to vote for O'Brien. Now he and O'Brien apparently had a personality conflict, but I was never a party to that, and I don't know why.

Ms. Boswell: What about Bill Day?

Sen. Greive: Bill Day was the most affable of them. I think what happened as I understand it—now you understand I was never a part of their deliberations or anything—but as I understand Bill Day: he was a chiropractor, he was a big moose of a man, but he was a pretty affable guy, pleasant guy to get along with.

The Republicans could have tried to use the coalition to take control, but they didn't figure they could hold them all together, and they didn't want to be responsible for everything the coalition would do anyway, so they made a deal. They decided that one member of the coalition should be Speaker, and Day was happy to do it. He liked the idea of the publicity and liked the idea of being a big man, which he was in more ways than one.

Ms. Boswell: Wasn't redistricting part of this bargain, too?

Sen. Greive: Until I read Howard McCurdy's book, I didn't know that. I had no idea that it was. I knew they wanted power. The book, or whatever you want to call it—the thesis—pretty much says that that was it. I presume that McCurdy was next to Gorton, and since he was in their camp he knows a lot more about it than I do. McCurdy said that the Republicans had reserved the right of redistricting. That was their bailiwick, and they got that out of it.

Ms. Boswell: So that wasn't something that was common knowledge to you at the time?

Sen. Greive: I always thought I could persuade Day and his members, and the fact is I made many, many efforts to talk to them. That's part of the reason why I had some problems back in my own caucus, because I was too friendly with them. I felt that they were the key, but I had no idea that they had a bound deal in which all redistricting matters were owned by the Republicans. The fact is, I can hardly believe it now, but apparently that's what the deal was made around.

Ms. Boswell: Were you surprised when the vote came to oust O'Brien in the 1963 session?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. In fact, I was over in the House chamber listening. I couldn't believe it. I just knew somehow O'Brien was going to put that together, and I thought even after that vote he'd put it together overnight. You see, he ran his shop with an iron hand. I knew that; hell, everybody knew that. What he'd done to them or what insults had taken place or what kind of fights they had over public or private power, I just didn't know about. While I was originally on the public power side pretty much, eventually I switched, although I never did it with any gusto. I never made speeches. I was just another vote. And that wasn't my issue, although I knew Jerry Buckley very well. He was the highest paid lobbyist for his employer—for Washington Water Power. He was later fingered by Perry and went to jail for corruption. He did contribute to my campaigns and to the campaigns of some of the people I had as surrogates, or I should say, as members of my team of legislators. He was always around, and of course I was a Catholic and he was a

Catholic, so it was a nice fit.

Ms. Boswell: But in terms of the coalition, you just didn't expect that O'Brien was going to get it?

Sen. Greive: I just figured he had seven or eight votes to gain, and I thought that was way too many.

Ms. Boswell: I'm not sure I know what you mean by that.

Sen. Greive: He was seven or eight votes short. There wasn't a one-vote difference—there was enough difference so that he had to have several votes. I would have to look to see what the match-up was, but there were enough votes left over to oust him. They held it together when O'Brien had only one majority, or maybe it was Hodde that did that. It's a hard thing to lead your party. But it's easier for the people from Eastern Washington if they're against somebody in Western Washington, especially if it's Seattle.

Ms. Boswell: Once this had all happened, how did that affect the dynamics of the whole redistricting fight?

Sen. Greive: In the first place, I didn't know until I read McCurdy's thesis, which was years after. I hadn't really read it through until maybe ten years after, maybe even longer than that. Maybe it was just for this interview, the first time I really read it. So I didn't know what the deal was. I just thought that those people were up for grabs if they could be persuaded—if they got the right kind of a district, the right kind of a break. I thought they were Democrats and would stay Democrats, and I thought that even after they went over to the Republicans. If they wanted to be Republicans they would have changed their party; they didn't.

Ms. Boswell: The redistricting plan that was worked out by the Republicans, how did their philosophy differ from yours?

Sen. Greive: I would say, "What redistricting plan?" In the beginning they had no plan. Gorton had some plan drawn, and incidentally, it was drawn at Republican headquarters. In the first session they were gone. I think that was Republican headquarters. The next one they drew in a committee room up there in the Legislative Building. Everything was secret and nobody had access to it. Somebody would tell you what was going on, and if you got it from a couple of sources, you could assume it was true. That's the way you would have to do it. But their plan from the general reaction, it wouldn't do it.

When we got down to drawing a plan, which was sometime after session started, there was still no philosophy. The philosophy came to light when they had to justify it. When they started presenting plans to the press they had to justify it by saying things like, "We want something where the Legislature truly reflects the vote." They added all the votes for the House up on one side and all of them on the other side, in total, not by district. My recollection is that the Democrats still had the control, but it was quite different than the number of faces in the Legislature. They would say, "Theoretically then, we should have control of the Legislature," which should be different.

It's a bunch of hogwash. That's the firm excuse that they were using or anybody would use. All of us from time to time tried to put a good face on something, just like any advertising people do. After all you, don't sell the steak, you sell the sizzle, and all that sort of thing. Books have been written about that. You put a "spin" on it—that's the latest thing—they call it a "spin" now.

Ms. Boswell: What kind of "spin" did you

put on your plan?

Sen. Greive: All I said was—and it was really no spin—that, "If you're going to get elected, you've got to do this thing. You've got to look at the people in the seats and give them what they want." We needed enough of them to get it through. You can't get it through any other way—it's not going to go through by itself. Any other way is defeat.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy goes on about your having the interest of the legislators in mind. That Gorton had the interests of the court decision—one man, one vote—and that was what always motivated him.*

The two redistricting bills were even more opposing than the two strategies, simply because of the disparate manners in which the two men approached the redistricting task.

Greive's overriding interest in drawing his redistricting bill was the legislators who would vote for it. He was an expert in the interests in the districts of most legislators. To him redistricting was a job of piecing those interests together while insuring his supporters in and outside of the Senate the most favorable treatment. He was no umpire, but a powerful arbiter.

Gorton, on the other hand, insisted (at least initially) that the primary objective of his bill was achievement of the "one man, one vote" requirement. Greive agreed to this only to the extent necessary to satisfy the court…Gorton's second objective, the crux of the battle between the two, was to change the overall political complexion of the districts. A majority of people, Gorton argued, should be able to elect a majority of the legislators….

McCurdy: 22-23

Sen. Greive: If you could talk to Gorton, he's a straightforward sort of a guy. I may not be enthusiastically friendly with him, but he's a straightforward sort of guy, and you might get an answer. I wonder if he'd say that now. But as a practical matter, it was just salesmanship. The philosophy was a mask; he wanted control for more and more Republicans, and he felt redistricting was the way to do it.

Ms. Boswell: That makes sense. Your unique interpretation of one man, one vote, and particularly the lumping together of the Senate and the House, has often been talked about. Can you explain that a little?

Sen. Greive: It depends. When Gorton would come up with his so-called philosophy, then of course we had to have an answer. And the first thing we did is, we added up all of the votes for the senators. Then we said, "We'll take these." Well, then we came out way ahead because we had thirty-some senators elected as opposed to seventeen Republicans, or something of that nature. So it was obvious that we had to have an awful lot more votes there. Well, they wouldn't accept that. That wasn't a true picture. And then the thought was that you could add the two of them together, we'd still come out ahead. They didn't like that, either. I think we're dwelling way too much on that which was nothing more than an advertising ploy. There was no deep, philosophical thing.

I mentioned abortion a while back. Well, abortion has real principles, real feelings, and evokes real passion. People understand that issue, and they divide on it. But nobody ever divides on redistricting except the legislators and other people affected, and they don't want the other side to have control. It's like every man and woman must look out for themselves.

Ms. Boswell: Aside from trying to help individuals, who were already seated, were there any other interest groups that you had to cater to? Were there elements of rural versus urban, for instance, in terms of the way it was done?

Sen. Greive: We didn't have to do that; it was already done. We didn't change that a bit. All we tried to do was give everybody a better seat or improve their position if we could, and sell them on the idea. The ones we couldn't sell on the idea—they had to go along, so that was good. We didn't go to any of that fanciness.

After all, the legislators know very little about redistricting as a whole. It's way too complex for them, and there're too many changes, too many nuances, but they know their own districts. If you tell them, well, do you want White Center to be a part of your district if you're a Democrat? You're damn right they want it; they vote Democratic there. Do you want Bellevue to be part of a district on the East Side? If you're a Republican, you damn well do, too, because you want Republican to be consistent. Or do you want Mercer Island? Do you want Mercer Island because Mercer Island's going to give you the votes? They knew all that because they are worried about it. They had to run, they had to campaign, and they had to worry about issues that affected them. So they've got their ideas already drawn.

So when you sit down and talk to them, if you're really well versed and you understand them, you can show them pictures, drawings of what went where. You'd show them polls or you'd show them mostly voting patterns. We would know what Evans got there, Rosellini got there, etc. Why, then they understand. But it had to be something they wanted. The way you do that, you have to talk to them.

Ms. Boswell: Did you follow pretty much the same procedure as you had earlier in terms of how you did this redistricting?

Sen. Greive: To the extent that we had to please the people who were sitting in the seats, yes. But by now we were much more sophisticated. We'd made some improvement—quite a little improvement—in the districts, from the first time. The first time was quite a step forward, considering it came out of the blue and we were forced to do it, but we had less to go on. However, we didn't have the motivation. Everybody before, they drew all new plans, and two or three people would be in the same district and so forth. We were very careful to try to keep everybody in his or her own district. Somehow, someway, we'd draw a district that kept them taken care of.

Ms. Boswell: How did you go about figuring that out?

Sen. Greive: You don't have to figure it out. You have some knowledge from the statistics. You see how their elections went. We always knew what the vote was for either the Senate or House members in that district because we went further and researched the county commissioners or whatever. Then we'd make a package up.

But first of all, we'd try to design a district which they'd say, "Well, that looks okay." Very often they'd say, "That's okay, but what's it do?" Then we'd have to go and do some

research for them. So we started off by drawing like you would anything else. If you go to sketch a ship, you start off by sketching the ship more or less the way you want it to look. Then you begin to get down to the nitty-gritty. You don't start and say, "I'll draw the keel, but I don't know what's going to happen next." You know where you're going.

So we tried to have maps that gave us an idea of where we were going and take it from there, because we knew, number one, we had to keep the legislators happy. Number two: we knew that they had to be compact because the court required that. Number three: we knew that people weren't about to vote themselves out of office. And that was our principal thing.

We were not really attempting to change the political atmosphere because we were satisfied with the way it was. The Republicans say, "Yeah, they owned the thing before they started, and they just didn't want to give up ownership." Maybe there's some truth in that. I suppose that's a different way of putting it. My way of putting it would be simply that if you're going to redistrict, you've got to take care of the people sitting in the seats.

Ms. Boswell: You mentioned that Dean Foster was your major assistant at this time. How did you two divide up some of the work that was involved in this effort?

Sen. Greive: He did it all. All I did was talk to people and things like that, and have numerous conferences and tell them what I wanted. He wasn't just somebody that sat out there and didn't know what was going on. He was a crackerjack. He could tell you what we did in those districts, and not only that—that's another thing I did—we let him talk to the Republicans as well as the Democrats. Anybody who came along and wanted to talk about their district, we talked to them about it.

Ms. Boswell: So you tried to make it a non-partisan effort, then?

Sen. Greive: I didn't even think of it as a partisan effort. I knew the wrong way was to be secret, so we left it open. Everything was open. They'd come look at the maps. They could do anything they wanted.

Now when we got down to drawing a plan, until we got it together, we didn't want somebody interfering. But we'd very often stop in the middle of the plan and want to talk to John Cooney, or to the chairman, or we'd want to talk to John McCutcheon or somebody else who was going to have a problem with something. We were very conscious of what they wanted. And there were always some people who would slip around and whisper to you, "If you do this I'll go with you." There was a little backbiting involved there, too.

Ms. Boswell: Now, you mentioned to me that McCurdy, who was Gorton's assistant, also frequented the office, right?

Sen. Greive: Oh yes. He was over there all the time. I'd go to lunch with him or go to dinner with him, dinner usually. We'd talk to him. He tried not to give us too much information. Obviously, he had his secrets. For instance, I didn't know some things until I read his book. Our instructions were not to pump him or anything, but just to be friendly. That's the way the ball game works, that's the way Olympia works. You become friends first, and once you've established a rapport and trust, why then you can get things done. You can't do it by forcing a person to do it. In other words, you just don't buy it with any kind of action or money or anything like that. First of all, you have to have a working relationship.

Ms. Boswell: You said that Dean Foster did a lot of the legwork, the statistical work?

Sen. Greive: He had a staff. He had a couple people working for him, but yes.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me a little more about him and how he got involved.

Sen. Greive: He was up in Bellingham at that time, as I recall, and he was a friend of Hayes—Hayes Elder. At this particular time Dean was just a college kid. He was with me several sessions. He worked in the bill room and so forth, and got acquainted with all of the people with an interest in politics. They had their own little world, and Hayes became a leader in that, and his buddy and right-hand man was Foster. It's been so long, I don't really remember.

Ms. Boswell: Dean Foster has told some humorous stories about you coming to pick him up in Bellingham and sending an escort to get him when you needed him to work. He was still a college student right, during much of it?

Sen. Greive: As I understand it, he was. I don't think he was going to school while we were in the session, but I'm not sure. The other thing about Foster is that he had a tremendous capacity for work, as did Hayes. In other words, he understood what was important. He understood the question of timing and everything else.

Ms. Boswell: Do you remember sending some state patrolman to get him? Tell me about that.

Sen. Greive: In those days we had control of the state patrol's very existence and anything that we wanted that dealt with the Legislature, they were "ours." They were most accommodating as long as it was something in an official capacity. If the majority leader in the Senate, or the chairman of redistricting or whomever, had something he had to have, they would accommodate you. They did that for a lot of other things. I wasn't the only one who did it. But I did send the state patrol up to get him and take him down there to Olympia if I needed him. Of course I'd phoned them first and cleared it with them.

Ms. Boswell: Probably in the middle of the night, too, right?

Sen. Greive: Well, timing becomes awfully important. You can say, "Well, it doesn't make any difference," like anything else, but if that happened to you the one time when you could have done something, it's awful important to have that information.

We had a reputation that if somebody wanted to know what happened to a district or what was taking place here, there, or anywhere, we would have the immediate figures for them. We'd always tell them anything we knew. When you brought them down to make your final plan, of course, then you had to put twenty or thirty people in there, but we never were very secretive about it.

The maps were always rolled up, and they could roll them out and look at them. Somebody would say, "What's happening?" And we'd say, "We're working on a general plan now, but I think it's going to be pretty much like that one. Why don't you roll that out?" They'd roll it out and look, and they'd come back and say, "I don't understand this or that or what happens," and we'd go and look it up. Or he'd come talk to me about what we intended to do to him.

Ms. Boswell: I understand that you initially drew up a constitutional amendment. Is that correct?

Sen. Greive: I didn't necessarily believe in a constitutional amendment. I'm from Seattle and from King County where the big

population is, and, of course, it was not something that would be a part of my constituents' thinking. On the other hand, if you're going to deal with people, you've got to understand their motivation. The rural legislators and the Grange, with whom I had an alliance at that time, their argument was "Let's get rid of the Washington Constitution. Why do we have one House by territory and one House by population? If it's good enough for the United States, why isn't it good enough for us?" Pretty good argument. And the fact is a number of the states did have that sort of an arrangement until *Baker v. Carr*. That was the big thing they did; it wasn't just the one man, one vote. They struck down this idea of two houses so that they were represented by the same people. What we probably should have had was a unicameral legislature like they have in Nebraska. They only have one House. They have all the same problems we do from what my reading tells me, but they just have one House.

Especially in the farm areas, the people felt that there was something sacred about the soil, something sacred about the way people made their livings and went about their business. They believed that their politics should be protected and that they had rights to some protection. Obviously, that's what they wanted. They constituted a big enough block that if I was going to do any business, I had to give some concessions, and that's one of the concessions I made. Except every plan I drew, they were pretty mad at me because I always made restrictions on it or made problems, and they weren't satisfied with it.

However, if you got right down to it, and I could have gotten what I wanted, I might conceivably have satisfied them. But the thing that made sure I wouldn't have done that is that I had to satisfy the senators. You see, I had the senators; I didn't have the House members. What are you going to do—tell a senator that from now on you're going to be out of business or that we are going to let a district, which for a matter of expediency was drawn just like the states were, that we're going to enshrine that forever? So we had a lot of problems, political science-type problems.

Ms. Boswell: Donald Moos had a separate plan, right?

Sen. Greive: He had a plan that was pretty much like the U.S. Constitution, by counties or something. That plan had been proposed in the early days when we were discussing the problem, but the state had turned it down. In the constitutional convention they tried to get that through. Each county would have so much. The reason it was turned down is a reason that's obvious to everybody who looks at the thing. There was a time when Whitman County had five legislators, or five senators I think, because it was big in those days. Well, now it's nothing. Now they don't have enough for one.

You see Whitman County, and Walla Walla, had the penitentiary. Nowadays they don't want penitentiaries in their counties, but they sure did then. The other county had Colfax as its headquarters, but it was dominated by Pullman, which had Washington State University. And so you could see where the power was. The power was in those two places, or they wouldn't have gotten those big institutions. You notice they didn't put a public university in Spokane, but I'm sure that Spokane would have liked to have one. They put them off on the side, and that's because they had a bigger share of the population. This was a very tiny state population-wise at one time.

Ms. Boswell: What would you have done if support had grown for the Moos plan?

Senator Greive: What I would or wouldn't

have done I don't know, but we did make some effort to take the gloss off it because that's what Don Moos was really determined to get, and Moos was a pretty reasonable guy. He wasn't worried about getting re-elected, I don't think. He'd always been re-elected by huge margins and his desire was to go to Congress. He thought he was going to become very popular with the rural areas with this constitutional amendment. It still would have had to have a two-thirds vote in both houses, and it would have had to pass the people. I don't think that would have ever happened, no matter what we did, but I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: What was the strategy to get your bill passed?

Sen. Greive: The strategy was as I said before, pure and simple, to satisfy enough people sitting in the seats that they'd vote for it. Get the votes.

Ms. Boswell: Once you could do that, that's all you really needed?

Sen. Greive: We wanted them to be compact. I'll can tell you one thing, any plan Gorton or I drew—I wouldn't say any plan, there's some exception to that—but generally our system was infinitely prettier than what we have now, or what was ever done by any commission. Today they do things that we wouldn't think of doing. We tried to go by rivers, and we tried to go by municipal boundaries, or county boundaries, and we tried to keep the lines straight. So we all tried to make them look pretty and neat and compact. If you had to put the thing together, you'd give a little on that, but you always started out with the idea that it would look straight.

Ms. Boswell: Did you feel pretty good about the plan as it evolved? Did you think it was going to pass?

Sen. Greive: It was a process, not a plan. There were so many plans. There just wasn't one plan—there were probably twenty plans before we were done.

It's pretty self-evident. Especially the rural ones are pretty easy. You've only got so much—you've got a lot of land and you have areas that have been together. They are traditionally Republican, but a few of them are traditionally Democratic.

It gets more hairy when you get closer into the cities. Then you've got many choices to go one direction or another. The cities and the suburbs, I should say now, because the suburbs are bigger than the cities.

Ms. Boswell: Were there, in particular, any that were difficult to deal with in terms of the process?

Sen. Greive: All were difficult in their own right. You dealt with people, not with districts. You may think you're doing districts, but you're not. And anytime we'd do a plan, we pretty much had a sign-off from the members of the district. What it did to them was something they had to take somebody else's word for. So when O'Brien or somebody would say that this does the Democrats in, why they'd get all excited, or if someone else said it would do the Republicans in, they'd get all excited. But that's only because they know about their district, but they're not sure of the other districts.

Ms. Boswell: I guess I'm still a little confused as to how the process worked. Once you had developed a plan, then what happened?

Sen. Greive: We don't just develop a plan. We develop a whole lot of plans and things that you can do. First of all, you can sketch in certain areas that come pretty close to the norm with very little change, and they can be left alone. Then there's some obvious choices that

look like they would make good sense, and that's about the only way to go. Then after that, you begin to talk to each individual, and see what he or she would accept. You find it out first if you've gotten them something they will accept.

First of all, you have to talk to the legislators, and from there you take the next step. If they don't like it, then you've got to try to make them like it—find something they'll want and they think will be good for their interests.

Ms. Boswell: And so you do that by just having sessions and meetings with them?

Sen. Greive: They're nearly all private meetings. They'd come into my office. I'd see them on the House floor, or see them almost anyplace you could think of—out at night dancing. I'd be out at a dance. There was a lot of socializing, and I'd go over and see them sitting there and say, "Let's talk about the redistricting issue." And we'd draw on the back of a napkin if I had seen them in a restaurant. There's no such thing as regular borders. Some of them you'd call up and ask them to come see you. Usually I'd send Hayes Elder or Dean Foster to see if he could negotiate them over. If they were Republicans, at first they'd be very tentative and afraid to be seen over here. After a while, however, word got around that it was no disgrace— you could go over and look, so they'd come over and look. You don't have to work very hard to get people to come over and look at their districts, or what happened to them. They're pretty interested.

The Republicans, I'm sure, had some splits between the old, the young, and the new. Also, between the rural and urban. But the Democrats had more splits than that. The Democratic Party by its nature is a collection of dissidents—especially at that time. You see, the state had been Republican for years, and then Roosevelt came in and he had all kinds of different regional allowances. You had religion that got to be a part of it. How liberal were they, or were they intellectual? That got to be a part of it. You had to know what their interests were.

For instance, geographically, Everett and Snohomish County always voted differently than King County. Not always, but they were a unit that had to be dealt with. The votes in Tacoma had to be dealt with because Tacoma pictured itself as a rival to Seattle. And the Legislature—O'Brien was from Seattle, Rosellini was from Seattle, I was from Seattle, so we sort of had a feeling of togetherness.

Spokane got into the public and private power fight. It was the private power bastion, and so the senators from there were loyal to the private power company. Washington Water Power spent a lot of money on campaign contributions and lobbying for all of us, but they especially had the Spokane people in their pocket.

Then there was a sort of Central Washington coalition of Hallauer, Washington, Hanna, and McCormack. They were public power and, by nature, were opposed to the private power people, so they hung together.

And of course, you got into other problems of the conservatives and liberals because in some instances, people by nature are more conservative. In other words, I wasn't a very liberal type. We had these many, many factions within the Democratic side, and we had to somehow get them all to vote. I couldn't press buttons and get them to go. Sometimes they'd go with me, and sometimes they wouldn't. I had a majority of ten, six, ten, fifteen, maybe, that I could count on, but that was the extent of my majority. Then I had to always watch myself as to what we did.

Then, in addition to those factions, we had the friendships. For instance, there were John Petrich and Fred Dore, who incidentally both

became judges—Petrich was a federal judge and Dore later became a Supreme Court justice, chief justice. Petrich didn't like his district. Dore wanted to be with him because he was such a good friend of his, and he didn't want to see him get eliminated. The same thing happened with other legislators. They'd come to you and they'd say, "You've got to make a change." And I'd say, "That's not your district." "I know, but it's my buddy's district, and I want him back. He says he can't get elected." So then you have to go to work and try to please them.

In addition to pleasing all those factions, you had to make some sort of a deal with the Republicans. From our point of view, they had divisions on their side. They didn't like Woodall, and they didn't like Raugust, because Woodall had been the majority leader before, and Raugust was an old-line guy, and maybe they had some other things against him. But the thing I had to deal with is that they wanted to gain. They were determined. The opposition said that it was a one-man, one-vote issue, but this wasn't about one man, one vote. I thought that was a lot of hogwash. They didn't really believe that themselves. Nevertheless, they kept saying that to the press all the time.

I kept wanting to know what they really wanted. If I knew what they wanted—if they told me they had to have three senators or five senators, then we'd have to face the problem in the caucus and decide whether it was worth it or not. How are you going to deal with somebody who won't tell you what they want? They knew what I wanted. I wanted a redistricting bill that pleased the majority, and I was willing to deal with anybody. In fact, you didn't have to be a Democrat or a Republican. Obviously, I had some friends that I wanted to protect. I had to be on their side.

Ms. Boswell: But you were saying that, essentially, to get anywhere, you had to protect almost everybody?

Sen. Greive: Look, one of the functions of the majority leader is being a business agent. He—or she—is a business agent for the people he or she represents. Because the members want a lot of things, they don't want to talk too loudly. They want trips, they want appointments to interim committees—they want prestige for this and prestige for that. They want to be on a particular bill that's got an interest for their particular district, or they may just want to be on some bill that the governor's going to put through anyway that makes them look good. They want a lot of things, and you have to try to give them what they want. They come to the majority leader and talk it over. They also want to get re-elected, and we had a crack re-election team.

The Republicans complained that they were gaining numbers of votes overall, and therefore they needed a lot of representation. Well, they weren't gaining in the Senate, but they were gaining in the House. That's because we ran the Senate elections. We had a coordinated effort. We didn't like to talk about it, and I'd jump ten miles if somebody said, "the Greive Machine." I'd get real nervous—I've said this to you before—but that doesn't mean that we weren't electing them. We were picking them, targeting them, polling them, and doing a lot of things that they are doing now. And we were doing it centrally, and I made sure that it got done.

We had all of this factionalism to deal with, so, obviously, we wanted to know what the Republicans wanted. They wouldn't tell me what they wanted; they'd just say, "I want another senator." I'm not saying we would have turned it down. If we thought it would do the trick, we would probably have taken it up in caucus and had it out. I didn't want to do that and neither did they—nobody wanted to do that. That isn't a job you want to do.

That's like doing surgery in a crowded room. If you set it up—and then sometimes you might be able to make a deal where it weakened somebody's district—it would hurt you. You can only do that once or twice because people get angry, and they get pretty excited when you fool around with their district borders.

Ms. Boswell: What was the purpose behind the Republicans' refusal to essentially name their price? Was that a strategy?

Sen. Greive: They were afraid for one thing, I'm sure. But I think it was strategy. They knew it had to be a process, too. If they had told us that they had to have five senators, why then the whole thing would be out of whack. It would have been on the front page of the paper and everything else. So I don't blame them for not answering, but that doesn't mean that it wasn't a legitimate inquiry. It's probably one I wouldn't have wanted to answer, either. I expected to gain and not have four more Republicans. If I'd said that, they'd get in a dither. They went around piously looking to Heaven, telling themselves how wonderful they were, and beating their breasts. Practically, they just wanted to gain. And at one point in our negotiations, Evans told me that. He said, "I'll settle for this if you'll give me two more senators," or one more senator or whatever it was.

Ms. Boswell: But that was later on?

Sen. Greive: That was during the last negotiations, yes.

Ms. Boswell: Early on in the process, another issue—and we've talked about this before briefly—was this constitutional amendment that Donald Moos had introduced. I'd like to clarify that step.

Sen. Greive: The constitutional amendment was the dream of Moos. Actually, the Washington State Grange wanted it. They thought that every county should have representation. Every county should have a senator—there were thirty-nine counties—and then we should apportion the House. Their argument, of course, was that it was the way the United States Senate was set up. How would we feel if we didn't have a senator from the state of Washington? In other words, if we had two senators, but they had to represent Idaho, Washington and Oregon, we'd have our nose pretty much out of joint because that's what we're used to. Is that right? Well, who knows what's right. We now would think it's all wrong because we've lived with this two party system and a bicameral legislature at the national level for all these two hundred years, and we think it's pretty dear. It's a wonderful system, and it seems to work out. Well, I'm not so sure I'd feel the same way if I came from Los Angeles or New York City. We're furnishing all the population, and we only get two senators, too. But nevertheless, that was what the Grange wanted.

Well, Moos came along and he wanted to be a congressman. He had his heart set on it. We used to call him, mostly behind his back, Congressman Moos. Sometimes, though, we'd call him that and he'd smile. He was an awfully nice guy, incidentally. He has a wonderful personality, and he was just determined that he was going to go to Congress. And, I might add, somehow he was going to get the constitutional amendment, which took two-thirds of both Houses to get passed. Let them vote on whether or not they wanted this representation by district. Well, you know from King County we weren't going to support that. I'm not saying we wouldn't vote for it—we certainly would vote for it; in fact, I did vote for one version. But we weren't going to let him do it—accomplish it—whatever we said, unless we got something

for it. We thought maybe that was enough incentive, that we could have a shot. He still would have to get the people of the state to vote for it. So we'd give them a shot at that amendment if they would come along with us on some of the things we wanted. That's from my point of view.

He seemed to think he could do it by personality and persuasion alone because he thought his argument was so wonderful. Well, he had an argument, but I don't know how wonderful it was.

I don't think the Republicans, in the final analysis, were going to be too enthusiastic about that amendment either, just because Moos was popular with them. But if they came from King County, that would be a very hard vote. But, in any event, he needed two-thirds to even get it to the ballot. He had to do it with other people, put it on the ballot by the Legislature, and have it enacted by the people to amend the constitution.

Ms. Boswell: Right. Now, what was his relationship to Gorton and his redistricting plan?

Sen. Greive: Well, I have a feeling he helped Gorton get to where he was, and still helps Gorton now. He was bright and affable. Gorton is not very affable. He's not a bad guy. I don't mean he's got a bad personality, but he wasn't a real salesman type. He's an intellectual, and I think even he could be proud of that. Moos—he shakes your hand, he dances with your wife, and lets the senator do whatever—is just a real salesman type.

Moos had the idea that he would create his two-tier system. Well, you couldn't very well create a system where you have the smallest county—which at that time I think was Ferry with 1,200 or 1,300 people—that could have an elected senator just like a senator from King County, which was many, many times that number. So he had to come up with something else, and I can't remember exactly what, and McCurdy's book doesn't tell me enough to know. It's like so much of what McCurdy has in his book—if you show me something, it all comes back again. But I have to have my memory refreshed to remember exactly what it was Moos proposed, but he had a system.

Well, the trouble was that his plan appealed to some of my people, and I thought it would appeal to Wilbur Hallauer and Mike McCormack. I thought, "Well, we can't very well afford to be against the thing," plus Big Al Rosellini and I were having a fight. The time before it was the Grange. They were the backbone—the field workers who helped us when we had the redistricting under the League of Women Voters—and we wanted to stay in with them anyway because they were quite powerful and friendly. So, for a variety of reasons, we felt that we had to draw one that we thought was a little more acceptable.

Ms. Boswell: When you say draw one, you mean a constitutional amendment?

Sen. Greive: Well, we were requested to study the senators' districts. The House districts—the constitutional amendment didn't spell it out in detail—but essentially you've got the senatorial districts and house districts along with a lot of things. So, how were we going to set the senatorial districts up? I felt that we had to put in more and give King, Pierce, and probably Snohomish something more. After all, they really hadn't blossomed in population at that point, but I had to give them a lot more. It is hard to say how many now. So I wanted to set more of them the way the population went, so if it did pass we'd have a workable system. In looking back, I wanted to see that it was going to go, but that doesn't mean that I was right. But Moos just wanted something to pass, even though his plan was pretty far out of reality. It wasn't going to pass the way

he wanted it, anyway. So I came up with a different version.

Ms. Boswell: So you had your version, and then there were other versions?

Sen. Greive: My version was the most representative. We drew it. I don't know that we introduced it, or who actually introduced it, but it had similar language. Finally, Moos got to thinking it over. He had convinced some of the Republicans of what he wanted, and it needed the two-thirds and so forth. So I remember we put an amendment on in committee that they didn't recognize until they had it on the floor, and it said that if the redistricting bill didn't pass, then the constitutional amendment was null and void. In other words, we had no intention of passing it. So whether that legally would have held that way—the courts might have decided for it—but that's the way we did it. They didn't like that.

Ms. Boswell: So your strategy was to tie the amendment to the redistricting?

Sen. Greive: My strategy was just to get it through. In other words, we weren't very choosy what we tied to it. We thought we had to make a sacrifice, and it was the ultimate sacrifice. Everybody had a personal interest in how the thing was done. We looked at everything—what would help, why we tried to do it, and if we could—because especially in a thing like redistricting, the process of amendment was very hard for those of us who came from a big county.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of introducing the two redistricting bills, Gorton had come up with one, and you had come up with one?

Sen. Greive: Gorton didn't really come up with one. He didn't have as good staff as we did. We had ours first, and we had many versions of it. We'd done hours and hours of work. Gorton didn't want his to be seen by anybody. He didn't want people to work on it, and so he moved slower. He didn't want anybody to see what anybody else got. So he was, actually, as I recall, just a figurehead. Most of it was done in the Republican headquarters out in Tumwater. They had a nice place out there close to the Tyee Hotel; in fact, it was in the same parking lot. And we knew that they were working there and they took people in—you'd hear about guided tours for Republicans. They had to go over a couple at a time. But they didn't have everybody wandering in and out, and they certainly weren't going to let any Democrats see it. So it took them longer to put theirs together.

I think it's because we had better staff and started it first, but I might be wrong on that. Maybe the reason was because they had to move more cautiously than we did. We had a bill. We always had a bill up to a certain point, but we were never foolish enough to think we had the final version. So we always said, "This is where we've got it for now. We'll have more changes. How do you like your district, and what do you think of that?" And then the next question was, "What would it do?" Our calculations were that if this was the final plan with the changes we'd made and so forth, then it would have given us so many votes in the last election. We didn't know what was going to happen in future elections, since elections change. But we could, certainly, just like Gorton, sketch out the solid ones.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of your strategy for introducing your bill, it's just a process of getting to the point where you felt confident you had enough votes to pass it?

Sen. Greive: Absolutely, that was the big thing. And we felt we had good votes in the Senate for some period of time that we didn't

have in the House. Eventually we got promises, but a lot of the people didn't keep their promises. We had Republicans over looking at it, and we'd show them the whole bill. In other words, we didn't just give them one district. My instructions to Foster—I'm sure that's what Foster did—was to sit right down and negotiate with them. I let him do the talking. We'd sit there, and I'd let him talk. I figured they were more likely to believe the staff than they are somebody with the power. "Come on over, have a look here. Have a cup of coffee, and we'll look at it," and they'd go over it.

I'd sit there while he'd explain the bill, and he'd explain the other portions he thought were important. They might not like what he had done with Eastern Washington. Well, Eastern Washington was all but taken care of. "Do you know about that?" "Oh yeah, we want to see that," they'd say. "Okay, well, here are your districts. Of course then, when we get to your district, that's going to affect the districts around it, so you might affect Southwest Washington." But then "That's okay, we're interested in that," they'd reply, so we'd discuss it.

We had Perry Woodall over, and we had W.C. Raugust over, and we had, I don't know who else we had over. I'm sure we had great numbers of Republicans at one time or another. But Foster usually talked to them.

Please don't say I wasn't there. Sometimes, if there were two or three people who came down, then I may be in one corner of the room. We had the downstairs conference room, and I had a little office off to the side of it, on the first floor. If there were two groups, or three groups, or something like that, then we'd split them up. Basically, most of them were handled by whoever my assistant was, whether it was Hayes Elder or Dean Foster or eventually Steven Cough. He was from West Seattle, a very nice young man.

Ms. Boswell: So, you would do all this legwork. Was there a point in time at which you said, "I'm ready to go"?*

During the week of March 25 the Senate Democratic caucus told Greive to pass his bill over to the House. Their sudden decision surprised most legislators, although Greive had known for some time that his caucus was growing impatient…The sentiment to bring out Greive's bill and "scalp" it onto Gorton's was tied in closely with the growing impatience over the whole redistricting issue….

The tensions of delay encouraged Greive's opponents to strike at his redistricting leadership. As early as mid-February Senators Hallauer and Mike McCormack (Dem., Richland) had begun to plan an amendment that would displace Greive's bill for the eastern Washington districts. They had first met with Gorton on February 25, hoping to win Republican support for their amendment. During March when some senators from southwest Washington had started to write a whole bill, one that would "scalp" Greive's as he was "scalping" Gorton's.

At first Gorton had enthusiastically received senators' requests, hoping that they could collapse Greive's bill and with it his whole network of fragile agreements and expectations. But by the end of March, when he was meeting almost daily with Hallauer and McCormack, Gorton had begun to doubt the untility of his strategy. They might defeat Greive temporarily, but

they could not exclude him from any negotiations. Nothing, he thought, could prevent Lieutenant Governor Cherberg from appointing Greive to any conference committee.

Gorton's compatriots in this strategy—Pritchard and freshman Representative Mary Ellen McCaffree, the LWV [League of Women Voters] leader—tried to encourage the two senators and assure Gorton that a victory would allow them to negotiate a bill with Greive's opponents. On Thursday, March 28, Gorton agreed to pursue the strategy, told his aide to draw up the bill for Hallauer and McCormack, and set out to secure the votes of all seventeen Republican senators.

McCurdy: 36-38

Sen. Greive: No, you're never ready to go. Apparently, I thought I knew it all, and I found from McCurdy's book there were several things I didn't know. There were negotiations apparently with Hallauer and McCormack and the Republicans, and I presume, Gorton. They never wanted me to have a bill. They didn't want a bill to come through, especially if we did it. If we were going to do it, they wanted to be in on it, which I understand because I'd have felt the same way. But Gorton didn't want a bill because he didn't think he had me to the point where he could force my group to give in. He had the amazing idea that somehow I could make them do it. If I went back with a bill in my hand while three or four people were screaming at me in the caucus, everybody would just be scared of it. A lot of times the votes would be against me, and it bothered me a lot.

It didn't bother me as much as it could, because I knew there was going to be a tomorrow. There was nobody else they could turn to. See, for the Democrats, who's going to do it? I had the figures, I knew it, and I didn't know how much work that Hallauer and McCormack did. I knew they put a bill out and we voted on it, but I didn't know how much studying they did. I don't think they did very much. At least they didn't do anything like we did. "We'll make a change in the Twentieth District," they would say, but you also had to know where the people were and why they were changing the district. I didn't know how strongly they felt. For instance, Mary Ellen McCaffree was going to be taken out by a change in the Thirty-second District. The Thirty-second District was out of proportion because I think they had a Republican senator by that time, and they had one House member who was a Democrat as I recall. So, you wanted a sure thing and basically—we got Pete Francis later and he beat Mary Ellen McCaffree in the election and she was out. She ran for senator.

Mary Ellen McCaffree was very important because she was the closest thing you could get to Gorton. She was his partner—his assistant—in this process. She did the work of the staff and a great deal of legwork. She was a member, but she also was similar to Dean Foster in his operation.

Ms. Boswell: But neither of you wanted to be the first to introduce your bill, right?

Sen. Greive: That was understandable. They didn't catch on at first, and I kept stalling. Finally it dawned on them why. I didn't even tell everybody why. We finally had to let them know because we got them restless. From the very beginning we realized that if we got it over there to the House, the other side would plaster an amendment on it and send it back

for a vote. Then you have to vote it up or down. And they had the same problem we did. Neither side wanted to send a bill over and let them plaster somebody else's amendment on it, and then begin voting on the amendment without going through the committee system—although the committee systems were pretty much of a sham.

Ms. Boswell: Why was that?

Sen. Greive: Well, both sides had a chairman of redistricting. One time it was John McCutcheon. This time it was Dewey Donohue. Cooney and McCutcheon were very close to me, but Donohue wasn't. Donohue had the smallest district—close to the smallest district, if not the smallest—and he didn't have a lot to lose. His district covered Pullman, Whitman County, Walla Walla, and the Tri-Cities area. He was a very capable and energized man. He flew over and met us in Yakima and had coffee, and we held the Senate's first campaign talk. He didn't turn out to be a good friend of mine. He turned out to be with another faction—the Martin Durkan faction—so he was pretty much against us, but we got along. We weren't enemies at all. But I didn't have too much influence except that he needed the protection from somebody from Seattle.

Ms. Boswell: So in the case of redistricting, it wasn't the committees that really made anything possible or difficult?

Sen. Greive: The committees made a difference. Whoever the person was that was in there—Cooney or McCutcheon—especially since they practically had their arms around each other. In other words, I didn't do anything without talking it over with them first. In effect, they were the second in command and I was the leader. Anything else they wanted went through the committee.

Why am I attending committee meetings? I didn't sit in on the committees, though. Only on redistricting. They understood. For one thing, they didn't want to spend the time.

Ms. Boswell: In this early part of this redistricting effort, the attorney general was John O'Connell and he got involved to a degree, too, didn't he?

Sen. Greive: I never got along with John O'Connell. Why, I don't know. I would have thought naturally I would, but John O'Connell was the kind of a guy that thought he was going to get ahead by stepping on somebody else. In other words, he was one of the "Respectable Democrats." He was always reaching for a place. He wasn't part of the machine, and he wasn't part of the Independents. He tried to set himself apart politically. He would be the Democrat that the Republicans thought was a coalition builder. The Municipal League people, the League of Women Voters, and groups like that would love him. We were too involved in politics. He wanted to be on their side. He also didn't care for Rosellini because he wanted to be governor. The fact is that he was against Rosellini in his bid to run again. O'Connell eventually got defeated. He also was the guy who took the million dollars away from Al Rosellini. It came out that a group had given O'Connell a million dollars for him to run as governor.

It didn't come out until after the campaign. The law apparently read that the attorney general could have a private practice of clients. But at the same time, the State of Washington was vigorously prosecuting anti-trust cases—anti-trust suits. O'Connell was trying everything he was eventually tried for. They didn't convict him, and I don't think they could because I don't think he'd actually broken the law; he'd apparently researched it. But if it had been known, it would have blown him.

After that he quit politics. So, he wasn't all that wonderful, either. People create a posture and that was his posture.

Ms. Boswell: Did he essentially let it be known that he thought that your plan didn't meet the criteria the court had set?

Sen. Greive: Right. I didn't like him, but I never thought I was going to have to deal with it, anyway. The court upheld the state. And the district court did and then they convened the Appellate court from the Thirteenth District, a three-judge district. And they upheld it and then they went to the Supreme Court, and they upheld it. So, as a practical matter, I didn't really, or honestly, expect that that was going to make it.

The press had all these stories. They had nothing to write about. We had the whole Legislature stalled by everything we did. You couldn't go anywhere; you couldn't meet with secret agents. But that's about like what Gorton kept saying— he was always so pious. He adopted the pious look and would look to Heaven to save one man, one vote, when he knew as a practical matter that he didn't even follow it himself.

Ms. Boswell: Did you ever sit down with Slade Gorton and try to negotiate at all?

Sen. Greive: A lot of times. It was almost impossible. When you read McCurdy's description, Gorton was negotiating with people who thought they could displace me, and he could negotiate with them. Except that for what they wanted, their prices were so high that he couldn't accept their plans either. He had the feeling that if he could get rid of me—I had the hold on the majority of the Democrats in the caucus—he could probably make a deal with somebody. But he wanted to gain, that's the long and short of it. He insisted that he had to gain. The reason that I wanted to know what some of the senators had wanted—what did we have, thirty-one to seventeen, something like that? We had so many more than they did that we weren't going to give them more House members, we were going to give them more senators. How could a senator be different than a House member elected in the same district? The only things you have are better candidates. Incidentally, that's what Gorton finally said on the last day.

Ms. Boswell: There is a passage from McCurdy's book, where Slade Gorton says that Senator Greive has been devoted to a solution to this problem for three years. " I never noticed that he was anxious to do in his own party…It's hard to see how a district that 'Saves our Senators' doesn't save our House members at the same time."*

This afternoon we have reached the end of a long road that began nearly two years earlier…In the sense that we were forced to deal with one another and have some weird and wonderful shapes and have spent more days than many legislatures, this solution may possibly have better results for the people of the state than would a solution dictated by one party…Senator Greive has been devoted to a solution on this problem. I never noticed that he was anxious to do in his own party. I hope I never have to deal with anyone who is tougher in working for his own party. It is pretty difficult to see how a district that "Saves our Senators" doesn't save our House members at the same time…As poor an arena as a legislature is in which to redistrict, we can say, that we have done so. You can feel triumphant in one respect. You have done the job. The legislature has done the job.

McCurdy: 99-100

Sen. Greive: That's the first time he's ever said that.

Ms. Boswell: Ultimately, though, in the first part of this fight, didn't he decide to introduce his bill first?

Sen. Greive: Yes, he had to. You see, we had better control. He had the dissidents, at this point, and he had to please them. He had the Republicans he had to please, and he had some problems, too. We figured that they couldn't hold out long. We were talking to them all the time, and we thought they had to give in. He essentially had no choice. He just about had to put a bill over. But he had the dissidents' written word or pledge that they would vote for it. So he probably had the votes, and then he got pretty scared because we almost got the votes.

Ms. Boswell: So his notion was that he introduces the bill first, and then if it gets amended, his people won't vote for it. Is that right?

Sen. Greive: That's right. Because you've got to vote it up or down. You can't put amendments on it. And if you don't agree, then it goes to a conference committee. And it did go to a conference committee, and I was on the conference committee, as was Gorton. But in the conference committee, there was no good faith at all. They wouldn't show up. Gorton was never there, somebody else wasn't there, or somebody just wandered in—one of the senators or House members—and wanted to look at districts when we were trying to conduct a meeting. We had an almost impossible situation because they really did not want to negotiate anything. I thought maybe we could negotiate it. I kept trying, and tried harder than anyone else, but I couldn't even keep the Republican committee members there. Gallagher was on the committee, and he was in an impossible situation because he wouldn't agree to anything.

Ms. Boswell: But now, one thing that McCurdy says, and I'm anxious to hear your opinion on this, is that the difference in your perspective and Gorton's, was that Gorton believed that the court would ultimately redistrict, and you did not.*

Greive announced that the court would never redistrict the state but would threaten to make all legislators run together on an at-large ballot, thus frightening them into staying in Olympia until they produced a satisfactory redistricting bill. Still adamant in his position that the court would redistrict, Gorton impugned Greive's sources of information and insisted that the Republicans would eventually get a better bill from the court.

McCurdy: 31

Sen. Greive: I don't know if he believed they'd do it or not. He was pretty nervous about it, especially at the very end. He was afraid the court would do it. But he always thought there was a possibility of that, I'm sure.

Ms. Boswell: What did he think would happen? If the court redistricted, then he thought that it would be more to his advantage?

Sen. Greive: He may have thought that later, but at that particular time I don't think we gave him any cause to think that it would be an advantage. Except that his attitude then might

have been: "If you can't do it my way, we'll just put their feet to the fire. If they want it bad enough, they'll give in."

Ms. Boswell: Who are "they?"

Sen. Greive: Me or the Democrats in the Senate. You see, he always had secret negotiations going, and I didn't know about the involvement of the Central Washington guys. There were more than that. They later included Mardesich and Gissberg from Everett, and several other people as well. He must have had seven, eight, or ten. Since I wasn't a part of it, I didn't know. I'll just take whatever McCurdy says at face value because I don't know how many he had. But I can imagine who the people were that were with him.

Ms. Boswell: So, the Legislature, if I recall, went into special session and you had insisted that the constitutional amendment be tied to the redistricting, right?

Sen. Greive: Yeah.

Ms. Boswell: How did you get that inserted?

Sen. Greive: Well, all I did was, I took the bill that came over from the House, and put it into committee. We didn't change anything much in the redistricting bill. I don't think I pushed their bill. I think we put their bill in committee, and then I brought out my own bill. And my bill was just about like their bill, except I put a provision into the bill that said that if they put the constitutional amendment on the ballot, that our redistricting bill had to pass—so that it was part of a package deal. I'm sure that I couldn't amend the bill that came from the House. Theoretically, you can't amend a bill that comes over. If a bill comes over for the first time, then I could put the amendment on. That's probably what I did. The bill came over, and I put the amendment on.

Ms. Boswell: Now, at that point, I believe, Senator Donohue from Columbia County was the head of the Senate Redistricting Committee. He held hearings on the redistricting plans?

Sen. Greive: Senator Donohue was from the smallest district, I think, population-wise, in the state. And he was very strong for some sort of a senatorial area representation, like we have for United States senators. And so it was to his advantage to have a little fun with it, and get some publicity back home, and make statements that the farm areas would like. So that's why he held the hearing. It looked like we were doing something as well.

Ms. Boswell: We talked earlier about redistricting being primarily an insider or in-house issue. What interest would the public have in it?

Sen. Greive: You see, your senator was trying to preserve your right to have a senator from your area. It was to protect the farm areas and the home, and that's pretty good. Geographically, it also made your position pretty important. It would be covered by the Spokane papers and by your local papers—Walla Walla.

Ms. Boswell: Did the hearings, though, have any bearing on what would happen, or what could happen?

Sen. Greive: Basically, whatever we wanted, he went along with because he couldn't do it by himself, anyway. Furthermore, he was always too vulnerable to be going too far astray.

Ms. Boswell: Now, ultimately, you had to

negotiate, didn't you, with Moos over the constitutional amendment?

Sen. Greive: Well, we were always willing to do it, but we could never come to terms because I kept tying it to the bill. I said, "One has to go with the other." If I gave that advantage away, we could never negotiate with them again. I figured if they wanted it bad enough, they might split and go with us.

See, Moos needed two-thirds. If you need two-thirds, you've got to be good to everybody. If a bill only needed a majority, a lot can happen, but if you needed two-thirds you have a problem for a constitutional amendment.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy indicates that William S. Day was constantly trying to push for some kind of negotiations and some kind of compromise. Is that your remembrance?*

Representative Day, anxious to build his image as a Speaker who could "get things done," had been pressuring Gorton for nearly a month to begin negotiations with Greive. When he heard of the chance meeting [between Greive and Gorton] on the House floor, he pressured the reluctant Gorton again. The result was two very short and inconclusive meetings between Day, Greive, Gorton, and Pritchard on February 21 and 22…Speaker Day, who was not a part of the "new breed" strategy to weaken Greive, again pressed for informal talks. At first Gorton simply stalled. Later, rather than directly confront Day with a strategy probably unacceptable to him, Gorton agreed to new talks.

The two redistricting leaders, plus Pritchard, Moos, and Perry, met Tuesday evening, March 12. The meeting instantly collapsed.

McCurdy: 28, 31.

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. I thought I was double-crossed by Day a couple of times because I thought I had him tied up, and I tied up the dissidents, and then they turned and went against me. But I negotiated with Day a number of times. He was the Speaker, and I tried my best to involve him. I figured if the dissidents were with us, we had it made and we could do something. Somebody had to bridge the difference anyway. The bitterness between O'Brien and his followers and the dissidents was enormous. I was probably the only person around that could talk to both of them. I had carefully tried to cultivate both of them. The fact is, to this day, I'm still friendly with the ones that are still around.

Ms. Boswell: Did that become your strategy? Instead of trying to get Republicans, it was to get the dissidents?

Sen. Greive: Oh, no. I was open to any kind of a deal from anybody. We talked to Republicans all the time. People like Paul Barden were often over talking to me. We'd talked to Horace Bozarth, and we talked to anybody who would talk to us. We'd pursue them, or they'd come over and talk to us. Mostly, they came over to talk to us. But we were open—we didn't just limit it to one particular group. If I could put some sort of deal together, I didn't care who I was working with—if we could get something through that we could agree on. We'd make half districts.

We'd do most anything that we thought would get the votes.

Ms. Boswell: What about Lieutenant Governor Cherberg's role?

Sen. Greive: John Cherberg was a very fair man. When I first knew him I thought he was kind of a lightweight, but over the years I concluded that he was a lot more knowledgeable than I was. I was never a big favorite of his, but he understood what I was trying to do. He was very loyal to me. He insisted that I be a part of the process because he felt if he didn't, that the thing would blow apart—that nobody else could hold it together.

Ms. Boswell: What role could he play in all this?

Sen. Greive: More of an ideological role than anything else. If they appointed a committee, why, he got to appoint the conference committee, so he had first shot at it. At one point he did tell them that he thought they should remove Gorton from the committee simply because Gorton fought everything. I'd frequently go in and brief him. I never left him out of the loop. In other words, my days were always filled with all kinds of conferences with everybody, for everything.

Ms. Boswell: He suggested Gorton be removed. What about you? Did he suggest you be removed, too?

Sen. Greive: I was in a little different position. At that point we didn't know what Gorton had. You see, Evans was the leader of the House Republicans, and Gorton didn't have any official position. I don't think he was even chairman of the Redistricting Committee. I don't think it was even an official position. Mostly, he was Evans' alter ego. But he kept blocking everything, constantly blocking everything, and it dawned on all of us, including Cherberg, that he just wasn't going to let us have a redistricting bill unless it was what he wanted. See, Evans always kind of took the high road. He never took the brunt of anything. I now think that he had Gorton out front, just to take the brunt—somebody had to, so he had Gorton out front.

Ms. Boswell: Well, in the long run it didn't harm Gorton, I guess.

Sen. Greive: No, he did very well. They all did. Pritchard got to be a congressman, and then Lieutenant Governor.

Ms. Boswell: What role did Joel Pritchard play in all this?

Sen. Greive: Well, Gorton, Pritchard, and Evans were like the Three Musketeers. I don't know, they were together on almost everything. I think they discussed strategies, and Pritchard was a very affable guy, and very much unlike Gorton. He got along well with everybody—a big smile on his face, and "What can I do for you?" But I don't know what he had to do on this particular thing. I know he was a part of it.

Ms. Boswell: I think McCurdy mentioned certain meetings where you and Gorton were negotiating where Pritchard appeared to have been there, too.

Sen. Greive: Probably. I never cared if they had two or three people there. That didn't bother me. As a practical matter, when it got down to this, somebody had to do the drawing of the lines. I knew that in order to get what they wanted, that they had to go through me. I was unaware of all that McCormack was doing, and he may have gotten a lot of information from us, and maybe even some

maps because we weren't against doing that.

Ms. Boswell: Finally, did you have to compromise with Moos?

Sen. Greive: No. I said that if we pinned the two together, I would make it work. Where we had people sitting in the seats, they had to run in the next election. They had to be elected in the next four years, and I could do a lot. But all I was talking about was putting it on the ballot. The people still had to decide it. If the people voted for a system of representation based on land for senators and population for representatives, why, that was all right with me.

Ms. Boswell: Now they had initially included in redistricting—I think it was in the constitutional amendment—this notion of automatically redistricting. What did that mean?

Sen. Greive: Well, that's all right. That's what they've got now, but they haven't drawn very good districts. The districts aren't very compact, but since we're not doing it, nobody publicizes it or makes an issue out of it. However, the idea that we'd have a commission of some sort to do redistricting is pretty common. All over the United States the commissions are having just as much trouble with it as the Senate. They get locked up, too. Individuals don't get on the commission until they promise they won't vote for something, and then they have a tough time getting what they want. Whoever the majority party is just does it. It's a little easier to do if you get a commission because you appoint five guys, and they're all pledged pretty much together. At least that's the theory.

Ms. Boswell: It's amazingly complicated. Once this compromise essentially came along, then what happened?

Sen. Greive: There were many compromises, and they all failed for one reason or another. They adjourned the Legislature after the last one failed, and we couldn't come to any conclusion. Essentially, they failed because Gorton or Evans wanted more senators. I believe it was Evans, but it might have been the combination. Anyway, that's what they wanted.

Ms. Boswell: Now McCurdy suggests that Governor Rosellini got involved at the end in order to put a stop to all these machinations.*

Many feared that the high court would uphold the district court, throwing the case back to the state just before elections and thus forcing state officials to chose between a sudden, disorganized at-large election or a frantic special session during the election campaign. The Governor should call a special session immediately, some urged. Rosellini balked at this request, insisting that the court would never suddenly disrupt the state election machinery. He added that the legislators were too far from agreement; a special session would be lengthy, costly, and wasteful; and the Supreme Court might be preparing new redistricting guidelines, standards that would make all existing proposals unconstitutional.

McCurdy: 61

Sen. Greive: Rosellini, by that time, was having a tough time. He was at low ebb politically, and for some reason—I think it was

because the *Seattle Times* had taken him apart on some stuff—he really didn't want legislative business to tie him down. In other words, if we had gone into special session, he would be presiding over the Legislature and the redistricting all the way to the election. He just did not want that to happen. He wanted us out of there; he wanted to go campaign and talk about something else. He wanted to stall until after his election. Of course, he thought he'd be re-elected in 1964. It turned out he wasn't.

Ms. Boswell: And then you lost Hallauer and McCormack, too. Is that right?

Sen. Greive: I hadn't known I had them. What I think is that McCormack was hungrily trying to create some sort of a position of importance for himself in the press, in his district, and so forth. He wanted to be some sort of a leader because he wanted to run for Congress, which he did. He served, I think, six years or eight years and that was his big dream. Now looking back on it, that's what I think he was trying to do. At least that's the way I viewed it at the time. He tried to make a deal.

Hallauer had a different deal. Hallauer had the problem with his district and what number went on the district. It really isn't very complicated. In each district, every other number has a four-year term, although originally it was two-year terms. Half the senators are up every other time. If you have a number and someone else had a number, and he was going to run and serve for two years more, then you would have to run against the incumbent. If they used Hallauer's number, then it would have been up the next election, and he could run. David McMillan wouldn't want to run due to his two-year holdover in his territory. That problem happened in Everett with August Mardesich and with Bill Gissberg, and some people like that. This is a very essential thing, and very important to both of them. I could understand it—they both had a legitimate interest.

Ms. Boswell: Can you explain to me, again, the district numbering system?

Sen. Greive: There was one district left after redistricting from District One and Two. One went away when you combined the two of them. If McMillan's number was left from the Second District, he could serve for two more years. If it was Hallauer's number, District One, the election would be immediately. But McMillan still had two years left on his district, so he would have had to abandon two years if he wanted to run. He had to be in a different district because that number then would have gone somewhere else. So he couldn't do both. It was very important to both of them, very important.

Ms. Boswell: What happened when you got into cases like that? How did you make the decision?

Sen. Greive: I had to make the decision on the basis of who'd been my friend for years and supporter, and naturally I supported McMillan. Everybody expected me to, and I did. I didn't detect any bitterness from anybody else. Hallauer said he understood. I'm sure he thought it was a crummy idea, but he didn't say he didn't like it.

What happened was, Hallauer went to the Republicans and he had the pleasure of seventeen votes—which was all they had to go—for his number to be on the district, which is what he wanted. But then they got into a fight over the Thirty-first District when we tied the amendment in, and the Republicans insisted on changes, and we said, "All right, but we have to get such and such." This fight happened on the floor, incidentally, during the vote. I lost on the vote. They won, and got enough votes from Hallauer and the other

people who were part of the deal. That's how they got the votes. What I did is, I moved for some changes in the Thirty-first District, which strengthened us. They wouldn't go for that, and Hallauer was on the spot because he had pledged his support to the Democratic senator in the Thirty-first District. At that point Hallauer needed the Democrats as well as the Republicans to put his number on the new district. He couldn't very well run out on us on a crucial vote like that. Not a thing he could do about it. So the Republicans voted against him. McMillan got his district number.

Ms. Boswell: Were you ready? Did all this happen during one day?

Sen. Greive: We were many, many days. You probably wouldn't need to have a thing like this on the floor for two or three days.

See, McMillan had sixteen or seventeen votes, anyway—maybe more than that. It was an even fight, or else the Republicans split evenly. I think that is why Hallauer was going to lose. He needed the seventeen votes to go with what he had. But you see the reason the Republicans were willing to do something for him is that they had hopes that he would become the floor leader, and he'd take over. However, I don't think that he would have taken over redistricting and then knocked me out as floor leader. But, who knows, I'm not that good a judge. He may have had conversations with others and so forth.

I think Gorton and I became an obsession for each other, and we were looking at everything that the other did, and all that sort of thing. We both probably went too far. As a practical matter, as I look back on it, I think that Evans, Pritchard, and Gorton were so tied together that they would have never made a deal no matter what happened.

Ms. Boswell: As this session ends and the redistricting didn't go as you had hoped, McCurdy suggests that you felt you'd been double-crossed.*

The House convened early Sunday evening [March 31], and with it a great crowd of senators, spectators, press, and state officials. To most, the outcome was fairly certain. Each thought his own side would win...O'Brien moved to approve Greive's amendments, and, as the more positive motion, this was considered first. Calling the bill fair and equitable, O'Brien implied that any move to set up a conference committee would send the issue to the court.

Then dissident Perry rose. The bill was not reasonable, he said; the issue could be resolved by Greive and Gorton in a conference committee.

Democrats wondered if Perry spoke for all dissidents. He did…Gorton moved that the House send the bill back to the Senate for reconsideration. Another regular Democrat broke, and the House approved Gorton's motion 60-37.

Greive left after the first vote. Later that night in the Speaker's office he assailed Day for supposedly breaking his word. As he left he shouted, "I don't mind telling you, I've been double-crossed. Some of the people I've been dealing with haven't kept their word." He claimed he was through with redistricting.

McCurdy: 43-44

Sen. Greive: I had pledges from the dissidents, and I had pledges from several

Republicans. I had more than the number of pledges to have the votes I needed from the House by two or three. They evaporated when the caucuses bore down on them. I held the Democrats, but I couldn't get the Republicans and I couldn't get the dissidents. See, there were more Democrats than Republicans, so the dissidents were like a third party.

There had been many years when the Republicans and Democrats had a coalition. There was a different coalition than this one, and the Senate was always run by a coalition or by the loyal Democrats. I was with Rosellini, who was a loyal Democrat. We didn't have control. When I got to be floor leader, the thing I made sure of was that we didn't have dissidents. That's how I became so close to the Spokane people because that's where the dissidents came from. I did everything I could to make sure that we kept them in the Democratic Party and we didn't split.

There were some other factors in here that McCurdy doesn't deal with. I had a few close ties of my own in the Senate and in the House. I had a few people who were particular friends of mine who played a part in this. I was a very, very close friend of Mark Litchman's. I was also a very close friend of Wayne Angevine when I was in the Senate. He was my right-hand man, and he'd been in the Senate before he got back in the House. In both cases I helped to finance their campaigns, and a lot of other things. So I had a few votes of my own that were pretty loyal to me. But we didn't try to surface anybody's vote or put them on the spot until we needed them.

One of the reasons I always wanted to help the Thirty-first District, incidentally, was that Angevine was going to run for senator from that district. That's why we did the Thirty-first and the Thirty-second districts the way we did.

Ms. Boswell: Once your bill fails on the House floor, then something had to happen. There had to be a compromise, right?

Sen. Greive: Well, the conference was appointed. I was on that committee and Gorton was on it, and Marshall Neill was on it. I forget who the others were. But, essentially, Gorton and I tried to negotiate something, but I never could get him to agree to anything. I don't know if they thought they had a deal or they could make a deal on the side with Hallauer. I don't know. I was never a part of any of that. But I have no reason to doubt it happened. I'm surprised McCurdy knew all of these things. They may have told him because he always pretended to us as though they wouldn't let him in on things.

Ms. Boswell: Tell me about your caucus at this point. How did they feel about what was going on?

Sen. Greive: Well, they didn't speak of one mind. Cooney once made the observation, "When you hear these people jump around in here and shouting and talking, you wonder how they had enough sense to get here in the first place." So, everything was fluid. You spent your time putting your finger in the dike wherever you could, and I had to depend on people like Cooney or McCutcheon, or whomever my close friends were, to come through and protect me. You have to protect them, and they protect you.

Ms. Boswell: During those behind-the-scenes caucuses, then, how did your fellow Democrats feel about what happened?

Sen. Greive: We'd have periods of elation when we thought we were going to get something passed. We'd also make all kinds of strategic moves. On several occasions, we did things just because we wanted to scare the Republicans. I'm trying to think of one time,

but I can't remember the incident now. We put out a vote and we voted down redistricting—it came up and we just voted it down.

That was nothing but a ploy. We knew what would happen. We wanted to make them think that they weren't going to have any redistricting, and we were going to go home. As it worked out, we didn't have any redistricting, and we went home. But at the time we thought that would crack them. We thought that when they got right down to the fact that they might not have a district to run in, why we'd get enough votes to do something.

Ms. Boswell: Wouldn't Gorton also think that you had possibly lost your support?

Sen. Greive: Yes, that could very well be. We just felt this way: If we weren't going to get the votes, we'd put them against the wall. Not just Gorton, but we'd put the whole caucus on notice, and they'd have to decide if they were going to accept it or not. That was the strategic move we made. It may have looked like I'd lost my support, which was a little embarrassing, but it was a practical matter. We thought that tactic might get them to vote for it. By now, I think they realized Michael Gallagher was a turncoat, and they realized that I was easier to deal with than some of the others. That was another thing that kept running through the debate. I never had the feeling that they believed—Gorton might have thought it—that I didn't want to get a plan. I wanted a plan bad enough that they didn't figure that I was pulling any shenanigans. If I could get a plan, I'd get it. Or if they took the hard-nose—Gallagher's hard-nose—they figured there'd never be a plan.

You see, Gallagher had been the county chairman for the Democratic Party in King County for eight years or something like that, and his big focus was on King County. He thought that all of King County should be Democratic, and that sort of thing. He didn't want to give an inch. He always thought he could make a better deal if he was tough. We put him on the Redistricting Conference Committee because he *was* tough. He turned out to be a lot tougher than I thought. So it was stuff I couldn't do anything about. He had Ed Logan, his very close buddy who was the election officer for King County, come down. They had a plan, which I understand later was incorporated into Hallauer's plan. Gallagher wasn't able to carry the day, however. Everybody recognized that he was kind of the extreme. He was against everything.

Ms. Boswell: What was the alternative? Could you use as a bargaining argument, at least, that if they didn't go for something then the court would take over?

Sen. Greive: Well, we argued that. They say when you go to war, that the troops rush in under fire and all that sort of thing, and it reaches a point where people are no longer afraid because somehow they think they won't be hit. "It's going to happen to you, but nothing's going to happen to me." I think that was sort of the numb feeling that they had. They didn't know what was going to happen, but up to now they'd survived. They were willing to take a chance. In other words, they always thought there was going to be a tomorrow until the very end.

Ms. Boswell: That's interesting. I read, though, that you had suggested that one alternative would be that the court would make everybody run at large.

Sen. Greive: The three-judge panel's chairman was Judge William Beeks—I think that was his name—and he suggested that plan as an alternative. We thought it was crazy,

but, nevertheless, we did a lot of talking about it. When all you want to talk about is redistricting—the newspapers talked about it, everybody talked about it. So I seized on that as an alternative that they wouldn't like. One person, for instance, Senator Nat Washington, thought it was a pretty good idea. He said, "With the name Washington? I think I would come out pretty well." If you had enough publicity, you might come out very well, but some of the guys in these seats weren't going to have a chance. They were going to be running against football players or musicians, or anybody who had notoriety.

Ms. Boswell: Once there was this stalemate, then Cherberg could name the conferees to try to break the stalemate? Is that correct?

Sen. Greive: Automatically—if we pass a bill in the Senate and it goes to the House, and they put an amendment on it, it comes back to us. If we don't accept it, you've got to have a conference committee. You may have a chance to move to reconsider some things. For instance, at one point you may have noticed, both Perry Woodall and I changed our votes. Anyway, he changed his vote and I changed my vote—that's what the floor leader does. You change your vote if it's necessary. They let you change your vote, and then you move to reconsider.

Ms. Boswell: I see. Now, who were the Senate conferees? We talked about Gallagher and you, but Marshall Neill was also a conferee?

Sen. Greive: Marshall Neill was a very even-tempered, even-handed guy, and he eventually became a federal judge. He was very close to Perry Woodall. He was just there. He's a nice guy and all that. One time, I talked to him—I was giving him a hell of a time—I said, "We've got a deal and you won't do it because of Evans." He says, "Bob, you don't understand how it is. When the governor is from your own party, you're not going to buck that." And then he said, "Oh, I forgot who I'm talking to." He said, "Maybe I'm wrong. You do understand how it is." We all laughed.

Ms. Boswell: When the conference committee was set, you had the Senate ones and then the House ones?

Sen. Greive: You have to have a majority and a minority, and so one minority and two majority votes.

Ms. Boswell: Right. And then the House committee would be the same thing?

Sen. Greive: The same thing. Then the six of you get together and you're supposed to decide. It could have more members than that, but that's what the rule called for. The Lieutenant Governor appoints, and the Senate confirms. Usually the Lieutenant Governor knows enough to appoint the right guys, or else he has them in, talks the thing over, and sees what they'll do.

Ms. Boswell: Gorton presented to those conferees some kind of a stop-gap plan?

Sen. Greive: Yes. He was going to propose something like that. The four smallest districts—he was going to combine those—and divide the four largest. He had something worked out, but I can't remember in detail what it did. I'm sure he was presenting a plan and had thought it out and I had another idea, but that's all I can tell you at this point. If I had some maps to go with this, I could tell you more. I can't remember what I did.

Ms. Boswell: But you had come up with your own new proposal by this time?

Sen. Greive: I think we had a new proposal

almost every day. What happened was, if we got wind of somebody willing to vote with us—where we could pick up a vote—or if a change would do it, then we'd go and try to make the change. But you just don't make one change. Every change depends on every other change.

The worst part would be that you thought you had everybody satisfied, and then at the very last minute Fred Dore would come along and say, "You've got to do something for Petrich." It never occurred to me that he was going to be a factor. And then if you tried to make a change there, you had to do something more. Nothing was set. If you were firm and said you wouldn't do it, then you'd have an enemy. So you'd try to do what you could under the circumstances. And very often you'd have to talk to some Republicans and see how the change would go with them, and you had to test everything out all the time. If I took a town that you'd carried away from you and put it in somebody else's district, then he might be mad or you might be mad, or both of you.

Ms. Boswell: Essentially, though, you and the conferees did come up with at least some compromise, but then the rest of the Legislature voted it down, right?

Sen. Greive: I knew how to persuade them to take it, and it would probably be just as well with what we finally got. I can't remember what the changes were, but whether it was just as good or not, they were ready to go along with it because Gallagher kept saying he could do better.

Ms. Boswell: How does Moos end up in all this?

Senator Greive: Moos doesn't end up very well. Everyone knew from the beginning that he couldn't get his plan through. It was impossible. The Supreme Court said we couldn't have fixed boundaries.

He didn't run again. At the beginning he was sincere—he thought he had discovered the world. We told him we'd been discovering the world for some time. He was affable, though, and tried to be fair.

Ms. Boswell: So, ultimately though, all of the compromises or attempts at compromise failed?

Sen. Greive: The real problem with the compromises—you called them compromises—was that they weren't always compromises. If Gorton pronounced it was bad for Republicans, it was bad. If I pronounced it was bad for Democrats, it was bad. Nobody really looked into it to see what it was. I would know and Gorton would know, and time after time we were wrong. The trouble was that you were looking at thirty-nine districts, or fifty districts, and you don't know what the change might be. If he presents something to you, you've got to go over the whole thing and review it because you don't know where the changes have been made, and you don't know where to make the changes. So you have to count the votes, and frequently—very frequently—we'd find that they were hiding more than they said. And then you've got to get people to believe you, and that's hard because they figure you might lie just to help yourself, or to help your cause, I should say.

Ms. Boswell: So, the Legislative session ends, and we have nothing, right? We have no redistricting.

Sen. Greive: Except that we were going to get a special session. Some people would let it sit. Rosellini wasn't going to let it sit. However, he did let it sit until the next election. He was convinced the court would let him use

the districts.

Ms. Boswell: But didn't the courts intervene?

Sen. Greive: Yes, they did. At the time we thought maybe they'd do something, and, finally, with the help of O'Connell and his arguments, the courts decided to let it go one more time because we'd made progress. I didn't think they'd do that. I was kind of hoping they'd make us go back. I thought we were close enough that we'd probably do the trick—if we had come back then, we'd have done it.

Ms. Boswell: But the court did not?

Sen. Greive: No. They put it off, let everybody leave, and then had an election. Well, they were probably right. What I hoped for wasn't right. As a practical matter, somebody might get hurt, and we wouldn't have enough time to properly handle the situation. The court just felt it wasn't that necessary.

Ms. Boswell: Then that allowed the whole issue to be carried over until after the election?

Sen. Greive: Dean Foster was still with me—we had the next session to worry about, then.

At the close of the 1963 session, legislators adjourned after a 60-day regular session and a 23-day special session without passing a redistricting bill. The following month, in May of 1963, the U.S. District Court for Western Washington declared existing legislative districts null and void. In July of 1963, Secretary of State Vic Meyers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of the District Court's ruling. But it was not until February of 1964 that the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay of proceedings, thereby restoring existing districts; the stay was granted pending the state's appeal of* Thigpen v. Meyers*. On June 15, 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal in* Thigpen v. Meyers*, and thus upheld the original ruling of the District Court: Washington's legislative districts were once again null and void.

In October of 1964, the District Court ordered the Legislature to make redistricting their first order of business in the next session. The legislative members of the 1965 session could not pass any other legislation until they had secured a viable solution to Washington's redistricting problem.

CHAPTER 10

REDISTRICTING UNDER COURT ORDER: 1965

The 1965 legislative session opened in January under considerable duress. Not only was a newly elected Republican governor paired with a Democratically controlled Legislature, but the Legislature itself was under court order to solve the redistricting problem before passing any other legislation that session.

Ms. Boswell: Evans takes office as governor in 1965. What is your strategy then? He can veto any bill passed by the Democrats, right?

Senator Greive: A lot of what you see in Howard McCurdy's book we did not know. In other words, these are things that I picked up later. I don't know what their strategy was except that Evans was more a part of the Legislature than any governor we've ever had. He really was very, very close to the people who elected him. He'd had to beat Richard G. Christensen in the primary and beat the right wing, and then he was coasting through the final election. He was active. He knew something about redistricting. He knew where those people sat, and he'd been a part of the thing with Gorton and had it explained. He was much more knowledgeable. Rosellini wasn't that deep into it. He took my word for most of it, I think. Maybe somebody else's word, but he didn't monitor everything we were doing. He just figured I'd take care of the legislators.

Evans was deeply involved. That's why, eventually, I could negotiate with him because he was enough of his own man that even Gorton didn't call all the shots. Gorton and he disagreed finally, and then Gorton changed to go along. Or else Evans changed. Whatever, he knew what he was doing.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy suggests that, essentially, the plan that Gorton then began to work on once the session started was based on the earlier Hallauer plan.*

****Gorton and his aide moved into the expansive offices of the new Republican Secretary of State, "new breed" leader A. Ludlow Kramer, and began to prepare a Republican redistricting bill. They worked from the proposal drawn the previous summer with Senator Hallauer; it was essentially the same plan. Relying upon a preponderance of "swing" districts, the bill was designed so that a moderate increase in Republican votes would produce a landslide of new Republican legislators.***

McCurdy: 77

Sen. Greive: For one thing, they wanted a plan that satisfied different people in Eastern Washington. There were a few public power Republicans in that area. Washington Water Power was the great nemesis.

Every governor has had the glorious idea that he could be "King of the Hill" on redistricting. Rosellini had it. We didn't get along very well over that issue because I didn't

feel I was his floor leader—I was the floor leader of the Senate. Governors would get their name attached to something, and then it became their accomplishment. And I think there was nothing that Evans would have liked better than to have an Evans plan that swept through the Legislature to resolve that terrible redistricting problem. Now I don't think that's bad, and I'm not condemning him for it, but I think that was a prime motivation for him. Not only that, they can get a lot of publicity for anything the governor puts his seal on.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds as though you may have turned that around on him with the so-called test for fairness that Gorton proposed.

Sen. Greive: What do you mean?

Ms. Boswell: First of all, we talked about Gorton's idea, about what's fair redistricting.*

Gorton suggested that returns for statewide candidates provided a better test than votes for legislative candidates, which were hard to manage. Thus a candidate for a statewide office, such as the governor, who received 55 percent of the vote would receive at least 55 percent of the votes in half of the legislative districts. He would show majorities (50 percent or better) in about 57 of the 10 districts—the 50 districts where he received at least 55 percent and the seven districts where he received between 50 and 55 percent.

McCurdy: 77-78

Gorton insisted that any bill reflect standards of political fairness, and proposed a statistical test for this. The statistics were complex, but the standards were elementary—each political party should win that proportion of seats roughly corresponding to its share of the total vote for all legislative candidates.

(Footnote: For example, in a state with 100 single-member legislative districts, a party receiving 55 percent of the total vote for all legislative candidates would receive 55 seats. When a party received over 55 percent, their percentage of seats would increase geometrically, due to the nature of the single-member district scheme).

Sen. Greive: One of the bad things about politics is that rumors become true. The press and the media will adopt something, and suddenly that becomes so, just because they say it. Gorton had argued that this was a one-man, one-vote issue, and the Republicans had gotten more votes for the House than the Democrats had, and yet they didn't control. They only took control with the help of the coalition.

They were never willing to add in the Senate, though. If you added the senators, even though we gave them a third of the votes, there still would be more Democratic than Republican votes. But they never would go for that. However, they made big, big quotes and big speeches and so forth. Now, what I could have done was challenge them on that, but I felt that wasn't worth it. If I got into some ideological debate and I won, it would be that much harder to deal with. So we really didn't meet the challenge, which if I had to do over again, I would have done more adequately. But, I think most of all of us that

were on the inside—certainly maybe every legislator—recognized that it was just a makeshift argument. Every legislator knew it was a joke.

Later on, you'll find that Gorton, himself, came up with a plan that was gerrymandered. And then he came up with another plan for the governor that was out of this world, and that nobody paid any attention to. But that's details. It's a footnote. But I better be looking at it when I'm talking. McCurdy's statement is some sort of an idea that they would have single districts. It looks to me, from what he says here, that he meant that whatever percentage of the vote the governor got, that they would be single and the districts would be divided into two camps. The district wouldn't necessarily go to who got the most votes in every instance, but the governor would automatically have so many of those votes if he led, so that he would have control over the Legislature. It's something like the parliamentary system. In other words, if you have one hundred districts—and you may not have won a hundred districts—if the governor has seventy-four percent, then seventy-four of those would be for the governor, and then he'd leave the Senate alone. That's about as far from one-man, one-vote, as I can imagine. That's what it looks like to me, now.

Since I didn't draft this plan, I never took it seriously, never thought it was anything, and neither did the press. I'm not a leading authority on it, but the fact is, this is one thing that I learned in preparation for this interview. I got to reading this thing, which is something that I just skipped over before. The footnotes didn't mean anything. It may mean something different, but that's the way I interpret it.

Ms. Boswell: What I was talking about earlier, about the press, is that it appears that they did agree with you that this was a pretty strange idea.*

Greive immediately called a press conference and lambasted Gorton's bill as horribly unfair, saying that it would cost House Democrats alone 15 to 17 seats at the next election. This alerted newsmen, who were scheduled to hear Gorton explain the bill and the statistics on Tuesday. As a result, Gorton faced a hostile press the next morning and after that was never able to convince anyone but fellow Republicans of the utility of the test.

McCurdy: 79

Sen. Greive: I like to think that the press figured I'd told them the truth.

Ms. Boswell: But they jumped on this whole issue, too.

Sen. Greive: All through this argument it always amazed me, truthfully, that I did as well with the press as I did. I always figured I would be the whipping boy. I was scared to death about it, but I was treated, I thought, very fairly by the press. Of course, I had enemies and friends. But I wasn't really just trying to sweep the Democrats and give them things they weren't entitled to. I always told everybody, "You vote for the people in the seats." And I told that to the press, and I told that to the public, and I told it to the members. I think they disclaimed it. They didn't understand redistricting, anyway. Nobody could follow the twists and turns except my staff and myself, and Gorton and his staff and maybe Evans. The average legislator didn't know what was going on. They didn't have the whole picture.

Ms. Boswell: Talking about not understanding, can you explain to me this concept of swing districts? I don't understand that.

Sen. Greive: That's an entirely different story. That's a legitimate, very legitimate, position to take. I don't make fun of that. In other words, I made fun of this funny system Gorton had.

Democrats are better spread than Republicans—at least they were then. In other words, you had areas like West Seattle that were normally Democratic, but once in awhile might have voted for Evans rather than Rosellini, or something like that. But, they aren't all just Democratic. Republicans had a tendency to cluster around the view or cluster into the more wealthy neighborhoods. For instance, in the Seattle area Magnolia isn't all view, but there's something about living in Magnolia that gives you a step up, or Montlake and those places. Montlake has undergone a lot of changes now, but in those days, if you lived in Montlake or you lived in Sand Point, or you lived in Broadmoor, it was a status thing.

Well, it's harder to deal with those people because they aren't conveniently spread out, which means you've got to figure a Republican district. A legislator never wants to leave his district, but their idea was that they would have to design districts so they could get enough votes in those districts that they could control. Now, the Republicans hadn't controlled in the twenty years prior to this—almost since the 1930s—so it would be thirty years, almost. They'd had moments, like 1946, when I was first elected. But that was about all. And so their dream was that they would develop districts that were close, and if they had districts that were close, then they would bring out people of moderate character—like Evans and Gorton liked to think they were—and that they would get the support of the press and take the control in that way. So, they were trying to spread their majority all the time.

The Democrats would have the same problem. In this last redistricting when they set up Jim McDermott's district, they made it so Democratic that there was no way you were going to defeat him once he was nominated. Anybody who concentrates all of their support—I'm talking about congressional districts, now—can be successful.

Ms. Boswell: So, it was smart for Republicans to try to do something a bit different or to confuse the issue a bit?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes, that was good strategy. And it was a legitimate argument. I may not have liked it; in fact, I disliked it because it was so true. I thought it was a legitimate argument and one that serves their purposes, and a lot of districts could go either way. It's one of those things you talk about, but you really don't want. "In every district but mine. Make mine, dear God, be a little Democratic or Republican, but these other guys, they can run from awful districts."

Ms. Boswell: It sounded as though the Democrats then—I don't want to say they were split over all this—but you had this faction led by Representative Gary Grant who just didn't want to deal with your plan or you?

Sen. Greive: Grant wanted it to be his plan. He wanted to be the redistricting guru. He felt that he had a lot of—the deal with the coalition was fresh in their minds—control now. They wanted to refute it, if you can call it that. They wanted to make some changes for the better. I never took any one of his plans very seriously. He had one that I put through just because I figured that it was so radical that the public would never accept it. We let it go through. We used it as a bargaining chip,

but we knew Evans would veto it. There was no chance because, you see, I was always tending towards something that I thought had a little balance and some Republican support. If Hallauer or Grant were going to start off by drawing a plan, that's fine, but, eventually, they got to the point where if they were going to differ from me, then they'd have to make greater gains. We'd deal with the people in the seats, and they'd start talking philosophy: "We've got to beat more Republicans or more liberals—eliminate somebody," and that sort of thing.

Ms. Boswell: Did you just step back for a while and let him take over and see what he could do?

Sen. Greive: No. It's pretty easy to get publicity because the press never understood redistricting, but they liked the controversy. He was telling you he had a plan, and his plan was better…and so forth and so on. Grant got his name as the lead name in the story because he came up with a plan. He was chairman of Constitutions and Elections in the House, plus he could get a little push from O'Brien.

Ms. Boswell: A bill does pass in the House—S.B. 2.

Sen. Greive: It does pass.*

Now Grant and Schaefer had to convince the senators of their strategy. But one of the major reasons for their militancy meant nothing to the senators. Grant and Schaefer feared negotiations because they knew Greive and Gorton would dominate them and resist the intrusion of the new House leadership. Still, the Democratic senators were interested in the House strategy because, by approving S.B. 2, they could test Evans' intentions. Many suspected that he might never wield his veto. Without approving either the House strategy or Grant's and Schaefer's reasons for it, the Senate Democratic caucus agreed to approve the House changes to S.B. 2 and send the bill to the governor. Greive argued for conference negotiations, but the Democrats ignored this.

McCurdy: 81-82

Sen. Greive: We helped them pass it. I lined up as many votes as I could. My attitude was that I didn't care whose name was on it; we'd put it through. However, I never thought it was going to fly because we knew—by this time Dean Foster and I had looked at the thing and all of us on the inside knew—it was much more Democratic than the ones I had proposed. But we thought, "Let's get it out of the way." We expected it would be vetoed, and it was.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy suggests that you wanted it to go to a conference negotiation. I don't know how he knows that, but that's what I was going to ask you. How would he know that?

Sen. Greive: I don't remember all the details of what I wanted. Generally, I was against conferences. However, if you control both Houses, you don't vote against a conference. I may have wanted that because I wanted to involve the governor. I would think that would

be my motive if I did it. But I can't tell you at this sitting what my motive was, exactly. I was always a little jealous, as anybody would be. I did the work, and to see somebody come along and move in for the grand swoop and take the credit for it was difficult. On the other hand, I can honestly say that I don't think that I ever tried to block it, no matter how I felt. The real answer was that if we had to redistrict, we had to redistrict.

Ms. Boswell: There was something that McCurdy comments on—and I just wondered if you remembered any background on this—that the bill passed the Senate, and then it was held over for a long weekend. Seemingly, McCurdy's idea was that the Democrats held it over so that Evans would think about it and maybe change his mind and not veto it. Does that sound possible?*

Greive put S.B. 2 before the Senate on Friday, January 22. The senators quickly approved it on a party-line vote. But for reasons that at first mystified the Republicans, adjourned for the weekend and refused to send the bill to the governor. In fact, the Democrats hoped that Evans would think about the matter for two days and decide not to veto the bill.

Evans did not need the document to make his intentions known. He assembled the Capitol press and lambasted the Democrats for delaying a redistricting solution…He attacked S.B. 2 as a partisan bill that simply obstructed rapid settlement of the redistricting issue, and announced he would veto it and all bills like it, regardless of which party passed them.

The Democratic delay entirely backfired, delighting the newsmen, and gave Evans his first major victory in the press…

McCurdy: 82

Sen. Greive: Yes. All I can say is that it sounds possible. Obviously, I don't know. Evans wasn't communicating with me on a regular basis, you can be sure of that. So, I don't know what he wanted. I would imagine that's why we held it over. Was it held in the Senate or in the House?

Ms. Boswell: It was held in the Senate.

Sen. Greive: If it was held in the Senate, then I must have known what I was doing.

Ms. Boswell: But then, Evans, instead of mulling it over, in fact went right to the press and said, "I'm going to veto this," and so he got something of a head start in the press. Again, this is how McCurdy is describing it.

Sen. Greive: I have to do some guessing at this point because I don't fully remember. But, I would suspect this is what I was doing: I thought, "Here we've got a bill that hasn't got any chance of passing, it's too Democratic." So I couldn't turn to the Democrats and say that this bill was too harsh. That's the thing they accused me of—they said I wasn't a loyal-enough member. They said that I gave too much to the Republicans, that I was too easy, and that I was too soft. So I thought if I held it over and they could see how bad things were, they would come to me and reach a compromise, which apparently didn't work. Now that's my guess of what I was thinking.

That would be my normal path of thinking. If I knew a thing was very Democratic, I couldn't very well be against it, unless I had Republicans who would compromise—anything to prove to them what I was about.

Ms. Boswell: You did come up with another bill within a couple of days?

Sen. Greive: I had the other bill.

Ms. Boswell: You had it ready?

Sen. Greive: I had been down, or sent somebody else down, to talk to Gorton or talk to Evans, trying to work a deal out.

Ms. Boswell: Once that was vetoed, Grant then proposed another bill, although McCurdy suggests that it was pretty much the same bill as your bill, only with a different number on it. And that Hayes Elder was in there negotiating to try to get something accomplished.*

Grant finally decided to go it alone; he would be Greive's equal and draw up a House bill for House Democrats (and do it in only two days). The news of the bill spread quickly, and the legislators hurried to tell Grant of their demands and supervise the drawing of their own districts. They overflowed Grant's committee room and harassed his staff, but Grant heard them all. Essentially the legislators reiterated the positions that Greive had already led them to. Thus the bill Grant produced was a replica of S.B. 2, although it did have a new number—H.B. 196. It was a very important number, one Grant would never forget.

McCurdy: 85

Sen. Greive: I wouldn't doubt that. I don't remember. Incidentally, about this time, Evans was installed as the governor, and he was vetoing this and vetoing that. So Mike Gallagher got up in the Senate and he said, "I thought we had one Italian governor, now we've got another one, Danny Veto."

Ms. Boswell: That's a great quote. Evans, evidently, threatened to call the court in and say, "Okay, you're going to have to take over redistricting." Do you think that was an idle threat?

Sen. Greive: I don't remember that. I wouldn't think they'd come in as long as there was a chance of us passing a bill. I don't think I paid much attention to it. But I don't specifically remember. Everybody threatened everybody with something. If they thought you didn't want it, then that was one of the things they could be for.

Ms. Boswell: All along the way it appears that you had also been trying to negotiate again with Moos?

Sen. Greive: Moos. Everybody tried to use everything that they had around. I liked Moos. He was congenial, an easy-going guy. I thought he was a pleasant fellow to deal with, and I always had hopes that with his interests from Eastern Washington, if he got some of the things he wanted, we'd get things we wanted. Moos looked at himself as the next congressman from Spokane.

Ms. Boswell: Had he shown an interest because of his earlier constitutional amendment, too?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. He'd participated in the whole thing. He was probably on the conference committee. If he wasn't, he certainly was a player.

Ms. Boswell: It seems as though, at least according to McCurdy, that after this Evans is again secretly planning a different strategy, and that was actually to have an executive redistricting bill that he's going to propose. Did you know about that?*

…Gorton was busy developing a new strategy, designed to shake the Democrats' confidence in their legislative majority and put even more pressure on Greive. Gorton, his aide, Evans, and Mrs. McCaffree were secretly preparing an executive request redistricting bill. It would be submitted to the House with bipartisanship sponsorship, with the full weight of the Governor's prestige behind it.

McCurdy: 87

Senator Greive: No. We knew he was going to have an executive request bill. We weren't very impressed with that. We couldn't see how his lofty position as governor was going to make that much difference. He didn't have the votes in the House or the Senate. It certainly would fit, though, in the strategy that the governor was running to the courts for a way around the bill. If you have an executive request bill and it's got a lot of support, the court might adopt that plan.

But, somehow, we never were very worried about it. I'm familiar with the fact that there was an executive request in the works, and we kept hearing about it. I remember that when we saw it, we thought we could blast the living daylights out of it. We called a press conference—I think we called the conference before they were able to present their bill—and told them what the thing did. And the press, apparently, believed us because it went nowhere. It didn't get very favorable press. The same people who drew up their overall redistricting plan drew it up. Evans may have had a part in it, but I don't think it was any different than any other Republican bill.

Ms. Boswell: During this time, I wanted to ask you about an episode. McCurdy suggests that you had continued to negotiate, and that you'd come up with a new plan. In the meantime, the Republicans had developed a proposal, which they presented and they called it, essentially, an ultimatum. If you didn't go along, then the governor would put in this executive request bill. But, McCurdy suggests that there were some Republican demands that, "strangely enough, you went along with." One of them was over some districts in Tacoma. Tell me about that.*

The Republicans made their first package proposal on Thursday night, February 4. It was a seven-point ultimatum…Moos explained the proposal to Greive and the other negotiators. He began with minor points, to which Greive mildly objected. Then Moos touched on an open sore. He insisted that Republicans retain the two districts they already controlled in Tacoma. Strangely enough, Greive accepted the Republican demand. It was strange because Republican solutions for Tacoma always eliminated one of the area's five Democratic senators, but Greive's reason for acceptance was even odder. The one Tacoma

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senator whom Greive would gladly sacrifice was safely barricaded behind miles of solidly Democratic precincts. Greive, however, now devised a weird gerrymander, making that senator swap his district with another Tacoma senator, most vulnerable and most powerful. Moos, gazing at the shape of the district, gasped, "Why, we couldn't show up on the floor with that."

McCurdy: 88-89

Sen. Greive: Here's the story on that. Number one, I disliked the senator, and I don't deny that. I'd have loved to see him out of there because he was also competing with John McCutcheon.

Ms. Boswell: Who was this?

Sen. Greive: This was A.L. "Slim" Rasmussen. And I could tell you a lot of that old story. There are some very humorous parts of it.

However, I didn't think to push the issue. There was another senator by the name of Ted Bottiger. He was a House member who wanted to be a senator, and he wanted to get Rasmussen out of his district. He's the one that showed me the "stovepipe." Furthermore, he said that he was one of the ones that wasn't committed from Tacoma, and that he would vote for our plan if I stretched the boundaries a bit. And I thought it was one vote over in the House. He was a House member then. He wasn't a senator, yet. He was senator later. And so he was essential because I was having trouble in Tacoma, anyway. The public power people were in favor of dams locally on the Cowlitz River. The people of Tacoma figured it would affect their rates.

I was having trouble getting anywhere in Tacoma with the House. Bottiger came over to see me, and he showed me how to do it. Now, would I have done it without him? If I'd thought of it I would have, but I didn't.

Ms. Boswell: When you say a "stovepipe," you are referring to the shape of the district?

Sen. Greive: What happened was that Bottiger didn't want to run against Rasmussen; he didn't think he could beat him. He wanted to put him in another district—probably a Republican district—I don't know what it was. And I had terrible fights with Rasmussen. I said a lot of things about him, and he said a lot of things about me, and we just really had it out. I thought I came out pretty well on the exchange. He was the one guy I didn't like. Now, I hadn't tried to do anything to him before. He eventually became mayor of Tacoma for one term, so he didn't run again.

Ted Bottiger was one of the younger progressive Democrats and didn't want to run against Rasmussen. So he's the one who talked me into it. I remember telling him, "This looks terrible, but if it will get your vote, and we can put it together, I'll do it." That's why I did it. In other words, I wasn't just trying to be a hero. I also wasn't the guy who dreamed up the whole thing.

Ms. Boswell: Okay. Then McCurdy mentions that it then came down to some Spokane districts.*

Moos skipped onto the next trouble spot, Spokane. He inisisted on no Democratic gains in the county, since Republicans wanted to retain the chance to unseat two vulnerable Democratic senators. Unfortunately, the two were faithful to Greive, and Greive insisted that their districts be strengthened. When Moos insisted again, Greive retorted, "We might as well go to the court." He would honor his promise to protect the two senators. The court could break the promise, but he could not.

McCurdy: 89

Sen. Greive: That's true; however, what districts are they? One of them was William S. "Daddy" Day's district. He had a pretty strong in with the Republicans. One of them was Bill McCormick's district. In other words, the House members from those districts were two of the major dissidents, and when we got down to the final negotiations, Evans had called McCormick down and told him. He tried to get out of his promise. He'd made a pledge to them he wouldn't hurt them, either, but I didn't know that at the time. But, on the other hand, you make your reputation because you keep your word. And before we did the final redistricting, I had Karl Herrmann and John Cooney come down. We talked to them, and they finally gave me the okay before I did it.

Ms. Boswell: In this instance Evans went ahead and said he was going to submit his executive request.*

On Friday morning Governor Evans revealed his intentions to submit the executive redistricting bill and begin a search for representatives to sponsor it. The announcement caught the Democrats unprepared. Since no redistricting bill had come before either house since negotiations had begun one week ago, they criticized Evans for scuttling negotiations.

McCurdy: 89

Sen. Greive: That didn't worry me very much. They thought it would sweep. It would come with a sweep of publicity for the new governor, popularity, and all that sort of thing, but it didn't get anywhere simply because the press didn't understand it. They took our word for it. We said it was a rotten bill, and we got it defeated. McCurdy had brought a copy of it over, I think, the night before, and innocently let us look at it. So we knew what was in the bill.

Ms. Boswell: So, what was the result of all this posturing?

Sen. Greive: If we did something, then they did something, and we were thinking about it about as hard as we could. I'd get a new idea, and then we'd cast around and try it out on each other. We'd try this, and we'd try that. I just figured something had to give because redistricting was so important. The members wanted it. Everybody wanted it.

Ms. Boswell: We've been talking about the back-and-forth discussions that had been going on as redistricting moved into, essentially, its second session, and the fact that it was difficult to keep even the Democratic

caucus together behind different redistricting proposals. Do you want to add some more to that before I move into the specifics?

Sen. Greive: First of all, there is a difference in Democratic and Republican members. It isn't a party difference; it's a subtle psychological difference. Democrats are dissidents, or at least they were then. And they gathered together the people that were similar in party affiliations, but they often had different goals. In other words, labor contributes to their people. Labor is their chief supporter, but they vote on a lot more than labor issues, like teachers' unions, education, and all types of things. And so you have these various elements, and they have more influence with the members than they do with Republicans.

The Republicans—at least the ones there at that time—were straightforward, generally. They knew what they were for, and they were for a few simple issues. They would stick together like glue because they were in the minority, and that was the only way to have an effect. They voted as a unit, generally.

That's one thing to look at. Another thing to look at is why there was dissatisfaction. No matter what I did, there was always some dissatisfaction. There had to be because it was redistricting, and everybody was affected personally. Then there were the people who were in safe districts like Bill Gissberg, who was almost certainly going to be re-elected when he ran, unless he had an awfully strong opponent. However, Gissberg was ambitious. He wanted to be the floor leader, and he had a group gathered around him who plotted and worked together. They made some speaking arrangement with Web Hallauer's group. They communicated throughout this time in relative secrecy. They voted on a lot more than labor.

And finally there were people like Mike Gallagher who wanted to win. And I think that everybody wanted some kind of victory, not only Gallagher. The way to get someone to vote for something is to go to the caucus and say that, "We're going to gain six seats by this, or three seats by that, and, by gosh, we'll have more, and we'll be better off." You couldn't do that because if it got out that you even thought that—and it got out to the Republicans—then that would be their battle cry.

The fact is that the Republicans used that tactic, and we used it several times. They would make a statement, and I'd have it mimeographed on a sheet of paper and put on everybody's desk: Republicans claim this and claim that. We'd make it in big letters. And we did it on a number of occasions. Then they'd see it, and what could they do? They couldn't deny it since we knew what we were talking about. So, the best you could promise a person is that you were going to try to solve the thing and keep the status quo.

Well, that doesn't really excite anybody because there's no win to it. You go to the Legislature because you beat somebody. You get up and fight against a bill because you beat somebody—you win something. It's like fans trying to have faith and confidence in a football team that loses all their games. They don't want to lose. Losing and winning are so deeply ingrained in people that you have no way of really combating it. All I was trying to do was get a bill through. I wasn't trying to make any gain whatsoever, believe me.

We checked it all the time, and we were always prepared to defend our position. I never once had a situation where Gorton or somebody came up and started telling me my plan was all wrong, and theirs was all right. They would attack it in generalities, but they wouldn't dispute it street by street because we knew what we were doing. But the conclusion is easy to beat because I never offered to win anything more. I was very, very careful about that. The most you could do was say, "Trust me." Well, that's all right, except after a

couple of sessions they don't trust you. You didn't solve it last time; you're not going to solve it this time. "Trust me to save your skins, and that is what I'll do." And even that is a hard thing to say, because if I put that in words—which I didn't—and the other side thought they could use it, why then it would be said it in front of the caucus. I could tell them, and then you know what would happen. It would be in the press, and they'd make an issue out of it. So you had to take a lot of blows that you otherwise would have answered, simply because you'd just say, "I am honest," or "Yes, it is fair." But you really didn't want to enmesh yourself in something.

Furthermore, somebody gets a district they think is fair and they're satisfied with, then you'd better not change it. What are you going to do if you have to change it because somebody overhears, and then makes a lot of it in the press? "See, I'm changing you here because of these other two districts here; we've got to do something for somebody else." What kind of a deal is this? The press then makes it a story. They had nothing to write about. See, the whole Legislature was shut down by court order. There went all their stories.

Finally, then, there are the people who are ambitious, and who think like Grant that they could get a bill and have their name on it. Then they are suddenly raised from lowly freshman, or whatever they were, sophomore senator, or sophomore House member, and into the leadership class. They thought that was a way of doing it. So, it made it almost impossible to keep everybody together all the time. They would float in and out. I had a core of people that stayed loyal.

All the time I was fooling with the guys, always stopping the proceedings and holding the bill. Sometimes we'd hold a bill for a month. We'd put it down if I didn't have the votes and had to work it awhile. When you finally had the votes, you'd let it float. I'd put it on the floor, so we'd just move it any time. I did redistricting the same way. I held it until I thought I had everybody satisfied. Of course, they didn't always stay satisfied. When you thought you had them all satisfied, then somebody would come up with an adjustment or would jump ship and abandon the plan.

John Petrich. Fred Dore wanted to do something for Petrich. I didn't even know Petrich was in the thing; I thought we had taken care of him way back when. We certainly took care of Dore. Now, Dore said that we had to satisfy Petrich, too, because they were buddies. There's a lot of that. So the most difficult thing was to keep everybody in line.

Ms. Boswell: In one sense you're dealing a lot with personalities.

Sen. Greive: All personalities—all over the place. And with the egos. Of course, I had an ego, too. A lot of the things I said about the others apply to me. It's just the nature of where you are and what you're doing.

Ms. Boswell: You were mentioning earlier, too, that because there is such a turnover in the Legislature—and especially in the House—that people want to make their point, do it fast, and make their fame, too.

Sen. Greive: That's right. Become famous overnight. We've had several instances where people became Speaker after two or three terms. First was Robert M. Schaefer. Schaefer was nobody, really. He became Speaker. John O'Brien wanted a Speaker, but he didn't want a Speaker who would push him around. He wanted somebody he had a lot of influence with—I wouldn't say control, but influence.

Thomas Swayze was the same way. He was involved in the next-to-last redistricting. His ambition was to become a judge. He kind of framed out a career that would lead to that.

It isn't a long-term business for most legislators.

Ms. Boswell: You were saying that the average term was twelve years?

Sen. Greive: Well, no. I was always very proud of that. At one point in the Senate, there was a survey of sitting incumbents, to see how long they'd been in office, and so forth. We took the senators and figured it out, and we figured that the average was twelve years. I had twenty-eight years, and of course, several people were there longer. That was for all the senators.

But we were in control. We had thirty votes, which the Democrats had for a long time. But the trick was that you had to keep them satisfied. In other words, you don't go in and make a stirring speech and come out with the votes. People think that we would be in there making speeches. We never made speeches; we made deals. We took care of people. We worried about them—not just me, but anybody who was very successful. To be successful as the floor leader, or even as a Speaker, you're somebody who keeps people happy.

Ms. Boswell: So, your entire career was basically occurring behind the scenes?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Whether you're behind the scenes or not, you keep them happy. Sometimes it's pretty easy, but sometimes it isn't. But that's the nature of the Legislature—or it was then.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think it's not that way now?

Sen. Greive: Well, I suspect that it's that way, but I don't know. I'm not there, and I can't say. I've been away from there twenty years, now, and I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: Let's talk now about some of these back-and-forth situations that were going on in redistricting. We had talked about how Evans had decided, as governor, to step in and to push his own bill—what he called the compromise bill—which he tried to make look nonpartisan.

Sen. Greive: I think that was ninety-nine percent Gorton, and one percent Evans. But Evans was the key factor. That was one of the things about Gorton: he appreciated that he wasn't always that popular. I think he probably does today. He's always been the kind of a guy that works with somebody else and lets them take all the credit, for which I credit him his success. I admire him for that.

Ms. Boswell: One of the things that came out of this back-and-forth was a new proposal that was talking about a legislative referendum on redistricting.

Sen. Greive: We had a legislator from Vancouver, and he was a very studious guy. He was a lawyer, but he was the type who researched things, always studying, always looking for a better way and an answer to every question.

His name was Klein, William Klein. We called him "Deputy Dog." Apparently, there was a cartoon character in those days by that name, and he looked like Klein. I didn't give him that name, but people made fun of him and said, "There's Deputy Dog," all the time. He was kind of half-hunched over, but he was brilliant. He would get in there, and he'd be reading the bills when other people were just voting on them, so he really was a very smart guy. He was also very difficult to deal with—very, very opinionated. His claim to fame was that he caught some errors, some mistakes, and he understood the ramifications. He wasn't personally very popular with the members in the sense that he was Speaker or

anything like that. But he just did the work other people didn't do.

He came up with a theory. They kind of laughed at it at first—I know I was one of them—but his idea was that we could refer the redistricting directly to the people. In other words, we wouldn't have to go through the governor. His idea was that we would put a bill through both Houses and refer it directly to the people. The governor's veto wouldn't extend to that; therefore, he couldn't stop it.

So, that idea gave us some hope that we could do it that way. We had all kinds of reservations because we weren't at all sure we were that popular with the people. About that time, I thought we were awfully unpopular because we didn't get any good press, you can be sure of that. Redistricting is like the "Tar Baby"—the closer you got to it, the more people disliked you. They might appreciate that you were doing the work, but then the public didn't like it and the press didn't like it because nothing was happening. They had to write about every little nuance, and there wasn't anything that really justified their being around.

And so, Klein's solution was that the governor's veto shall not extend to—it's written in the Constitution, the state Constitution—initiatives by or referred to the people. Now, they said we constitutionally couldn't hold it up, but in our heart and soul we all thought we could do it. Referring to the people would be a feat in itself; it might never survive after that.

The thing that worried us was that we didn't know if that would slow down the court. The court might look to the Washington Constitution, which I'm talking about. The GOP are talking about the federal Constitution and looking at the whole picture. We were never quite sure that we could carry it off. I know the courts were pretty disgusted with redistricting about that time. I'm not trying to say that I had any super-human background, or I was a constitutional lawyer or anything. I'm just saying that we had a majority, and if we did it then, we had something. If we didn't, we got another case on the list. The court knocked this down, and we're right back where we started. There wouldn't be any state judges deciding the matter. It would probably be decided by one or two federal judges from the Ninth Circuit Court. We weren't at all sure that they were going to be satisfied with something that took another election because, you see, that means we'd have to go through another election after this one. We'd already gone through an election and held it up with everything we could. We'd be out there in the field trying to do things. So, there were all kinds of problems with it, but Klein's was a great idea.

Ms. Boswell: Another player who seems to come in about this time, or, at least, comes in more dramatically than he had before, was Tom Copeland.

Sen. Greive: Tom Copeland was young, but he wasn't part of the so-called "new breed." He was from Eastern Washington; he wasn't from Western Washington. In other words, his set of friends was not the same as Gorton's and Evans' set of friends; however, he was a player. He had support, and he was very strong, and a number of people were loyal to him. It got to be an east-west sort of fight. He was much easier to deal with because he seemed to be much more realistic and willing to make an agreement. Incidentally, he was a pretty capable guy.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of redistricting, you had what were called secret meetings with Tom Copeland and others in a downtown hotel? Tell me a little about that.

Sen. Greive: Well, no, that is not quite true. We were trying to negotiate. Every time we

tried to negotiate, somebody would squeal, and the first thing you'd know, we'd have trouble. In other words, somebody would accuse us of doing something underhanded, and then we'd all go to a caucus—the caucuses are secret—and then somebody would make an issue out of it. And so it was impossible to have negotiations because if you were in there giving the store away, you were in real trouble. And so it was a terrible atmosphere. You couldn't do it.

So, finally, I rented a room or had somebody rent a room—I forget how I did it—on two or three occasions. We went down and tried to negotiate there, and we did quite well. But, then the next day, somebody found out about it. Then we got lambasted for secrecy. But, if you have a cadre of people standing around in a circle yelling and screaming, "Don't touch that district. It's mine!" you can't do anything.

Ms. Boswell: So, it was really just a means of trying to get away from the publicity and the pressure?

Sen. Greive: That's right.

Ms. Boswell: There's an implication in McCurdy, though, that Gorton was very angry because he thought you were trying to shut him out of the process. Was that true?*

Most legislators dismissed the hotel talks, but Gorton and Moos were both furious. Both were working hard to win Democratic votes for the Governor's bill...By Thursday night, February 11, Greive and Copeland were proclaiming that a redistricting settlement was imminent. This was too much for Gorton. He was convinced not only that Copeland had devastated the strategy for the Governor's bill, but that the minority leader, who had entered the negotiations with only an elementary knowledge of redistricting, had surrendered the Republican position.

McCurdy: 92

Sen. Greive: Probably. Maybe he wasn't, but he looked to me like a solid rock that was unwilling to yield. If we dealt directly with Copeland, we had a chance to get something done because Copeland genuinely wanted to get a redistricting bill. Copeland was one of Gorton's strategists, and Gorton wanted to break somebody. He wanted to win. We got Copeland involved because we couldn't deal with Gorton at all.

Ms. Boswell: But then Gorton, at least according to McCurdy, sent in Pritchard and others to say to Copeland, "You either stop or else the caucus is going to vote you out."*

Gorton asked Representative Pritchard to get Copeland out of the negotiations. Pritchard, Moos, and two other House Republicans sternly confronted Copeland with the choice of pulling out of the negotiations or facing a caucus revolt and a vote of no confidence. Copeland made no definite reply, but his efforts to engineer a redistricting solution languished and died.

McCurdy: 92-93

Sen. Greive: Like I've said on so many things, now you're in an area where I wasn't present, and I don't know what happened. It seems logical that happened, but I learned it for the first time when I read this account.

Ms. Boswell: It seems to me that all along the way Grant is still a wild card. He has his own agenda and his own bill.

Sen. Greive: He wants whatever is going to be a compromise, and that's fine. But it has to be the Grant compromise or the Grant bill. And the only way he could displace me and what I was doing was to say that he was cutting it short, and he beat me out of it. He said, "Let me do it, and we'll win. We're going to win. We'll get new seats." Now, that wasn't accurate. He couldn't do that—it couldn't happen—but then that's what he said. I wasn't present when he said it because he said it in caucus, and it was reported to me.

Ms. Boswell: Now you, ultimately, presented this referendum bill that Klein had suggested. How did the Republicans feel about that? What happened there?

Sen. Greive: They were quite concerned. They said they weren't concerned; they said the court would knock it over. They were confident that they had the necessary approval. Our answer, of course, was, "Okay, even if they put their own plan forward next time, and people pass that plan, it won't replace this plan." But, traditionally, it isn't a popular issue.

Ms. Boswell: But the referendum bill did pass, right? It passed in the House?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy refers to, at this point, a speech that you gave. I wondered if you remembered this. It was a speech to some Chamber of Commerce group where you satirized the whole proceedings, and you and Gorton, I guess, in the humor of it, got together a little bit. What happened? Do you remember that?*

The state Chamber of Commerce, in planning their annual visit to the Legislature, had invited Greive and Gorton to address them on redistricting. Both had accepted, and at the lunch on Saturday, February 13, Greive satirized his and Gorton's role. The touch of humor lightened relations between the two redistricting leaders. Together they walked back to the Capitol, reminiscing about their redistricting battle. The light talk continued for two hours in Greive's office.

McCurdy: 96

Sen. Greive: McCurdy attaches more importance to that than I do. I remember it very keenly. I forget what I did to satirize, but we had all kinds of funny material, and I made fun of both of us. Gorton laughed, and I laughed, and we walked out together and sat down and talked and had a cordial conversation. But, at that time, I didn't realize the extent that Gorton was blocking everything. I always felt, somehow, that there was a way around it.

Ms. Boswell: But that talk, then, in that instance, didn't really change much?

Sen. Greive: I didn't think it changed that much, at all. I'm not in Gorton's shoes or

McCurdy's shoes, so when it comes to that I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: Right after that conversation, evidently, you had tried again to negotiate with Copeland and also Marshall Neill, but Gorton had come instead. Do you remember that incident?*

…Greive sent for Copeland and Neill for a continuation of the hotel talks. Gorton intercepted the message and went himself. The two discussed how to map the seven-seven-two arrangement for Seattle-King County. All earlier attempts to draw this required the destruction of one of the existing Democratic districts. Now Gorton proposed a weird bird-shaped district, with a major Republican stronghold in the beak and a scattering of Democratic outposts in the body. By wedging the bird onto the Seattle district map, the seven-seven-two scheme could be achieved without disturbing the political complexion of the surrounding districts.

McCurdy: 97

Sen. Greive: Yes. I don't know how that negotiation took place. The only time Neill came was when he was appointed by somebody to come. In any event, it sounded like it was a conference committee. That's when I told you that Marshall Neill said I had to understand his position; he couldn't go against a sitting governor. He said, "He's our governor. Nobody in their right mind would challenge him."

Ms. Boswell: Again, it appears that at least you were moving somewhat toward a compromise in something that, essentially, at least by McCurdy, was called "seven, seven and two." And that was that in some of the districts in question there would be seven Republican, seven Democratic and then two swing districts?

Sen. Greive: A lot of things I don't remember. He wrote them down when they were fresh, and it's been twenty years now. But my recollection, and what I expect I was saying at the time, was that Gorton wanted to make everything swing districts. Well, obviously, I wasn't going to do that under any circumstances. And so then the next question was, "What do we do with the different districts?" Finally, we decided on the seven-seven-two arrangement. It was Seattle we were talking about, or King County.

Ms. Boswell: Seattle was one of the ones that was up for grabs?

Sen. Greive: Seattle had a lot of districts in it. It's big enough that pretty near all the districts are partly in Seattle, or Seattle had an effect on them, certainly. The only exceptions were some eastern King County districts, and some southern districts, Auburn, Kent and so forth. We finally decided that we'd have seven, seven and we'd have two swing districts. Since I don't remember very well the details of that, I could very well have agreed to that.

One of those districts would be Mary Ellen McCaffree's, the Thirty-second, and we all knew it was a swing district before. My argument to the Democrats was, "Well, it was a swing district, and it's still a swing district."

Ms. Boswell: I think that one of the districts was Grant's district,or at least that came to be at issue.

Sen. Greive: In those days—and I think even today—parts of the south end are pretty Republican. They have a lot of airline pilots and horse owners, who tend to be Republican, and you put that with the small town, the backbone Main Street thing, and it was a close district. I think Grant's was one of the districts, but I don't know how important that was. Could be. I might have had a motive there, but somebody would have to refresh my memory.

Ms. Boswell: One of the things that I think happened, ultimately, was that some—particularly O'Brien and Schaefer—decided that they wanted to try to break some of the deadlocks by calling a formal conference committee, which you didn't object to. So Evans moderated, or at least stepped in, and this conference committee met with him. The committee included from the Senate, Democrats Greive, Gissberg, and Bob Bailey and Republicans Moriarty, Neill, and Ryder. From the House were Democrats Schaefer, O'Brien, and Brouillet, and from the Republicans, Gorton, Copeland, and Goldsworthy." At least, again, according to McCurdy, that committee was able to agree on a pretty large segment of what had been compromised.*

On Tuesday afternoon, February 16, an army of legislators descended upon the Governor's office. From the Senate came Democrats Greive, Gissberg, Washington, and caucus chairman Robert C. Bailey (Pacific County), and Republicans Moriarity, Neill, and John N. Ryder (Seattle). From the House came Democrats Schaefer, O'Brien, and Frank B. Brouillet (Puyallup), and Republicans Gorton, Copeland, and Robert Goldsworthy (Whitman County). Moos, busy selling the new Republican bill, did not attend, and Grant was not invited.

For two hours they talked. O'Brien insisted on a conference committee, but Gorton, Greive, and Evans talked district lines. District by district they ratified the progress that had been made earlier—the more definite agreements for the rural districts and Tacoma and the general plan for Seattle. Evans played the true mediator, proposing solutions, arbitrating, reconciling, interposing.

All this seemed to represent genuine progress.

McCurdy: 98-99

Sen. Greive: It's always pretty easy to until you get down to the bottom, and then you have your trouble.

Ms. Boswell: Right. And it was that bottom ten percent or so that was really difficult. It appears that drawing the district lines themselves was a real sticking point. You could accept in principle the districts, but drawing the lines was difficult.

Sen. Greive: Yes.*

Only a few districts seemed to prevent a final compromise. Other differences would surely have appeared had the legislators taken time to scrutinize all their agreements, but in

continued on the following page

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the haste of the negotiations only these five controversies stood out:

1) ***The Thirty-second District in North Seattle…***
2) ***The newTwenty-first District, to be carved out of the suburbs between Everett and Seattle…***
3) ***The Fifth District in Spokane and its precinct and one-half.***
4) ***The Twelfth District of Chelan and Douglas Counties…***
5) ***The Sixteenth District in the Tri-Cities area….***

McCurdy: 101

Ms. Boswell: According, again to McCurdy, there were five real sticky districts or areas that were really holding back that last ten percent. One was the Thirty-second District in North Seattle. Could you tell me a little about some of these issues?

Sen. Greive: The Thirty-second had a bigger problem. Wes Uhlman came from that district, and he was a pretty good player in his own right. Then, eventually, Pete Francis. But, Mary Ellen McCaffree came from that district, and she was the pet of Gorton. McCurdy wasn't his chief assistant—it was Mary Ellen McCaffree, as I understand it. She had a lot more influence than anybody else. She actually did a lot of the drafting work and the head work. But she never surfaced in every effort to negotiate with her. Gorton made all the decisions, but she, we understood, was the motivation, and he was very anxious to protect her.

See, her husband was a professor of economics or something at the university—I think it was economics. And her great friend was Lois North, whose husband at that time—they're since divorced—was a professor of economics. Lois North's and Mary Ellen McCaffree's districts came right next to the university, and that was partly in the University District.

Ms. Boswell: Then another sticking point was the new Twenty-first District, which was carved out of parts of Seattle and Everett?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Well, that's a district that was a line between King and Snohomish County, in both districts, and we always assumed it would be Republican, although it wasn't that Republican. It grew more Democratic. But, I think it's had more Republican representation than Democratic. Ray Van Hollebeke was there for two terms as a senator. I think Everett had a Republican senator then; they have a Democratic senator now, I think. But it was a strange area, and we just didn't know what was going to happen. It had the people in the north part of Lake Washington.

Ms. Boswell: The third of these areas under discussion was the Fifth District in Spokane. I think that is where you had some Senate friends.

Sen. Greive: Cooney was very close to me, and he also was very active in the redistricting. He knew what was going on. As I recall it was a split district, and had one Republican and one Democratic representative, and the Democratic senator was John Cooney. They had a Democratic House member called McCormick—that's not the McCormack from central Washington—that's Bill McCormick. And then they had a fellow by the name of Jerry Saling who was a Republican. It was a close district.

It might have been a controversy with us, but, apparently, if you believe McCurdy—and I wasn't there—he says that Evans had a deal with McCormick to protect him. When we finally got to our final compromise, when it got down to one or two districts, we called them down and Evans wanted to speak to McCormick privately, and they did. So, McCormick had a private conversation with him, and reminded him that he had a promise—that he'd promised to protect that district.

I didn't know anything about that, and I still don't. I just took it from the detail McCurdy gave in his account.

Ms. Boswell: Now, the fourth of these controversial districts was the Twelfth District, which was Chelan and Douglas counties.

Sen. Greive: The argument there was that we were putting two districts together, and who got the number. We knew what was going to happen, and we agreed on it.

Ms. Boswell: I see. And then, finally, the last one was the Sixteenth District, which was the Tri-Cities area.

Sen. Greive: I don't know why. I could tell you that there were all kinds of problems with that, from time to time. What the particular problem was at that moment, I don't know. A lot will depend on what's left over when you did some of the districts. You see, Pasco is very Democratic. Richland tends to be Republican. And what's the other one? Kennewick tended to be in the middle, probably a little Democratic. But, you see, that isn't the whole of it because you have the surrounding area. The surrounding area was made up of farm owners, and they tend to be Republican. But it was, basically, a Democratic area. If you could break off Kennewick from Pasco, or Pasco from Kennewick, why then it would be Republican.

That was McCormack—the other McCormack—Senator Mike McCormack's district. That was one of the reasons he got interested. He was concerned about his own skin, as we all were.

Ms. Boswell: Once these problem areas had been identified, Evans, I think, tries to set up a meeting whereby the leadership gets together. Gissberg refused to attend; you wanted to try to compromise by dividing the differences in half. I think that began a whole new stage in the process, trying to come up with a compromise.

Sen. Greive: In the first place, I don't agree with his characterization of Evans, that he sat there as a fair arbiter, or that he put it together. You had to look at the players.

Ms. Boswell: I wondered about that strategy and where it came from?

Sen. Greive: I think that I was responsible for that. Now, part of my problem was that I had all kinds of problems back in my caucus, where I wasn't winning anything. We now controlled two houses; we were in control of redistricting. What are we doing? Let Dan Evans veto another one. I could be wrong on that—it was a long time ago.

Ms. Boswell: No. I'm sure you're right on that. One of the things that McCurdy mentions is that in this process, an aide of Gorton's goes and completes a version of this compromise where you draw out these boundaries. Later, again according to McCurdy, you accuse them of "fast penciling" on certain districts.*****

see McCurdy quote on the following page

All that afternoon and night Gorton's aide rushed to complete a draft of the Republican version of the compromise. When it was finished, he gave it to Greive and his aide and told them how to rewrite the plan in the five disputed areas. Greive accepted the ready-made draft. Later he accused Gorton of "fast-penciling" him on the lines of a few supposedly undisputed districts. In fact, those districts were then undisputed, but the agreement on them was usually vague enough that had Greive and Gorton drawn their own bills, slight differences would have appeared. Enough slight differences would collapse the compromise; that was the reason why Gorton's aide was so anxious to draw the final bill.

McCurdy: 103

Sen. Greive: I remember that. We agreed in principle, and we described what it would be. I didn't think there was any aide in the room. I think that Evans drew it, but somebody sketched it out, and then the question became who would put that down in writing? Now, McCurdy may have been in the room, I can't remember, but anyway, they were going to draw something for us to look at. When they came back, it looked like the same district, but when we got down to doing the final drafts, they had altered it a bit. The streets make a big difference, you see.

This was in King County, too, where we were disagreeing. There were a lot of big populations. We felt that he weakened the districts. In fact, I don't remember exactly what we did, but I know darn well that I was convinced at the time that they had played with the districts after we had agreed, and I was pretty disgusted. We should have drawn it, but they kind of wanted to do it, and it was all right with me.

Ms. Boswell: When you say "fast penciled," did that mean that they just didn't draw what you'd agreed on? Is that right?

Sen. Greive: Yes. In other words, their version maybe looked like it. There's always a possibility in a thing like this that I called "fast penciled," that they may have made a human error. I think they tried to skim it a little here and there in order to improve their position.

Ms. Boswell: One of the other interesting things that happens at this same time was that you are calling people in and telling them, "Here's what it looks like now." One of the people who came in was Jack Dootson, and one of the districts at issue, the Twenty-first, was going to be carved out of Dootson's. Again, according to McCurdy, he just said, "Do what you want," and was surprised that his district was at issue.*

By the next morning…most of the controversy over the Twenty-first District disappeared as soon as Evans called Dootson into his office and explained the problem. Dootson was astonished. He admonished the Governor not to le this suspend the fate of what seemed to be an honorable compromise. "Do whatever you want with my district," he told Evans, "I am sure it will be the right thing."

McCurdy: 104

Sen. Greive: In all my time in the Legislature, I met some screwballs, and one of the best screwballs was Jack Dootson. He had a lot of idiosyncrasies. He seemed to march to a different drummer. He was a railroad engineer who didn't get along with his union, but he was kind of a popular, affable guy, and he got elected. He was very loyal to the governor. He thought the governor was a great guy. Evans had his friend there, so he got the governor's vote. I, of course, didn't know he said that, but I heard that he said it. This isn't the first I've ever heard of it. But I don't know whether I believed it. Dootson—you just took care to make sure he was okay. He might do anything.

Ms. Boswell: As it turned out, he lost the next election, so he may have just talked himself out of a job.

Sen. Greive: That very well could be. And I can't say that I had any bad motives. He may have really believed that was the right thing to do. Of course, you've got to put his character in there, and as a footnote that he wasn't typical at all.

Ms. Boswell: You were having trouble with your caucus. In fact, McCurdy called it a "blood bath." O'Brien was accusing you of having given in and of trying to protect the Senate, but not the House. I guess that's how it went.*

The two Republican senators walked back into what they described as a "Democratic blood bath." O'Brien and Schaefer had grown furiously suspicious that the bill protected Greive's Senate faction in exchange for relinquishing control of the House to the Republicans. Senators and representatives run in the same district, Greive had retorted; "This is your own senator you are protecting."

McCurdy: 104

Sen. Greive: It sounded good when you said it, but it's got all kinds of parts to it. We had a blood bath, no question. Anytime they brought up redistricting—I don't have to say which one—if I had a plan, it was a blood bath because people began to look at their own districts and were critical. About this time the people who were on the other side that had their own plans—incidentally, most of which I learned from McCurdy's thesis, I didn't know about it—they challenged me and said that it wasn't liberal enough, and that I'd given things away. I explained it away.

When my caucus was all over, I had a majority of the votes without any problem, at that point. I just knew so much more about it, and, in most cases, I had Dean Foster, or whoever it was, in there explaining it, so that I didn't take the burden of it. They explained what it did and didn't do. And we'd been fair with them, so we did pretty well.

However, that didn't wash with John O'Brien. O'Brien didn't know about redistricting; all he understood was the shifting of power. You understand, I'm friendly to O'Brien. After that, when he ran for office, I contributed to his campaign. I gave him one hundred dollars two or three times when I thought he was in trouble. I'm not against him, but his whole life was that you either won or you lost. There was nothing in between. There was no such thing as halfway. Now, he was saying, "Take care of the House

members—the House members."

I never could understand that argument, really. To me it was so asinine. Why even bother to mention it? You take care of everybody because there may be a few instances where somebody wants a piece of territory that they were particularly popular in. That could have happened a few times. But, basically, we weren't looking at it that way.

O'Brien really wanted to reassert himself in the House. I really believe that when he left—the man-made Speaker as it were—he just figured that he'd be the Speaker the next time. He was the House. He was the leader, and it wasn't somebody else. He was a part of most of the decisions. He, number one, didn't want us to get redistricting. Number two, it may very well be that he wasn't as capable as some of the House members. But I don't know whether those House members could back it up with figures.

Everybody that looks at his own district says, "Oh, damn it all, you've done me in." We had all kinds of complaints that weren't logical. We'd always said, "Well, let's look at the figures." The other problem is that I wasn't in that caucus, and I didn't have anybody, really, to represent my point of view, or the point of view of the statistics we had. So, you could say almost anything, and nobody could challenge it.

Ms. Boswell: Could Hayes Elder have played that role?

Sen. Greive: Well, really that wasn't the wise thing to do. He's dead now, but at that time, we thought about Hayes as having a bright future and being governor or something, someday. Why should he get into the middle of a blood bath with the people? When I needed him, he came through.

Ms. Boswell: Now, in your own Senate caucus, you had pretty stiff opposition from Mike Gallagher, Martin Durkan, and others.

Sen. Greive: Durkan and I had never gotten along too well. Gallagher—you never knew what he was going to do, but he had to win. No such thing as a compromise to him.

Ms. Boswell: And they had, evidently, secretly or not so secretly, approached Evans with their own ideas about some plans, too.

Sen. Greive: That's par for the course. Everybody approached everybody with secret ideas. We weren't above doing that, either. In other words, some things are legitimate, part of the game. If they had a better plan, and they thought they could secretly make a deal with Evans, they probably should have. I didn't like it. I felt that we could agree with them, but that doesn't mean that was wrong. But the thing is—I was always comfortable in this—I didn't figure anybody was going to come up with any better deal because they would have had to deal with the same forces I dealt with. You can imagine if they'd come with that plan fresh, then all the people that we'd taken care of would be up in arms and saying, "You haven't taken care of me; you haven't taken care of me." They'd have to start all over and negotiate it.

Ms. Boswell: How did you meet their objections? I read in the McCurdy book that you prepared to submit the bill, and the senators locked themselves in the basement to talk about it.*

To review Greive's bill the senators abandoned their chambers and locked themselves in a basement hearing

room, barring all but senators and staff. Those locked out included some very angry newsmen. District by district Greive and his staff explained their bill, and district by district Senator Gallagher questioned, embarrassed, and harassed. Gallagher spoke as the chief opponent of the bill, frustrating the supporters, stalling the proceedings, trying to force Greive to lose his temper and his control of the meeting. Laboriously Greive continued to explain the bill. Each senator received his due recognition, until all forty-nine districts had been explained. The senators filed back to the Senate floor.

McCurdy: 107

Sen. Greive: That sounds a lot different than it was. I had two offices in those days. I had one upstairs that the leadership had because I was a leader, and I never frequented it. I had somebody up there to answer the telephone. My offices were down in a little place I'd had for years—a little, little corner room with a round table in it. I met down there and did all my negotiating. We had a big room next to us with a bunch of tables where we'd just pull our maps out. It was a real good-sized room. It could almost be a ballroom if you took the chairs out. And that was the basement. So, when they talk about the basement, they talked about the room next to my office.

And we did get them in and locked the doors because we were always afraid of somebody running out and telling everyone something different. And so it was pretty much agreed by everybody that we'd have our caucus down there because we could lock the door and keep the press out. And we could also watch the guys who were running to tell them—such as Dr. Cowen—he was always a great one to go and tell everybody what was going on.

Ms. Boswell: I see. There's an indication that you, literally, had to go district by district and explain exactly what you'd done.

Sen. Greive: That's what I did. We went down, and then we could also answer any questions if somebody wanted. As we were going through it, if they would want to know why, we could just stop and explain why. Or it might be, in some cases, that we said, "When you see it, what do you think?" It happened in the Forty-fourth District because the district had some of the same questions. We had numbers on them, like the Forty-fifth might be in between the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth, because we were taking districts from one place to another and the numbers were so important to see who ran when. And so, we'd say, "We can't discuss this now, but that will come out when we get to the other side. Then we can do something."

Ms. Boswell: It seemed that at this point you had, you thought, enough votes that it went to the floor, and one Republican who had agreed to go along had left to go talk to someone—I think to Gorton, perhaps—and as a result, the opposition was able to get an adjournment. Do you remember that particular situation?

Sen. Greive: Yes. I have a feeling that the person, at that point, was Perry Woodall. He and I were very close friends. And we used to go to leadership conferences together with our wives, and I was protecting him all the time. He hated to be the only guy on the spot because he'd been the floor leader the time before. I suspect that's who it was, but I don't remember. I know we were short a vote. But, I suspect it was him. He felt too much on the

spot. He may have talked to me, and I was probably the kind of guy that would have said, "Okay, take a walk this time, but we'll get you on the final passage."

Ms. Boswell: Then, as a result of that, you have to go back to the drawing board, especially, as I understand it, in the Thirty-second District. That seemed to be one of the big, key problems.

Sen. Greive: Everybody knew it. That wasn't a secret problem. It was a problem because there wasn't a senator there that understood redistricting. A few didn't know anything; they just knew about their districts. That was the issue. And that's what made it so hard to give in on.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of all the strategizing that's going on—Republicans had their version of the compromise, and you've got O'Brien and Schaefer lobbying in certain areas. Then you've got Web Hallauer, too, and it seems as though Hallauer is trying to get some deals going on his own.

Sen. Greive: Actually, Mike McCormack fronted for it, but Hallauer was the force. Hallauer, by nature, wanted to run things. It's the type of guy he is. He's a very successful businessman, probably the most successful businessman in the Senate at that time. He made it on his own. He was just a bossy type. I don't think his motives were bad.

Ms. Boswell: One of the things that McCurdy mentions again and again is a "scalping" strategy. I wondered if you would explain to me what that actually means.*

Greive now began to twist the old "scalping" strategy, originally designed to focus on the "new breed" Republicans as a final, automatic vote. But it was now the House Democrats who would bury any new bill. Greive searched through the Senate redistricting committee and found H.B. 196, Grant's original bill, and prepared to scalp it with the compromise.

McCurdy: 111

Sen. Greive: That means you come out with one bill and put another bill in its place, or an amendment in place, that changes the whole thing. If you want to put in some language that makes a big change in it, you just scalp that and put it on as an amendment.

Ms. Boswell: So you put, literally, a whole different bill on it?

Sen. Greive: You can do that, or you can put in an amendment. McCurdy is talking about a whole bill. Add a number and that solves that. There were lots of stories about things like that—people who ended up with their names on bills that they didn't want to be on. It was embarrassing to them. Occasionally, it was even done deliberately. They did that one time to Rosellini, so he said that any Catholic school had to be approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. They tried to put his name on it because they were mad at him. Al took on the whole Senate—that was when we had the Futile Fifteen, only

fifteen of us. And he took them on. He spoke and got it in the paper and made such an issue out of it that he turned the whole thing around, and they struck his name off.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds like in this particular circumstance, Grant's bill that's still floating around gets scalped with the compromise bill.

Sen. Greive: You have to have a vehicle. The bill comes over to you; you scalp it. It really means that you amend it—only in this case you wrote a whole new bill and sent it back to them.

Ms. Boswell: You have this potential compromise. You've still got the Thirty-second that's a sticking point. They evidently are able, I think, on the floor to get a vote on the Thirty-second to go their way. But, then, at least according to McCurdy, you retaliated with a revision of the Thirty-first. One change, again, begets another.*

The redistricting committee met Monday evening. Greive was ready with his strategy. Only the Thirty-second District stood in the way of a final settlement, and as soon as the committee convened Ryder and Neill moved to add three heavily Republican precincts to the Thirty-second District. Ryder stressed that if the precincts were left out, Republicans would fight the bill all the way…Greive announced that the new Republican advantage must be matched. The Thirty-first District in South Seattle was not Democratic enough, he said, adding that the Republicans had "fast-penciled him and drawn it "swing."…Greive, insisting on another advantage, proposed to subdivide the Thirty-second District, insuring that one of its two representatives would almost always be a Democrat. Again the Republicans objected; again they were defeated.

McCurdy: 112

Sen. Greive: I don't remember. I remember the incident. I was there, and I remember vividly fighting with Gallagher and various things. What it looks to me now, looking back—but I'm not sure of this—what I did was, I was prepared for that situation. We lost on that one issue, and I immediately had an amendment all ready just to plaster and change the south end. So I moved that we change the nature of the Thirty-first. And, of course, it was a bonus to our side that we had to win. If we were going to lose in the Thirty-second, we were going to gain in the Thirty-first. The Republicans had pledged votes for their one compromise, but they hadn't thought of me making a move the other way. Now, that's what it looks like to me from this vantage point. That may not be accurate. I don't know how I could have scalped it that fast. I would have had to think up a whole different process to do it. But, I might have done it, and we may have done the rest of it overnight.

Ms. Boswell: It sounded like it was right in the same time. Gissberg was still fighting you on the floor pretty ferociously at that point, as well.

Sen. Greive: I don't know what that was about. I think, probably, he wanted to see the shift of powers, and he thought that if they had one with their name on it that would have protected Hallauer and done in some of my people.

I don't have a clear picture now of what Hallauer and McCormack's bill did. I know that we attacked it and that we were able to say that it was wrong, but you see, at that particular point, people figured I knew what I was talking about. So I don't remember what I said at the time. We could almost look at districts and know what they were; we'd been at it for two whole years.

Ms. Boswell: And then Robert Charette steps in, too. Can you tell me about him and what he was trying to accomplish?*

Senator Robert L. Charette (Dem.,Aberdeen) brought out a copy of the old Governor's bill and moved to substitute it for the compromise. The senators, Charette accused, were motivated by nothing but interest in their own districts. Since that was how the game was played, he said, he was presenting the one bill that "best takes care of me." He added that Greive had sold out for personal gain, and "as long as the Democratic Party has been sold a bill of goods, we might as well go all the way with Dan."

McCurdy: 115

Sen. Greive: Okay. There were some shifts made down in Bailey's district. And Bailey picked up a considerable amount of territory because he had a small district, and he was a senator. But that district number was floating around, so that area had two senators until the next election. Same problem we talked about with Hallauer. Charette got elected for the unexpired term, so there were two senators from the same district.

So Charette was a loose cannon. He never said anything, hardly, and then finally it came to light. It was always a smarting under that because it was understood that Bailey was going to be the senator, and they wouldn't run against each other. And Charette's district was going to be eliminated, and he was going to be out. He wasn't a bit happy about it. But, what could he do? He couldn't be against the hero from his district because Bailey was very powerful. That was just his response to the thing. I don't know that it was very significant because he did run. Actually, what he did, he went back and ran for the House and became floor leader of the House. Very competent guy. And then after that, he was a judge. He's dead now.

Ms. Boswell: At this point, you can't predict what he'll do. In this case, he brought out the governor's bill again, which had been long dead.

Sen. Greive: Charette was never a friend of mine, and I never quite understood why. Probably because I was entrenched with the people who were there, and he was only going to be there one term. At that particular point I was supporting Bailey in whatever he wanted.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds like at that point, the Democrats were just going at each other, wildly though, trying to get their say and get their due.

Sen. Greive: You see, O'Brien said I gave in to the governor and that the governor and I made a deal. Gorton was there, but the governor was not, and they said I'd sold them out. That was the argument I had to try to stave off. I couldn't very well do it publicly because if I said, "We got this," or "We got that," why then I'd be in the press. So, you had to take it or say it behind closed doors. It was very sensitive. If you made the

Republicans mad, and they thought they were done in—well, the average House member didn't understand what was going on anymore than the senators did. They knew their district. That's the only thing they knew or they knew a little bit about a couple of districts around them. And they had to take a lot of it on faith. If I said, "Boys, let's get this thing; we've done them in," why then if that got in the press the whole thing would blow up. So, you had to take criticism from that, too.

Ms. Boswell: Sounds like such a thankless job. So, then you've got a compromise that is really close, but the Senate didn't vote for it, right? You had this compromise pretty well set up and then the other members shot it down?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: Then you and Gorton, essentially, have to move together because you want to get this going. The court then, all of a sudden, intervenes?

Sen. Greive: First of all, you have to understand the situation. We had this agreement more or less, and I had my own group, which went just wild when they heard the news. And you had O'Brien and the House members all wild. On the other hand, where else were we to turn? We had enough Republican votes to put the thing together, so finally, we had a vote and it lost. Well, there were several of those people, I was convinced, that if we could have extended the session, would have turned around and changed their vote. See, their argument in the caucus was that we could get more—always you can get more, get more, get more. "We'll get it. We're going to win, going to win." They figured they weren't winning. But if it was voted down, they might change their minds, but then they failed to call them back in session.

Ms. Boswell: Now, doesn't the court, at this point, say, "We want to have a meeting," and they put the fear of God in you.

Sen. Greive: Everything from the court came on high. If there were any negotiations, we weren't a part of it. John O'Connell might have been. I doubt if Gorton was. Court judges just decide things and tell you.

Ms. Boswell: But they had decided, I think, at this point in the negotiations, that they wanted to have a meeting and that everybody was going to get together. And the implication was that they were tired of all this messing around, and they were going to do something themselves. It sounded like it put the pressure on to get the final negotiations under way; a feeling among the legislators that, "If we don't get this done, now, we're going to be in trouble."

With that pressure, the Senate and the House took up the compromise bill one more time. What happened?

Mr. Greive: We got the bill passed.

It took the Legislature forty-seven days to agree on a redistricting bill. On February 26, 1965, Governor Evans signed Engrossed House Bill 196, originally sponsored by Representatives Gary Grant and Hayes Elder. But HB 196 was a compromise bill resulting from extensive negotiations between legislators—the final version looked quite different from the original bill presented by Representatives Grant and Elder.

Though legislators had a reason to celebrate the signing of their redistricting bill, final passage was not an unequivocal success; Washington State Assistant Attorney

General Phillip Austin had to defend the plan—specifically the population figures by district—in court. The court reluctantly ruled to uphold the legislators' plan, and issued with their ruling the reminder that the plan would do only until 1971. In that year legislators would be required by the state constitution to redistrict using the 1970 census figures. Meanwhile, Washington's population was rapidly growing. Thus, though the 1965 session adequately resolved the immediate redistricting problem, the solution was only temporary. The nature of Washington's redistricting laws meant future legislative members would have to go through the whole process again.

CHAPTER 11

REDISTRICTING: 1971-1974

Ms. Boswell: We've talked about different redistricting efforts and I wondered about the redistricting effort that began in the early 1970s. When you finished in 1965 with redistricting, did you think you were finished with this whole issue?

Senator Greive: No. We knew we had to come back.

Ms. Boswell: And why was that?

Sen. Greive: Well, because of one man, one vote, and we have to do it every ten years. There was no other mechanism at that time set up for doing it, and actually the legislators didn't want another mechanism set up because they were afraid of what it would do. I mean, finally after the third time, they accepted it.

Ms. Boswell: So how did this 1970s redistricting effort begin?

Sen. Greive: Well, I think a number of factors brought it to that conclusion. The whole AFL-CIO promoted it, and there were an awful lot of other things that happened. Redistricting just isn't popular to the public. They figure you're only down there looking out for yourselves. We accuse them and they accuse us, and so pretty quickly it degenerated down to a bunch of pigs fighting.

Ms. Boswell: Did the census—the 1970 census—have much to do with it?

Sen. Greive: We were required to do it by census, and the census comes out every ten years and that's what drives the wagon, so to speak.

Ms. Boswell: Can you lay out for me the sides or issues that developed in terms of this last redistricting, then?

Sen. Greive: Well, of course you understand that's the last redistricting that we'll ever do—that the Legislature tried to do because now we've got a commission. I don't know if that's any better or any worse, but it's out of the hands of the Legislature.

This particular one was marked by the same problem we had before. I never could get the Republicans to put all their cards on the table. To be perfectly honest, there was always a hidden agenda all the time. We thought we had, at one point, the thing all negotiated, and we all agreed—I remember Bailey saying we better get the governor to vote on this. The governor said, "I have to have," I think it was, "one more senator." He said, "I'll veto it unless I get one more senator." He was just that cold about it.

Well, what are you going to do? Evans just blew it sky high. I started looking at it and saying, "Well, if you make a little change here, a little change there, or if you do this or that…" But see, we'd been negotiating for weeks. He just blew it completely out of the saddle on a Sunday afternoon, as I recall. Bailey and I went over to the house and talked to him and were just sitting there in the house in the conference room. So, it was a political question all the way, as far as he's concerned.

Ms. Boswell: Now, had you put together a

similar office and team as you had in past redistricting?

Sen. Greive: Yes, and actually I've got a little interesting story on that. When we did it we, we thought we had to reach across party lines because the Republicans had a majority. We had lots of votes in the Senate—we had twenty-nine to twenty or something—but in the House it was fifty-one Republicans to forty-eight Democrats or something like that. I think that would have to be it—there're ninety-nine House members. We'd always be struggling to get some of them to come over, and we put on an open house. We would openly discuss it with them. Our worst enemy could come over wanting to know anything, and we'd tell him, "Sit down." We'd go over it.

By that time we had the conference room downstairs right next to my little office. I had an office upstairs with the official office, but then I've always had the little cubbyhole that I used all for ten to fifteen years. Right next to it, I had the whole conference room where we had maps laid out and hung up and on reels and that sort of thing, so that they could take them down and look at them as well as the overlays. Somebody said that we were being secretive, and I got pretty sore because the Republican headquarters was about five miles away, and they weren't even permitted in to look at it, the average Republican. They might let you see your district but that's it. We were letting them see everything, and I had a sign made—or maybe I made it myself—it said, "Redistricting Clinic. Open to the public." We plastered that on the door—it was a good size sign. So, our attitude was anybody who wanted to look at what our plans were could.

We were not necessarily telling them, but we had a plan ready to go, and we'd show it to them. We often discussed the details, in the meantime, because I was always convinced that if I only had to please the people sitting in the seats, I could please them. But if somebody had a hidden agenda—that wanted to take over or make a game—we weren't going to make it. What I preached the other times is that if you're going to redistrict the people sitting in the seats, you'd better take care of the people sitting in the seats, or you're not going to get the votes.

This is for not for public consumption, but I mean, it just doesn't follow one man, one vote and all these phrases and things. It was just window dressing, that's all. The Republicans had the same problem that I did; they couldn't put a plan together. In fact, when they did do a plan together, I remember I saw it the first time, and I was laughing at what they did. There's an article written by Richard Larson, who was never a political friend of mine, although he was a nice guy to talk to. He talks about the fact that they showed me the Republican plan and then he said:

[*Senator Greive reads from an article by Richard Larsen published in the* Seattle Times]

Moments later, outside the Speaker's office, Senator Greive, Democrat mastermind of the Democratic redistricting, sat on the couch to examine the Republican plan. Grieve said, with a giggle, 'This isn't a plan; this is a joke. They want to repeal the election, that's all.' He scans the map and gives a running commentary to the gathering of mostly reporters. 'They kind of put Francis and Dore in the same district, that's Senator Francis, Senator Dore.' He points out the Thirty-second District of Senator Pete Francis, a Democrat, has been stretched across the Seattle's North End to gobble up the Forty-fifth District, which is Senator Fred Dore, another Democrat. Still examining the map, with rising emotion, Greive asked, 'Where did they put Herr? They didn't just leave him out; he has to be some place.' The reference was to Senator Gordon

Herr from the West Seattle District who served faithfully in the Democratic infantry in the Senate. He said, 'Aaaah! Herr is found; his home lies in the newly formed District Five. The district meanders along the water, salt waterfront, King County; it's a lovely place to live but it's a tough place for a Democrat to find votes.'

Grieve said loudly, 'Look here.' He points to the Thirty-third District, 'Another water front trip from Seward Park along the shores of Lake Washington.' It would accommodate two House seats but the boundaries include five incumbent Democrats: John Bagnariol, John Merrill, Bud Shinpoch, John O'Brien, William Chatalas. Representative Brown, a principal author of the plan, joined Greive's conversation group and Greive asks him why Dore's senatorial district in the North End disappeared. Brown said, 'It didn't disappear. We merely moved it to Enumclaw.' Brown alludes to Dore's move last year from his home in the Thirty-seventh District to the North End, where he won an election skillfully riding the property tax revolt. 'Senator Dore has moved before and we thought he might not mind moving again. Besides Enumclaw is a lovely place to live.'

Ms. Boswell: Tongue in cheek. And that was the article from April 27, 1971.

Sen. Greive: So you know it. We got to the point where I knew the districts almost by looking where they were and the shapes because we'd been through all that. In that case they didn't set out to draw a plan; they set out to destroy it and propose something we couldn't accept. That was typical of what they would do.

Ms. Boswell: Now when you say "they," who was primarily behind it?

Sen. Greive: Well, I don't know, Gorton was now Attorney General, but he was masterminding the whole thing, I think. Some things I don't know, and obviously they didn't tell me, and so I going to put some on the record. I'd like to be sure I'm accurate, but I always thought that Slade Gorton was running it and Evans, of course. Evans didn't sit down and do all the things, but Evans is a smart guy, and he knew a lot about the districts, too. But I didn't feel I was negotiating with the House; I felt I was negotiating with the hierarchy.

Ms. Boswell: Who was the spokesperson for the House?

Sen. Greive: It was Brown. Brown was the chairman, but he wasn't in control of anything. He wasn't in the position to make changes.

Ms. Boswell: What about George Prince?

Sen. Greive: Well, George Prince is the front man. As I look at it, he liked the idea of getting publicity and having his name in the paper and so did his wife, and he felt that he was a respectable Democrat. He didn't have to be with us working types, and he could sit in Mercer Island and sort of do the whole thing. Not only that, when he brought his actions he got paid, because if you're successful then the Court will put in a bill, and he got money. Now, I don't think money motivated him, though. I think he just liked the idea of being one of the major players in the state of Washington.

Ms. Boswell: He had previously been involved in the very early League of Woman Voters suit; hadn't he been an attorney or had some sort of involvement in it?

Sen. Greive: Yes, he was involved with them all the way along. Now I never met George Prince. I wouldn't know what he looks like if he walked through the door, so all I know is

what I read in the papers. People told me they used him to support their plans essentially.

Ms. Boswell: And whom did you have working on your team this time?

Sen. Greive: Well, I had Cough, Steve Cough. He was out of the University of Washington. He's got a Master's Degree and he doesn't work in this particular field. I think mostly he runs computers and that sort of thing. But he was a real genius when it came to statistics, and he kind of ran the show for me. But we had a number of other people; for one thing, a lot of people became interested in redistricting. Workers down there—just employees if they had free time—they came over and helped us work. We always had a crew down there. Everybody that became interested—it caught up a certain number of people—and it was just something to do. Late at night they could go down there, and they could have fun moving districts around and wondering what happened. They all had contacts, and they all had people in the area they would ask what they thought about their district and find that out. Probably several of them were reporting to the House, but we didn't care—I mean the House Republicans and the Democrats.

Then we had Gary Grant from the House; he became involved. Gary Grant seemed to be more interested in having his name on something and pushing me around than he was interested in redistricting. He only wanted the Grant plan, but his plan looked pretty much like what we were doing. But we didn't object when he came over. We were glad to talk to him, too. I felt that was the only way he could do it.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of your career at that time, what percentage of time did you end up having to spend on redistricting?

Sen. Greive: Enormous amounts of time, and I mean enormous. We worked days and weekends; we worked nights. We quit at ten or eleven o'clock, and I'd go out to the dances or clubs or wherever they were, have a few dances. I usually picked up my wife before I went, and we'd go out there for a while. But other than that most of the time was spent on it. We had some duties as far as keeping the agenda, but this redistricting got so important and had so massive an impact that it sort of held everything up. We worked on it for two years….

Ms. Boswell: I was going to say, it took about two years.

Sen. Greive: We had Cough—a new staff. He made a deal with the university to be released. He worked right around the clock. When we were out of session, he was still down there working.

Ms. Boswell: But what else happened? You had your plan that you had developed, and the Republicans had one.

Sen. Greive: We had several plans. If there was somebody who said they had an objection to something then we would make changes, but you just don't make a change in redistricting. You make a change, and then you find you have a whole massive other lot of changes to make because that changes the boundaries. We contended one hundred forty nine thousand people weren't counted actually. The master just didn't have the expertise that we had. I'm sure he didn't leave them out deliberately, but we put that into our appeal—that's one of the things we appealed on.

Ms. Boswell: Now, you mention the master, but let me step back for a minute and sort of get to the point where he comes into the story. So you've been working on this for a long

time, pretty much night and day through the session and outside of the session. Essentially, does it come to an impasse where you can't seem to agree? What happened?

Sen. Greive: Well, the Republicans would never agree, but they never say that it's hopeless. They make an issue out of it. I think the public was pretty disgusted with all of us working on redistricting. I don't think that it was popular then. I wish there was something we could do without getting into the newspapers or getting TV involved because every time they gave us publicity, even though they didn't say anything bad, they had us fighting and bickering. "They got a plan, and I got a plan," and the public didn't understand it. The public thinks it's easy: just go put them in a district someplace. They don't appreciate the differences. Now, the insiders do, when the AFL-CIO people would do it. I'm sure that the Boeing lobbyist would, for example, but it's a very thin layer of people who really know anything about redistricting or care. You get beyond that media circle, and they don't know—even the county officials. They may be sympathetic with us, in say Mason County or Pend Orielle or whatever, but they're not going to knock themselves out for redistricting. They run their own counties, and they're not too involved in it. It's like "a plague on both their houses."

Ms. Boswell: So what ultimately prompted Prince to file the lawsuit?

Sen. Greive: He began the first of the lawsuits and said we hadn't done our jobs. He saw a chance to make a public speech or two, so he filed it—and more power to him. It was a good thing rather than a bad thing, but after that he got a taste of the publicity, and you couldn't keep him out of things. He kept wanting to get in the middle of it every time. Now, I said I wouldn't recognize him if he walked in here, but that doesn't mean I didn't see him in court. I did, but I forgot what he looks like now. But we weren't in court very much together. Once or twice.

Ms. Boswell: So, his first complaint was essentially what? Was that before you actually had started redistricting then?

Sen. Greive: Oh, we were working on it.

Ms. Boswell: You were working on it, but you just hadn't reached any kind of agreement?

Sen. Greive: So he filed it. He saw a chance to sort of be the white knight and that's politics. At that time he may have had other ambitions, too. I don't know. I always thought he wanted to end up with a judgeship or something, but he didn't.

Ms. Boswell: And so when he filed it, what were the immediate ramifications?

Sen. Greive: Well, we didn't take him seriously. You see Myron Borawick had done it before. The first person to do this was Borawick. He filed suit in the redistricting effort that began in 1962. Prince didn't come in until the second redistricting. By that time Borawick was representing the AFL-CIO. Borawick was a friend of mine; I didn't put him up to it. He had filed the case for a man named Thigpen who was a justice of the peace, out in his area, and the case was Thigpen versus the United States or what ever it was.

Ms. Boswell: *Thigpen v Meyers*.

Sen. Greive: Yes. Prince saw a chance to enhance his public acceptance. See, when you're a lawyer you don't need to worry when things are really awfully popular. He was on the popular side, so let's get it done. "The Legislature doesn't know what they're doing;

they're fighting. They can't do it, so I'll do it." So he was in a very popular position.

Ms. Boswell: And once he had filed it, how did that affect you? What happened then?

Sen. Greive: I don't think it affected us particularly. I think we'd have ended up in the same place anyway, but my problem was that by this time, Gorton had taken over and filed the lawsuit. He conspired—I call it—with Prince to kind of be a front. And looked at from my perspective, it appeared like that. Prince and Gorton seemed to be tagging along together, and he would use—he would quote Prince—and Gorton was kind of independent, so when he filed the lawsuit, well, the lawsuit bothered us. He asked the court to accept the plan and—first of all—we didn't know he filed a lawsuit. We were never given any notice of it.

I remember specifically that May 5, I think it was, or May 6, 1971, we met with Gorton, and we were pretty upset because we found that they'd been talking about plans and whole lot of things. I can't comment on it honestly because I wasn't part of the discussion, and we pointed out to Gorton that he was the lawyer for the state of Washington and the Senate was a part of the mechanism, and we should be kept informed.

We were sure we that we would be kept informed, but he didn't keep his word. On May 5 then, we found out that Prince filed and the Attorney General had moved to intervene; he wasn't in the original action. So, that night we had a terrible time because Gorton kept saying it was the "Gorton strategy." Actually, it was that he and Evans had finally come up with a governor's plan that they would present. The governor's plan, as the official plan of the state of Washington, was the one he hoped to get the court to accept. That official plan, of course, was not in our favor—the Democrats—and I think that was his strategy. Of course, he was going to keep us from knowing what it was about, so we weren't even parties. We didn't get papers served on us; we didn't know what was going on. So, then we went and got the court to put us in as a party so that we could be informed. Until that point, we were out of it. They were going to have a plan, adopt it, and send it to the Supreme Court, and we would be just up a creek, as I see it.

And it very well could have been Prince's plan because Prince was part of the negotiations, but since I wasn't part of the negotiations I don't know exactly.

Ms. Boswell: Who was really behind that?

Sen. Greive: Well, what I strongly suspect is that Prince and Gorton were working together. But I only suspect; I don't have proof that I know of.

Ms. Boswell: Now, there had been a lot of changes in terms of the population of the state in that period.

Sen. Greive: And in our plans we got the compromises. Why, we had some that were under and over in terms of numbers, there's no question about that. I was the first to say that it wasn't perfect, but we did a lot better job each time we did it as far as population is concerned because even when they were all done, they missed all kinds of counts. We showed it to them—affidavits that were in the lawsuit.

Ms. Boswell: What were they actually hoping to do with their suit then?

Sen. Greive: They wanted their own plan. In other words, they wanted a partisan plan. They wanted to adopt it. They didn't care that the Senate was thirty-two to nineteen or thirty-one to nineteen in favor of the Democrats.

They wanted to have their plan, not our plan.

Ms. Boswell: Now, it seems like I read, too, that there was another provision of Prince's motion that said something about declaring the 1965 law unconstitutional.

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: What was that all about?

Sen. Greive: Well, he didn't want them to just put it over another year. He wanted to knock it out so we had to redistrict. That was a good play.

Ms. Boswell: All right, so the 1965 law just was the old redistricting?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: And so he just wanted to get rid of that?

Sen. Greive: Ten years, every ten years, but we were five years into it before we got it done, and I don't think it was popular with the public. I mean, I'm not against Prince particularly.

Ms. Boswell: Now, in going through Prince's particular motion, something also comes up under representation of minorities.

Sen. Greive: I don't know what Prince has to say about it right now, but I know that when their plan was done—the master's plan—they didn't represent the minorities. We submitted a series of affidavits—very substantial series of affidavits—by people who for one reason or another knew a piece of it. We didn't know—most of the people didn't have a picture of the whole, but they know a part of it.

Ms. Boswell: We jumped the gun here a little. How did the master get involved? How did that all come about?

Sen. Greive: Well, finally, I got to thinking we were going to make it; in fact, I was very hopeful, and the newspaper articles at the time would reflect that. I was so focused, and I could see that we were very close; we were at the point where we could make a compromise. Time after time, we had it almost there, and then it would blast apart. I had no idea that—well, I had an idea, but I didn't have any proof—that somebody was frustrating it. Now, looking back on it, I was duped, but I really did think we had it. I didn't want to go and have the court do something, when I thought we had it done ourselves because I had the dubious task of protecting the members. You can't be the floor leader and majority leader and then sell them all down the road.

So I had to protect the people who were elected in office, but every time I got to the point where I thought we had it, why, then there would be somebody who'd throw a monkey wrench into it. It was their people who did it, and then we'd have to start over and make another try because they'd bring up some new problem. And we'd try to solve that problem, and so, little by little, we knew all of the problems. We'd talk about a problem, and we'd know right now what they're talking about. They'd tell us there was a problem in Gig Harbor or Spokane or Davenport or Walla Walla, and we'd try to go out and solve it. Sometimes we could bring the two sides together, but, you see, I think we have forty-nine senators and then ninety-nine House members. You've got an awful lot of people to please, and you can't get too many of them mad.

Ms. Boswell: But then all of a sudden—

Sen. Greive: Well, we always came out politically. My thought was if we kept the people happy that were sitting in the seats, we'd come out politically. I didn't think we had to go to unusual tricks to eliminate people, or we'd just come out to do this or that.

Ms. Boswell: But then when Prince filed his suit, did that stop the negotiation on the Senate side?

Sen. Greive: Well, it didn't hurt us; it helped us. But the thing was, see, the only two parties before the court were Prince and Gorton, and the rest of us are excluded, including the AFL-CIO, the Grange, and so forth. Why then, that's what the court hears. Then they make a deal and negotiate a settlement, and that's it. They can negotiate Prince's plan. Prince would be happy with that, and the court would accept it, and it would be redistricted. It was a way to get around us.

Ms. Boswell: So, how does the master come in then?

Sen. Greive: Well, the master was appointed by the court because we couldn't agree. I kept thinking we could because what they would do is, they'd talk about agreeing, but every time it got close, well, then I'd feel softness on the other side. "Well now, I think I've got a chance," and I got pledges from people saying they would vote for it, but they didn't have nerve enough to vote for it when the time came down to it. Of course, I had accounted for that. I always knew that most of them would be that way. I always figured a few of them might stand up, but they never had nerve enough to stand up against the leadership.

Ms. Boswell: So these would be primarily Republicans?

Sen. Greive: Primarily Republicans, but then, the times the Democrats were in control, then I had to contend with Grant and O'Brien, who thought we had given up too much in 1965, although we had done very well politically after that in the elections. I don't know what they were thinking about.

I'm convinced that O'Brien wanted to be the one that protected his people. He had a handful of people that made him Speaker three times, and I don't blame him for that—that's the world. You live in a realistic world when you're trying to put everything together. You can't go design something that won't work. You had to get the votes.

Ms. Boswell: But would you still say that you thought your plan was as non-partisan as you could make it?

Sen. Greive: Well, I'm not saying non-partisan. It ended up protecting the people in the seats, but I think it was bi-partisan in that both sides could win and have a say in the matter. I'm sure of that because I felt that I couldn't go too far, or else nobody would accept it. If I went outrageously far—well, I didn't try to. In other words, I didn't object when they made a deal for Thomas Swayze so that he could live across the Narrows and have a little strip of land. Why, I figured that he's entitled to it, if that's the way they wanted it. It didn't hurt anything. He was the Speaker of the House after all.

Ms. Boswell: So what prompted the courts to finally step in?

Sen. Greive: Well, they just dragged it on and on; you couldn't come to a conclusion. I don't blame them, either. I think we could have done it, if the court had told us that we couldn't do anything—like they had before in 1965, that we couldn't pass a piece of legislation, or didn't do anything—I think we'd have agreed. But as long as they let the business keep

flowing along, why then there's always somebody that didn't agree.

Ms. Boswell: So, how did the court decide whom they were going to choose then for the master?

Sen. Greive: Well, I don't know how they chose Richard Morrill. We all submitted names of people we thought that would be good masters. We submitted Howard McCurdy, for instance, who's a Republican and had been Gorton's assistant before. We submitted a variety of other people—I forget who all they were. I may have it down here, but I think we might have put Borawick in. We put down Ken Gilbert, who, for instance, has been chief elections officer for the state of Washington for twenty some years. He worked for the Secretary of State in the Elections Department. We put him down for somebody we trust, and they submitted their list.

Ms. Boswell: They, being the Republicans?

Sen. Greive: Yes, the Republicans, and maybe Prince may have submitted some names, too. I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: Now, Richard Morrill, who was he? He was from the University of Washington?

Sen. Greive: Yes, professor of geography.

Ms. Boswell: So, they had him, then, do his own plan?

Sen. Greive: Well, the question is, did he? The judges appointed him to do it. There were all kinds of rumors that that the judge had a hand in it, but I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: Did each side have to provide him with all of their materials that they had been working with?

Sen. Greive: Well, we made ours available, I'm sure everybody else did if he wanted it. I don't think he was much interested in what we had done or anybody else. I think he wanted to draw his own plan, but his plan was very hard on incumbents, I can tell you that for sure.

Ms. Boswell: And how long did it take him to develop it?

Sen. Greive: I don't know, it was a matter of weeks—a month or something, a month and a half. He made a lot of technical errors. For one thing, we were given guidelines, and he violated all the guidelines. They let him do it. You're supposed to have a natural border for district; you're supposed to incorporate this and that. And he didn't count all the people; we figured he missed one hundred forty-nine thousand people that should have been counted because there's a little piece here that he'd leave out, and a little piece there he'd leave out. He didn't make it clear where they were supposed to be, but I suppose that's inevitable. When Gorton and I were doing it we did a lot better job because we looked at each other. We knew that if we did something, Gorton was going to look at it, and Gorton knew we were going to look at it, but Morrill didn't have that pressure on him. See, we had what you call peer review when we did something.

Ms. Boswell: Right. So, Morrill then revealed his plan, and what happened then?

Sen. Greive: Well, it was eventually adopted by the court, and that was it. We appealed, or tried to appeal it, and we couldn't get it. See, this is a special three-judge court, and the only place we could appeal was the Supreme Court

of the United States. It doesn't go through the District Court procedure. Because it was a constitutional matter, they were sitting as a three-judge court judging a constitutional issue. The only body above that with jurisdiction is the Supreme Court of the United States.

Ms. Boswell: This three-judge court, though, what level would it be? Is it a District Court?

Sen. Greive: I've never been through anything like it before or since. I don't know, but as I understood it, it was a constitutional issue. This is a three-judge court, and the three-judge courts are almost the highest. The only place you could go is the Supreme Court of the United States if you're not satisfied, and they don't operate like the others do.

Normally, you operated in a chain. You worked your way up to the U.S. District, the District Courts, and then to the Appellate Court—the Ninth District—and from the Ninth District to the Supreme Court, but they didn't. They went from there to the United States Supreme Court.

Ms. Boswell: So, when Morrill introduced his plan, there wasn't any argument and you just had to accept it?

Sen. Greive: There were all kinds of arguments. We consumed several days of argument. We submitted briefs, and it seemed like to me we had about five hundred pages—four hundred seventy-four, four hundred-eighty, four hundred and ninety-four pages or so—that were filled with all the documents and exhibits that we put in. So four hundred and ninety-four pages is a lot of pages and exhibits, plus a lot of other things that the court could call upon if they wanted to, so they could reach out. There was plenty of reading material.

Ms. Boswell: What were your few main arguments about?

Sen. Greive: Well, we had a series of arguments that we objected to. Once we made the decision to oppose the plan and show that it was unfair so that we'd get a better shake the next time, then we began to look at things. Part of the first things that we said was that blacks and other minorities are under-counted, and that the principal people who were under-counted were the soldiers who were permanent residents. Mostly that's in Fort Lewis, but it was other places, too. These are people that were stationed somewhere for a period of time and are voters in the state of Washington. They were missed.

He missed the Indians—the Indian nations. We had statements from our attorney and various people like that saying that they were under-counted, substantially under-counted, especially around Yakima where they had a better line on them.

And the other thing we went after was the blacks, and the mistakes that were made. I said one hundred forty-nine thousand, I think it was—a little mistake here, a little mistake there.

Now, these mistakes are questionable. Maybe somebody else would look at them and say, "Well, you read it differently," and say, "That isn't a mistake." But there was enough to be substantial, whether it was one hundred twenty-nine thousand, I don't know. We figured they could get around those by withdrawing it, but we didn't think they would let the mistakes go. But they let the mistakes go anyway, and nobody called them on it. The courts accepted it, but I guess it's an area where it's so hard to do, and they don't want it to come unraveled. Why, you just accept it. So, we didn't think the count was right.

We did think they had under-counted, especially the blacks, the Indians, the military personnel, and those were our attacks on them,

but we got nowhere.

Ms. Boswell: Now, you were joined in the attacks by the AFL-CIO. Is that fair?

Sen. Greive: Yes, well, it's unfair to say that we were joined. We went and sought them out. They were our natural enemies. They were interested; they were around there all the time. They were talking about it. What my attitude was is this: if you're going to become part of it, and you've got a lot more prestige than others do, you should come in. So, we were probably more encouraging is the best way to say it. They paid the lawyer, though, and they hired Borawick. I suggested him; I thought he was a good lawyer. He was the one that handled it the first time, but that doesn't mean that they had to hire him. They could have hired him if they wanted.

Ms. Boswell: But now, did you serve as attorney for them at all, too?

Sen. Greive: I was the attorney. It finally came down to where I represented—not the AFL-CIO (at one time, I did for one of the unions, but I never represented the AFL-CIO)—but in this particular instance, I became the attorney for the appellants. So I wrote the brief with considerable help from various people who assembled the material and did all that sort of thing, but I had the staff to do it—I didn't have to do it all myself. All I had to say is, "Get me this document and that document and index it," and various things like that, and they did it.

I had to get myself admitted to plead before the Supreme Court, incidentally. I went to Washington, D.C. and got myself admitted, and the next time I was in Washington, D.C., I had to go, walk up, and stand before the Court, and they admitted me. The ceremony was very brief; it was done on paper. I've got a certificate out there in the office. I'm one of the few lawyers around who's got a certificate to show that I'm a member of the Supreme Court—not that's it's very important. I've never had a case since or before. It's an honorary thing; I think almost anybody can get it if they have to, especially if you've got a case that might be important. But I had to do it; it was a requirement, or otherwise I probably wouldn't have bothered.

Ms. Boswell: I didn't know you had to get special permission to argue a case there.
But now, I guess I still don't understand how Borawick fits in.

Sen. Greive: Well, Borawick was the first person to bring in a redistricting action. He represented *Thigpen v. Meyers* in the first redistricting. He was successful, but he's also a friend of mine. He's somebody I knew and had some respect for, and he became a part of this. To the AFL-CIO, I said, "I think you should intervene." "Okay, now who do we get for a lawyer? Who would you get?" They were our allies, and so to ask me was the logical thing, and I suggested Borawick. I didn't tell them that they had to get Borawick; that's up to them. My attitude simply was that he was familiar with the material; he'd done it once successfully by himself, and who else do you get? He was, I think, a Democrat, but I don't know if he was or not. He's dead now.

Ms. Boswell: So, he essentially then represented the labor interest in this?

Sen. Greive: Yes, but in most cases we were together; in other words, any brief I put in, they were in support of it. I'd have to look at all the documents to see what they put in.; I just have the one thing here, but somewhere I've got all the documents, or I can get them down at the court in the archives. I suspect that he put his own briefs though.

Ms. Boswell: But then, you said that you gathered literally hundreds of pages of testimony and supporting documentation.

Sen. Greive: Mostly they were affidavits. There was very, very little testimony because they didn't give us a hearing. But everything was on the record, and the record was done by affidavit; it wasn't done by calling witnesses and putting them on the stand and putting them under oath. This is all done on paper.

Ms. Boswell: And what kind of people or who did you have give affidavits?

Sen. Greive: Well, it depended on what issue. If we were interested in the all-over census of Melvin Seuger—

Ms. Boswell: I'm sorry, who was Seuger?

Sen. Greive: He was the director of the census, or one of the directors of the census, in King County. We had an affidavit from Peggy Maxie—Peggy Joan Maxie was the first black woman ever elected in the Legislature. She was in the Thirty-second District, and they were cutting her district out. They hadn't counted everybody, so she put an affidavit in saying that it wasn't the correct count.

Ms. Boswell: Was she any relation to Carl Maxie?

Sen. Greive: Yes. I don't know what relation, but some relation. I don't think she was married to him at all, but he was prominent civil rights lawyer; at least that's what I remember.

Another was Sam W. Hunt, an aide to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, because he kept taking in more correlation between how many students were in class in their district. You see, the federal government pays part of the per student cost and so they had different figures. We made comparisons and they helped; they were very helpful to point out that there were really more people—based on the number of students—in the Thirty-seventh District. They used the number of students in Pasco because they also had them by race. So, they weren't being reflected in the numbers being counted.

Now, we had George Kupka. He was a former state representative, no longer in office and therefore he was out of the fight. But he had represented the Twenty-seventh District or the Hill Top District over in Tacoma for many years, and he put one in. We had Mike Gallagher—he's an old war horse—but very knowledgeable in this manner. He'd been King County chairman, and he'd been a state senator, and he'd been a state representative. When he was in the Legislature, he was always on the Constitution and Elections Committee and he'd been chairman of it several times. So, he had an affidavit from him on some of the racial minorities and so forth and so on.

George Sheridan had been very active in various things; at one time he was a state representative, but he'd also been a county commissioner in Pierce County. When he was a county commissioner, the county was divided into three districts, and his particular county commissioner district was the one with all the minorities were in it. So, we had him give his opinion on the statistics, and he said that they left out six hundred thousand Negroes. He said about seventy percent of the people were counted and that was his doing.

And we had William Schlick. He was an attorney for the Yakima Nation, when they were the most successful tribe, at that time, probably in the state. They had a lot of farms and—you know they were something—they had a lot of land. It was reservation land that had been set aside for them, and he explained

how they hadn't counted all of the people in the tribes, and that they had different counts for different purposes.

We had Ross Young—now, Ross Young had been a statistician who was employed in various capacities around the state Legislature. He had done everything from being a doorman when he was out of power, and when he was in power, they had him as a statistician. He lived in Olympia and just liked to be around to some capacity, but he was very capable. I think he had a Master's—he certainly had a degree—he was no dummy. He wasn't just somebody that we picked up. In the Legislature, people like him were always in demand. There's a group that somehow seemed to turn up on various sides of things. Sometimes they're one way, sometimes the other, but they're people of expertise who live there and go and look for a job every session.

And then we had Pat Sutherland. Now, Pat Sutherland had been a state representative and a state senator for the Thirty-seventh District at one time, and he would eventually became the prosecuting attorney down at Thurston County. In fact, he retired and died here just shortly after, but at that particular time we used him in the capacity because he was familiar with the Thirty-seventh District and knew about the under-count.

We had Neale. Neale Chaney was the Democratic chairman for the state of Washington. We got Neale to come through and give his say that it was partisan, and talk about the political things that separated it.

Those are the type of people that we had, so you can see that every one of these people is partisan—I'm not trying to say that we were nonpartisan—but they were people with expertise. When you go to court and you bring your experts, they don't expect you to bring experts that you don't agree with. Every one of them would qualify. Now, were they prejudiced? Well, they may have been Democratic-oriented because that's who I'd get. I'm sure that we had affidavits from Joe Davis and some other people, too.

Ms. Boswell: Al Rosellini, I think.

Sen. Greive: Rosellini, but we had those because they were big names in their own right. Generally, they commented on broader things. We also had a number of people whose names were instantly recognizable because they took a part in the process. For instance, we had Albert Rosellini. We had Joe Davis; we had AFL-CIO people. We had Graham who'd been a state Democratic chairman, and we had people who were openly partisan.

We called them just to show that the Democrats were united. Probably the most important person that we had was Steve Cough. Steve knew more than anyone about it; he knew more about that land than the maps and actually ran the drawing and ran the crew and so forth and so on. He had two or three affidavits in, but we felt he was an expert. Rosellini and Davis—they were much broader. So, we had a good team, and they didn't put any experts on to contest us. It wasn't like we had to fight with them. They just ignored it—the attorney general and Prince.

Ms. Boswell: And then some of them testified about the apparent partisanship or inequities, and even about the way the master had divided up the districts?

Sen. Greive: Well, the master didn't do a very good job of redistricting, that's all. He may be a professor of geography, and I think, given enough time, he might have done a better job. He took on a job that I'm sure boggled his mind a little, and he wanted to show how he could get it done in a hurry—how he could do it this way and that way. I don't think that he sat down and studied, except in a few cases, mine or somebody else's. He might have done

that, but I don't think he was anxious to just fine-tune the whole thing. He knew things; that is, you lived in certain areas that were along the water if you were Republicans. He knew that where the "Gold Coasts" were, and he knew the general characteristics. He would know where the blacks would live, and he knew where the military would live. He was a geographer; he knew those things.

Ms. Boswell: But, just this one example: your own district, as opposed to the Speaker of the House's district, was strangely apportioned, wasn't it?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: Can you tell me about that?

Sen. Greive: Now, did you put that on the record already?

Ms. Boswell: No. We haven't talked about that yet.

Sen. Greive: Well, then stop for a minute until I find it. The Democratic chairman is talking about the unfairness of the plan.

Ms. Boswell: This is Neale Chaney. This is an affidavit and I'm just going to read a short portion of it. He says:

That in the districts of the two most prominent leaders in the Legislative redistricting effort—the majority leader of the Senate, who is a Democrat, and the Speaker of the House, who is a Republican—the master showed gross favoritism for the Republican. For instance, the Speaker of the House, part of his district is in Tacoma. But he has recently moved to the peninsula area across the Narrows Bridge, which is also in his present district, so that the Republican attorney general made a special plea that his district be kept intact—which was done by the master, even though his new district will be separated by Puget Sound. When it came to the Democratic leader, Senator Greive, however, his district has for forty years had a river running through it, an industrial section of the district. Requests were made by the interveners, the AFL-CIO, and Senator Cooney that Senator Grieve's district be left intact. But the master not only used the Duwamish River as a border but brought the district down along the Republican-leaning "Gold Coast," something that no plan proposed by either Democrats or Republicans had done.

Sen. Greive: That brought it along the coast; it meant that it was stair-stepped in degrees, and the river was along with the border then.

Ms. Boswell: So, there appeared, at least to some, to be some favoritism in this redistricting, even though the master was supposed to be neutral?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I think that there was gross favoritism; I didn't know, no question about that. They displaced a lot of the city people, but I suppose that's old hat now. Those people are dead and gone.

Ms. Boswell: In getting these affidavits, did you provide information to these people?

Sen. Greive: Well, we probably drew up the affidavits, if you want to know the truth, but that's no different than you do in court. By now, I can say that I practiced law for over forty-five years, and you go out and get your expert, you talk over the facts and so forth. You expect them to write it, and some cases—like Neale Chaney or somebody—they might be willing to write it, but normally the experts want you to write it, and they'll correct it and change it. Now, once in a while you get somebody that's so technical only he can write

it, or she can write it; then they do it. It was a standard procedure.

In any event, it was something that was read several times by whoever signed it. We didn't just automatically sign it; we took our time with it and explained it. We'd have two or three sessions with them, often. I don't know how many, I can't remember at this point how many we had. The information we had, for instance, when it was statistical information, it was a good chance that the expert didn't actually look the statistics up. He took the statistics from us. The important thing was that this is submitted in court, if you're worried about that in the first place. The second place is the other side is going to read it with a fine-tooth comb. They didn't submit any documents in opposition, so I'd presume what we said was correct. In fact, I'm sure I'm right.

Ms. Boswell: But the judge—what did the judge do with the information?

Sen. Greive: Well, there were three judges.

Ms. Boswell: The three judges, then?

Sen. Greive: They did just what the master proposed. We didn't have a chance; they just adopted it.

Ms. Boswell: So, they adopted Morrill's plan?

Sen. Greive: They prevented us from making arguments, but then that didn't do us any good. They made up their mind; they just adopted it, and they were done with it. We had to appeal to the appellate court, and the appellate court in this case was the United States Supreme Court.

Ms. Boswell: So, tell me about that experience.

Sen. Greive: Well, we got it all down on paper. They refused to hear the case. We made an application to be put on the docket, and we submitted all our materials to the judges, asking one of them to certify us and to put us on the docket. We didn't make the docket so the decision stood. But they had lots of material; both sides submitted material on that. The attorney general, I believe—I can't remember now—but I think he supported the Morrill plan.

Ms. Boswell: That would have been Slade Gorton?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: So, once they adopted Morrill's plan, then that was it?

Sen. Greive: That was it, and I'm convinced that initially the Republicans had a real tough reaction. They lost control of the Senate or the House.

Ms. Boswell: Why do you think that happened?

Sen. Greive: Well, I think I got it the next time because I wasn't up that year. I think the public had it up to here with redistricting. I thought that they believed one more time that we were partisan, that we were bickering, and that we were small children, whatever. I always thought that even when we were doing it. I always felt that every redistricting would be the last session I'd ever serve. I used to say that; well, I figured I'm not going to survive—I'm surprised I survived them.

Ms. Boswell: Why did you keep doing it then?

Sen. Greive: Well, because I thought I had to. You can't be the leader and not take on the unpleasant tasks. You don't give away the

ship. It was my job. I knew about it; I was interested in it. I'd done it once, and once I'd done it, why—see, the first time we had to for self-preservation. They just knocked us all out, including me. So when I did that, why there was only one nominee; nobody else wanted the job.

Now, somebody like McCormack came up with a plan of his own because he thought it was some publicity or something like that, and he'd taken an interest—but initially he didn't take an interest. They'd only taking interest, once they had seen—see, once we'd done the statistical work and they could see what we'd done—how things were comparably easy for somebody to make another plan. They had places to check and information had to be gathered, so McCormack or somebody wanted to make a plan. He was Congressman McCormack by this time. He served in both houses of the Legislature, but he became a congressman after what I'm talking about. When he made a plan, he could go down there, and we'd get him any material we had. He could study the records because we had all the redistricting records. Anybody could have them. So then he could make his plan, but he was never able to get the Republicans.

Ms. Boswell: I'm sorry. You had another point you wanted to make about the candidates.

Sen. Greive: When we would be negotiating with the Republicans, why they would make concessions and we'd always wonder what the motive was behind the concession. The concession was—there were several people who were rumored not to be interested in running in the Legislature again, who wanted to run for Congress. One was Thomas Swayze, so if they made a concession that affected Swayze or anything, why they weren't really giving anything away. Another was Bud Pardini; he's a Spokane Republican coming up. Stewart Bledsoe wasn't going to run again. He ran for Congress and lost. Tom Copeland. He was always rumored to run for something else. He was interested in higher office or something—Lieutenant Governor and that sort of thing.

And so we always laughed when they came up with somebody who got hurt, and they'd tell us how hard that was and how important that person was. We'd always call them "congressman." We called them Congressman Bledsoe, Congressman Swayze, Congressman Copeland. Isn't that when Copeland tried several times to get back in as the county councilman or county commissioner over there, but never had been able to make it again? Although he's rich and so forth, he kind of had the style they don't like, apparently.

Ms. Boswell: Now, you had brought up—and then we got sidetracked—that you might have had something more to say to about the census itself and what happened.

Sen. Greive: Well, what we found out or were told was that this was the first time they ever had this mail-back business.

Ms. Boswell: I'm sorry, what is that?

Sen. Greive: They didn't go door-to-door and question and talk to these people. They had a mail-back situation. The whole census is now a mail-back, but this is early on.

Ms. Boswell: Oh, this is 1970.

Sen. Greive: And at that time they tried to do the black areas, but they said the people were so afraid to go there at night. They couldn't get any people willing to go take the census in the black area at night in the Thirty-seventh District, and so they decided to work a mail-back system. And that's why they did it. That accounts for the dramatic differences in the

number of people that were counted there. That's one reason; another reason why the census was inaccurate is that there were a certain number of people who worried about child support or other things that didn't want to be known. Just leave and not have to be identified as being some place. That accounts for another thing, so there were a number of reasons.

In the Indians' case, I don't know why they missed them because the federal government had to supply them money for the Indian census. They should have known, but there were complicated reasons as to why the errors remained. You have to read the affidavits to know, but I don't know at this point if they're of any great importance.

Ms. Boswell: But, so there's the issue of under-counting—the first issue of under representation—that the numbers they're basing all this on in the first place are not correct?

Sen. Greive: Yes. That's one hundred forty-some thousand people—at least that's what Ross Young said. He was working on the staff, and I told him that was his job to go through and recheck everything.

Ms. Boswell: Then there's another issue, too, that's there's partisanship in terms of how they're drawn. And for the black community, the way the Central District was carved up diluted any power that they might have as a block of voters, is that right?

Sen. Greive: That's right; that would be one of them. I don't know if that was true, but it was always a given that they were going to be Democrats, and we had more Democrats to split out. Of course, it's just like having the Gold Coast—you know you have more Republicans. You have more Republicans coming out of the district.

Ms. Boswell: But you could add Democrats and possibly change the vote of a district? In another sense, it could dilute the numbers so that they were overwhelmed by other people?

Sen. Greive: Not only that, I pointed out one case where they stretched the district—and I think this was a Republican plan, not the master's plan—I forget. But what you do is, you could eliminate people by just putting them in the same district. You could do it another way; you could do them in by putting them in districts, senatorial districts, that are not where they live. In other words, if you've got a district representative that is up for re-election, and you move the number somewhere else, they've got to sit the election out because they're no longer eligible when you've changed the number to another district. See, if the Fifth District has its two senators and one has two years to go in his term and you move the Fifth District from Spokane to Seattle, for instance, why, then they'd be without representation. So, you'd have two senators left in what was the Fifth District, but only one of them could survive; there's only one spot. So those are the techniques that we used.

Ms. Boswell: Then you believed that, ultimately, the fallout over this final redistricting plan would hurt the Republicans, but you later became a casualty of it, too, to a degree?

Sen. Greive: Well, I became a casualty by a very close vote, yes. I worked at it; it wasn't like I didn't campaign. I just had the feeling that my district had had enough of me. You know, you think you're popular, but they get down on you for some reason and what are you going to do? You do your best. You can fight back. I had all kinds of coffee hours, put up the campaign signs, the ads, and all that sort of thing. They elected my replacement,

Nancy Buffington. She served only one term in the Legislature; she got married and didn't come back. She is a very delightful woman, but she didn't have to win the election. They voted against me in 1974; they didn't vote for her.

Ms. Boswell: And did that surprise you at the time?

Sen. Greive: Well, I was surprised. I think, when you get into a campaign, you always think you're going to win. Your optimism is something you can't get rid of and I was stunned and that sort of thing. But I think, in looking back on it, that's all right. Probably did me a favor—my constituents put me in the King County Council where I got a lot better retirement. It goes by your high years.

Ms. Boswell: But at the time, how would you describe your feelings when you found out?

Sen. Greive: I felt rejected; I had never lost an election up till then. I run in the same place, you see my district—it varied—sometimes it went downtown, sometimes it went over the hump to Lake Skyway and that area right up to Renton. Sometimes it went south to Federal Way. West Seattle was a peninsula and so it was difficult to join with others areas. So, wherever West Seattle went, I went.

I was born and raised here and I felt very bad about it and you always do when you lose. But in the Legislature, it was probably a good thing. Besides, I had enough of redistricting. I thought at times of becoming a consultant for redistricting and things like that because many states have problems, but I always felt I'm better off not getting involved in it anymore.

Ms. Boswell: In retrospect, were you sorry you did get involved?

Sen. Greive: No. It was just like a job. Plumbers make a lot of money, but they've got a miserable job. There are miserable aspects of almost every job. For instance, I have some rentals and people play loud music late at night. I've got to go tell them they can't do it, and this is just a part of the job. If I were the floor leader and didn't look out for the people, I wouldn't be doing my job. I used to feel that I was not just a legislator, but I also was a business agent for the people. There's no other way to do it, or you can't look out for them.

Ms. Boswell: To a degree, isn't there sort of a Catch 22 in redistricting? You know as majority leader, you did have to represent the rest of the Democrats. On the other hand, you know you had to get redistricting passed, and it had to be as bipartisan as possible. So, on the one hand you have to be partisan because that's your job; on the other hand, you have to be bipartisan because it won't get through if you're not. So, how do you balance it?

Sen. Greive: Well, what you're having is constant contacts—just constant contact—and millions of words, just million of words, get said. And you do some of it right when everybody is listening—all the people in the caucus. Some of it you do just by sitting down and putting your arm around them and talking it over, seeing what they have to give, seeing if there's another way. A lot of times you give it straight. You say, "Here's our problem. Now, can you come up with a solution?" So they'd go away and try to work this way or that way and then they'd come back. "Well, I'd like this district better." You'd try to see how it affected the others to see if you could live with it.

Such a slow process, but we sort of worked it out. It worked itself out; we didn't have to dramatically cut people's throats. We had to get a majority vote anyway, but it got too

partisan. One thing I can say in reading this material that you got, and the newspaper articles which I hadn't ever seen before, is that I don't think I was treated too unfairly with the press. I think they understood I was trying to do the best I could, too. But I was constantly afraid of it.

Ms. Boswell: Now ultimately, did the courts take redistricting out of the hands of the Legislature?

Sen. Greive: No, they didn't. The people did it.*

Ms. Boswell: Explain that process to me.

Sen. Greive: Well, I don't know too much about it because I never lived under it, but they set up a bipartisan commission with so many Democrats appointed and so many Republicans appointed. The chairman is non-partisan, and they have to do the job.

It is probably a better way of doing it, although I'm sure they have the same problems we did. Only, it's intense. I think the best way in the world would be to let the Legislature do it because they know the most about it, and they have the most to gain or to lose. However, it's an awfully difficult thing to do if the legislators do it. Their plans always look better than the ones that the master or somebody else does. If some outsider does it, they don't go into all the details. We always worried how square they looked, how neatly they looked on the sheet. We were worried if we violated the idea of natural borders. We worried about a whole lot of things that maybe they don't have to worry so much about because they don't just want to get it done—it's going to pass.

That doesn't mean the Legislature doesn't have a shot at it, but by then it's pretty well done. They do have to submit it to both Houses. But, if I was in that position, I could do it pretty easily, too. It was the partisanship, the idea of somebody's plan affecting you or your friend. It was an opportunity for someone to use his leverage, a convenient place to put his arm around somebody's shoulder that needs your vote. Everybody won't become absolutely essential unless you have a big lopsided majority.

Ms. Boswell: And you never really had that during these years.

Sen. Greive: No, and then you got a lot of people that loved to be the final vote on anything. They were the votes you needed the most, and at the end they could bargain for all kinds of little things that were important to them but not maybe to everybody else. If it was an interesting process, you haven't gone through it—that's all I can say.

**Editor's Note: In 1983, the Legislature passed Senate Joint Resolution 103, which gave redistricting power to an independent bipartisan commission. The joint resolution was then put to a vote of the people on November 8, 1983, and was passed, thereby amending the Washington State constitution to allow for redistricting by commission.*

CHAPTER 12

THE END OF A SENATE CAREER

Ms. Boswell: We have talked a lot about redistricting, but I wanted to ask you about a few other issues that came up when you were in the Senate leadership. What about workman's compensation as one of the important issues you were involved in over a long period of time?

Senator Greive: I think my name was on every piece of workman's compensation legislation. I was a close ally of labor, especially of Joe Davis. I used to say that the Republicans had Evans and I had Joe Davis. He had contacts. He was a brilliant man. He could read a book in an instant. His brother was, at one time head, of the department that dealt with workman's compensation. As chief lobbyist Joe became a star. He'd run rings around the other people. He'd come in and have discussions about a variety of things with the representatives of industry, and even if they brought their smartest guys, they were always at a loss. But he would just run rings around them.

Well, the source of his power was that they couldn't get legislation through if he wasn't going to support it. Well, it was my job to keep the Senate democratic. He helped me and I helped in that way. The Democrats controlled the Senate, although for ten years out of the eighteen that I served, Republicans controlled the House. For twelve years out of the eighteen, Republicans controlled the Governor, but they never could get things they wanted through the Senate.

That's where Bill Gissberg and his people came in. They were closely allied with some of the…well, it's hard to say, because I don't want to imply there was anything crooked about it. They had other interests, and they became allies of the anti-labor people. But they were afraid to be against labor, and when it came down to it we had enough votes that they made a difference, they always caved in. I was the one making the speeches and running things. Well, see, Joe Davis was there, and I can remember many nights when we'd be there until midnight.

Workman's compensation was of real interest to me. What I became outside of the legislature was an injury lawyer. That's where we made our money. We used to have four lawyers here in my office. Anytime there was an injury case, I handled the case.

Ms. Boswell: Teachers' pensions were an issue you were involved in. You were helping to push through giving teachers their first pensions. What about that?

Sen. Greive: Yes, sure. I was always very careful about teachers. I am a Catholic and I make no bones about it. There are some of them that try to be Catholic for part of the time, and the rest of the time something else. I didn't want anyone to accuse me of being anti-education because my kids went to private schools. That's one version. The other version is that they are underpaid for what their education is. Another part of the riddle is that underpaid or not, they don't work a full year. You can twist it and look at it different ways. For a variety of reasons I supported the pension, and I supported the teachers in almost everything they wanted.

Ms. Boswell: Talking about strategy, I was reading that there was a controversy in whether to put a cap on pensions, so that somebody like an administrator, like a principal, who earned more, the pension would move higher and higher. Some people wanted to cap it at a certain amount, but you got through an amendment that said no caps.

Sen. Greive: That's my attitude now. I told you about my former assistant Tracy Peterson who now earns a very high salary at Metro. I was asked about it, and I said, "Hell, if she's worth it she should have it." I think there are too many educated people around; however, the ones who are there should be compensated. If I saw Rosellini or Evans or anyone stacking the place with people I didn't think were competent, why I would feel the same way, only in the other direction.

Ms. Boswell: One of the big issues I think you are most known for is environmental protection.

Sen. Greive: I don't know how I ever got into that. I started off in air pollution. We had a Civil Defense Committee. I was chairman of that, and then I got interested in various aspects of shoreline management, plus the fact that I've got an awful lot of shoreline in my district. I've got the shoreline for the river. People forget. And I have the shoreline for the Sound as well. It's actually almost a peninsula, and I had a lot of constituents who were interested in that issue. Civil Defense dried up and there wasn't much to it, so I got interested in these other issues.

Ms. Boswell: Air pollution. Tell me a little more about that.

Sen. Greive: The most dramatic thing about that is that I went down to Los Angeles because I wanted to see what they did about it. They have the problem worse than anyone else. They have the smog. They took me in a helicopter. The guy who was the executive of the county assigned me someone from the police department, and they took me around and flew me up along the beach so that I could see the footprints in the sand. Nobody else was there to do that. You could actually see the footprints, and you could see what difference it made at different levels. That got me started in wanting to do something about protection of our air.

Ms. Boswell: I read that the pollution control bill you started led to the Department of Ecology. How did that work? I think it was in 1967, the development of the Department of Ecology.

Sen. Greive: Yes. Don Talley was putting on a fundraiser and he came to me for help. He was one of the slow ones. I looked it over and said, "You haven't got anything down there about what you've done in the way of legislation." He said, "Oh, I can do that easy." So he had someone dig up the stuff and mailed it to me. I got a hold of Sid Snyder, who is now the Majority Leader, and I said that I wanted him to verify it because Talley hadn't done a very good job. Then when he was done, he said, "It was pretty tough. Talley had an awful lot of stuff." I said, "Yes, I know. He's got diarrhea of the bill." He said: "Diarrhea of the bill? Do you want to know who is the worst one in terms of sponsoring legislation? It's you. You've got double what he's got." (Laughter) But when you're floor leader, you've got your name on a lot because hopefully that will help them and pull them through the committees. It doesn't mean so much on the floor, but it does mean a lot on the committees. But anyway, he said I had diarrhea of the bill.

Ms. Boswell: That's quite a phrase. Just

looking at a couple other issues. One I noticed was obscenity laws.

Sen. Greive: I've got a fetish on it I suppose. I thought they should be cleaned up. My tolerance is a lot greater now than it was then. I'd gone to school and I'd come out, and I thought we could do it with legislation. I don't know whether you could do it with legislation now or not, but I got the bill through the Senate several times—three times I think. But I could never get anywhere in the House. They were different bills, but they did the same thing—went in the same direction.

Ms. Boswell: There were other some internal issues in the Legislature that you became involved in. One was the controversy over the Rules Committee and over secrecy in that committee.

Sen. Greive: When I first went down there, I was shocked to find that so much work was done in committees and particularly the Rules Committee. The power lay in the fact that they had this committee that was secret. They gave out chits, as they called it. I may still have one. When they voted, the members had to write on them yes or no. But they knew the writing. They'd say, "This is Reilly or this is Greive…" or whoever, because they knew their writing. So then they just printed little ballots. They would distribute them around, and they'd be sure there were fifteen of them out or whatever the number was at that time. They'd pass them out and count them. Put it this way. Just like in church people would always sit in the same place. They'd get to know their habits. So then they'd put out one that said yes, no; yes, no all over the thing. And you just had to check one.

In any event they had a secret ballot. The secret ballot was sacred. The leaders would get together and be friendly in there. They didn't have to put on any act. It was better. They had a lot of bad legislation that nobody had to take responsibility for if it was unpopular. That helped, but there were issues like abortion and things like that where you might want to say, "No I don't support it." But the vote was secret. The only way you could stop it was to take it away from Rules. If you had a majority you could take a bill or legislation away from Rules if Rules wouldn't report it out. Well, that is easy to say and hard to do. The fact is nobody ever succeeded at that. If you take things away from Rules, they might retaliate and so forth.

As a practical matter, I decided to take them on. It gave me some publicity for one thing; another thing was I thought it was a rotten system. I campaigned against it. When we had a landslide, and I was elected majority leader, they had their first meeting for Rules to organize. The Lieutenant Governor was to be chairman. He's on Rules. I boycotted it, so I was working downstairs. I had two offices—one upstairs and I had a workroom downstairs and I had a big room next to it where I could have a group of people and we could talk about redistricting or whatever. So, I figured this was a good time to disagree with them. They sent the Sergeant at Arms down to see me. He was Charlie Johnson. He said, "Senator, I've got to do something." I said, "What do you have to do?" He said, "I've been told to arrest you." They have the power during the session to have a quorum. He said, "I don't want to do it, but you've just got to go to that meeting." Well, I argued with him for a while.

I think I missed the next one, but the third one I went. The first thing they said was, "What about Rules?" And I said, "I'm not going to vote for Rules unless it is open Rules." They knew what I meant. We argued for a little while. An old friend of mine who was a Republican said, "Gentlemen, we might as well face the facts. We lost the election. and he's got a majority in his caucus. He's

going to get re-elected. If we try to do anything, he'll fight us on the floor. If we try to throw him out, they'd put him right back in. Are we or aren't we?"

Well, then they wanted to know how far I would go. There was one fellow who would always run out and tell the press what went on in Rules. It wasn't as secret as they thought it was. And so what they did is, they thought it over and finally they said, "Well, will you join us or not?" I finally said, "I'll give you half a promise. Most of the time I will be with you, and you're going to be satisfied." But I said, "I'm not going to sign anything or pledge anything." I didn't. I very rarely revealed what went on in Rules because I figured I had made a promise. That was the end. After that, why they got looser and looser. Now I understand they even invite people to listen.

Ms. Boswell: How would you choose what issues over which you might violate the secrecy of Rules?

Sen. Greive: Oh, they had absolute secrecy when they were running it.

Ms. Boswell: I meant you personally.

Sen. Greive: Well, you had to persuade the votes, and you had to depend on people to keep their word. They would collect the chits and then burn them or get rid of them. They didn't even leave them around.

A lot of people wanted to know. That was especially true of labor and the teachers and the big blocks. Members would want them to be their friends and yet they wouldn't want to vote for what they stood for or what they wanted. I don't want to say anything uncomplimentary about all the members of Rules, but there are all kinds of stories about those fellows, including me, I suppose, because I was a member.

By the time I got there, why it was pretty well run. We didn't know for sure how people voted. (Laughter). Reuben Knoblauch once said to one of the other Senators who is still alive: "What in the hell. You told me you'd vote for my bill." "Well," he said, "I told you I'd vote for it, but I meant if it had a chance." "No, you didn't," Reuben said. "You told me you were going to vote for it in Rules." "Well how do you know I didn't?" "Because nobody voted for it." (Laughter) So one of the fellows had put it up and made a speech and everything else, but when it came right down to it, he voted against it.

Ms. Boswell: Why such secrecy in Rules and not other committees?

Sen. Greive: Because that is where they buried everything. All the heads were buried there. Usually you took Rules rather than a committee chairmanship—that's how important it was. Or a committee chairmanship rather than Rules; they crossed over in importance. If you were interested in running the whole shebang, why you wanted a committee chairmanship. If you were interested in beating off certain things or blocking them, then you wanted Rules. It varied from person to person.

Ms. Boswell: We have talked before about your role as majority leader and how you evaluated your contributions. Do you want to talk a little bit more about that?

Sen. Greive: Well, mostly I would collect money from whoever was willing to give it. Then I would ask them how they wanted it distributed. In most cases, I didn't even need to ask; everyone got the same unless we had a particularly rough race, and we always had some. We ran anywhere from five to fifteen candidates. Fifteen is an odd number, it might be sixteen or seventeen, I don't know. Two

or three of them would be in deep trouble, and two or three would just be able to make it if they had a little help. So we tried to put the money where it would do the most good. So we had a dual system depending on who you were and what kind of race you were in, which I believe is the way that industry and everybody else does it—that is, unless they are personal friends with somebody.

Ms. Boswell: So what do you think were your strengths as majority leader?

Sen. Greive: Well, my strengths were that we tried to think ahead to tomorrow and the next day. For example, when I had a difficult piece of legislation to get through—and it happened to me many times—why I'd make my pitch in the caucus, get whatever it was I could. I probably wouldn't have a majority. I would then lobby two or three of them if they looked like they were "lobbyable." Why then I would ask them to postpone the legislation for a day, maybe a week…never a month, but a week or two weeks, and meanwhile I would have the legislation out there where they could see it. When I thought I had persuaded enough, then I'd move to take it from the table and put it through. That worked real well for me.

There was always a good chance that there was something that Mrs. Evans or Mr. Greive or Senator So-and-So, or even the governor himself, wants. If you've got a piece of legislation out, you say, "Well now, Governor, there's this piece over here. I'm not trying to put any pressure on you, but I think that if some of your constituents knew you were helping them over on the West Side where they need the help, everybody would be popular." And I talked to him a lot. Whether he believed everything I said is another question.

A particular thing I wanted to show—and I may find the article—but when I was defeated as floor leader. I guess Evans was after me to get defeated. Robert Cummings was a veteran political reporter, and he said that eyebrows were being raised in Olympia because Evans was taking after me. He said that he couldn't understand why because there were people whose records were much more violently anti-Evans than mine. I had helped him get legislation through and I had done thus and so, and it didn't seem like it was appreciated. Worse yet, it wasn't difficult to get him to follow. Once we got a thing out there and we could talk to him, we could kill the bill the next day if we wanted to. Little by little we would build them up, build them up. Most people didn't have anything against Metro, for example, except that they were giving money to the big fat people, or whatever you wanted to call the people of the state of Washington who live on the west side of the mountains.

Ms. Boswell: What did you think were Evans' reasons for opposing you?

Sen. Greive: Well, Evans, I've always said, is a mixed blessing. In many ways he represents good. In other words, he stands apart from the thing and acts like he is an observer. But I know one thing, he doesn't appreciate anybody whom he can't move or push, in my opinion now. Maybe that's good; maybe a governor is supposed to be that way. I think he may have dealt with the Legislature differently than he did with me. But I would think he would have wanted to continue relationships and have a cup of coffee with them and be their friend as much as he could, and I think they would expect to do the same thing with him. They would have been so flattered that he built a relationship, and I think that relationships help.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think he was an effective governor?

Sen. Greive: Yes, because he had the

newspapers and the radio and TV stations with him. He got much more publicity than anyone else. It was much easier for him to move. Furthermore, the governor always has the advantage because he is of one mind, and he can work and doesn't worry about consequences as much as somebody who doesn't know if he's going to get re-elected or has all these burdens on him.

Ms. Boswell: But did you see him as a strong leader in terms of legislation?

Sen. Greive: I think he's better than average, but I don't think he's very strong. He's better than average. His way was all set up for him by the Municipal League; maybe not the organization but that type of member. The same thing is true of a lot of the other things he supported. He had to put off his appointments sometimes, but you don't ever know that the person turned out to have a bad record you didn't know anything about.

Ms. Boswell: How would you characterize your relationship with him?

Sen. Greive: When we were face-to-face it went well. For example, he appointed me to the Kingdome stadium committee. He had a committee that was supposed to work out the stadium. But he got a little pressure from somebody, and he struck me and put Dave Cohen on. I didn't make a big fuss because it wasn't that important to me, but I figured that I was out there pushing his stuff and we were colleagues, and he should have been a little more considerate.

Ms. Boswell: You mentioned earlier an article saying that he, if not deserted you, turned away a bit. Why do you think that happened?

Sen. Greive: I don't understand the question.

Ms. Boswell: You mentioned the article earlier that talked about Evans turning against you, so to speak. I just wondered why you thought that happened?

Sen. Greive: I don't think he thought he was against me. He was just making speeches to his caucus and once in a while to the Democratic caucus. That would be rare. More often he would send somebody to articulate it. That somebody would either articulate it through a member, or he would get up and state it as his own mind. I don't think it was a personal vendetta. I think mostly the attitude was he turned like a chameleon; he turned from being on one side to the other side. He went, I thought, too far. You had the Democrats in the Senate and if you wanted that legislation you had to convince them. It was near enough in the metropolitan area.

Ms. Boswell: We were talking earlier about your strengths as a majority leader. What would you say, if anything, were your weaknesses?

Sen. Greive: Well, I'd rather talk about the strengths. Incidentally, the first thing I did was get a seat like everyone else. I first went to the Senate, and I was seated in the back, not in the last row, but close to it. I kept that seat the whole time I was there. Technically, the way they were running it was that they would move your seat up if you wanted to. If you survived and somebody else was out, they wanted you to move up. In other words, it was a progression. I did that because I wanted to keep a relationship with the new legislators as they came in. That's when you have the strongest bond; that's before they get too wise. I remember a number of other things that I did that he copied.

Ms. Boswell: He meaning…?

Sen. Greive: Slade Gorton. I was the one that set the thing up. When you're in a battle, do you want to be reasonable and really try to get a compromise, or do you want to leave yourself open to be shot down? I think some of those people who were pretending to be all "Let's see your finances" and that sort of thing had a double motive. What happens when you're in a fight and somebody brings something to your attention, it may be more important to you than that. Maybe that legislation represents a very small impact statewide, and he was trying to emphasize that. But he has always been courteous, and he's always had a smile on his face and been pleasant. I don't feel any enmity toward him for that.

Ms. Boswell: You are talking about Slade Gorton?

Sen. Greive: No, I mean in this case Governor Evans. He turned that over to Slade. I have no doubt that Slade is a pretty reasonable guy, but he does not have Evans' personality. He likes to fight, and he's good at it, awfully good at it.

Ms. Boswell: What were the origins of your rivalry with Augie Mardesich? How did that evolve?

Sen. Greive: I'm not going to go into it. It gets into things I am not going to discuss.

Ms. Boswell: It is public knowledge, though, that ultimately you both had some criticisms of each other.

Sen. Greive: Well, I never publicly said anything about him. I don't remember, but you'll find I was quiet. The connection with me was that my right arm, George Martonik, was the secretary of the garbage collectors. They had a little organization and Martin Durkan was a lawyer for them. They got into a fight. I was never anything other than a best friend…a friend of Martonik. That was as far as I would go.

Ms. Boswell: Did you go along with him or encourage him to come out with his accusations against Senator Mardesich?

Sen. Greive: I thought he shouldn't, but when I found out he had gone as far as he had and he had done the spade work, I just threw up my hands. Obviously, we were working together every day; he was my assistant.

Ms. Boswell: How did you meet George Martonik?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I think he worked for Fred Dore down there. When you get down in the Legislature, you get a line on people who are willing to work and do things. If you are going to run an organization of volunteers, you have to have somebody to make the phone calls and do a lot of things. Some things you do yourself. Usually, I handled the money; no question about that. But I didn't give every order and a lot of the things get to be his. In other words, I'm calling the shots.

He sees what I'm doing and he just takes over and does it with other people, with my tacit approval. But I didn't sit down and say, "Don't give any more money to him." We would always know who our friends and enemies were. My attitude was that I'd give it to any Democrat who wanted it, including Mardesich or anybody. He never asked for it, so I never had to, but I gave it to people who were friends of his. I may have even given to Hallauer; I would have to look and see.

Ms. Boswell: Yes well, how did the turnover in leadership of the floor leader position take place from your perspective?

Sen. Greive: Well, I would off the record tell you the story, but I don't want to tell you the story on the record. I don't want to.

Ms. Boswell: You don't want to say anything about it?

Sen. Greive: I've told you before, there's a whole area of people who are not necessarily friends of mine, but are not bad people. Maybe there are one or two rotten apples among them, I don't know for sure, but I'm not going to get into anything knowingly that hurts their reputation. Because when I'm dead, which can't be too much longer—not that I want to be, but you know, age—but this text will be around. Somebody will be researching and going through it, and I don't want to tell a half story. I don't want to hurt their feelings either because some of their children, relatives, or friends are also my friends.

Ms. Boswell: Right, but don't you want the truth to be known from your perspective?

Sen. Greive: Well, no. When you tell your perspective, I don't trust the press that much. They're all right. Whether they report the news or not, they're not there to do what I want them to do. It's worth it to me not to have it wrong.

Ms. Boswell: When Senator Mardesich challenged you for floor leader in 1972, one of his platforms was that he wanted to improve the Senate image. What do you think about that?

Sen. Greive: Well, all I can say is that if you need Mardesich to build up your image you have real problems. I'm not going to go into an attack on Augie except to say that he is one of the smartest men I have ever known when it comes to the technical side of things.

Ms. Boswell: Some of the articles in the newspaper talking about your contest with Senator Mardesich for Majority Leader, said that they were surprised that you didn't seem to be trying very hard. Shelby Scates essentially said, "Bob Greive, the incumbent Democratic majority leader whose position is in jeopardy, doesn't seem hardly to be squeezing an arm on behalf of his candidacy."

Sen. Greive: Yes, that's true. I had reached the heights of imagining myself maybe as governor, and I had begun to look at Congress or something like that. What I did is—I had something to overcome. I felt that—in fact I knew that—information was going to come out about the garbage commission and all the big scandals. I hated it and I sat around at night and I think that some of the legislators who were there are probably dead now who could have told you about that. We tried to figure out how to get the onus off us. We expected it to be more far-reaching than it was. I felt the only way I could do it was that I had to have a fight and get thrown out, so that people would know I was for the yellow or orange—or however you want to say it—and they were for the blue or the green and so forth. We deliberately threw the race. I'm not saying I couldn't have lost, but I managed to win every other time. What we did is—the control depended on five votes. And those five votes kind of amalgamated and so forth. Two of them were very close friends of mine, and I think I could have had a third. Maybe it was more than five, but I know that when I went there, I insulted them. I didn't call them names or anything, but I acted like I knew it all and didn't need any help.

I went home that night and told my wife that I didn't know whether to cry or to laugh. "I got what I wanted and those stupid people didn't follow or didn't understand what I was doing. I know what I want, and now I'm going to try." But I never got off the ground; the other events were just rushing to me. I put it

over until other sessions. But that's been a long time ago.

Ms. Boswell: I see. But when you say you didn't want to be tainted or that it wouldn't spread further, were there indications that other people had done this too?

Sen. Greive: I don't know anybody who had ever given up the leadership like a majority leader. I haven't been on the inside of people running for governor. They might have if they wanted it bad enough. They thought that would do it.

Ms. Boswell: I guess I'm still not clear why you decided to give it up.

Sen. Greive: If I was defeated, I was definitely not on their side. I didn't see that the position was worth anything as far as legislation was concerned because anything I did would be considered political.

Ms. Boswell: There are lots of articles about you that suggest that you were just always content to be majority leader. So that really wasn't the case by then?

Sen. Greive: No, by then. And those are the most important words to underline—by then. At the very first, why I just wanted to be content and that's all I wanted. Then I began to think, well what about a pension? What about my family? I said I probably wanted to be governor, but I never really got to the point of running because I didn't want to run and just get defeated. I wanted to lay a proper foundation. But I ran into all these other problems, and it took all my time.

Ms. Boswell: When you aspire to an office like governor, were there certain things you thought you could bring to the office or certain things you wanted to accomplish?

Sen. Greive: Well, I think it was whether you wanted to be right or wrong. When you were majority leader, you had to be in the majority and you have to create a majority at the same time. I did it by setting up their campaigns. You just don't just walk off and say, "I'm in the majority." Pretty damn soon you'd be in the minority. At first, I just tagged along and took whatever was good or bad on the moment. But the next session I was a little wiser and I just kept getting wiser as time went on. Because the same thing—for instance, taxes on California wine and various things like that—they come back from year to year, or at least from two years to two years.

Ms. Boswell: And so you just learn how to deal with the issues?

Sen. Greive: Yes, what I needed was someone to give me a position that was full-time. I was always trying to earn a living.

Ms. Boswell: So as governor you could move beyond the partisanship and just work on issues?

Sen. Greive: Well, you could pick a few things that were worthy of your effort, and if they were worthy, maybe you would get the credit for them.

Ms. Boswell: Were there any governors or other politicians whom you modeled yourself after or who you admired as following directions you would take?

Sen. Greive: Well, there are two questions there. First, as models, I looked at everybody who I thought worked a smooth transition or got what he thought was fair or made a good legal move. Philosophically, what I thought about each of them, I would have to get the legislation out and discuss it in detail. As they

say down there all the time, the devil is in the details.

Ms. Boswell: No individuals who stick out?

Sen. Greive: I said before I thought Charlie Hodde was as close as anybody. Put it this way: every one of them had their limitations. If anyone knows their limitations or what they really want, that's part of the rules of the game. It isn't like you imagine it on the outside. On the inside, you get to be friendly and that's the first step to having influence.

Ms. Boswell: And where do you go on from there?

Sen. Greive: Well, you get the office or you get defeated and you go on with your life.

Ms. Boswell: So there were no particular governors whom you thought were really tops?

Sen. Greive: No. I knew Lowry, Wallgren, and various other people. Booth Gardner was a part of my group at one time, at the very beginning. I can't think of who else.

Ms. Boswell: In the past you said you had a lot of respect—he wasn't a governor—for Warren Magnuson.

Sen. Greive: Well, now, when you get into a lot of respect for, I've got a long list and that list includes both Magnuson and Jackson, particularly Magnuson. It includes Charlie Hodde, and it includes a number of the legislators I worked with. Bob Bailey and John Cherberg. Vic Meyers was a great parliamentarian, and I could go on and on. But that is different than patterning myself after someone. I couldn't pattern myself after Vic Meyers if I tried.

Ms. Boswell: Well, you liked music. Vic Meyers wasn't a dancer, too, was he?

Sen. Greive: No, he was bandleader. I don't know about anything else.

Ms. Boswell: I know you don't want to talk about personalities or individuals, particularly in terms of when you left the majority leader position. I just want to ask you, once you had given up that position or once you had lost that position, were you disappointed or were you sorry you had done it that way?

Sen. Greive: No, no. What they said in that article was correct. I felt relieved. I felt I had to fight for it, and it was almost embarrassing when I lost. But I wanted everyone to know I wasn't part of that group. Maybe I wouldn't do that again this time, and things would be different. But at that time and place, I didn't want it. That was the overpowering thing; it destroyed all my plans to do anything. I got a lot of publicity down there, and they figured I was doing the bad things. I'm sure; in fact, it affected my outcome twice when I ran.

Ms. Boswell: One of the interesting things about a lot of what was going on at that time—how do I phrase it? You yourself became an issue. You mentioned earlier that generally you represented labor, but there were certainly accusations that Seattle First National Bank and Household Finance had both contributed money to other people in the Senate essentially to unseat you.

Sen. Greive: Yes, well, that's because of the Small Loan Bill. Small loans can run interest as high as twenty-four percent—at least they were then. But some people they gave the rate of eighteen percent. They were always afraid their licenses would be taken away from them. The banks didn't like us setting any limit on interest rates. Joe Davis was behind

that. Joe dreamed of having an amendment on the ballot. They wanted desperately, desperately to get back into the race, and they did not want to let it go to the people because it was a popular issue on our part. As he would have in any instance, Joe Davis (he is dead now) would have said he depended on me. Or I depended on him, whichever way you want to put it. He didn't want it to get through the Legislature, so I blocked it. I made it an anti-union vote. They just couldn't get enough votes to get it through. Who knows? I heard rumors all the time that they had scraped up almost enough votes or close to enough votes, but they never distributed them on the floor, so I could never see. It would have been a black eye with labor—with the AFL-CIO and the other unions that were sponsoring me.

Ms. Boswell: So you became the target primarily because of that Small Loan Bill?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Well, that and I think that at the time my enemies thought they could get me. A little of it was religion—I was a pretty staunch Catholic. Part of it was just that there were other ambitions and that they were using whatever was handy. Part of it was that they thought, "We've had him long enough; maybe I've got a shot for me." Part of it was that they had a favorite bill, and somebody had to pay for it or get it through. There may have been some of that, too. I don't know—you can only surmise. All of these enemies put together knocked me out. But if I hadn't insulted these people—the key people, the new senators—why I would have been elected, I'm fairly confident. But I quit the campaign after that—for floor leader.

Ms. Boswell: Right. How did you feel about no longer being in a leadership position?

Sen. Greive: I figured they'd kill themselves off. I figured they'd have a field day. I was happy and sad. It bothered me both ways.

Ms. Boswell: So there were positives and negatives to not doing it anymore?

Sen. Greive: Well, you can assume it. There are a lot of rumors floating around about that time. A lot of it is true, and a lot of it is untrue. Mardesich or Martonik might be willing to talk about it. I am not that close to Martonik anymore. He might resent it; I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: OK. I am just really interested in your own perspective. One of the issues that was in the papers had to do with streamlining and revamping the committee system, for example.

Sen. Greive: They did that after I left.

Ms. Boswell: Right. That was an issue that Senator Mardesich and others brought up that they wanted to see changed.

Sen. Greive: They wanted to remove some people—yes. They had friends that wanted the jobs.

Ms. Boswell: Did the loss of committee positions bother you more?

Sen. Greive: No. We got all kinds of publicity. There were six of us. When we voted together we could control it. The Republicans were just so close. But the Republicans then would snap—they'd give a couple of votes to make up for it.

Ms. Boswell: This is after Senator Mardesich became floor leader? Did you try to put together a coalition of Democrats and Republicans?

Sen. Greive: No, I just voted in a solid six. We just talked things over and did things in

our own way. If we had anything to say, why then TV would give us publicity.

Ms. Boswell: An issue that came up about that time had to do with the fisheries.

Sen. Greive: I don't remember much. I do remember that the county commissioners—I think it was in Pierce County—that they were stealing the fish. I 'd have to go look at my notes. Martonik was with me on that. We investigated it and released the information and so forth.

Ms. Boswell: Yes, I was curious about that. I wondered how do you happen upon information like that?

Sen. Greive: Well, politics is full of people who want publicity. I had this fish thing—it was an open scandal. I waited and then held a press conference. I didn't like it leaking it out. The most important thing was that I didn't have to do it at all if I didn't want to.

Ms. Boswell: It seems like there were a lot of charges and countercharges flying around at that time. There was an issue in the papers about somebody who had worked for you by the name of Paul Gronnert coming back all of a sudden and saying he had done work for your law firm at the same time he had worked for you in the Legislature.

Sen. Greive: Well, everyone had part-time jobs in those days. Anything I did was open. They took it to the Prosecuting Attorney, but there was nothing they could do.

Now Paul Gronnert was disbarred—well, he wasn't disbarred, but he was up to be disbarred, and he agreed to resign as an attorney in Oregon. I knew him from my business entirely separate from this. He came to me one day and said, "I can't get a job anywhere. My skills are out, too. The only thing I know is law. Bob, as a personal favor, can you find me a job?" Well, I found him a job down there. He became very thick with Big Daddy Day and several other people. I don't know that he was necessarily adverse to anything about me, but they had him working. I noticed they had him working, and he held onto the thing until the statute of limitations ran out, and then he released it. I figured that I was straight, and he was getting even with me.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds like it.

Sen. Greive: He owed me a lot as far as political terms are concerned. I had dealt with him favorably for some years and I liked him. I didn't know anything about his problems in Oregon.

Ms. Boswell: Oh well, you didn't know about those things before you hired him?

Sen. Greive: No, I didn't. I knew he had some trouble with the bar. You see, if you are disbarred, then you can't even work in a law firm. If you resign, you can. He could continue and practice law in a limited sense. He could look things up for people; he could still be a part of it and so forth and so on.

Ms. Boswell: Oh, I see. What about Martin Durkan's role? Do you see him as being behind the scenes?

Sen. Greive: Yes. He was a leader of a lot of the conniving. You see he had the Appropriations Committee. That was his big thing. He was very powerful.

Ms. Boswell: Now do you think that all of this—the issues of the majority leader position and things like that—contributed to your defeat in 1974? How do you think that came about?

Sen. Greive: No. My problem was redistricting. People don't like redistricting. They figure you are cutting a fat hog. You can tell them you are fair; you can tell them you did this and that and adjusted it, which I did. I could maybe convince some individuals, but they wouldn't trust me that much. Nobody would trust anybody with their districts. That district becomes sacred to you when it elects you, unless you get rid of some people who are known adversaries.

Ms. Boswell: So you think that within the Senate that was sort of a downside for you?

Sen. Greive: Oh. In the beginning at least, I would never have tried to get a two-thirds vote. I had to get a two-thirds vote of the House and the Senate in order to achieve some things in redistricting. In other words, the League of Women Voters drew their own districts. In their first effort, they left out 125,000 people in their calculations. With that leverage we got the Secretary of State to recommend we do something. He said it was impossible to work with. Every time you got publicity, good or bad, they'd ask questions of me. Everybody just knew you were in there stealing.

Ms. Boswell: Messing around?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: But redistricting in terms of your own re-election in the community of West Seattle, was that a big issue for voters?

Sen. Greive: Yes it was. It may not be one they put in the newspaper too much, but there was no question about it. In fact, it scared the hell out of me. After I went through it once, I thought I could survive, but it's just like an albatross. You're in there doing something that people don't trust.

Ms. Boswell: Right, I see. So when you ran against Nancy Buffington, what was her strength?

Sen. Greive: She was very pretty. She was pleasant. I've said very nice things about her before, and I'll say them again. I'm not blaming anything on her. She just did what she tried to do. I was within two hundred votes—it may have been less than that. It was very close, and I could have won it as well as lost it. But redistricting left a bad taste in people's mouths.

Ms. Boswell: Yes. In looking back was there something else you wished you'd done or not?

Sen. Greive: No, probably I would have done the same thing. Congressman Tom Foley faced that same problem. They wanted to limit terms, and somebody had to make it an issue. He let himself become a plaintiff. I'm sure that was one of the things that defeated him. In other words, it's just an unpopular subject. Only bad people get into redistricting. You may have been good before, but you're not very holy when they are after you.

Ms. Boswell: How did you feel about that loss?

Sen. Greive: I began to think that I needed some high income years. Ed Heavey was my district representative on the King County Council. I took some polls, rough as they were. I thought I could beat him. I decided to go out and try, and I did. And after that he said to other people that I was the best friend he ever had. I contributed heavily to some of his legislative campaigns. I made the motion to get the Thirty-fourth District to support him for judge. When he had things before the Council while he was a lobbyist, I would try to be a friend. I think he'd repeat it.

Everybody was afraid to help him or didn't

bother, but I was very interested in him. Former Governor John Spellman later told me one time that one of the strangest phenomenon during that period of his service was that I was such a good friend of Heavey's. I shouldn't have run against him by all odds.

Ms. Boswell: Why did you choose to run for the Council in 1976 and not some other position?

Sen. Greive: Because it had such high pay. When I left it was $58,000 a year. My pension depends on that.

Ms. Boswell: Was there a draw, though, in terms of being on a smaller body like the Council?

Sen. Greive: No, I was satisfied where I was.

Ms. Boswell: Did you miss the Legislature when you were out of it?

Sen. Greive: Oh, I thought I was going to, but I didn't miss it that much. Otherwise, I would have run for it.

Ms. Boswell: You mean run again?

Sen. Greive: You know when I was honored by both the Senate and the Council, one ceremony was instigated by Greg Nickels and one was instigated by Heavey. Heavey sponsored the one when I went down to the Legislature, and Nickels was the one who organized the ceremony down here in West Seattle. I held both of their jobs. I told them both that now that I was getting old, they didn't have to worry about competition from me. (Laughter)

Chapter 13

Metro and the King County Council

Ms. Boswell: In the past we talked about a few of the environmental issues you were involved with, but I thought we might talk at greater length about Metro, the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle. Metro was essentially a metropolitan municipal corporation that tried to address problems created by the population growth in the greater Seattle area. Your involvement spanned your career in the state Senate as well as in the King County Council. Can you tell me about how you perceived the whole "Metro" movement?

Senator Greive: It was started by the "Go-Go's" as we called them.

Ms. Boswell: Go-Go's?

Sen. Greive: G-O, G-Os. That's what they called the men and women voters in the Municipal League. The idea was that they thought we had an antiquated form of county government. We actually had a really good government in King County. We had Ed Munro, one of the better people who ever engaged in politics. We had Johnny O'Brien, who was a pretty good guy as far as I'm concerned.

The fact still remained that there was agitation, so they elected a bunch of freeholders. They either circulated a petition or put it on the ballot as an initiative. The freeholders then commenced to write a new charter. They submitted the charter to the people and it failed.

One of the things they were after was something about transportation and something about sewage and sewage disposal because we had a bad situation. Here in Alki, we could see an imaginary line, and all the seagulls would stay out that far because that's where the sewage came out.

Ms. Boswell: Where was this?

Sen. Greive: Alki. This was my problem area. The real big problem wasn't mine; it was the people who served Magnolia. That's where the West Point treatment facility is located.

Ms. Boswell: Was raw sewage coming out?

Sen. Greive: Into twenty-five feet of water. But those people in charge of waste disposal didn't know. For instance, one of the things they didn't know—and it was always surprising to me—was that they thought when they got it in the water they were done with it. It turns out that it circulates around Vashon Island and back. They'd get some of the same sewage back.

We developed Metro and had a very, very aggressive leader at that time by the name of Peterson, Neil Peterson. He got an exemption for us because we were on salt water, and at that time they thought that the waste would circulate differently than it did. It was commonly thought—and I've got quotes from some of the hearings they had—that if you put sewage in salt water you didn't have to do anything else. They don't think that is true now, but they thought that then.

What happened was that for years we didn't have any problem because of the idea of salt water. Then in the 1960s it began to

change. It became apparent that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was dissatisfied with the exemptions they made and that salt water didn't do the trick, plus the fact that the sewage circulated differently than they expected. They refused to grant us exemptions, so we had to do it.

Ms. Boswell: You had to do what?

Sen. Greive: We had to spend the money and make sewage plants, at least for Seattle. We spent billions of dollars on it.

Ms. Boswell: But going back to the Go-Gos—they were first agitating in the 1950s. Right?

Sen. Greive: Sort of. These notes aren't one hundred percent accurate, but I jotted down what I thought. It first started in 1950.

Since I graduated in 1951 from law school in Miami, Florida, I wasn't even here during the formation of it, although I was here for the legislative session. It turns out that they had a Metro in Miami, which is much different. It's a super-government that took over all the small entities and city portions. There are some things they don't even get to vote on. They vote on zoning and things like that, but some things were just too big for the little towns and so the Metro does it. In Miami they have a lot of gambling and other problems. I thought it was going to be something like that.

So I came up and kind of joined the discussion. By the time Metro went through the various trials and tribulations in the 1950s and 1960s, and they were getting ready to function, I was the floor leader. I was interested in it. It fit me fine, and I had William Goodloe helping me. He was the minority leader. We were both from Seattle, King County, so in those years we introduced the first legislation. That was in the 1960s.

Ms. Boswell: I thought some of the first legislation was passed in1957 or somewhere in there.

Sen. Greive: That was when they decided to do what they could, and the enabling legislation was passed in the Legislature. They put it up for a vote in 1958. It was voted down.

Ms. Boswell: Who approached you to get involved?

Sen. Greive: Nobody, really. I just knew about Metro, and I kept hearing about it in Miami. I didn't know what it was, really. But I knew that I was in politics. So, people go somewhere, and they read other things; I read the political news. And I was going to school there for two years in 1950 and 1951.

Ms. Boswell: So, you were real familiar with the concept?

Sen. Greive: I wouldn't say I was real familiar.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of the concept of Metro, why did the Legislature have to get involved?

Sen. Greive: In the first place, nobody foresaw what it turned out to be. All the Legislature wanted to do was make it easier for them to cooperate.

Ms. Boswell: By "them" you mean the different communities?

Sen. Greive: Yes. There were several hundred water-sewer districts around—an awful lot of little districts, especially in the rural places where they wanted sewers and they wanted water. It wasn't natural—they didn't even have a stream or anything. They had to sink wells and all that sort of thing.

There were seven small cities and about seventy-five water districts—water or sewer

districts. Sometimes they were both; sometimes they were one. But then that didn't make enough, so we kept having trouble with a lot of the districts, you see. The county commissioners statewide didn't want Metro to succeed. They were used to walking around and saying, "Take this out; take that out." They were the bosses. So they didn't like giving up their authority and they quietly objected to it behind closed doors.

That's why we limited it first to King, Pierce and Snohomish counties. That was in the planning stage. Snohomish County was hostile at the time. I think we later subtracted Pierce and Snohomish, and we just did King County.

Ms. Boswell: When you developed an enabling act, was it the framework for the cooperation?

Sen. Greive: Yes. That's all it was. There was one agency with a lot of subcontractors. That isn't an accurate description either. It was like a bunch of illiterate pigs. They all have to find their place, and some took a lot of services and some took very little.

That was a start, and then they got the little cities and small towns. Some of them were not so small, like Bellevue and so forth. They've got a lot more of them now.

Ms. Boswell: What about in the Legislature? Who or what was the opposition?

Sen. Greive: The opposition was the county commissioners. Every one of these state senators, for instance, had a county commissioner or two. Some of them had several counties. Up in the northern part of the state where the districts are small, you have three and four counties in a district. The county commissioners didn't like somebody telling them what to do. There was quite a little opposition from them, but they didn't do anything much to the Senate because we had an overwhelming majority.

In the House it failed and they had to reconsider it overnight. They passed it the second time around.

Ms. Boswell: How did they get the votes the second time around?

Sen. Greive: When you move to reconsider, the people who are interested might have had something over in the Senate that they were a little interested in. I can't remember in detail, but I would suspect that somebody talked to me. I'd go over and question my own legislators—the ones I was close to. I don't remember anything like that. I never knew when I was going to be asked. I did it on a lot of stuff, though.

Ms. Boswell: You were primarily interested just because you were familiar with the concept? Did you see it as being really beneficial for West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: Yes, because West Seattle had an outflow on the sewage treatment plant here, and we didn't want that here. The seagulls were hanging around it all the time. It's a pretty enough looking place on the outside, but inside it's just a sewage disposal plant. We still have it, but it only works now on rare times—for overflows.

Ms. Boswell: Was that in place in 1957?

Sen. Greive: Yes. And there were all kinds of articles in the local paper about the sewage on Alki beach. When I was a kid and brought up here in West Seattle, things were different. People swam out in that water. It never occurred to me that I would get mixed up with sewage.

Ms. Boswell: So people were complaining

that their beaches were not really safe to swim in?

Sen. Greive: I didn't hear any of it. When you live somewhere and the thing happens over time, it's far different than when you come in and try to put something in new. But I'm sure that there were complaints.

Ms. Boswell: Your role in the Legislature then was to marshal this bill through?

Sen. Greive: What happened is that both times I had a Republican with me. Then we opened it up and used many strategies.

In the Senate I opened it up and asked other people if they wanted to put their names on it. I'm the floor leader, and that's the guy who opens it up. So even though the rules only provide for three sponsors, we'd have ten or fifteen. A person like Martin Durkan, who wasn't a particular friend of mine, could see the importance of being for Metro. In the House they made a real effort.

Ms. Boswell: So the House vote was reversed overnight?

Sen. Greive: Yes, overnight, by one vote. I think they were one vote short. Fred Dore voted on the prevailing side. He moved to be recorded as voting against it after he voted for it, and then he moved the next day to open it up, and they won. It easily could have been defeated.

Ms. Boswell: Once it was passed, did you have any involvement in the organization of the Metro Council?

Sen. Greive: I think they learned a lot of things, the people running that campaign. They learned that politics is a business as well as a game. They learned that you couldn't complain and say the politicians are all bad and expect anything out of them. I think I was part of the teaching process. I'm sure I wasn't the only one. That's always the big complaint on the part of those of us who have been around politics a long time—that somebody comes along and thinks they have it all figured out. And they may be right in what they want to do, but that doesn't necessarily get you the votes. Idealism gets you part of the way, but you have to do the things that are necessary to make it worthwhile.

Ms. Boswell: Once they had the legislative enabling act, what was next?

Sen. Greive: Then they had to submit it to the people. They submitted it to the people and they lost. They didn't lose in Seattle, but they had to carry other parts of King County as well.

Gissberg, who was against it in Snohomish County, put an amendment on that I really didn't object to, and I probably wouldn't today. He said it had to pass in both the unincorporated and incorporated areas.

Ms. Boswell: He put that on because he didn't like it?

Sen. Greive: Because in those days he had mostly unincorporated areas. There were lots of internal reasons in the caucus, and he wanted his amendment. I voted for his amendment. In fact, I helped get it on. We were all pretty surprised when the measure didn't do well at all in the unincorporated areas.

Ms. Boswell: Enough to bring it down, totally?

Sen. Greive: Yes. They got the total vote in both counties, which was fine, but they didn't have enough in the unincorporated areas to

make it a success.

Ms. Boswell: Metro was going to include a lot more than just sewage initially?

Sen. Greive: Yes. They had zoning and planning, mostly planning. They also ran into—I'm a little unclear on this—but as I understand it they ran into a lot of opposition from the public officials because they were afraid that they'd lose their jobs. That was the county auditor and the coroner, etcetera, etcetera.

Ms. Boswell: They were afraid that all county positions would be lost to Metro?

Sen. Greive: In those days they had patronage and they had machines. So they cranked up their machine and went out and distributed literature and said, "Are we in Moscow or are we in Seattle? This is dictatorship." And I could see their point of view. They didn't know how it was going to work. They knew there was no job for them if this thing passed.

Ms. Boswell: When the public vote failed, what did they end up doing?

Sen. Greive: They had to sit back and lick their chops for a while. It passed first in the Legislature in 1957. It was then put to a public vote in 1958. The sewage disposal part passed in September 1958. Metro went up for a vote on public transportation. It lost in 1958, but then failed again in 1962.

Because of the sewage issue, we had red flags on several of the swimming beaches on Lake Washington, too. That was a very powerful thing. The sportsmen got involved in the thing. They said that it would ruin their chances to shoot game and so forth. It got so they had broad support.

Ms. Boswell: Once it passed, at least for the sewage part, were you at all involved in how it came to be organized?

Sen. Greive: We had little or nothing to do with it.

Ms. Boswell: How were the decisions made to build at West Point and to build the treatment facility there?

Sen. Greive: West Point had been used by the city before as a city disposal site. Initially, there wasn't any change. All they did was just take over and expand the site. They pumped it out into deeper water and made changes that turned out not to be as beneficial as they thought.

Ms. Boswell: I thought there was some talk of locating the treatment facility in West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: That was later. It was in 1986 just before I was out of the council. That was my big victory—I won by two votes—to stop them from putting a secondary treatment plant in West Seattle. They expanded West Point instead.

Ms. Boswell: As Metro evolved, and especially West Point, did water quality improve pretty dramatically or very quickly here in West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: It has over the years. West Seattle had its own treatment plant. Now they ship everything to West Point. Everything goes there on this side of the lake. There's a demarcation line somewhere for the stuff on the east side of Lake Washington, which is a little different. They've only got two or three outlets.

Ms. Boswell: In reading through some of the bills that were passed for various parts of

Metro over time, there was a bill to amend the enabling act to separate transit from other operations. There was another one to let Metro plan for other functions beside the ones that the voters said it could do. It seems like you were one of the driving forces in all of those different bills.

Sen. Greive: Yes. I figured you couldn't get a system that was very successful unless they had a chance to try their wings. Tracy Peterson, who was involved in finance at Metro, probably had leaned on me a little. My feeling was that if you limit what Metro could do very narrowly, then you never get all the auxiliary functions you should get.

Ms. Boswell: In fostering this legislation about Metro, I noticed in the journals that most of the time the votes are not unanimous, but almost. But Louis Hofmeister seems to always be in the opposition, sometimes all by himself. Why?

Sen. Greive: Louis was an old-timer and a good guy, but he really was thirty years behind the times. He had a farm that he took care of. He had a mostly rural constituency, and he was very distrustful. He was a wonderful fellow, wonderful fellow as a friend.

Ms. Boswell: He was distrustful of the government running this agency?

Sen. Greive: Either that or he had some lobbyist who was a friend of his, or he had a lot of personal friends who convinced him it was a bad thing. I don't know. I never had any argument with him about it. He knew I was for it, and I knew he was against it, and that's it. But he always supported me for floor leader, so I couldn't get mad at him over this.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of Metro, tell me a few of the people who were really involved with that program.

Sen. Greive: I've got comments to make on most of them, but very few bad ones. The people who were for it were good people, generally. There was Rosellini, Evans, and Dixie Lee Ray. Jim Ellis, Gordon Clinton, and….

Ms. Boswell: Let's start with Rosellini and then we'll work down that list.

Sen. Greive: Rosellini was for it, and I think it was because he thought it was going to be popular, just like I did. But he also would be asking a few favors. I was his floor leader and helped him manage his first campaign. We were pretty good friends and still are. We've had our falling out from time to time.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think his interest was primarily because it was popular?

Sen. Greive: I think there's no difference between Ray or Evans or Rosellini on this issue. They all thought it was going to be popular. There may have been a difference in some parts of it, where you've got somebody that wants something and has got the kick to fight back. Rosellini needed my help on a lot of things, an awful lot of things. That's why I couldn't stay mad at him.

Ms. Boswell: Does the governor's support have a fair amount of weight or clout with others in the Legislature or even with the voters? Did it make a difference?

Sen. Greive: It did. The fact is that all three of them were very quiet. You just knew they were for it. They didn't have to get in and fight about it. I don't think anybody goes out and looks for fights. That's a regional thing. It didn't affect the whole state.

Ms. Boswell: You also mentioned a number of other names.

Sen. Greive: Evans should be credited with getting involved. Before he was even governor, he was involved with the Metro project when he was still in the Legislature.

Ms. Boswell: Was Ray?

Sen. Greive: I'd have to go back and read it. She wanted some changes. I think she had limited the governing body of Metro to seventeen people, but by the time I got there it was at thirty-five or thirty-six. I don't remember.

All I know is that it was sixteen to nineteen on the final vote out there. There were very few absences, so I'm sure it wasn't more than twenty. I've got a gap in there of what I can remember.

Ms. Boswell: What about Jim Ellis? He's often named as the father of Metro. How would you characterize him?

Sen. Greive: He was given a position that I don't think he really deserved. However, he does deserve a lot of credit, more than anyone else. Of all the people who helped, he did the most. So maybe we'll just leave it at that. But I think he had to depend an awful lot on people like myself and John O'Brien and Fred Dore. He had some really powerful help that he couldn't have generated without us. Rosellini might have. He knew us all backward and forward.

Ms. Boswell: But it was somewhat of a bipartisan issue then?

Sen. Greive: It was bipartisan. After all, who could be against it? The only thing you could say was that it was too expensive.

Ms. Boswell: What about Neil Peterson? Do you want to say anything about him?

Sen. Greive: He was a superb guy. He was another one like Ellis. He doesn't deserve credit for doing everything, but on the other hand he came late in the 1960s or 1970s, and he was there about ten years. Neil Peterson was involved with the whole garbage shebang from California. He went from here to there. He was very successful, and then they had a big scandal about picayune things. Was he taking golf lessons on the government time and stuff like that? And who paid for the lessons? Rather than take it, he figured he was just too silly for a guy to fight about that. Of course, he had a wonderful wife.

Ms. Boswell: What about Carey Donworth, who was the chair?

Sen. Greive: I don't know much about him other than he apparently was a good leader and had been active in it.

Ms. Boswell: Was there anybody locally here in West Seattle who was particularly active?

Sen. Greive: No. I think I was the only one. Penny Peabody, George Benson, and Ruth Grimes. They all took part in it, to their credit. They kept the whole thing going from time to time.

Penny Peabody was chairman for a while—for two years, I think. She filled out somebody's term, and somebody else got it in the election.

Another was a fellow by the name of Gary Zimmerman. He was at work for Seattle University at the time. He's not a priest; he's just a layman. He was the chairman of the Metro Council.

Ms. Boswell: You mentioned Neil Peterson's wife. What was her role?

Sen. Greive: Yes. They got married after he worked here. Before that she was Tracy Duiker.

About that time we floated an awful lot of bonds, a fantastic amount of bonds. We're still building on the bonds. That was for the city of Seattle, the subways, and all of the heavy improvements at West Point and all kinds of things that cost money. She was the bond specialist. She was the treasurer.

The reason I know her so well is that later I became the finance chairman of both Metro and the Council.

Ms. Boswell: This was when you were on the King County Council?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Let me tell you a cute story about Tracy Peterson. She worked for me for about two or three months and I could see what she was doing. She was getting her way all the time. Well, the way I operated, I liked to make the decisions myself. I figured I'd make my own decisions. They could give me advice, but I kept losing all the time to her. So I took her out to Salty's and we ate and then I came out and said, "I want to talk to you. I know what you're doing. You're using charm." And she said, "Mr. Greive, have I misled you on any decision?" I said, "I don't know that you have." She said, "Have I been frank and open with you?" And I said, "Yes." "Have I done good work?" she said. And I said, "Yes." And she said, "What do you have against charm anyway?"

She was very, very beneficial because we had to float bonds with one of the big bond people down on the coast. We had everything. We had transportation stuff.

Ms. Boswell: When you say "we" are you talking about Metro?

Sen. Greive: Metro. For instance, I've got some statistics here. At the time it was taken over, they had one hundred and fifty-five new buses. They had one hundred and thirty that were twenty or thirty years old. We had three hundred and thirty-one that were diesels. A lot of them had a tremendous amount of wear on them. So they didn't get much from the city. So we had to buy all new buses—the kind that bend in the middle and all that sort of thing. In fact, it's been voted on several occasions to be the best transportation system in the United States for buses. The ones that are better than that are the ones that have a subway or a track, high-rise track, so they just go straight.

Ms. Boswell: What did you think of the issue of rapid transit?

Sen. Greive: What I think now. I've always thought rapid transit is the only answer. The city is going to stagnate if you don't. Look what happened to West Seattle since we got the bridge.

Ms. Boswell: Did West Seattle figure into any plans for a rapid transit?

Sen. Greive: No, because I think we had the best transportation system in the city.

Ms. Boswell: Internally in West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: Yes. We've got an excellent system.

Ms. Boswell: How did that evolve?

Sen. Greive: George Benson and myself. He was the city's guy in transportation, and we held some hearings. We found out what the people wanted, and we gave it to them. We had the decision down to the two of us. Of course, George Benson is a doll to deal with. He's just a real decent guy. He's one of the nicest men I ever met. He's just too good,

almost, for politics.

Ms. Boswell: What was his position?

Sen. Greive: City councilman. But he was interested in transportation. His brainchild, for which that he will be remembered longest, was the cable car down along the beach. He thought it up, and they went and found the cable cars in Australia and brought them here. He almost did it himself. He used government money, but he took a real interest and lined up the votes and everything.

The reason he was such a doll to work with was that he just didn't say, "Just go do it, or send Pat to do it;" he'd go do it himself. He would talk to them and try to work out the problems. He'd work on technical problems with people. You'd see him down there with the railroads. He took an interest far beyond just sponsoring it.

That's why I say when you talk about Jim Ellis, Ellis deserves all the credit he could be given because he did more than anyone else. However, he wasn't the only one.

Ms. Boswell: Then Ellis went on to do a lot of legal work?

Sen. Greive: Yes. He was Metro's lawyer for twenty years. It was perfectly legal. It's not like he wasn't supposed to be working on it. Jim Ellis, from 1958 to 1978, was the general counsel for Metro.

I don't know the way that the bond money is portioned out. As I understand it, it's a completely different part of the law firm. In other words, it's like you and I both work for Microsoft, and you have your department and I have mine. One was the legal counsel for advising and the other was the bond counsel. But they both have got money involved. I don't think that depreciates my admiration for them at all. He was never particularly a friend of mine or an enemy. He was just somebody I knew that I admired.

Ms. Boswell: Once you were on the King County Council, after you left the Legislature, how did your role evolve or change in terms of Metro at that time?

Sen. Greive: It was considered an extra duty.

Ms. Boswell: At the Legislature?

Sen. Greive: No, at the Council. The interesting thing is that the King County Council members were not elected to Metro. I wasn't elected to it; I was appointed. The governor appointed me.

Ms. Boswell: Appointed you to Metro?

Sen. Greive: Yes. There were supposed to be so many city positions and so many county positions because they were based on a percentage of the population. So I had a county position. And then I got to be finance chairman because I was interested in that, and I had the county finance position anyway.

We had a lot of spots—almost enough spots—to cover all our councilmen, anyway. In fact, maybe we did. But I was different because I volunteered for everything. Anything to do with finance, I was volunteering. And I was interested in Metro. In the end it wasn't just an extra job for me, because what can you do inside a city anyway? Transportation and sewage are the two big issues. We had a limited role. We don't have control of the police; we don't have the firemen, or even 911.

Ms. Boswell: You, essentially, got even more heavily involved in Metro?

Sen. Greive: I had to be involved; otherwise, I would have taken my shot at being president of the Council because that's the way we were

working it. We were circulating it around among the majority. Each generally got a year. But I figured I'd never get anything back.

Ms. Boswell: Got a year. What do you mean?

Sen. Greive: You'd have a year being president, and then somebody else would have it. I figured once that year was done I wouldn't be chairman of finance anymore, so I didn't want to lose it. It's a lot of honor. You become president and you're honored; you're introduced and all that sort of thing, and it's good. You've got a title.

Also, I was president of the State Association of Counties for one of those years. And I held other offices, vice-president, and so forth. So I made up for it in other ways.

Ms. Boswell: How did those positions evolve, especially the Metro position?

Sen. Greive: They chose. They had to try to balance it so that on the board there were enough spots. They had an open spot for finance, and I just got it and kept it. The others changed.

Ms. Boswell: Was being on the Metro Council something that a lot of people sought?

Sen. Greive: No. Most people didn't know it existed. That's the trouble. You'd try to tell them you were running the Metro lines, and it doesn't say so on your title. They don't know. They didn't know even what I did.

I know that Tracy Peterson and her staff would come—at least one staff person, sometimes two—would come over and we'd spend the mornings going over all of the stuff before we'd have a meeting, so that I was familiar with all of the bills and everything that was coming up. We'd go and analyze them. Then they'd do a lot more work because when I got them, I usually found something that I wanted more information on.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of that switch between the Legislature and the County Council and Metro, was this something that you could sink your teeth into? Was it difficult to make that transition from the Legislature to working on the county council and Metro?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. I think politics is politics. You have to study and find out what the issues are. Just because you're a county councilman doesn't mean that you understand all the stuff in Metro. But information is the least of your problems. The real thing you're trying to do is make the thing work right and be enough of an expert that you don't foul up the thing.

I always took the attitude to let the staff make their own decisions. If they were staff people, they did it, and all I'd do is sit back and criticize and change things I didn't like. I thought Metro was the best-run government agency that I ever saw in my life.

Ms. Boswell: How different was it to maneuver things through the Metro Council than either the county council or even the Legislature? What are the differences?

Sen. Greive: The Legislature is the toughest.

Ms. Boswell: Why? What are the differences between them?

Sen. Greive: Because in the Legislature you've got all these people, and the only way they can get publicity is to do or say something sensational. You've got nearly one hundred and fifty of them down there trying to get publicity. That's so many mouths to feed.

Ms. Boswell: You're saying it was easier to get what you wanted done in the County Council?

Sen. Greive: As long as I was chairman of finance. We had to have committee meetings, too, and make our recommendations.

One reason that I eventually got defeated—part of the reason—was that I was too friendly with the Republicans. I would stand in the middle. I wanted the thing to run smoothly.

When you're chairman of finance, and you've got things just the way you want them, you just have a lot of bombast. So usually, whenever we got into a fight, if it was five to four or whatever, I would very often go over. I'd take Ruby Chow with me and we'd go over, depending on what it was.

Ms. Boswell: How supportive was the King County Council of what Metro was doing?

Sen. Greive: It's much tougher because it's not done by districts. That puts me in a kind of bad position because I've always believed in districts. I had a district when I was in the Legislature, and I've always thought in terms of districts. My wife used to accuse me of that. She said, "Other people figure in terms of landmarks; you figure in terms of districts."

Louis Hofmeister, for instance, it wouldn't make much difference to him where I was because his district was rural. But it was quite important to the people in my district here in West Seattle.

Ms. Boswell: To see who you were supporting and associating with?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Always had a little bit of a machine. We got money for them, and I helped them with their campaigns. I was more active than they were.

You've got a loyalty to a district. It isn't like just being loyal to the whole thing.

Ms. Boswell: How did you try to marshal votes behind what you wanted?

Sen. Greive: You don't marshal votes. When people write about the Legislature or talk about it, they're not accurate. They pretend like somehow I grab you by the shirtfront and say, "You vote with me." And I don't doubt but what that happens once in awhile. But theoretically you have to, first of all, persuade them. The best way to persuade them is to be a friend. I'd been a friend of theirs on the things they wanted, and if they didn't have a strong feeling, then they'd go with you.

The second thing you do is to have a logical position, and you've got to be able to sustain it with facts. Nobody wants to vote because Greive says so. That's what they don't like. Then they just become part of a bureaucracy.

The third thing you do is make it convenient for them. You do something that they want. Now, what do they want? It's pretty nearly always money.

Ms. Boswell: Money for their constituents?

Sen. Greive: Yes. I don't think there's a more honest organization that I've ever served on in my life than the King County Council. As far as I know, nobody was on the take. Even the thought of it would probably get them kicked out. They didn't raise very large sums considering the importance of the job. It was just a bunch of people doing their job. There was no graft or corruption that I knew of, and I think that if there had been, it would have been something I'd have found out about. And I didn't say that about some of the other people I served with in the Legislature.

We had all kinds of differences of political opinion, though. Paul Barden was very conservative. We had Mrs. Stearn and various other people who were quite liberal, so it balanced out.

Ms. Boswell: You touched on this before, but I'm still not clear. You were the chair of

finance at Metro as well. Was that a position that was voted on by the Metro people?

Sen. Greive: Metro had an Executive Committee, and we'd make up a slate. And they'd say, "The County Council has got this one and the city's got that one." Theoretically, the chairman appoints them all. The fact is that the chairman may have made the choices. But the chairman, from time to time, didn't follow what we wanted. They wanted somebody different. I just didn't find myself in that position. All I wanted was really my job, and I wasn't trying to maneuver anything else.

Ms. Boswell: What about the Metro work? Was that something you enjoyed doing?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Even today, I look at a bus and think, "I was a part of that deal. We purchased those buses." It was all those bend-in-the-middle buses. I don't like to see them on the street. They terrorize me when I'm in the car, but, nevertheless, you try to put up with it.

In all of politics, what else are you interested in? You're interested in good government, having your say, and being important. I just liked Metro.

Ms. Boswell: How did it feel to be on Metro as opposed to the Legislature in terms of satisfaction in what you did? Is it more or less, or can you really compare them?

Sen. Greive: I couldn't really answer that. The Legislature is much more dog-eat-dog. If one dog doesn't eat you, another one will. There's such competition for the spotlight. And there are so many people that it's hard to get organized.

In both cases it helps if you've got a lot of seniority. If you've been there a long time, you know your way around.

Metro is the second biggest corporation in the state of Washington. I don't know if they count a corporation like Spokane and Tacoma. I just don't know what the figures are, or how they are arrived at, and I didn't have any reason to look them up. It's very, very big. There are millions and millions of dollars.

Ms. Boswell: The members of the Metro Council who were from a particular part of the area that the council served, were you representing a constituency?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Most of the members of the council were from small towns like Renton, Kent, Redmond, or Woodinville. All of these towns have people who have come on the council or else they may represent two of these constituencies. They all had a vote. Actually, I've got some figures here. Thirty-seven percent of the population was unincorporated. Twenty-four percent of the council seats were from smaller cities, and suburban areas counted for thirty-two percent. Twenty-four percent was the real small towns. So, the unincorporated and the incorporated were about even. People don't realize that. They think it was all in Seattle and Bellevue. But it's not.

And incidentally, another thing that is so misleading: everybody thinks the vote is like in the Legislature when they go into caucus and come out. In a job like this, it's much more sitting and talking and being friendly. You just don't work the same way. You don't say, "You do this or you do that. You want to do it? Okay, that's up to you."

Ms. Boswell: It's more consensus-based?

Sen. Greive: That's a way of putting it. But the idea is to be reasonable, civil, and not to fight. But you do have differences of opinion.

Ms. Boswell: What role did the engineers and the technical people play?

Sen. Greive: The engineers decided this is the better of the two ways. I think they were about evenly split. And they answered the question of who wanted it and why.

Ms. Boswell: When you say about even, do you mean different engineers?

Sen. Greive: Yes. The money was none too far apart. It depended on whether you figured it one way or another, and what you included and what you didn't.

Just like in a house. You've got to figure a house is going to cost twenty-five percent more if you make changes. That's why they make studies for affordable housing and so forth. They just try to design it so that it can be stamped out like a rubber stamp. It's a lot cheaper if you can do it that way.

Ms. Boswell: How long did you serve on the Metro Council?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. Twelve years, I think. I think I was there two years before I got to be the chairman of finance. I served a total of twelve years until 1987.

CHAPTER 14

THE WEST SEATTLE BRIDGE AND COUNTY COUNCIL FINANCES

Ms. Boswell: I'd like to talk now about the West Seattle Bridge and your involvement in it. Let's start by going back a little bit. Tell me about the bridge situation that you remember.

Senator Greive: It started before my time. In the early days it was all swamp between downtown Seattle and West Seattle. They used to come over by ferry or by boat and have their summer homes along there. It is a far cry from what it is now, but they were adequate summer homes.

We had Luna Park, which was the big recreational center that burned down. It was right in that area. The fishing pier is Luna Park's swimming pools filled in. That was kind of a recreational area down there.

The first thing they had to do was get better transportation, and they thought of streetcars because we had had streetcars. They drove a great number of piles into the firmer parts of the area. I don't know much of the detail. And we had transportation that way. Auto transportation came after that.

You could always get to West Seattle by going far enough south and coming back up because there was firmer ground. The slushy part of it was on the east side of the golf course. Actually, what you've got is the mouth of the Duwamish, which was much wider than the river. You had two channels, and they went around Harbor Island. Harbor Island didn't really exist, either. It was a sandy spit, which was all right when the water was low, but when the water was high, it went over the top of it or most of it. So, when the U.S. Engineers wanted to widen it and deepen the channel, they had to pump out the sand and put it somewhere, so they put it in Harbor Island. They had a very, very wide mouth, and the middle of this island became an industrial area. They had to deposit the sand somewhere and it was cheaper and easier to deposit it there than anywhere else.

In the early part of the 1900s they tore down one of the hills in Seattle, which is the re-grade, I guess you call it now. That's where Harbor Island came from.

Ms. Boswell: They just built it up?

Sen. Greive: Yes. In other words, most of it was there. I come in much later when I made a bridge proposal, which wasn't mine particularly. It was Harry Powell's. Harry Powell was an eminent bridge builder, probably the most eminent one in the state because he built them all over the country.

Ms. Boswell: Were there any bridges at that time?

Sen. Greive: Yes, there were two bridges. One had been the traditional bridge that went downtown, and another one was beside it. It was a newer version. However, in 1977 Powell said that he could build a bridge for forty million dollars. At the time they were talking anywhere from thirty-five to one hundred and seventy million.

Ms. Boswell: Did they want to build a new one just because the old one didn't work?

Sen. Greive: There was a committee

appointed by the mayor, and they were to make a report back to the City Council. They made a report and it came down to this: a lot of good people wanted the thing built, but they didn't know where to get the money. That was an awful wallop—as much as $200 million. It was a tremendous wallop, and they just didn't have that kind of money. They had about thirty-six million dollars on hand, which they got from highway funds for urban arterials that they'd never spent.

The city of Seattle didn't want to put any more money into it. The fact is the city engineer—I don't think he was the engineer, I think he was the assistant—but he said that they should abandon it. The City Council people were talking about where they should put the money.

Ms. Boswell: When you say abandon, they would just abandon the idea of building the bridge?

Sen. Greive: Yes. They made some sketches early on of the way they thought it should go. Of course, that's before they priced it all out. I have a copy of the report I did on it entitled, *The Proposed West Seattle Bridge Project.* I wrote it in May 1977.

The idea was that they would have steel girders, and they called that the grand design. That was the most expensive. But that's what they thought would make a good bridge. But then it went to the people who had to dig the money up. I had wanted a good bridge, but it was just too expensive.

However, you've got to really soft-pedal. When one-fifth of all your voters live in a particular area—or a substantial portion of them does—they can get awful mad at you. So, we always had good representation in the City Council. We had Bob Jones, and before that we had W.T. Campbell. We had Ted Best, and we had Phyllis Lamphere, and we had just a series of people. Charlie Chong is from West Seattle. So there was a stick-togetherness when we're fighting the rest of the world.

Ms. Boswell: Most of the people opposed it only because of the cost?

Sen. Greive: Yes. I don't think anybody resented us having a bridge; it was just a matter of cost. The cost was just outrageous. There's no comparison, but you could build a lot of Sears stores or you could build a Columbia Tower for that.

It was a big, big project, and everybody recognized that we were cut off out here. Everybody had different plans. For instance, Charlie Richey, who was a former legislator and considered by everyone to be "Mr. West Seattle," had the idea that he was going to connect the ferry with the bridge and make it a state highway. If we went on that theory, then the state would put up the money. The state took on the burden several times, but they never did anything about it because it was too expensive. They put it in a Category C, which was something that was too expensive for us to build. They had a committee report to the mayor, and they'd go back and forth and forth and back. The mayor didn't know what to do. He'd send it to the City Council, and they'd send it back to the mayor. I am not critical of any of these things. It just was an awful lot of money, and nobody knew quite how to get it.

Charlie Richey's idea was to make it part of the state system. We were all for that. Somebody else said, "Let's let the city build it and charge tolls." Then they began to fall off. They were not so sure.

Harry Powell came along, and he was looking for somebody with some influence to promote his idea. So I became a disciple, so to speak, but I wrote the actual report. He did all the calculations or told me where they were. There are always a lot of things that the assessor or various people that have an interest

need to know.

They spent $175,000 on this committee to try and find a way to do it, and they were about ready to give up.

Ms. Boswell: Was "Forward Thrust" involved in this at all?

Mr. Greive: Yes. Part of the thirty-five million dollars they had was "Forward Thrust" money.

Ms. Boswell: Had you been involved in "Forward Thrust" at all? That was a Seattle program, wasn't it?

Mr. Greive: Yes, it was another attempt beginning in the late 1960s to develop urban planning like mass transit and other things that were not passed in the earlier votes on Metro. I went to "Forward Thrust" meetings and shook hands and so forth. Then lo and behold, when they needed somebody a few years later, they figured I was the perfect ally.

Ms. Boswell: A portion of Forward Thrust was to go into highway building. Is that right?

Mr. Greive: A vote turned them down. When the people were making their choices as to what should be in Forward Thrust, highways got struck out, as did zoning. Some of the other pieces of it passed, like the stadium and parks, but the transportation part didn't pass. People were discouraged. They did have a referendum on the bridge itself in 1974, I think.

Yes, the people voted for West Seattle bridge. But they wouldn't vote for any money. If they'd have put a dollar a throw on that thing or fifty cents a throw, it may never have gone through. So everybody was very shaky. It was very close as things were. But they had the sense of the council. Phyllis Lamphere had a lot to do with it.

The appeal of the bridge that I had in mind, and Harry Powell had in mind, was that it was cheaper to build. It was cheaper, in the first place, because it didn't meander all over the place. When a bridge starts meandering, it may be better for the people riding on it—it may be safer and everything else—but it's an awful lot more expensive. More steel, more everything. A bridge is a very expensive thing to build.

Compare that with a bridge where you go in a straight line, no curving. You start up high enough so that you're on a level with the freeway, so you don't have to go all the way down. You make the east channel rather than the west channel the thing. You leave the west channel bridges intact. They can go up and down when they have to. But it wouldn't be as often, because the east channel would be one hundred and some feet above the ground.

There are approximately three thousand openings a year, but it would maybe go down to one hundred or one hundred and fifty. That may be wrong; it's just off the top of my head. The bridge would be opened one hundred to one hundred and fifty times simply because the rest of the boats could go under. But you'd have to deepen and change the east channel. We didn't talk much about that because that would have to be done by the engineers. We thought if we ever got a bridge, they'd soon get the channel fixed because the east channel is deeper.

There were other problems, too. The east channel, unfortunately, wasn't owned by any one person. The city had certain rights. The Indian tribes had certain rights. What I'm trying to say is that we had a legitimate proposal, and I think that they would have accepted it. I don't think that there was any spite or anything like that. Eventually it got pretty nasty, but I don't think anybody was trying to do anybody in or that I was in a bad position at all. It's just that all of these other things came together. We hadn't really figured

that out. Like Powell said, "How do you figure out how much it costs to dredge? There are so many square feet, but we haven't been dredging down there. We don't know what's down there." But he said, "I think we can do it."

I was much more interested in positive things, so I discussed it very briefly. It was cheaper because it went straight. And it was cheaper because it wouldn't have to descend all the way down to sea level again. They'd have to have ramps to go down there because you had to find some way to service Harbor Island. You couldn't leave Harbor Island without access. You had to build bascule bridges of your own because the way it is now—and it's still that way—that flat spot is an essential part of the whole thing. You couldn't take that away, so they built another bridge.

Ms. Boswell: When you say a bascule bridge, can you describe it?

Sen. Greive: As I understand it, it's one constructed out of steel, and it goes up and down. I may be wrong.

Ms. Boswell: It's more of a drawbridge?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: And then the cable-strung one?

Sen. Greive: The cable-style one would be like a bridge you'd see anywhere. But you see, you're building that high, and for some reason—and I never did get the sense of it—they didn't like that.

By the time I came into the picture, not only was there reluctance to fool around, but anybody with the money to spend hated the idea of a bridge that was going to be that expensive. So the bascule bridge had been booted out. It was last year's news, so I really don't know too much about that.

However, the stumble was never on the bridge and the fact that we wanted it—it was all on money. Nobody was willing to be taxed. The port wanted it, and they dictated to us how high it had to be and that they wouldn't support it unless we did this or that. But they weren't putting the money up.

Finally, we had the city money and we got the money—$110 million and a few million dollars after that—we eventually got that to build the bridge, but they said it wasn't enough. They were short by thirty or forty million dollars. So, we had a meeting.

Ms. Boswell: Before you get into that, we haven't talked about how the $110 million came into the picture.

Sen. Greive: First, we heard from a representative of Senator Warren Magnuson's. He explained that they had a fund, and they were using almost the entire fund for the West Seattle bridge. Nevertheless, he didn't see how they could get any more and we had to have some local money. The city of Seattle, I don't think, ever put up any extra money. They were already in for thirty-five million dollars, and they said that was enough. That didn't make us happy because I had understood the deal to be that the county would put in ten million dollars, the port would put in ten million dollars, and the city would put the final ten million dollars. I think they just had made their contribution and let it stand.

They'd had all kinds of jurisdictional problems as far as money is concerned, too. How do you get federal money for a bridge that's not on the state highway system? What kind of a deal was that?

Then we had an awful lot of other problems. Most of the designs were pretty expensive. They, at times, weren't sure what they wanted. I found that when the federal government does something, they make an

estimate but then never complete it. At least that's the way I understand it. They get additional money, and they have to update it as things come along. But they kept us very well informed, and I think I was president of the West Seattle Chamber of Commerce in 1978.

There were all these other movements. If one person would think he had the answer, he'd start it and get some support, and then he'd find out pretty quick that it was too expensive. Then somebody else would try. Of course, I tried with my forty million dollar plan—which would cost more than forty million dollars, but I wasn't calling their attention to things that might be a little more expensive at that particular time. However, they all got an airing, whether I liked it or not.

Ms. Boswell: You presented an alternative that was much less expensive and that would work, so why were people resistant to it?

Sen. Greive: They were resistant to it downtown—the City Council. That may have been personal. The City Council really believed that they were so much more important than the legislators—at least they did in those days.

Jeannette Williams was in the middle of it, and she was supporting the city's positions. Although she had quite a little give to her—I don't want to get too hard on her because she helped. Phyllis Lamphere did quite a lot, too.

It was a unified effort. It wasn't just Bob Greive building a bridge. I thought they should have taken the forty or even fifty million dollars. It was the smartest thing to do. I never quite could understood why, but they had a lot of what I considered silly arguments against it. That could be jealousy; I don't know. But I know that every time you'd gather support and it looked like it was going someplace—they had finally appointed a committee of seven or eight people—they kept demanding more meetings and more discussions. Eventually the shit hit the fan, and we got a bridge.

Ms. Boswell: Let's talk a little bit about that. Were you here when the ship hit the old bridge?

Sen. Greive: Yes, I was. It is kind of interesting what had happened. I was pursuing another idea at that time on the same problem. I wanted us to have a ferry service run.

Ms. Boswell: From Alki?

Sen. Greive: No. Not at Alki Point. Alki Point is way down the way. They still call it Harbor Avenue. That's famous, at least to West Seattleites. They changed its name. It's Beach Drive, and then it becomes Harbor Avenue, and then it becomes something else. But it's always the same thing. It's just that they tried to honor too many people.

Ms. Boswell: Is it Duwamish Head that's further in?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Duwamish Head. I wanted to set up—right where they've got the old recreation park—a dock right there where people could take their cars. I even gave on that. I was willing to say that we would just have it as a passenger-only ferry. That was my interest.

I went off to talk to some people who had built such a system in Vancouver, B.C. They have the north beach and various areas, and they have this wonderful ferry system that you go on, and you just drop your money in. Everybody stands up, and then they get off and walk over. It really moves people.

Then, when it looked like we could have money, the people weren't nearly as willing to compromise. They wanted a first-rate thing,

and truthfully, I wanted it, too. If they said it cost two hundred million dollars, okay.

After the discussion about money, a ship hit the bridge in 1978, and they said that it was too expensive to repair. That's where the people downtown were very helpful because they had engineers and access to people who would say the right thing at the right time. I think that they were very, very beneficial and helpful. It was a contribution by a lot of different people.

I was in the thick of it, that's for sure, but it wasn't Bob Greive's bridge.

Ms. Boswell: Was it primarily insurance money that helped build it?

Sen. Greive: Oh, no. The insurance money was only up to the value of the ship. These shipping lines—as I understand it and the way it was explained to me—say that the insurance is to the value of the ship. They're all separate corporations. In other words, this will be Corporation A and another will be Corporation B, but the stock in them is owned by the people running the thing. This way they limit their liability. I think we got ten or twelve million dollars.

Ms. Boswell: With the bridge not working, you were minus a major arterial?

Sen. Greive: We had a marvelous ad. I can't think of a better ad. Not only was the thing not working, we'd become so famous that people came from other places to take a look at that bridge.

Ms. Boswell: It was stuck in the up position, is that right?

Sen. Greive: It was stuck up, and you could see it everywhere. It was tremendous. The fact is I've got a view of it from my apartment. It was really a winner.

Ms. Boswell: When that happened it meant that there was only one bridge left to get to West Seattle?

Sen. Greive: There was only one bridge left, and people had to be courteous. And they were—very courteous. I don't think I ever saw a bunch of more courteous drivers.

Ms. Boswell: What were the traffic jams like?

Sen. Greive: It jammed when it got overloaded. Everything was made for two bridges, and when you've only got one, you're going to have a lot of detours, or you're got to let them go in like an eyedropper, one or two at a time. Harbor Island itself has a lot of business.

I understand that places like Todd Shipyards changed their hours because they had the same problem. Their trucks had to get in and out to service their business. They were very courteous, and they did everything they could. Although driving a little Suzuki and seeing two big trucks on either side—an oil truck on one side and something else on the other—scared the hell out of me.

There was a certain amount of business, too, after you got off Harbor Island. There's a flat area down there, and there were some radio stations. They had a certain amount of shipping. They had railroads over to it. It's all built up now very nicely, but in those days it was still kind of a garbage dump.

Apparently, when the federal government makes a budget up, they put aside some bridge money. I don't know the history of the bridge money or how it got there, but it was there.

Magnuson, of course, was the great hero as far as we were concerned, too. So the story goes, Senator Packwood from Oregon was another one just like Magnuson. Eventually, he got to be finance chairman, and he did the same thing I'm told. He kind of favored this area. When Maggie got the money, Packwood

came up to him and said, "Look Maggie, I don't want to spoil anything and I'm not giving everybody a hard time but my gosh, you took all the money." Magnuson said, "I only took two-thirds of it." And he said, "That's about right."

Ms. Boswell: Two-thirds of the money for the whole country, right?

Sen. Greive: Not only that, he said that he thought that was fair—two-thirds for West Seattle. But that was only one budget cycle, and they had to do every year.

That was the bulk of the money. Then there was ten million dollars from the county and ten million dollars from the port. Maybe there was ten million dollars from the city, I don't know. Plus the fact that there was insurance money, and it was put together. They were out to build a pretty fine bridge, and they did.

Ms. Boswell: Who made that decision about what kind of bridge and where it would go?

Sen. Greive: We decided that in order to be sure that the thing was done right—it had so much federal money in it—to let the U.S. Engineers build it. They didn't build it in a sense that they did the work, but they supervised it and verified it.

Ms. Boswell: The Army Corps of Engineers?

Sen. Greive: Yes. They were more familiar with this sort of thing than anybody else. There again we got wonderful cooperation from them. It was a cooperative effort.

Ms. Boswell: Was there public support, by that time, behind whatever was built?

Sen. Greive: We'll never know. There were several proposals floating around. Nobody quite knew what to do because they wanted to connect it. We thought that it would have a better smell to it if it was done by the Corps of Engineers. They were responsible.

The city of Seattle actually did all of the supervision. They had engineers who drove the hard bargains and made the hard decisions.

Ms. Boswell: You were on the County Council then, right?

Sen. Greive: Yes. And I was finance chairman. By virtue of the County Council, I was chairman of appropriations for the county and for Metro concurrently, which was a separate organization at that time. I was a member of Metro because I was a King County Councilman.

Ms. Boswell: I would have thought that that it would have been more of a City Council project than a County Council issue.

Sen. Greive: Until you look at the politics of it, it is. The beauty of it is that it's simple, and you have a group of people that you want to take care of on your side. But the down part of it is that it's awful hard to get what you want when you've got to quarrel with the rest of the nation. You just have to have the right people in the right place in order to pull a thing like that off.

You want to remember that there's no way you can expand it. For instance, one of the arguments they made was that the people on Vashon Island would benefit. Well, it's hardly connected, but West Seattle does have a ferry to Vashon. All kinds of arguments were used to get it.

However, I didn't have to figure out the calculations—that was Harry Powell's job. Lots of times he had somebody who just happened to have what he wanted. Somebody had made the measurements. Somebody else that knew would come to him, and he'd say,

"Oh yeah, I know he'll do this and she'll do that." He was kind of coaching us all the time from the sidelines. But he was important enough that we also had him testify, and he did a good job. I think he was close to ninety years old then.

Ms. Boswell: Was he disappointed that his bridge didn't get built?

Sen. Greive: I think so, but nobody really got far enough to figure they had the cap on the thing.

It was a lot like the time I put the redistricting together. You don't go too far with people. You go far enough to get them interested, but then you've got to get some concessions from somebody else. If you're too rigid, you can't do it. We were all in the mood to try and get that bridge—that is, the West Seattle people. I think there was very little jealousy.

Ms. Boswell: Once the bridge was completed—this is a broad question—but how do you think it affected the community?

Sen. Greive: It probably adversely affected the community if you get right down to it. It makes me think that Charles Royer was probably right. That was his argument. We weren't going to have the same living conditions. We've got about twenty percent more people than we had then. All of the available land left for building in the city, practically, is up on Pigeon Hill, where you've got large tracts. All of it has a problem or else it would have been built on long ago. It's swampy or hilly or something, somebody doesn't want to sell, or some sort of problem. It's just one of those things. It's a miracle that we got it.

It also is very nice because Phyllis Lamphere could claim that she's the mother of the bridge, and Mrs. Williams can claim that she is. I can claim that I had my part in it. Even if your thoughts were rejected, you could still take some credit, but Sam Smith is our hero.

Ms. Boswell: Was Sam Smith involved, too?

Sen. Greive: Yes. He was with us every step of the way. When we had the next Hi-Yu parade, he was the grand chairman.

Hi-Yu was our big celebration in West Seattle. It was a lot bigger then than it is now. The parade would be a good-sized parade, and it was a very coveted position to be the Grand Marshal and ride first.

Ms. Boswell: So Sam Smith was the Grand Marshal? Is this around the time of the bridge building?

Sen. Greive: Right at the time. He made these big speeches about why his friends in West Seattle had to have a bridge.

Ms. Boswell: But he followed through with the bridge?

Sen. Greive: He voted for it all the time. It was eight to one or whatever it was.

Tim Hill cast the only vote against the final plan. That's quite amazing because Tim Hill graduated from West Seattle High School. He doesn't live there now, but he did. We always considered him a West Seattle supporter.

Ms. Boswell: Why did he vote against it?

Sen. Greive: I'll never know. Once in a while there's a vote that comes out from under the skirt that we didn't know was there.

Ms. Boswell: Did you have to do a lot of engineering to get that many votes?

Sen. Greive: Yes. We had more and more

engineering I think. The effort was spent with the city and County Councils.

Although it shouldn't seem that way, but you see in the County Council we had John Spellman solidly on our side. No horsing around. He and I discussed the thing, and I told him that I was a big supporter. He sent me to the meeting to represent the county. I told him that we were going to have to come up with some money, and he more or less told me that if I got close that he'd find the money somehow.

We had the County Council. I was in very good shape with them. As an actual matter, two or three of them tried to get me to run for president of the King County Council several times. On several occasions Lois North or Bill Reames suggested I run. I wouldn't run. I'm the only one who wouldn't run. I said, "I don't want to take away what I've got, and it won't be there when I come back." So I just stayed. I was guaranteed that I'd have all the Republican votes. I don't know how good the guarantee was, but I never wanted to let go of the money—the finance. I said that what would happen was that next year they'll have a different finance chairman, and then how am I ever going to get it back? Maybe some of the people wanted me to move on. But I had my little empire, too.

Ms. Boswell: You had the financial empire?

Sen. Greive: Just by virtue that I was there, and not that I was any greater than anybody else.

I was more interested at that time in my powerful position. I wasn't going to run for Congress or anything. There was no real reason why being president would help that much anyway.

Ms. Boswell: You saw the budget as a way of really having some power?

Sen. Greive: If you're writing the budget, you've got a lot of power. For one thing, the average person doesn't read the budget. The newspaper people, a lot of them, don't really read them too much. There are an awful lot of decisions—they mean very little to them but are very big to you.

For example—I think I told you this before—when the women organized a department. They had this one woman I didn't particularly like, but nevertheless, they were always promoting this and promoting that. I always made sure that they got more than they asked for. I'll repeat that—the women's division always got more than they asked for. The women knew, but the men didn't. I wasn't about to get into a big hassle with them. When I was running, why they said I was anti-women. Well, I got the signature of every woman on the Council saying I had been generous and so on and so forth. But I made sure they were taken care of.

Ms. Boswell: Did you think that the King County budget needed to be changed in any way when you came in?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Well, I had a lot of ideas. I think that Lois North after I left organized it so there wasn't any committee of the budget, but finance was handled by everybody. Well, that's all right except they don't have any staying power. The only way you can—well, you see there's never enough money. If I take from you, I have to give to somebody else and so forth and so on. There are things that you want, and that's part of your reason for being there—especially local things.

For instance, I was very active in getting this bridge in West Seattle. I was able to get Spellman to go for it. I said that the county had very little to do with this, it's the city on both ends of it. He said, "We'll go $10 million." Why then the Port said that if he'd go $10 million, they'd go $10 million. The

county said they would go $10 million, so all that put together with the federal money we got was the way we built the bridge. In fact, the bridge should be named the Magnuson Bridge. There was only so much in the pot. Magnuson said, "Two-thirds for the West Seattle Bridge, and the rest of the country can take the rest." His name is on a whole lot of stuff at the University and other places. You don't see as much of Jackson's name because Magnuson was the money getter. He was chairman of Appropriations, too.

Ms. Boswell: You personally had had experience in the budget being in the Legislature?

Sen. Greive: I think anybody could do it. If you wanted to do the work you could figure it out. You had competent people to advise you; you didn't have to be that bright even. I think I was better than the average.

Ms. Boswell: Did you have any competition from people on the County Council who wanted to deal with the budget too?

Sen. Greive: Well, at the very first out of the box, Mike Lowry had set everything in motion.

I can remember that when I was down there, why I found that they didn't split along party lines. There were two Democrats and one Republican in one faction. The other one had two Democrats and two Republicans. I didn't have a lot of choices, but I was very friendly with Paul Barden. I've always thought very highly of him, in spite of the fact that his social views and mine don't mesh. He's a real technician. When it comes to doing something, he'll know how to do it and he'll know the right person. But he was a right-winger.

He and I were sitting there, and we thought we were beat. We couldn't get enough votes, and whoever got to be the president of the Council made all the appointments. I remember him saying to me, "Bob, I'll be damned. It looks to me like we can't do it. We've only eight or nine people here to talk to. We're just not going to do it." I said, "Give me a try." He said, "What are you going to say?" I said, "I'll tell you." He said, "Okay." So I went and I said, "Mike, how would you like to be president of the King County Council?" Mike Lowry said, "Sure." He was excited. He was very excited. He had been quoted in the press that he was solidly behind Mrs. Stearn. She never forgave him for that, although she eventually became president of the Council anyway. But she was really hurt.

We elected him and he kept his word, and we got all the appointments. That's how I got to be chairman of finance.

Ms. Boswell: Was it more difficult or less difficult to keep your majority on a smaller body like the Council?

Sen. Greive: Well, the majority didn't amount to much. Any one of us could almost disrupt it anytime we wanted to. You could cause a lot of havoc. Except that Gary Grant had it in for me. He got to be president. You see, I could be president anytime I wanted to be. But if I did that then I couldn't get finance back. That was the problem. Lois North talked to me about a coalition. I went a different route. I put my energy into a statewide thing. I was president of the Association of County Governments. I did that.

Ms. Boswell: I think we talked about this a little bit before, but you were almost more associated on the Council with the Republicans than you were with the Democrats. Did you have a switch in your thinking or not?

Sen. Greive: No. I think that I was less

partisan than they were.

Ms. Boswell: Less partisan?

Sen. Greive: Yes. In other words, this was the end of my career. I wasn't really planning anything else. I wasn't planning to get beat either. I was friendly with these people. Working day-to-day, when you wanted something, they would cooperate, and I thought things should be nonpartisan. But it wasn't. I shouldn't say that because I always voted for partisanship. I think that I wasn't partisan in the sense that I took it out on them or anything.

It's just like my friend who works for the governor down there told me about what he learned from me: "You're going to need them tomorrow. Don't saw it off, because even if they get mad at you for a week or two, it may be just the time you need them. Do everything, but don't terminate it. Keep on good terms if you can."

I think when we were in the majority, and the Republicans were in the minority, that's all you could say. But, of course, if the Republicans had me, they had a majority. There was a one-vote difference most of the time.

I don't think that I particularly crossed the Republicans. The person that would paint me that way was Randy Revelle. I didn't get along very well with him.

Ms. Boswell: Why was that?

Sen. Greive: It's about like I felt about Martin Durkan, only in this case it was nothing to do with money—absolutely nothing to do with money. As far as I know, the fellow was scrupulously honest. In his case, he had the big head that he was going to do this and he was going to do that. I sent the budget over there and Revelle said, "What did you do to my budget?" I said, "They sent it to me and we made revisions." He wouldn't stand for that. That was his prerogative. No use being mad at him. You just smiled and shook hands with him. But he was going to do this and he was going to do that.

He was awfully sore at me because he couldn't write the budget his way. He forgot that I might have had some ideas, too. He wrote it up. He had the best way; he had the best experts. He had all the expertise he needed, and he didn't need old politicians like me. But I liked Yapp. I thought she was really a very capable woman.

Ms. Boswell: Who was this?

Sen. Greive: Shelly Yapp was her name. She was the director of the Budget Office. She was a bespectacled woman. She'd be in her fifties now. She was a facts and figures expert. I liked to discuss budget issues and things with her because she really knew something.

I'm not saying Revelle didn't. Randy has a wonderful mind, and I'm sure that if he wanted to know something, he'd know it, but he didn't think it was it was worth putting a lot of effort into. He wasn't a bad public official.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think you changed your style of politics as a County Councilman, either because of it being a different kind of governmental body, or just because you had a lot of experience and you saw what worked and what didn't?

Sen. Greive: What they did is, when I got elected, the Democrats had held a caucus without me, and they invited the press. There were the four of them, and I was never invited to come. They decided who would be this, and who would be that. That's how Lowry got to be finance chairman. They did it deliberately. There's just no way around it. I didn't get along very well with Mrs. Bernice

Stern. I thought Robert Dunn was a hale and hearty guy, and I got along fine with him. But you get along with the people who get along with you.

Tracy Owen was head of the Republicans on the council. He came to me and wanted me to switch over. He had promised me all kinds of things, and he was also a good friend of mine, but I wouldn't do it.

But I don't know that I became more Republican. I think that Randy and his people had control of the government, and I was their nemesis. I didn't really want to be because that wasn't going to do me any good. You can't be a dictator and get away with it very long.

Ms. Boswell: Did those kinds of animosities contribute to your loss in the election in 1987? Did they work against you?

Sen. Greive: I think so. There was only a thirteen percent turnout in that election. The people who voted weren't partisans. There was no one on the Republican ticket, just two Democrats. I think what happened is that they came out in greater force than my people did. I may be wrong, but that's what I like to believe.

I don't think I changed as far as liberal or conservative. In fact, I think I was a lot more liberal than some of the people who may have pretended that they were.

Ms. Boswell: Did you find when you were on the Council that it was as much work, more work, or less work than when you were down in Olympia?

Sen. Greive: It was at a different level. At the Legislature, I was number one. I wasn't always at that position—I had to take a while to get seasoned there. Number two: politics is infectious. It's almost like osmosis. You consume it and it consumes you. You try to do the best job you can. Some people are smarter than others and some people work harder. If they don't know how, well—you don't get a budget until you go through a lot of legislative hearings and talk to lobbyists. You listen to what they have to say and you read what is going on. You try to do the best job you can.

Chapter 15

Final Thoughts

Ms. Boswell: When you leave office, having spent a large portion of your career in public office, and you're just a citizen and involved in politics from the other side, does it change your view any?

Senator Greive: Forty years. When I left politics, I didn't keep it alive. I've spent my time dancing. But there's always something going on here. I don't feel a bit isolated. I was born three blocks from here.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think that the influence of religion or religious groups has changed politics? Was the religious right as strong during your career as it is now?

Sen. Greive: I don't know that the religious right was as well organized. It was the left wing that was organized in those days. The right wing was either conservatives, or they melted into the middle class. I don't think that we heard as much from that group. But we got it from the left wing as well as the right wing.

I just don't know why they're doing what they're doing. Somehow they've got an idea that they're going to be rewarded for it. The fact is that in a good deal of it, the Catholics are much more tolerant of it than anybody would believe they ever would be.

Ms. Boswell: What about on the state level? What do you think of the directions the parties are taking now?

Sen. Greive: I don't really know. I'm not deep enough to discuss it in detail. The things that you've asked me about, I've had a chance to look them over and look at it and figure it out. But all I know is that I vote Democratic and will probably continue the rest of my life.

After all, when I was just a little kid my mother was the district chairman. Those were the days when women didn't have the vote. They didn't get the vote until the 1920s. She had come from Canada, and she had been a Liberal up there. When she married my father, she became a citizen and a Democrat.

Ms. Boswell: You don't think that the party labels really mean as much these days?

Sen. Greive: In my book on campaigning, I try to explain that. All of us would like to figure out some prototype for winning every time. You don't really control enough votes to make a difference, except if you've got a bunch of different issues that all have a following. That's about the best way to do it. It takes a lot of skill because you've got to weave them and get people to accept them because some of the people that you count on won't go along with you on that.

For instance, welfare reform is not popular with the Democrats. It may be with other people. I noticed that Governor Gary Locke is sort of going along with welfare reform, which I think is too bad. However, the only place where they've been able to overcome problems like that is in the machine.

Then they had the days of the political machine, unfortunately there was a certain amount of corruption involved. But in the days of the machine, they knew what they wanted. They registered them to vote. They got them the coal in the winter. If they wanted

a promotion they helped them get a promotion. They got the Irishmen on the police force, etcetera, etcetera. The Negroes wanted their share.

When you've got all of these people pulling together, you have a machine. The machine really isn't fashioned very well for today because we're reading other stuff, and we're listening to the TV and radio. They just don't have a captured group. If it's a close election, they still have enough that they can do wonders. But it's got to be very close which means that the voting area is less.

For instance, I think Carol Mosely-Braun might very well have been a United States senator in the old days of the machine because they'd have turned out the votes, crooked or honest, one way or the other. She was the auditor or something from Chicago, North Chicago, and she just filed and got elected. She had a stormy career in the Senate.

You see, everybody in the machine wasn't dishonest. However, everybody in the machine probably knew who was dishonest. I, for one, can't be too critical of that because it wasn't my job to clean the thing up, either. What these people do is that they know how to hit the cutting edge and make it pay off.
I just think it's a whole amalgamation of things that people know how to handle with a machine. They get the machine, and then you have to take a lot of corruption and so forth, so it isn't a viable option. But an honest machine would help. They say, incidentally, that Mayor Daley's father was honest. He didn't die with any money. I've heard it said that the young Daley is the same way.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think that the state of Washington throughout your political career has been relatively free of corruption?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: Why would that be?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. It could be because we have open primaries. Another reason is that we're a comparatively new state. We don't have a long tradition of having to take care of the cop on the beat and that sort of thing.

I think by and large most of them are honest. There are some scalawags, all right. I told you that at our first meeting. They're just people like everybody else. They might take a drink with somebody, they might take a trip, they might take some small change, but they're not taking big dollars.

Even I have been on occasion invited to speak to groups that I favored their legislation and know that my appearance was kind of a payoff for their friends. That's the way it is. I can remember one time when the osteopaths wanted something, I was their lawyer, and I was over in Yakima and I said, "You've got to get Perry Woodall on your side. So for lord's sake let's give him a standing ovation," so we passed the word around. He was a big supporter after that.

He knew some osteopaths and they were quite strong in his district. That sold him. After that, he was openly for them.

Ms. Boswell: What is it about politics that most intrigued you?

Sen. Greive: You'd do a lot better to ask somebody who came into it when they were twenty-five or thirty years old. The bug bit me when I was seven or eight. It's the gamble; it's the fun. It's the only game for grownups. It's interesting, and I find that politics does one thing—it turns out people with good personalities. It really does. In other words, you can't be mean or petty without being found out. Depending on the situation, it may be disastrous or it may not be, but it's a point against you, so people avoid that.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think that it can create

shallow people, too?

Sen. Greive: Sure. Shallow people have got a right to be represented, don't they?

Ms. Boswell: Yes. But should they be the ones that run politics?

Sen. Greive: Spoken like a person with a Ph.D. That's what they always say. It's a hard thing because a lot of times they're some of the best people, and they get blocked out simply because they don't have the education. It happens most frequently when your boss has had the education because that's their weapon. "What have you done since college?" That sort of thing.

I remember I had an uncle by marriage; he's dead now. He was postmaster out here and had a big job downtown. He'd been a carrier for years and got nowhere. A fellow who was the Democratic county chairman was given the post office to administer—a political deal. My uncle came up and told him that he wanted a job. The man looked at him and said, "What have you done since college?" My uncle said, "I'll show that SOB." He got a bunch of books and read them and kept keeping the guy informed. He got promoted, too. You can't knock education, but it doesn't automatically assure your standing or a job. Some things are very unimportant and then suddenly become major issues in politics. But, unfortunately that's how you get ahead.

Ms. Boswell: Would you tell your children and your grandchildren to go into politics?

Sen. Greive: Well, fortunately, up until now they've had better sense. The reason for it is that they had to work like hell. They don't like doorbelling, they don't like putting up signs, and they don't like all of the day-to-day work that I enjoyed. I could tell the difference. Unless they have a real, real desire to make it, I would think they're better off not being in it.

Cherberg used to say every Saturday is an election. You have no idea of the pressure that gets on you. He said, "I thought it was great to be a coach, but, oh, what pressure. I love it here as Lieutenant Governor. That's the place." That may have been unusual, but that's what he said. I doubt that he would probably feel that way about now. In politics you have to be willing to make sacrifices.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think polling has really changed things? Do you think the ability to poll has changed politics?

Sen. Greive: Sure it has. What we used to do, you couldn't do now. We'd truck all the secretaries up there at night, and we'd have the stuff worked out. They'd make phone calls, and we'd try to figure out how this district was going and that district was going. We were in the Neanderthal Age compared with what they've got now. It was something to value, but we tried to poll. They had a lot of telephone lines up in the Senate, but fortunately for me, the Republicans are the ones that got caught doing all that stuff. But we did it, too.

Ms. Boswell: When polling did come in, how was it received?

Sen. Greive: It was always there. But it was for those who were fascinated by politics. It's sort of recreational. It wasn't the guts of the game.

I've been around some of these people's brilliant conclusions they draw. I don't always agree with them, don't get me wrong, and a lot depends on how the questions are asked and how clever the poll is set up. Those are the bad things. But the good things are that you can get an idea of how you're doing. If you try to parallel park a car, you have to make

several swings. It's about like that. In other words, every one isn't perfect, but then you have the same process you go through. Selecting the people you poll is important. If you select only friends you get a false impression. It's pretty important.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think campaigning is changing, too? Your success was based on hard campaigning.

Sen. Greive: Yes. I think it has changed, but changed for who? It certainly has changed at the federal, state, and gubernatorial level and any other statewide level.

My book on campaigning is dedicated pretty much to the people who don't have radio or TV coverage. They may have some radio, and they might have a little TV coverage but if they're in a place like Pasco, Washington, they don't have that much. By and large they can't afford that kind of thing. Lord only knows I spent $100,000 the last time I ran, of which $50,000 was my own. I just figured I'd get to recoup it later, and I didn't. That was one of the flaws. You still have to communicate one way or another. It's harder.

They try to personalize everything by filling the name in, and all the things that the direct mail people have. That's had a big effect. We used to be able to mail the whole district for $2,000 or $3,000 because they were two-cent stamps back then. You still can use signs. You still can use sweat equity or whatever. The trick is not only having the volunteers, but having somebody who knows what they're doing to direct them. Signs aren't as effective in the city as they are out in the rural areas, unless you get them in people's yards. Of course, that's pretty good. That says, "I'm for him."

Then the question is, do you make a mailing just to get the locations and that sort of thing. For instance, Senator Cooney, one of my heroes, never made a speech that I know of. He was an old-fashioned politician. He said he had a lot of open land so he said he would go back around the curve and put all his signs back here on both sides because the people who wanted to tear them down wouldn't think of going back to find them.

Ms. Boswell: When you say "back," do you mean away from the road?

Sen. Greive: Yes. The road is here and the main highway is there.

Ms. Boswell: Kind of on a side road?

Sen. Greive: Yes. We're running out of days when you had the side roads. But you'd see the intersections. We used to do just the intersections because that would catch them going all ways. But he advocated putting them this way, all of them. I'd say, "Well, what about when they know it?" He said, "They're lazy and they'll get you there, and they might get you here, but they're not going to tear them all down." They've got people looking over what they're doing, too.

Ms. Boswell: Who would you say were your heroes in politics?

Sen. Greive: Magnuson. I liked Jackson, but I was very, very taken with Magnuson.

Ms. Boswell: What was it about him?

Sen. Greive: I don't know. Maybe it was because he was an insider rather than an outsider, and I'm an insider. In other words, I liked the publicity if it just came to me, but I never was one out doing some vast thing simply to get publicity. If I had an intelligent thing to do, I thought it would bring me exposure, I'd be all for that. Just to make wild statements for no reason, I don't go for.

From time to time there were a lot of other

fellows I liked. Charles Savage was in the Congress for a short time, and in the House, in the Legislature. He was a man of impregnable character—he was a left-winger, but he was really standard. There are several people around like that. The Kennedys and even Carter were a little too fast for me.

Ms. Boswell: What do you think is your greatest legacy? If you had to pick one contribution that you've made in politics, what would it be?

Sen. Greive: I've worked harder on redistricting than anything else, but I don't know if that was a contribution. That probably was a negative contribution.

Ms. Boswell: Why would you say that?

Sen. Greive: It didn't get good publicity. I've always said when I was going through it—I was telling my wife and different colleagues—I'd say, "You think it's great to get the publicity, but I'd rather have anything than this type of publicity. People don't like it." I said, "Inherently, there's no way you can look good if you're going to do that. You're wheeling and dealing, and there's no other way to do it." You're going to get condemned for it. You're engaging in a non-popular sport. The partisan Democrats like it if you win, but the Republicans don't like it. Very often you don't win and nobody likes it.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of what you're most proud of, would you say it was redistricting or was it something else?

Sen. Greive: I think the one redistricting campaign where the women voted for it, and I had to turn them around was the most difficult. As for what the good things I did, I was for a lot of good things, but most of them weren't mine.

I would do a lot of things for Evans, although he never appreciated it, simply because his thought process and mine came out the same place. But I never considered him much of a Republican.

Ms. Boswell: If you had to describe Bob Greive's politics, how would you describe it?

Sen. Greive: I figure I'm a technician. I just figure that I went into it a lot more deeply than anybody else.

The Real Majority, for instance, was a favorite of mine. I thought that was a wonderfully simple explanation of the way things go. I've had occasion to discuss that with Senator Jackson, and with the people back in Washington, D.C. on one of my visits when it was still hot. They told us about the guys who wrote it, Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, and that they do consulting and so forth. I was just fascinated by the detail, because I thought it was down to earth. They weren't talking about sketchy concepts way in the future.

I think that you make reforms one form at a time, and I think you know what you're doing. You don't go blabbing about the five or six that you can't keep. Whether you're a Democrat or Republican, it's pretty hard because there's always something you won't swallow.

Ms. Boswell: Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently?

Sen. Greive: I'm sure there are hundreds of things I would have done differently.

Ms. Boswell: Any major thing?

Sen. Greive: I'd have to think about that. Pretty nearly everything you do is dictated by something else. Would you find an issue and say are you for that issue? Therefore, I'm for

you. You just don't have issues like that. It's always pieces of one thing that depend on another.

If a person has been a regular in your caucus and supported you when you needed the help, when he comes around and he has a bill that I don't think is very good, but I think that he deserves something, I'd give it to him.

Ms. Boswell: Any regrets?

Sen. Greive: Not really. No. I admire the guys who are slick, I guess, but I wouldn't trust them. I'd trust Rosellini better than any of them. But I knew him better. And lots of times I didn't agree with him. But in his case, I told him so. I never tried to pry into his personal life or anything like that.

I've known lots and lots of people over the years who have voted dry and drank wet. We used to see them in the Legislature. I don't drink anything alcoholic—never have in my whole life. The first thing I'd tell somebody when they voted for me is that I've never had a drink in my life. That's the way it is.

But you see, when I broke into politics I had the Skid Row and Chinatown. I had more taverns than anybody else, so I became a friend of the wets. Was that right and would I do it again? Maybe I wouldn't, but that was the atmosphere. So I got in the habit of just having a cranberry juice. It's red and looks vicious, and I'd also have a cup of coffee. I'd drink the coffee and let the juice sit.

Ms. Boswell: So there are always ways.

Sen. Greive: It's more important for me to be one of the boys.

We had a funny thing happen to the J & M Café. It's still down there. I went in one time and this is when it was known as Skid Row, and we were campaigning. I took a couple of guys with me, I always did to places like that, and distributed my literature. A guy sitting at a table says, "I don't vote for this son-of-a-bitch, I know him. He's no damn good." I said, "You know him?" "Yes, I know him," he said. So I said, "What does he look like?" He went on and on, and finally I had to get my identification out to show him who I was. By that time a crowd had gathered around, and he says, "It's you, all right. Let's buy a drink. Let me see you drink." I kind of went out the back way.

You see, campaigning to me was always a certain amount of fun. I didn't mind. I was brought up so that if it was a gambling joint or whatever, I'd go down there if I thought a few votes were there.

Skid Road was the only precinct I ever had that I got all the votes. There were only thirty of them or something. It was way below registration, but I got them all.

I can remember campaigning and getting down into Chinatown, and it was eighty-three to five, or something like that. I took the notice of election off the telephone pole and kissed it. That was one of the precincts I wanted to save in redistricting.

It depends how you take it. Is it hard work? It's certainly hard work. Is it fun? It's fun if you look at it right. After all, what good is anything unless you have to put in some effort to get it?

I've always felt that there should be some economics as a basis [to districts] and so forth. In other words, you try to keep city districts together; you try to keep rural districts together. If there are bedroom communities, you try to keep them together. It doesn't mean you always succeed, but it makes better sense. One of the things about a democracy is that it works best when people are represented, not when they are ignored. Just to put them all in a block and say, "That's it" is a little ridiculous.

Senator Bob Greive